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Audiobooks, although largely unexamined, should be perceived as the aural artefacts of 
a distinct artistic genre. It, in turn, should be identified as part of an interdisciplinary 
aesthetic category—one which has not been defined hitherto. 
To classify audiobooks as artworks, I turn to the New Institutional Theory of Art 
(NITA), which currently provides the most effective explanation available to determining 
not only what makes something into an artwork, but also whether or not a particular 
artwork can be deemed beautiful (i.e. aesthetically good). In utilizing NITA, instituting a 
context—a framework governing the artistic praxis of recording written texts and 
delivering them to a designated audience—I consequently create a unique aesthetic 
category. As an artistic institution in its own right, it determines the criteria for 
identifying aural performances as works of art, and, in effect, establishes audiobooks 
among all forms of aural performance.  
In rendering aesthetic evaluation and appreciation crucial aspects to defining 
art, the implied notion of internal logic—while not explicitly expressed—prevails as a 
core concept, inherent to a comprehensive understanding of NITA. In articulating its 
meaning, I suggest its association with the idea of informed intuition, thereby 
introducing them both as pivotal in illuminating the contribution of my expanded 
application of NITA. Effectively, in recognizing that to define art necessitates more than 
mere classification, one is able to employ an institutional analysis on different kinds of 
artistic case studies. 
By surveying three major case studies—all manifesting the first-person narrative 
as a fundamental aesthetic property of audiobooks—the concrete analysis of 
audiobooks as artworks proves essential to my methodology. Ultimately, by 
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ascertaining their aesthetic quality, I propose to identify the manner in which the craft 
of casting aural performances necessarily, albeit unconsciously, consolidates aesthetic 
























A Note to the Reader  
For the convenience of the reader, I have included a copy of all of the audio recordings 
referred to and discussed throughout the thesis. To be sure, as these are of considerable 
importance in examining this study, it is highly recommended that the reader refer to 
and consult with the available material when so mentioned in a footnote. Thus, as a as 
a secondary bibliographical source, these recorded references are enclosed herein in 
the form of media files, saved on an ultra-thin (aka ‘credit card’-sized) USB flash drive. 
For further convenience, the files have been arranged in accordance with the running-
order of their reference in thesis. Effectively, each filename clearly notes both the 
Chapter sub-section and the relevant footnote. 
For extended listening, consideration and evaluation, I have included a separate 
folder containing most of these recordings in their complete form so that one is able to 
engage with the complete work (e.g., a novel or an autobiography), rather than merely 
with the particular passages I refer to. Nonetheless, where a complete recording could 
not be made available, I have provided Internet links to selected online samples. These 
too, in addition to their required citation within the footnotes, have also been supplied 
in the form of direct ‘click-to-open’ files, which are accordingly distributed in running-
order alongside the media files. 
Following my bibliography of textual sources and sound recordings, the reader 
will find my provided ‘audiography’, appropriately listing all the aforementioned files. 
 
Disclaimer  
All and any material included in the enclosed USB flash drive that may be subject to 
copyright law is utilised in this study solely for educational and research purposes.  
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Introduction: ‘And is not that, in a sense, a performance?’1  
In 2006, RTÉ released an eighteen-disc audiobook box set entitled Samuel Beckett: Three 
Novels.2 The novels are immaculately performed by acclaimed Irish actor, Barry 
McGovern. In his contribution to the accompanying booklet, he writes as follows:   
Many myths abound about Samuel Beckett. Some of these have to do 
with the question of performance of his dramatic works, especially the 
transference from one medium to another. […] Adaptations of prose 
works are legion – on stage, TV and radio. […] many of these 
adaptations were authorized by Beckett himself or given his blessing 
– as was my own one-man show I'll Go On, with texts selected from 
Molloy, Malone Dies and The Unnamable by Gerry Dukes and me and 
produced by Dublin's Gate Theatre in 1985. The prose works were 
written to be read, not performed in the conventional sense of the 
word. The early work is written in the third person. But in the great 
middle period of the late 40's and 50's the voice changes to the first 
person: the voice of the four stories or novellas; of Molloy, Malone 
Dies and The Unnamable. It always seemed to me that these prose 
writings cried out to be read aloud. And is not that, in a sense, a 
performance?3      
My short answer to the question posed by McGovern—an answer I am confident 
McGovern himself would agree with—is that it undoubtedly is. Nevertheless, my 
attempt to formulate a more elaborate answer, thereby substantiating my brief 
intuitive response, consequently prevails as one of this study's main objectives. 
To begin with, I would argue that explaining just what it is that makes a mere 
reading aloud constitute a performance does not require an exhaustive articulation of 
what a ‘performance’ actually is.4 Rather, I find that it requires identifying the particular 
                                                 
1 Barry McGovern, "It's a Question of Voices…." in [accompanying booklet to] Samuel Beckett: Three 
Novels. Read by Barry McGovern. (RTÉ, RTE271CD, 2006), 29. 
2 Samuel Beckett, Three Novels, unabridged, read by Barry McGovern. (RTÉ, 2006). 
3 McGovern, "It's a Question of Voices….", 29. 
4 Notwithstanding the various approaches associated with the term, I regard its meaning as a given: a 
performance, in essence, constitutes a kind of human behavior consciously created for a designated 
audience. (Human behavior in itself is predominantly not self-conscious. While behavior may include a 
certain performative aspect, it is more likely to be analyzed using anthropological terms). Fundamentally, 
the purpose of a performance is to manipulate or influence the viewer by drawing attention to the doer. 
In essence, one can only bear witness to behavior as a performance within a particular context. 
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aesthetic context—a discrete set of circumstances—that determine when one can 
regard a reading aloud as a performance to begin with. Accordingly, I would argue that 
the processes of identifying the performative context of a reading aloud can be likened 
to the process of classifying works of art—the latter being essentially concerned with 
identifying just what it is that makes something  into a work of art.5 With cases such as 
McGovern's narration of Beckett's three novels, one is thus required to ascertain under 
what circumstances an aural recording of the reading aloud of a written text would 
qualify as a unique form of performance. Now, since performances can constitute works 
of art in their own right, in order to identify these kinds of recordings as aural 
performances, one would need to assign them a particular prescribed aesthetic 
category. 
An audiobook, for example, can be established as something more than a mere 
aurally recorded version of an existing printed book.6 Indeed, within a particular 
context, audiobooks constitute a certain kind of recorded performance—one which is 
confined to an exclusively aural medium. As an aural artefact, an audiobook possesses 
its own aesthetic properties, and thereby manifests what I will later regard as a unique 
internal logic.7 Overall, the audiobook exists as one of a number of different kinds of 
aural performances. As such, audiobooks represent a discernible artistic genre in its own 
                                                 
5 As will presently be explained, there exists a particular theory in the philosophy of the arts—one which 
appears to articulate the notion of the classification of artworks remarkably well. The first chapter of this 
study examines this theory and its insights. 
6 In recent times, nearly every book published in print is entitled to recording copyrights—and since these 
are principally negotiated separately, many major print publishing houses employ their own individual 
audio division. Audiobooks fundamentally consist of nearly any given literary genre, as well as any work 
that one would regard as non-fiction. The medium of audiobooks is commonly regarded as Spoken 
Word—a phrase that in fact constitutes the particular title one would customarily see in bookshops and 
libraries that include a designated audiobook section.   
7 Now, the notion of internal logic is crucial to this dissertation. So much so, in fact, that the entirety of 
my Chapter 2 is devoted to articulating both its philosophical infrastructure and its practical application 
with regard to aural performances. 
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right—one that in effect belongs to the general aesthetic category used for classifying 
all of the different kinds of aural performances.8 Consequently, as an aural performance, 
an audiobook should therefore constitute a distinct kind of artwork in its own right, and 
thereby possess its own unique aesthetic. However, if one attempts to adopt this 
perspective, one finds oneself faced with two main obstacles: (a) no such general 
aesthetic category actually exists, and (b) audiobooks are neither perceived as 
artefacts—nor are they addressed in aesthetic terms.9 
In point of fact, while they have essentially been in existence since the late 
nineteenth century—with their inception commonly traced to Thomas Edison's tinfoil-
cylinder phonograph recordings—audiobooks remain to this day virtually un-explored, 
but for a small number of exceptions. Matthew Rubery, for instance, has recently 
published The Untold Story of the Talking Book (2016)10—a panoramic study of the 
manners in which spoken word recordings have captured the aural medium over the 
past 150 years, while also highlighting the differences in listeners' reception.11 To be 
                                                 
8 At the same time, audiobooks also prevail as a comparatively recent cultural phenomenon: that is to 
say, their very existence is rooted in a cultural praxis that centers on the act of recording written texts in 
an aural format. Bernard J. Hibbitts, for instance, referencing Tony Schwartz, points out that ‘the history 
of Western culture over the past 125 years suggests that the recent turn towards the aural is largely a 
product of new aural technologies. In essence, cultural aurality has tended to become more pronounced 
as aural technologies have multiplied and spread. At every stage in this process, the existence of these 
technologies has radically extended the power and range of aurally communicated information. As 
technologically transmitted and amplified sound has become able to assume more of the cultural burden, 
culture itself has turned towards sound for inspiration.’ Bernard J. Hibbitts, "Making Sense of Metaphors: 
Visuality, Aurality and the Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse", Cardozo Law Review 16, (1994): 
Part III [3.12], accessed August 31, 2016, http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/22609/1/meta_int.htm. 
9 Customarily, the significance of aesthetics has ostensibly been almost completely ignored. 
Predominantly, this appears to be a result of what one might identify as an inherently political modus 
operandi, given birth to by a distinctively post-modern epoch, whose overt hegemony in present-day 
academic disciplines appears persistent in virtually every theoretical field in the arts and humanities. 
10 Matthew Rubery, The Untold Story of the Talking Book (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 2016). 
11 For Rubery, ‘the history of recorded sound begins in verse’. Ibid., 29. He identifies the inception of the 
audiobook with Edison's 1877 sound-recording technology, and references Edison's own recitation of the 
nursery rhyme Mary Had a Little Lamb—recorded on a sheet of tinfoil—as one of the earliest ever made. 
Ibid., 1. According to Rubery, Edison had the ambition to record an entire Dickens novel on his wax 
cylinder invention. Ibid., 21. He maintains that Edison even conceived of two kinds of potential consumers 
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sure, Rubery's study constitutes one of the only books dedicated to outlining the history 
of the audiobook. One the one hand, Rubery’s study cites a number of recordings that 
he himself identifies as ‘complex works of art worthy of sustained critical attention in 
their own right’.12 On the other hand, as will be made clear from my own endeavour, 
his study does not necessarily focus on what it is precisely that makes these recordings 
‘works of art’ to begin with.13 Notwithstanding, it certainly prevails as a remarkable and 
fascinating study, and to a large extent shares my own passion for its chosen field of 
investigation. 
In addition to Rubery’s effort, there is a small number of works that proved 
essential to my study—especially in respect of their implied consideration of the 
aesthetic nature of the audiobook. For instance, particular attention should be given to 
Helen Roach's Spoken Records (1970)14 whose insights appear to highlight the 
importance of appreciating and evaluating these kinds of recordings.15 Her objectives 
                                                 
for these kinds of recorded material: (a) one who seeks to relax at home after a long day's work, and (b) 
one who is blind, visually impaired or is on the verge of losing his/her sight. Ibid. 37–38. In the same vein, 
Lorna Tracy concludes that Edison was ‘much less concerned with preserving musical performances than 
with capturing the voices of great men for posterity.’ See: Lorna Tracy, "Echoes in a Bottle", In Books at 
Iowa, vol. 8 (Iowa: University of Iowa: 1968), 24, accessed 15 November 2016, 
http://ir.uiowa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1306&context=bai. At the same time, citing John 
Cohen's Human Robots in Myth and Science (1967), Tracy asserts that it was in fact Giovanni Battista Porta 
(1542–1597) whom had conceived of conserving words in sealed leaden tubes long before Edison's men 
had conjured up the possibility of ‘keeping as permanent a record of uttered speech as of words 
committed to print’. Ibid. 
12 Rubery, The Untold Story of the Talking Book, 5.  
13 Rubery’s endeavour in his book is to focus on both the historical and the aesthetic concerns that 
surround the ‘talking book’ phenomenon. By his own admission, ‘three concerns find their way into 
almost every chapter: the audiobook’s standing as a “book”, its reception by a bemused public, and 
controversies over whether listening to books qualifies as a form or reading.’ Ibid., 20.   
14 Helen Roach, Spoken Records, 3rd ed. (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1970). 
15 In her introduction, for example, Roach points out that ‘Educators and students are aware of records 
as valuable oral complements to the study of drama poetry. Parents are familiar with records as a source 
of entertainment. But there are all kinds of records available today which would interest many adults if 
they knew about them. […] As surprising as some of the inclusions in the repertory of spoken recordings 
that are now available are some of the omissions. One cannot come to this territory expecting to find 
what he wants, as is the case for music. […] Perhaps not surprising in a pioneering field is the fact that 
many records have not been well done. New listeners have been turned away by poor recordings before 
hearing others which make for rewarding listening. Some records are indeed works of art. […] There are 
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include ‘to call attention to worthwhile achievement in this little known world and to 
indicate much that is well done which might otherwise be missed’.16 Similarly 
noteworthy are Susan G. Baird's Audiobook Collections & Services (2000)17 and Joyce G. 
Saricks' Audiobooks: Reading Lists for Every Taste (2011).18 Additionally, the perceptive 
essays compiled in Rubery's Audiobooks, Literature, and Sound Studies (2011)19—one of 
the single most substantial publications in recent years with regard to the medium of 
the audiobook—appear to demonstrate that the status of the audiobook is not only a 
legitimate but also a fascinating subject for research.20 Indeed, these essays underline 
the fact that as a field of research, the audiobook has never been properly explored.21 
Now, in my endeavour to apply aesthetic terms to the audiobook—i.e. to classify 
it as a unique kind of aural performance—I commence my study with the exploration of 
a particular theory concerning the philosophy of arts. As Chapter 1 will show, David 
Graves’s New Institutional Theory of Art (NITA)22 prevails as the most updated version 
                                                 
basic elements present on any good recording. [...] A frequent case of poor recordings has been failure to 
adapt to the new medium. Even actors with considerable stage experience have not always made the 
adjustment.’ Roach, Spoken Records, 9–10. 
16 Ibid., 14. 
17 Susan G. Baird, Audiobook Collections & Services (Fort Atkinson, Wisconsin: Highsmith Press, 2000).  
18 Joyce G. Saricks, Reading On … Audiobooks: Reading Lists for Every Taste, in Read On Series, ed. Barry 
Trott (Santa Barbara, California: Libraries Unlimited, 2011). 
19 Matthew Rubery, Audiobooks, Literature, and Sound Studies (New York: Routledge, 2011).   
20 Wittkower's essay, for example, is predominantly concerned with questions such as ‘What is it like to 
listen to an audiobook?’ or ‘What are we listening to when we listen to an audiobook?’ See D. E. 
Wittkower, "A Preliminary Phenomenology of the Audiobook", in Audiobooks, Literature, and Sound 
Studies, ed. Matthew Rubery (New York: Routledge, 2011), 216. I would argue that whereas the former 
idea alludes to some kind of aesthetic experience, the latter suggests—or rather, supports—what I 
contend is a necessity for some kind of an aesthetic category. At the very least, one should identify the 
need to establish some kind of context for defining what audiobooks actually are. Consequently, my 
proposed new aesthetic category should appropriately answer such queries.      
21 With regard to literature that has alluded to the status of the audiobook, also noteworthy is Virgil L. P. 
Blake and Renee Tjoumas's (eds.) Information Literacies for the Twenty-First Century (1990). Blake's 
chapter, "Something New Has Been Added: Aural Literacy and Libraries", is particularly interesting as its 
exploration of the manner in which audiobooks influenced the policy and mission of libraries provides 
important information and insights in respect of their evolution as a concrete genre. See 
https://archive.org/details/SomethingNewHasBeenAdded, accessed November 12, 2015. 
22 David Graves, The New Institutional Theory of Art (Champaign, IL: Common Ground Publishing, 2010). 
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of a theory whose theoretical infrastructure dates back to the mid-1960s. In brief, NITA 
offers four basic ‘rule-schemes’ for classifying what an artwork is and at the same time 
conveys a great deal of insight in respect of what makes an artwork aesthetically good.23 
My premise is that a proper theoretical application of this theory and particularly of its 
four rule-schemes can be utilized to literally create new aesthetic categories for 
different artistic media. As I will show, NITA articulates the particular context—i.e. the 
necessary circumstances—that define when something can be identified as a work of 
art. Effectively, I find that applying its rule-schemes to the field of aural recordings 
should likewise assist one in ascertaining when, whether or not and to what extent such 
recordings can be defined as aural performance. Indeed, as there appears to exist a 
remarkable variety of aural recordings that could—perhaps even should—be regarded 
as aural performances, the creation of a unique aesthetic category for them becomes 
imperative. 
Correspondingly, in Chapter 3 I will demonstrate my application of NITA and 
explain the manner in which my proposed new category—which I have named Audio 
Performance (AP)—constitutes a distinct artistic institution in its own right, which in 
effect institutes (i.e. quite literally creates and determines) a particular kind of artistic 
praxis. As I endeavour to substantiate, once one closely follows the structure of NITA, 
applying a comprehensive understanding of the aforementioned notion of internal 
logic, the institution of AP can be utilised not only to classify its aural artefacts (i.e. its 
                                                 
23 Chapter 1 is dedicated to the understanding of NITA—beginning with theoretical infrastructure, its 
original versions (dating back to the 1970s) which focused solely on classification, and its contribution to 
the field with regard to artistic evaluation. 
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artistic products) as ‘AP artworks’, but also to appreciate their aesthetic quality.24 
Consequently, when one engages with AP artworks, one should not only be able to 
ascertain what gives an AP artwork its artistic identity, but should also be able to 
evaluate whether or not a particular artwork is aesthetically good. 
Now, although my chosen case studies for extended analyses are predominantly 
comprised of audiobooks, it is important to emphasize that they do not constitute the 
only kind of aural performance that complies with my proposed aesthetic category. 
Rather, they prevail as only one of its principal and standard aesthetic manifestations. 
Put simply, AP artworks include more than just audiobooks. Indeed, their most 
prominent counterparts are radio plays—which already constitute a distinct genre in 
their own right.25 Nevertheless, it must emphasized that while I may briefly address or 
reference certain radio works—explicitly, by way of illustrating the occasional 
argument—my intention is not to comprehensively scrutinize their dramaturgical 
complexities or analyse their artistry in respect of the medium itself.26 Effectively, in 
focusing primarily on the realm of audiobooks, my intention is to demonstrate the 
manner in which they constitute an example of what an AP artwork is—and why they 
should thereby be analysed and evaluated as such. At the same time, it must also be 
                                                 
24 Put simply, my intention was to follow the distinction that NITA offers between art and not-art, good 
art and bad art—and apply it to aural recordings of written text, effectively distinguishing between AP 
artworks and not-AP artworks, aesthetically good AP artworks and aesthetically bad.  
25 In a broad sense, the field of radio drama can be perceived as a distinct form of dramatic performance—
one that is delivered to an audience via broadcast on the aural medium of radio. A radio play could consist 
of either (a) a text that was written specifically and purposefully for a designated medium, or (b) an 
adapted work, a radio dramatization, of an existing work (i.e. either a literary work or a dramatic work 
that was originally intended for the stage). The former, designed with full intention to comply with the 
properties of the medium; the latter, a pre-existing text which undergoes some process of translation so 
that it becomes properly suited for on-air broadcasting. In both cases, an audience experiences the 
performance through their ‘mind's ear’. Indeed, their very nature as dramatic texts, performed in the 
confines of an aural medium, is predominantly what makes them comply with the workings of the 
institution. This too will become clear in Chapter 3.  
26 To be sure, as a widely acknowledged genre in the prominent discipline of media studies, the field of 
radio drama has already been researched quite extensively. 
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underlined that my intention is not to survey the entire range of existing audiobooks. 
Rather, in order to best articulate the aesthetics of the audiobook, my resolution was to 
draw from literary examples that highlight the form of the first-person narrative. 
My major case studies will demonstrate an ascending degree of complication. 
Beginning with a concrete analysis of a number of different aural versions of Mark 
Twain's Adventures of Huckleberry Finn (1884)—a nineteenth-century novel, whose 
narrator happens to be an adolescent boy—I will subsequently explore more obviously 
unconventional works. I will examine the audiobook versions of Samuel Beckett's 
Molloy (1955), a complex literary achievement, which questions the very concept of 
authorship, identity, and the self; and, finally, I will examine the nature of Barry 
Humphries’s pseudo-autobiographical novels, published as the legitimate 
autobiographies of his own characters—who, in turn, are credited as their authors. In 
this respect, the varying degrees of complexity do not necessarily pertain to the literary 
nature of these works, but rather to their aesthetic qualities as AP case studies. In brief, 
the audiobook versions of Humphries’s pseudo-autobiographical novels, as performed 
by Humphries—in character—all fundamentally prevail as individual autobiographies, 
each effectively performed by its own assumed personage. To one degree or another, 
these works in their original printed form appear to test the boundaries of the 
autobiography. At the very least, they all challenge the concept of the first-person 
narrative—and more explicitly, the first-person narrator. Consequently, in taking the 
form of an aurally performed version of the written text, and in their utilising literal and 
concrete human voices, audiobooks possess the ability to enhance one's aesthetic 
experience of these kinds of narratives in particular. Evaluating these recordings as key 
examples of what AP artworks are can effectively lead to new discoveries in respect of 
xvii 
 
both performance studies and aesthetic appreciation—particularly once having 
established the relation to and expanded application of NITA as an intrinsic point of 
reference.27 
Summarily, the direct speech and storytelling of Twain's first-person narrator 
(i.e. the character of the adolescent Huck) is arguably filtered through the author's own 
embedded irony—thereby evoking questions pertaining to the very nature of 
autobiographies and the identity of their protagonists. By the same token, the 
fragmented speech of Beckett's first-person narrator—who appears to be split not only 
within the so-called confines of one particularly labyrinthine novel (i.e. in the form of 
the characters of Molloy and Moran), but also across an entire trilogy—invites questions 
pertaining to the nature of narration and the embedded voice of author. With 
Humphries, one appears to be confronted with a surreal style of pseudo-
autobiographical writing. The manner in which it is aesthetically experienced by his 
audience is enhanced by Humphries’s subsequent aural performances of the 
autobiographies, in character, as the authors themselves. Effectively, as AP artworks, 
his audiobooks appear to ostensibly infiltrate an even deeper level of philosophical 
questioning than the already profound contemplations that are evoked by the 
audiobook version of Beckett's prose. As I will show, Humphries appears to be literally 
working on the edge—leaving one unable to ascertain whether the performed work can 
be identified as a novel, an autobiographical narrative, or fictional autobiography that 
is embedded with actual biographical elements. As my conclusions will reveal, one such 
discovery appears to be quite illuminating in respect of the craft of casting these kinds 
                                                 
27 That fact that one may be inclined to quibble with certain subsections of this study—explicitly those 
pertaining to manners of interpretation and appreciation—appears to demonstrate the extent to which 
one is able to utilize NITA to ostensibly elasticise the articulation of institutional categories.   
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of aural performances.28 Fundamentally, I consider the manner in which what I will 
identify in this study as implicit to the craft of casting—namely, informed intuition—
corresponds with what is predominantly the manner in which one aesthetically 
evaluates artworks. 
Having literally constructed a new aesthetic category, my intention is also to 
identify and illustrate additional pertinent kinds of AP artworks. In other words, my 
objective is to demonstrate what other kinds of aural recordings—which are neither 
audiobooks nor radio play—can be said to comply with the institution of AP. While these 
would arguably be more easily categorised as borderline, uncommon or special case 
studies, I find it more appropriate to consider them in terms of institutional categories—
explicitly, by identifying the ‘sub-institution’ that prevails within the general ‘mother-
institution’. As will be made clear, audiobooks and radio plays—in constituting the chief 
manifestations of AP artworks—are themselves, in fact, two individual ‘sub-
(institutional)-categories’ that belong to the general mother-institution of AP.  
To be sure, the identification of the additional manifestations of AP highlights 
why I contend that there exists an inherent need for creating the category to begin with. 
Indeed, I find essential for the overall argument of this thesis to demonstrate the 
manner in which what can be identified as institutional rules manifest in practice. I thus 
intend to utilize different examples, demonstrating the extent to which one is able to 
determine what does and what does not count as an AP artwork. 
 
                                                 
28 As Rubery correctly points out, ‘Casting is the single most important decision made by an audiobook 
publisher. It is a truism that narrators can make or break a story.’ Rubery, The Untold Story of the Talking 
Book, 5.   
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1. Danto, Dickie, Graves: An Introduction to the New Institutional Theory of Art 
 
1.1 Identifying the Work of Art: Arthur Danto and the Notion of the Artworld 
In 1964, during what could be regarded as the ‘anything goes’ epoch of the 1960s, 
philosopher and art critic Arthur C. Danto entered the Stable Gallery in Manhattan, and 
encountered Andy Warhol’s Brillo Box for the first time. Confronted with Warhol’s 
plywood replica of the actual packaging of a Brillo Pad detergent product,29 the young 
Danto found himself unable to detect any discernible difference between the two. 
Effectively, he could not explicitly identify just what it was that made it possible to 
regard Warhol’s Brillo Box as a legitimate ‘work of art’ at all. Intrigued, Danto—who had 
become one of the most influential figures in philosophical aesthetics—endeavoured to 
decipher how these two objects, while possessing the exact same aesthetic properties, 
could be defined separately, in two completely different ways. Danto recounts: 
The problem, as I saw—and still see it—arose for me initially with 
Warhol and his Brillo Box, which was perceptually so like the workaday 
shipping cartons in which Brillo was transported from factory to 
warehouse to supermarket that the question of distinguishing them 
became acute—and this I took to be the question of distinguishing art 
from reality. I mean: distinguish them not epistemologically but rather 
ontologically—sooner or later one would discover that one was made 
of plywood the other not. The question was whether the difference 
between art and reality could consist in such discoverable differences. 
I thought not, but from the beginning my strategy was to find how 
there could be differences that were not perceptual differences. My 
thought was that there had to be a theory of art that could explain the 
difference. A handful of philosophers were on this track in the sixties.30  
                                                 
29 Brillo Pads, patented in 1913, were widely available at the time.  
30 Arthur Danto, What Art Is (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 144–45.  
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At a time when ‘anything went’, experiments and exploration of the boundaries of 
fashion, art and behaviour were taking place. What can be identified as an obsession of 
sorts gave rise to works that address their own nature, becoming almost routinely self-
referential, thereby making the medium itself the subject of the artwork.31 Indeed, the 
‘anything goes’ attitude, alongside the modernist notion of creating art for art’s sake,32 
evolved out of specific developments in the history of art, coupled with a changing 
understanding of the role of aesthetics and of the field of philosophy of the arts.33 
Consequently, to take on the problem of what made something into a work of art, Danto 
assumed a deconstructionist approach. For Danto, deconstruction ‘is taken to be a 
method for demonstrating the way in which society has advanced and reinforced the 
interests of special groups’.34 His premise was that whatever it was, it would need to be 
                                                 
31 According to Jerry A. Fodor, Warhol’s Brillo Box signalled for Danto an embodiment of art converging 
with its own philosophy, and served as evidence to the existence of ‘works of art that are about what 
works of art are’ [emphasis in original]. Jerry A. Fodor, "Déjà vu All Over Again: How Danto’s Aesthetics 
Recapitulates the Philosophy of Mind", in Danto and His Critics, ed. Mark Rollins (Chichester, UK: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2012), 55–56.  
32 Originally coined in the early nineteenth century, and particularly associated with the movement of 
Aestheticism, this slogan—translated from the French phrase l’art pour l’art—expresses the belief that 
art needs no justification external to the work of art itself. Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, s.v. "Art for 
art’s sake", accessed November 17, 2015, https://www.britannica.com/topic/art-for-arts-sake. According 
to Gene H. Bell-Villada, ‘The phrase today […] inevitably suggests Oscar Wilde and the epigrams he gave 
common currency in his preface to The Picture of Dorian Gray. […] however, [...] the idea neither begins 
nor ends with Wilde, […] Art for Art’s Sake, after all, is an ideology; and like all ideologies it has a 
defendable setting and a history. […] Aestheticism, in sum, is a theory with no major, vital resonances or 
academic standing outside Western (and Westernized) societies.’ Gene H. Bell-Villada, Art for Art’s Sake 
and Literary Life: How Politics and Markets Helped Shape the Ideology and Culture of Aestheticism, 1790–
1990 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 1–3. 
33 A distinction should be made between the philosophy of the arts and the study of aesthetics. Indeed, 
a line can be drawn between an artistic judgement and a general aesthetic one. For example, one can 
evaluate and appreciate something (aesthetic judgement) that is not a work of art. For a good analysis of 
this distinction, see Noël Carroll, Philosophy of Art: A Contemporary Introduction (London: Routledge, 
1999), 156–59.  
34 Danto, What Art Is, 138. Danto explains that ‘philosophy has been almost immune to the impact of 
what, since the 1970s, has been called Theory—a body of largely deconstructionist strategies that has 
inflected nearly every other branch of the humanities—anthropology, archeology, literature, art history, 
film studies, and the like—all of which have been refracted through the prisms of attitudes that were 
scarcely visible before the 1960s and have since flowered into academic disciplines with canons and 
curricula of their own […] driven by various activistic agendas, which in the case of art scholarship, 
criticism, and practice, have endeavored to alter social attitudes, purging them of prejudices and perhaps 
injustices toward this or that group’. Ibid., 137–38. 
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indispensable to any given artwork. Thus, he began by searching for an explanation to 
the nature of the question itself, manifest in the quandary posed by Warhol’s Brillo 
Box.35 
The prevailing attitude of the time, as David Graves explains, was that an object 
was considered to have intrinsic qualities that rendered it an artwork:    
In one way or another, we usually thought that some exhibited 
property or set of properties of the object was responsible for its being 
considered art. It is still commonly held that some visible, or audible, 
or somehow sensible quality of the object in question, be it a painting, 
a song or a poem, was the "art-making" feature. We normally call such 
features "aesthetic properties", and we commonly believe them to be 
responsible for the qualities that make an artefact a work of art. In the 
case of "Brillo Box", however, the piece exhibited no property that was 
significantly different from the non-artistic supermarket Brillo boxes. 
They all looked the same, and if one were shown a photograph of such 
a box, one would find it quite impossible to tell whether it was 
Warhol’s artwork or supermarket stock. This is to say that the artwork 
"Brillo Box" and the supermarket Brillo box bore identical aesthetic 
properties.36 
Danto, however, soon came to the conclusion that that which defines art had in fact 
nothing to do with either the object in question or with any of that object’s so-called 
properties (i.e. its aesthetic features). Danto’s response to his initial encounter with 
Warhol’s Brillo Box took the form of an essay entitled "The Artworld", which became 
one of the prominent influences on the formulation of the New Institutional Theory of 
Art (NITA)—the theory I will later utilise for the purpose of my study. In this essay, Danto 
                                                 
35 Fodor illustrates Danto’s frame of thinking by utilizing an example from Ludwig Wittgenstein: 
‘Wittgenstein famously asked: What more than my arm’s rising is there to my raising my arm? […] In 
effect, Wittgenstein imagines twin events both of which are instances of my arm going up and which are 
identical 'to all appearances.' […] Wittgenstein asks what it could be that makes one but not the other 
event an instance of my raising my arm. In similar spirit […] Danto imagines two objects, indistinguishable 
to all appearances, one of which is an artwork and the other of which is a 'mere thing.' What, Danto asks, 
could make this difference?’ Fodor, "Déjà vu All Over Again", 55. 
36 Graves, The New Institutional Theory of Art, 10–14. 
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argues that aesthetic features do not define art, and that which does define art must be 
found elsewhere. Introducing the concept of an ‘Artworld’, he explains that ‘to see 
something as art requires something the eye cannot descry—an atmosphere of artistic 
theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an artworld’.37 In effect, Danto pointed out 
that looking at the problem in terms of aesthetic features was a category error. He thus 
shifted the boundaries of the category in order to shed light on the concept. Stephen 
Davies explains Danto’s ‘atmosphere’ notion in terms of a ‘historical and social 
context’—one which is ‘generated by the changing practices and conventions of art, the 
heritage of works, the intentions of the artist, the writing of critics and so forth’.38 In so 
doing, Davies concludes, ‘Danto’s discussion of the Artworld shifted attention from the 
artistically relevant properties of artworks to the social context without which they 
could not take on and present such properties’.39 The ‘context’ effectively establishes 
that which makes one able to identify and comprehend a particular object as a work of 
art. As a set of given circumstances, the context both surrounds the Artworld, and, at 
the same time, inhabits it. Appropriately, that which bestows on a particular object its 
identity as an artwork cannot be found in that object’s exhibited properties, but rather 
in the given context of its place in the Artworld. 
Danto’s view is in direct contrast with that of the American aesthetician Morris 
Weitz, who maintained that it is simply not possible to speak about the essence of art.40 
                                                 
37 Arthur Danto, "The Artworld", Journal of Philosophy 61, no. 19 (1964): 580. In his essay, Danto employs 
two spellings: namely, ‘artworld’ and ‘Artworld’. In this study, I have chosen the latter—particularly as 
this is also the form used by Graves in his book. (As stated, my intention is ultimately to articulate the 
workings of NITA). 
38 Stephen Davies, Definitions of Art (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 81. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Morris Weitz, "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics", Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 15, no. 1 
(September 1956): 27–35. 
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A definition is, by definition, a closed concept. To define art effectively renders it a 
closed concept. As far as Weitz was concerned, however, art lacks the necessary and 
sufficient conditions that are required to define what it is. Thus, since it cannot be 
properly defined, Weitz maintained that art constitutes an open concept.41 Citing 
Wittgenstein’s application of logical categories for the purpose of examining and 
understanding games, Weitz maintains that one should consider and examine works of 
art in terms of similarities and relationships.42 Drawing on Wittgenstein’s advice to 
simply ‘look and see’, Weitz explains that while one might be able to identify a 
conceivable constant in a variety of similar games, one would nevertheless be unable to 
identify any one thing that is true about all games. He explicitly utilises the philosophical 
notion of ‘family resemblance’ to elucidate the need to find some kind of ‘common trait’ 
with which one can begin to construct any general definition.43 Furthermore, he 
suggests that every time one encounters a new artwork, one can potentially adjust or 
altogether alter one’s perception or understanding of the concept of art itself. 
Consequently, if it is impossible to define or understand what art actually is—as 
art has no known set of ‘properties’—Weitz finds it redundant to formulate definitions 
                                                 
41 As Boardman explains, ‘A concept is open if its “conditions of application are emendable and corrigible.” 
Specifically, when presented with a candidate x for inclusion in the set of objects α that fall under concept 
A, a decision must be made to either (i) apply existing criteria for inclusion in α to x or (ii) alter those 
criteria so as to insure x’s inclusion in α. (i) is a process of discovery, (ii) is a process of creation. […] Though 
there is not much vocal support these days for Weitz’s argument, it is commonly thought that it 
successfully rules out those theories that do not have some mechanism for accounting for art’s openness.’ 
Frank Boardman, "Weitz’s Legacy", American Society for Aesthetics Graduate E-Journal 7, no 1 (January 
2015): 1. 
42 Weitz, "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics", 30–31.  
43 The idea of family resemblances implies that in addition to what a particular family manifests as 
similarities in respect of exhibited properties, such as visual similarities, they also possess non-exhibited 
properties, such as a shared DNA. With art, according to Weitz, there ‘are no necessary and sufficient 
properties, only “a complicated network of similarities overlapping and crisscrossing,” such that we can 
say of games that they form a family with family resemblances and no common trait’. Ibid., 31.  
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or theories of aesthetic practice at all.44 Nonetheless, in 1965, American philosopher 
Maurice Mandelbaum responded directly to Weitz’s essay and to the theoretical ‘dead 
end’ it implies.45 Mandelbaum argues that Weitz leaves one with nothing but an 
artwork’s exhibited properties, namely its surface qualities, which are both aesthetic 
and stylised. Yet, while similarly referring to family resemblances, Mandelbaum 
maintains that one’s attention should in fact be directed at an artwork’s non-exhibited 
properties—for it is through them that one can begin to form a general definition of 
what art is or what it should be. Contrary to Weitz, Mandelbaum believes that forming 
a theory about art is indeed possible. Similarly to Danto, Mandelbaum argues that such 
a theory or definition has nothing to do with a particular artwork’s aesthetic features. 
Although Danto reached the same conclusion a year earlier (following his encounter 
with Warhol’s Brillo Box), and while Mandelbaum may not allude to Danto or reference 
him directly, I would argue that his essay offers a complementary perspective to Danto’s 
conception of the Artworld. 
The concrete existence of Danto’s Artworld not only proposes an appropriate 
explanation for why Warhol’s Brillo Box was indeed an artwork, but it also proves 
                                                 
44 According to Weitz, despite ‘the many theories, we seem no nearer our goal today than we were in 
Plato’s time. Each age, each art-movement, each philosophy of art, tries over and over again to establish 
the stated ideal only to be succeeded by a new or revised theory, rooted, at least in part, in the 
repudiation of preceding ones. […] theory—in the requisite classical sense—is never forthcoming in 
aesthetics […] we would do much better as philosophers to supplant the question, 'What is the nature of 
art?,' by other questions, the answers to which will provide us with all the understanding of the arts there 
can be. […] Aesthetic theory—all of it—is wrong in principle in thinking that a correct theory is possible 
because it radically misconstrues the logic of the concept of art. Its main contention […] is false. Its 
attempt to discover the necessary and sufficient properties of art is logically misbegotten for the very 
simple reason that such a set […] such a formula […] is never forthcoming. Art, as the logic of the concept 
shows, has no set of necessary and sufficient properties; hence a theory of it is logically impossible and 
not merely factually difficult. Aesthetic theory tries to define what cannot be defined in its requisite 
sense.’ Ibid., 27–28.  
45 Maurice Mandelbaum, "Family Resemblances and Generalization Concerning the Arts", American 
Philosophical Quarterly 2, no. 3 (July 1965): 219–28. 
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sufficient in solving a similar ostensible conundrum—one that had in fact surfaced 
almost fifty years earlier, when Marcel Duchamp famously submitted a urinal to the 
1917 exhibition of the Society of Independent Artists. Duchamp’s work, titled Fountain 
and signed ‘R. Mutt 1917’, is to this day considered one of the most infamous, 
scandalous and groundbreaking works of art in recorded history. Amid what proved to 
be the first great period of self-referentiality in twentieth-century art, Duchamp’s very 
conception of such an artwork, to say nothing of actually submitting it for display, could 
be construed as pure provocation. As such, the urinal itself (i.e. the object) cannot, 
perhaps even should not, be regarded as art. Even in recent times, one hundred years 
later, to take such a common (and arguably offensive) artefact, and then, as Graves puts 
it, ‘present it to finely cultured persons in the high temple of civilization, the art gallery’, 
was not only unheard of but also, ‘simply going too far’.46 Nevertheless, to the surprise 
of almost everyone involved—and, conceivably, primarily to the surprise of Duchamp 
himself—Fountain was consequently accepted as a legitimate work of art. As Graves 
explains,  
It is reasonable to think that Duchamp did not intend for the urinal to 
be regarded as a “serious” work of art. It is quite reasonable to think 
that Duchamp did this as a shocking, therefore meaningful, gesture, 
so as to make some point about the state of the contemporary 
Artworld. To this day, some think that he did it as some sort of joke. 
[…] ‘Fountain’ did not become a serious work of art in the sense of a 
deep and engaging work, but it did become historically important, and 
very important at that.47  
As far as Danto was concerned, the important thing was Duchamp’s ‘philosophical 
discovery’, namely that there was—or rather, that there could, if not should be—such a 
                                                 
46 Graves, The New Institutional Theory of Art, 12. 
47 Ibid., 13–14. 
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thing as art, and that one was in fact able to define it. It was clear to him ‘that it required 
some special effort to identify works of art with the null degree of aesthetic interest’.48 
For Danto, the fact that art ‘had no aesthetic distinction to speak of, at a time when it 
was widely believed that aesthetic delectation was what art was all about,’ was what 
gave merit to Duchamp’s approach to readymades.49 As Danto concluded,   
What in the end makes the difference between a Brillo box and a work 
of art consisting of a Brillo Box is a certain theory of art. It is the theory 
that takes it up into the world of art, and keeps it from collapsing into 
the real object which it is (in a sense of is other than that of artistic 
identification). Of course, without the theory, one is unlikely to see it 
as art, and in order to see it as part of the artworld, one must have 
mastered a good deal of artistic theory as well as a considerable 
amount of the history of recent New York painting. It could not have 
been art fifty years ago. […] The world has to be ready for certain 
things, the artworld no less than the real one. It is the role of artistic 
theories, these days as always, to make the artworld, and art, 
possible.50 
Just as Warhol’s Brillo Box was perceptually identical to the commercially available 
boxes containing the Brillo detergent product, Duchamp’s Fountain was literally 
indistinguishable from any other urinal produced by the J. L. Mott Iron Works. 
Ultimately, the very existence of these kinds of artworks effectively entailed (a) that art 
and aesthetics do not necessarily go hand in hand, and (b) that one should be able to 
define the necessary and sufficient conditions that enable works of art to be just that.51 
Danto considers his 1964 essay an ‘immediate philosophical response’ to his 
encounter with Brillo Box. He perceives his effort more as an attempt to figure out not 
                                                 
48 Danto, What Art Is, 144. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Danto, "The Artworld", 581. 
51 Danto, What Art Is, 143–44. In the same vein, if, as Mandelbaum suggests, the aesthetic is essentially 
perceptual, it could explain why the essence of an artwork should not be a subject of interest. Indeed, it 
would clearly illustrate his conjecture that the aesthetic aspect of an artwork is simply irrelevant.  
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only the given circumstances enabling one to see Warhol’s work as an artwork but also 
to understand why indeed it should be perceived as such—rather than what precisely it 
was that made it a work of art.52 Noël Carroll’s summary of Danto’s account of his own 
theory—a summary ‘endorsed by Danto himself’53—seems to successfully recapitulate 
and highlight the theory’s main points.54 According to Robert J. Yanal, Danto reflects on 
art in terms of ‘artrelevant predicates’, which are unique and essential specifically in 
respect to their role in defining artworks. He argues that no matter how many of them 
one might consider to be the defining predicates of artworks, ultimately it is the artists 
who possess both the opportunity and power to suggest, determine and substantiate 
additional ones as relevant factors in the definition of artworks.55 It is thus inferred that 
any object to which one would be able to apply a so-called ‘new’ predicate, could in 
effect be distinguished as a work of art in its own right as it will comply with the general 
definition. Consequently, Yanal argues that Danto’s theory fails to explain why or how 
one's mere decision has the power to render one predicate more relevant than any 
other.56 Nonetheless, although Danto’s essay indeed does not address this explicitly, I 
would argue that Yanal seems to be focused on the wrong point. Just as something does 
                                                 
52 Arthur C. Danto, Beyond the Brillo Box: The Visual Arts in Post-Historical Perspective (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1992), 37. 
53 Diarmuid Costello, "Danto and Kant: Together at Last?", in Danto and His Critics, ed. Mark Rollins 
(Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 159. 
54 Slightly paraphrasing Carroll, for something to count as artwork, it would first and foremost have to be 
‘about something’ or have a particular subject. Its subject, in turn, would project some kind of notion or 
attitude, or would possess some particular ‘style’. The subject should project its style ‘by means of 
rhetorical ellipsis.’ The audience, in turn, as they engage with an artwork, are required to interpret and 
understand it—effectively identifying some kind of an ‘art-historical context’. Noël Carroll, "Essence, 
Expression, and History: Arthur Danto’s Philosophy of Art", in Danto and His Critics, ed. Mark Rollins 
(Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 138. 
55 Robert J. Yanal, "The Institutional Theory of Art", in The Encyclopedia of Aesthetics, ed. Michael Kelly 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 1–2, accessed November 17, 2015, 
http://www.publications.bobyanal.com/Robert_Yanal_Publications/Later_Articles_files/InstitutionalThe
ory.pdf. 
56 Ibid., 1. 
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not become a work of art merely because one ‘says so’, it is surely not merely a matter 
of one’s decision that renders ‘predicate (a)’ more relevant than ‘predicate (b)’. Yanal’s 
criticism can be addressed by examining the given circumstances enabled by Danto’s 
conception of the Artworld’s ‘atmosphere’—as it is precisely that atmosphere which 
enables one to accept a certain predicate’s relevancy. As Stephen Snyder points out, 
Danto’s theory made it possible to form the distinction between ‘art’ and ‘non-art’. In 
effect, he argues, the theory’s strength resides in its ability to explain the artistic 
products that one encounters in a post-modern era, or what one would customarily 
regard as ‘conceptual art’.57 For Snyder, one of the engaging things about Danto’s theory 
is that it successfully ‘weaves philosophy, art history and art criticism together, merging 
his aesthetic philosophy with his extensive knowledge of the world of art.’58 
Over the years, Danto’s view has changed to some degree. Whereas in the past 
he had argued that ‘if the indiscernible objects—Brillo Box and the Brillo cartons—were 
perceptually alike, they must be aesthetically alike as well’,59 he later no longer found 
this correlation to be accurate. Drawing on the German philosopher Hegel,60 Danto 
found that the very idea that there actually exists such a ‘thing’ (i.e. the Artworld) that 
quite literally makes something (i.e. a particular object) into something else (i.e. an 
                                                 
57 Stephen Snyder, "Arthur Danto’s Andy Warhol: The Embodiment of Theory in Art and the Pragmatic 
Turn", Leitmotiv - Topics in Aesthetics and in Philosophy of Art (2010): 135, accessed October 17, 2016, 
http://www.ledonline.it/leitmotiv/Allegati/Leitmotiv-2010-0-Snyder.pdf.  
58 Ibid. 
59 Danto, What Art Is, 147. 
60 Explicitly referring to Hegel’s distinction between two kinds of ‘spirit’—namely, one that is objective 
and one that is absolute—Danto explains: ‘Objective spirit consists of all those things and practices in 
which we find the mind of a culture made objective […] all that falls under les sciences humaines [sic], or 
what Hegel’s followers called Geisteswissenschafften. Absolute spirit is about us, whose spirit is merely 
present in the things that make up our objective spirit. Harvey’s boxes belong to the objective spirit of 
the USA circa 1960. So, in a way, do Warhol’s boxes. But Warhol’s boxes, being about objective spirit, are 
absolute: they bring objective spirit to consciousness of itself. Self-consciousness is the great attribute of 
absolute Spirit, of which, Hegel felt, fine art, philosophy, and religion are the chief and perhaps the only 
moments.’ Ibid., 149. 
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artwork) appears to pose a major philosophical question—predominantly concerning 
one’s need to define art, and/or the possible futility thereof.61 Indeed, having 
considered alternate philosophical approaches, Danto realised, for instance, that the 
fact that the original Brillo cartons were devised and designed by an artist is not 
inconsequential. Rather, it was quite a meaningful fact—especially as it is that artist, 
James Harvey, commissioned by Brillo, who bestowed the commercial product with a 
certain kind of aesthetics—which otherwise would not have appeared in Warhol’s work 
of art. At the same time, Danto questioned whether or not that aesthetics is in fact an 
inherent aspect of Warhol’s work. In his own words: 
I don’t know what aesthetic properties if any belong to Warhol’s Brillo 
Box itself. While the term itself did not exist in 1964, it was 
nevertheless a piece of Conceptual art. It was also a piece of 
Appropriation art, though this term was not to come into existence 
until the 1980s. Warhol’s box was a piece of Pop Art, so called because 
it was about the images of popular culture. Harvey’s box was part of 
popular culture, but it was not a piece of Pop Art because it was not 
about popular culture at all. Harvey created a design that obviously 
appealed to popular sensibilities. Warhol brought those sensibilities 
to consciousness.62 
                                                 
61 Danto rejects notions proclaiming (a) that any attempt to define art is pointless, (b) that there is in fact 
no actual need to define art, and (c) that defining art goes against everything that art stands for, and 
therefore it should not be attempted in the first place. In his own words, ‘It is, of course, indispensable in 
socratic discussions that all participants be masters of the concept up for analysis, since the aim is to 
match a real defining expression to a term in active use, and the test for adequacy presumably consists 
in showing that the former analyzes and applies to all and only those things of which the latter is true. […] 
a theory of art, regarded here as a real definition of 'Art', is accordingly not to be of great use in helping 
men to recognize instances of its application. Their antecedent ability to do this is precisely what the 
adequacy of the theory is to be tested against, the problem being only to make explicit what they already 
know. It is our use of the term that the theory allegedly means to capture, but we are supposed able […] 
'to separate those objects which are works of art from those which are not […] to use the word "art" and 
to apply the phrase "work of art".' Theories, on this account, are somewhat like mirror-images on 
Socrates' account, showing forth what we already know, wordy reflections of the actual linguistic practice 
we are masters in. But telling artworks from other things is not so simple a matter, even for native 
speakers, and these days one might not be aware he was on artistic terrain without an artistic theory to 
tell him so.’ [emphasis in original]. Danto, "The Artworld", 571–72.  
62 Danto, What Art Is, 148. 
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Danto’s insights and contributions remain quite considerable. Predominantly, he seems 
to have put an end to all previously existing aesthetic definitions of art. Consequently, 
however, it was the fact that Danto shifted his attention to other aspects in the Artworld 
that prepared the ground for George Dickie’s account of art as a cultural institution.63 I 
will soon demonstrate the manner in which Dickie’s Institutional Theory of Art both 
draws on and reinterprets Danto’s perception of the Artworld in formulating a unique 
theory of his own.64 Subsequently, I will show the manner in which David Graves further 
elaborates Dickie’s theory (which Dickie himself revised a number of times) in his 
publication of NITA. 
 
1.2 Classifying Art: George Dickie and the ‘Institutional Theory of Art’ 
Applying his understanding of Danto’s notion of the Artworld, Dickie began to develop 
his institutional definition of art in 1969 and worked on his initial version of the theory 
well into the 1970s. In order to appropriately grasp Dickie’s theory, it should first be 
understood that, as Graves maintains, while Danto may have ‘correctly concluded that 
it was not ‘the aesthetic’, or ‘beauty’, or indeed any other exhibited feature of works of 
art, which made them works of art’, he failed to explain what it was that actually did 
make something into a work of art.65 Put simply, Danto’s theory identifies artworks as 
                                                 
63 Davies, Definitions of Art, 81. In the same vein, according to Thomas Adajian, the fact that some 
artworks require a deeper analysis of their background in order to better interpret them is precisely what 
makes Danto’s approach ‘institutionalist’. Thomas Adajian, ‘The Definition of Art’, in Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, last modified October 9, 2012, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/art-
definition/. 
64 As far as Yanal is concerned, the ‘first’ institutional theory of art is in fact already outlined in Danto’s 
"The Artworld". Yanal, ‘The Institutional Theory of Art’, 1. 
65 Graves, The New Institutional Theory of Art, 21–22. 
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artworks, in the given context of the Artworld. It does not, however, in any way explain 
what it is that makes an artwork an artwork. It is important to understand this 
distinction. Dickie’s attempt was to formulate a definitive theory, panoramic in scope, 
aimed at defining art in all its various forms and manifestations. His objective was not 
only to help one understand, once and for all, what art is, but also to demonstrate what 
it is that quite literally makes something (i.e. an object, artefact or just about anything) 
worth being given the status of a ‘work of art’. 
Contrary to Danto, Dickie perceives the notion of the Artworld as a paradigmatic 
representation of what one would regard as a ‘cultural institution’. To appropriately 
understand this notion, attention must be paid to the relationship between the overall 
purpose of cultural institutions and a distinct outlook pertaining to the various facts and 
values according to which one constructs one’s life—namely that they are inherently 
bound to a given social structure’s cultural institutions.66 All cultural institutions are 
man-made. They fundamentally present one with an array of particular rules and 
regulations.67 They all are devised and constructed in accordance with both what one 
(as an individual) finds important and what one (as a collective member of a cultured 
society) considers valuable enough to form a designated institution for. Institutions, as 
Graves puts it, ‘institute the facts of the matter, they make facts’.68 To be sure, they 
                                                 
66 Cultural institutions pertain to the manner in which a particular social structure and/or cultured society 
aims to preserve and maintain particular aspects that it finds important to its existence, such as language, 
marriage, law and order, religion, education, games and—as Dickie suggested—art. 
67 As opposed to a mere ‘bunch’ or so-called ‘cluster’ of rules, a particular institution’s rules have a distinct 
order about them. In fact, they essentially dictate the manner in which an institution is supposed to 
‘behave’. They ‘work’ in accordance with a well-thought-out logic. Thus, they set certain acts of conduct 
in a specific field. As a result, one’s cultural institutions are in point of fact those responsible for bestowing 
meaning and value on one’s life. 
68 Graves, The New Institutional Theory of Art, 22. 
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create facts. Ultimately, they are responsible for making a ‘thing’ into a ‘some-thing’, 
effectively endowing it with an identity of its own. 
Drawing on the profound intellectual philosophical foundations established by 
Wittgenstein in the early 1920s,69 British philosopher, G. E. M. Anscombe demonstrates 
this idea in her 1958 essay "On Brute Facts", in which she distinguishes between two 
different sets of facts in the world: namely ‘brute facts’ and ‘institutional facts’.70 The 
brute facts, as their name implies, are characterised as brutal and cold. As Graves 
explains, ‘she calls such natural facts “brute facts”, mainly because they seem to have 
this brutish power about them, as they are what they are regardless of what we humans 
might think on the matter’.71 For the most part, one is accustomed to accept these facts 
as ‘given’ since they appear to be inflicted upon one by the world itself. As such, there 
is literally nothing one can do about it. To a large extent, they can essentially be 
perceived as deprived of any values or meaning whatsoever. Alongside them, there 
exists a so-called ‘opposite’ set of facts. These types of facts are created by one’s society. 
They are dependent upon one’s culture. Hence, these are regarded as ‘institutional 
facts’.72 Together, they function as given sets of facts to which one turns in one’s 
                                                 
69 Consider the following passage from what is commonly regarded as Wittgenstein’s masterpiece, the 
Logico-Philosophical Treatise: ‘The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything 
is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists—and if it did exist, it would have 
no value. If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens 
and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental. What makes it non-accidental cannot lie 
within the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental. It must lie outside the world.’ [emphasis in 
original]. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness 
(1921, Reprint, London: Routledge/Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2002) 86, accessed October 18, 2016, 
http://aramdhon.staff.uns.ac.id/files/2011/10/wittgenstein_tractatus_logico_philosophicus__routledge
_classics_.pdf. 
70 G. E. M. Anscombe, "On Brute Facts", Analysis 18, no. 3 (Jan. 1958), 69–72.  
71 Graves, The New Institutional Theory of Art, 22.  
72 Since one belongs to a particular cultured society—which is in fact responsible for one’s cultural 
institutions—one will most likely choose to live one’s life in accordance with what that particular society 
finds important. After all, one’s society created its cultural institutions depending upon what it believes 
one should find important—in respect of the things according to which one should lead one’s life. The 
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everyday life. While it might seem somewhat counter-intuitive, one ultimately favours 
the institutional facts and considers them to be more important and more meaningful 
than those afforded to one by nature. 
To further illustrate this point, I hereby paraphrase the example given by Graves: 
Consider one’s ‘natural’ (or, to some, ‘God-given’) ability of ‘running extremely fast’ (i.e. 
a ‘brute fact’) as opposed to one demonstrating an ability of ‘running extremely fast in 
an Olympic race’ (i.e. ‘institutional fact’). Both cases essentially concern the same 
manifestation: one’s ability to run extremely fast. However, one values each case quite 
differently. Winning a medal in the Olympic Games, for instance, indicates quite clearly 
that the fact that one is simply able to run extremely fast is of no particular value 
without a cultural framework. In other words, without the context of the Olympics, 
‘running extremely fast’ remains nothing more than a ‘brute fact’—and as such, means 
absolutely nothing. It might be argued that this fact does have great value, in respect of 
the likeliness of its ensuring one’s escape in the event, say, of one being chased by a 
tiger. Moreover, in the hypothetical scenario of a tiger chasing two individuals, if one 
possessed the ability to run much faster than one's counterpart, one's survival would 
quite probably be secured. However, following what he regards as Wittgenstein's 
response to Charles Darwin, Graves asserts that one's survival should be understood as 
a necessity. As a sort of built-in ‘mechanism’, for lack of a better term, one simply needs 
to survive. It therefore cannot be considered a value. In essence, the concepts of 
                                                 
cultural institutions are thus intended to assist one to do just that. As Graves points out, ‘their very status 
as facts at all depends on the existence of a social institution which sets them up as such. […] it becomes 
an impressive distinction of paramount importance. Our social-cultural institutions do institute facts, and 
those facts are usually very different from the brute facts of the matter.’ Graves, The New Institutional 
Theory of Art, 23. 
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meanings and values simply do not exist in the natural world.73 Graves then utilises the 
famous scandal surrounding athletes Ben Johnson and Carl Lewis in the 1988 Olympics. 
He demonstrates the manner in which one prefers the institutional facts: he points out 
that Johnson being the fastest man in the race constitutes a rather unequivocal ‘brute 
fact’. Notwithstanding, since it had been revealed that he did not play by the rules of 
the game (i.e. the rules of the given institution), he was subsequently disqualified and 
the gold medal was given to Carl Lewis, rendering him the ‘fastest man’ in the race, 
which effectively constitutes an unequivocal ‘institutional fact’.74 In the same vein, Ruth 
Lorand explains that cultural institutions possess both the power and authority to make 
literal changes in one’s world. Thus, just as the papacy, for instance, has the power and 
authority to proclaim a man who has been dead for over 200 years as a saint, and just 
as the judicial system has the autonomy of acquitting one who has already been found 
guilty, art too—as a cultural institution—has the capacity to change the status of 
particular objects, i.e. declaring something that was previously ‘not-art’ to be an 
artwork.75 
Conceivably, one could identify Dickie’s perception of Danto’s notion of the 
Artworld as an attempt to bridge the gap between two sets of facts (i.e. the brute one 
                                                 
73 David Graves, "Lir'ot shki'a ve'lamut" [To see a sunset and die], Odyssey—A Journey Through Ideas, 
issue #4 (July 2009): 33–34, accessed June 20, 2014, http://odyssey.org.il/files/pdf/issue4/10.pdf. As the 
essay is written in Hebrew, I present an abbreviated paraphrase of Graves’s explanation: One’s search for 
meanings and values commenced once one’s perpetual fight for survival ceased consisting as one’s main 
objective. As mankind evolved, one began perceiving oneself and one’s peers as part of a cultured society, 
whose members sought after something other than, ostensibly making it through the day and not dying. 
Cultural institutions, fundamentally, are designed to bestow meanings and values to things that in their 
natural form are deprived of them. In brief, everything that happens in the natural world simply happens. 
Animals who eat the cubs of another pack are not ‘evil’. A solar eclipse is not an ‘ominous sign’. A tsunami 
does mean that nature is ‘angry’. Indeed, nature has no ‘will’ of its own (and in this respect, according to 
this frame of thinking, it can also be said that neither does God). Nature simply happens. It just ‘is’. 
74 Graves, The New Institutional Theory of Art, 23. 
75 Ruth Lorand, Al tiv'a shel omanut [On the nature of art] (Tel Aviv: Dvir Publishing House, 1991), 158.   
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and the institutional one).76 While for Danto this gap was more about the two 
supposedly different objects possessing the exact same aesthetic properties, for Dickie 
it was about a so-called dissonance that supposedly exists in every given work of art. In 
effect, Dickie utilises Danto’s term and perceives the Artworld as a referent to a ‘broad 
social institution in which works of art have their place’.77 Although Dickie did not 
consider Danto’s effort as an attempt at formulating a general definition of art, he did 
consider "The Artworld" a ‘provocative article’ and a gesture in the right direction 
towards such a definition.78 As will presently become clear, the manner in which Dickie 
formed his own definition demonstrates the extent to which Danto’s conception of the 
Artworld influenced Dickie’s thinking.79 Indeed, both Danto and Dickie realised that the 
Artworld was a particular framework that establishes an artistic praxis. As such, it 
consisted of a setting of limitations. Effectively, it is the framework itself that dictates, 
decides and defines what would and would not be included within the framework. It is 
not, as Graves points out, an actual ‘physical’ place (such as a museum, a galley or a 
theatre). Rather, it is an ‘abstract’ framework, which accounts for all the physical places 
oriented with the Artworld and its products.80 Accordingly, the framework institutes a 
particular kind of activity: an artistic praxis—which exists within the framework in all its 
forms and practices. It is in essence the creative process through which all artworks are 
created. 
                                                 
76 Graves, The New Institutional Theory of Art, 24–25. 
77 Steve M. Cahn and Aaron Meskin, eds., Aesthetics: A Comprehensive Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2008), 429. 
78 Ibid. 
79 As Davies points out, ‘it is not surprising that Danto has been taken to be a proto-institutionalist to be 
discussed in the same breath as Dickie. […] One would expect his views to be compatible, if far from 
identical with the institutional approach.’ Davies, Definitions of Art, 81. 
80 Graves, The New Institutional Theory of Art, 19–20. 
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Over the years, Dickie made four attempts to formulate his definition of what 
art is, following his understanding that it should be regarded just as any other man-
made socio-cultural institutional system—such as marriage, education, law and order, 
or religion. Dickie recounts that 
in all formulations of the theory, I have tried to formulate what I […] 
called a "classificatory" sense of "work of art". […] I have always sought 
to define a value-neutral sense of art. […] The general claim of the 
institutional theory is that if we stop looking at the exhibited (easily 
noticed) characteristics of artworks […] and instead look for 
characteristics that artworks have as a result of their relation to their 
cultural context then we can find defining properties.81 [emphasis in 
original]  
Dickie’s first institutional definition offered a set of rules and guidelines pertaining to 
the act of classification.82 The theory argued that ‘a work of art in the classificatory sense 
is (1) an artifact, (2) a set of the aspects of which has had conferred upon it the status 
of candidate for appreciation by some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain 
social institution (the artworld)’.83 Evidently, in his initial endeavour to define what an 
artwork actually is, Dickie did not consider the appreciation of artworks necessary at 
all—a matter which seemed to provoke some confusion.84 Nonetheless, the importance 
of evaluation and appreciation did subsequently surface and was alluded to in his later 
revisions to his own definition. 
                                                 
81 George Dickie, "The Institutional Theory of Art", in Theories of Art Today, ed. Noël Carroll (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2000), 97. 
82 His initial attempt at a definition took the form of a journal article, published in 1969, and in 1971 and 
1974 he made two ‘rather minor attempts at revision’. Dickie, "The Institutional Theory of Art", 93. Since 
his initial three versions basically differed only slightly in their wording, it is the 1974 version that is 
fundamentally considered Dickie’s first version. 
83 Ibid., 94. 
84 For instance, since it could be maintained that if one is able to make a distinction between ‘art’ and 
‘good art’, should one therefore not discard that which does not constitute ‘good art’ as ‘not art’? 
- 19 - 
 
All things considered, Dickie’s initial definition was not entirely well constructed. 
According to Graves, ‘it appeared to focus upon the wrong sorts of things’.85 Danto, by 
his own admission, ‘saluted Dickie for his bravura, but faulted his definition’.86 Indeed, 
as a definitive theory about all things art—which is precisely what it set out to be—it 
seemed both limited and restrictive in the sense that one simply could not accept it as 
a valid theory that could be applied to each and every artwork in existence. In effect, it 
attracted quite a bit of criticism, if not outright ‘attacks’—the most common of which, 
as Graves notes, ‘relate to (a) the act of status conferral, (b) the person who acts on 
behalf of the Artworld, and (c) the circularity of the definition’.87 Davies maintains that 
it had apparently ‘struck some people as preposterous, as involving an elementary 
mistake’.88 Similarly, as Graves points out, a common criticism held against Dickie’s 
theory claimed his approach to be inherently elitist:  
Art is a world unto itself, and one must know how that world works. 
As the Artworld in the West is one of our oldest ongoing cultural 
worlds, with a continuous history of two millennia and a half since 
Classical Greece, then it just so happens that there is a lot one has to 
know about art [...] A person who is ignorant of a particular artistic 
phenomenon should refrain from passing judgment on it, this is what 
really follows from Danto’s principle. 89 
Nonetheless, Graves proves this objection to be both misguided and misleading. It is 
essentially a result of an inaccurate understanding of what the theory sets out to do. 
While Davies insists that the charge of elitism is a serious one,90 Graves, for his part, 
                                                 
85 Graves, The New Institutional Theory of Art, 19. 
86 Danto, What Art Is, 145. 
87 Graves, The New Institutional Theory of Art, 25.  
88 Davies, Definitions of Art, 78. 
89 Graves, The New Institutional Theory of Art, 17. 
90 Even in recent times, after the rise (and assumed fall) of post-modernism, it would seem that being an 
‘elitist’ is not only frowned upon but is also perceived as some sort of academic equivalent to committing 
‘foul play’. 
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maintains that this claim stands in contrast to the manner in which both Danto and 
Dickie characterise the nature of the Artworld: namely, as being ‘democratic’ or 
‘pluralistic’.91 At the same time, Davies argues that most reservations begin to surface 
once it becomes evident that more than a handful of artworks, and indeed artists, do 
not in fact comply with the seemingly restrictive confines of the Artworld. Hence, since 
it seems that the Artworld quite literally dictates what is and what is not worth being 
identified as art, one can hardly regard the Artworld as a democratic system of 
classification. Davies, admittedly, primarily attends to Dickie’s initial account of his 
theory. He maintains in this respect that he is more concerned with what a general or 
definitive theory of art should be, in order to be convincing, rather than taking issue 
with any particular version.92 
Another major reservation concerned Dickie’s ‘candidate for appreciation’. 
Danto, for instance, argued that although Dickie never wanted to be too explicit, this 
clause may suggest aesthetic appreciation.93 Dickie himself defended this objection, 
concluding that while his language might have sounded misleading, his explicit 
explanation of what the status of the ‘candidate for appreciation’ is—namely, that it 
‘must be conferrable by a single person’s treating of an artefact as a candidate for 
appreciation’94—demonstrates why a definition of art must account for the actions of 
an artist, constituting their creative process.95 According to Davies, Dickie’s ‘version of 
                                                 
91 As will later become clear, forming a theory of art that manifests a sense of freedom while at the same 
time dictates strict rules of conduct appears to be one of the primary objectives of NITA: ‘This, we believe, 
would be the ideal situation, even though it sounds somewhat paradoxical. Complete artistic freedom 
together with clear restrictions on what works and what does not’. Graves, The New Institutional Theory 
of Art, 38. 
92 Davies, Definitions of Art, 79. 
93 Danto, What Art Is, 145. 
94 George Dickie, "Defining Art", American Philosophical Quarterly 6, no. 3 (1969): 252.  
95 Dickie, "The Institutional Theory of Art", 93. 
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institutionalism’ fails to account for either how the artistic status is conferred or how it 
is conferred by an exercise of authority. He asserts that Dickie’s theory fails in delivering 
a ‘truly institutional account’ of what art is, and that it seems to invite objections rather 
than offer a defence against them.96 Dickie, for his part, finds this quite ‘unfounded’.97 
He maintains that most of the criticism raised against the institutional theory primarily 
refers to his initial version.98 Ultimately, these and others are appropriately dealt with 
and respectfully rejected by Graves in his construction of NITA. 
It was only in 1984 that Dickie attempted what he himself regards as ‘a major 
overhaul of the theory’.99 As before, Dickie’s aim here was to formulate a classifying 
‘apparatus’ rather than to engage with aesthetic evaluation.100 Indeed, it was his intent 
to create a ‘procedural’ theory of art (as opposed to a ‘functional’ or historical one). 
Published as The Art Circle, this time around Dickie turned his attention towards the 
institution itself—primarily focusing on the distinct rules, roles and regulations that art, 
as a cultural institution, actually institutes. According to Graves, ‘Summing up the new 
twist, Dickie suggests that art can be seen to be a complex of inter-related roles 
governed by non-conventional and conventional rules. The inter-relatedness of the 
institutional roles was the most important finding of the later version’.101 In brief, 
Dickie’s new account suggested a group of five consolidating and inflective clauses that 
                                                 
96 Davies, Definitions of Art, 84.  
97 Dickie, "The Institutional Theory of Art", 106. 
98 Ibid., 94–96. 
99 Ibid., 93. 
100 As Dickie points out in Evaluating Art, ‘In this book I present and argue for a theory of art evaluation. 
As far as I can tell this theory has no necessary connection with the institutional theory of art. The lack of 
connection should not be surprising, for the institutional theory of art is supposed to be a classificatory 
theory of art—a theory that explains why a work of art is a work of art.’ George Dickie, Evaluating Art 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), ix. 
101 Graves, The New Institutional Theory of Art, 30. 
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form the definition of what art is. Effectively, the role of each clause in the definition is 
dependent upon every other individual clause.102 While the circular nature of the 
definition appears to be precisely where its deficiency lies, it was surely the inflective 
nature of his argument that had led Dickie, perhaps jokingly and with some degree of 
irony, to incorporate the word ‘circle’ in his chosen title. Dickie considers this version to 
be ‘the single best account of the institutional theory of art’.103 According to Hans van 
Maanen, ‘when Dickie wrote The Art Circle he had the feeling that his institutional 
theory was ready and he was right: it was finished and sufficient; the circle was round 
and the statement had been made’.104 However, Graves maintains that although 
Dickie’s wording appeared to be very precise, it nevertheless remained misleading.105 
At the same time, Graves argues that though the definition is indeed circular (which 
could constitute a major flaw), it does not leave one uninformed.106 Ultimately, the 
objectors to Dickie’s theory remained unconvinced. To be sure, one of the reasons that 
Dickie reformulated his theory as many times as he did was to find the most appropriate 
wording to convey his insights. As Graves points out, ‘as is often the case with Dickie, 
there is a lot more to it than his odd words tend to disclose’.107 Consequently, he 
explains, 
Dickie found himself going around a circle once again. Only this time, 
the circle appeared to be quite essential to the understanding of art, 
for one simply could not understand the concept of art, let alone 
                                                 
102 George Dickie, The Art Circle: A Theory of Art (New York: Haven, 1984), 80–82.   
103 Dickie; in Carroll, "Theories of Art Today", 108n13. 
104 Hans van Maanen, How to Study Art Worlds: On the Societal Functioning of Aesthetic Values 
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009), 28. 
105 Graves, The New Institutional Theory of Art, 25.  
106 Ibid., 28. 
107 Ibid. 
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create or receive a work of art, without an understanding and the 
presence of the other constituents.108  
 Thus, understanding each clause simply requires an understanding of every other 
clause.109 Drawing on a rather frequent analogy in philosophy, Graves compares the 
inflective principle in Dickie’s institutional definition to how one grasps the core 
principle in chess. One simply cannot comprehend the purpose of the ‘checkmate’ 
position without possessing a comprehensive understanding of the role of the ‘king’, 
and vice versa. According to Graves, ‘Institutions, like Chess, where the rules not only 
tell us what to do, but they verily create the very possibility of doing it, are properly 
called ‘constitutive institutions’.110 Referencing John Searle’s 1969 book, Speech Act—
in which a typical constitutive system is described as one where ‘X counts as Y, under 
circumstances C’—explains that ‘the nature of a constitutive system is that it defines 
the realm, it constitutes it. The logic of a constitutive system is not one of problem-
solving, as it is for a regulative system, but rather a logic of creation’. [emphasis in 
original].111 Ultimately, Dickie’s insights helped explain why is it that one is able to 
understand and experience a Jackson Pollock painting, for instance, as a divine artistic 
depiction of the spirit of man, while simultaneously observing the very same painting as 
nothing more than a large canvas riddled with spritzes and blots of paint, which might 
as well have been produced by a sugar-rushed four-year-old with a tendency for over-
dramatics. Although an exaggerated depiction of Pollock’s style of action painting, the 
latter view can be regarded as a rather common ‘brute fact’ that can be applied to the 
majority of such paintings. Similarly, one might also go so far as to argue that Duchamp’s 
                                                 
108 Ibid., 30. 
109 This is true both in Dickie’s case and, as I will presently demonstrate, in Graves’s formulation of NITA. 
110 Graves, The New Institutional Theory of Art, 33. 
111 Ibid., 34–35. 
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Fountain, once ‘extracted’ from the confines of the Artworld could be rendered, as a 
brute fact, an ineffective urinal. 
According to Robert Stecker, if one is drawn to the institutional approach, one 
might find it quite interesting ‘to explore other social aspects of roles existing within 
institutions to see if there really is some viable alternative to this approach’.112 In a 
rather lengthy footnote, he states that though to his knowledge this has not been 
‘pursued beyond the point Dickie has taken it’, he does know of one exception: namely, 
‘a recent Ph.D. dissertation by David Graves (1994)’, which he finds ‘promises to be 
marvellously useful in such matters as interpreting artworks’.113 Since Dickie’s theory 
essentially establishes the circumstances under which a particular object would be 
defined as an artwork, it would entail that one is just as likely to encounter aesthetically 
bad artworks as one is sure to come across aesthetically good ones. Evaluating whether 
a particular work of art is or is not aesthetically good seems to be the next ‘natural’ step. 
Nevertheless, despite his focus on classification, Dickie’s definition does allude to some 
notions of what a good work of art should be—albeit without explicitly intending to. 
Thus, Dickie did appear to find the appreciation and evaluation of artworks not only 
important, but also quite necessary. To paraphrase Lorand, not everything that is 
defined as an artwork is necessarily a good artwork.114 She asserts that a definition of 
that which one can call ‘art’ should apply to both good and bad artworks.115 Accordingly, 
in order to evaluate whether or not a particular object is a good or a bad artwork, one 
                                                 
112 Robert Stecker, Artworks: Definition, Meaning, Value (University Park: Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1997), 68–69. 
113 Ibid. 69n2. 
114 Lorand, [On the nature of art], 153. 
115 Ibid., 161. 
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must first and foremost consider that particular object as an ‘artwork’.116 She suggests, 
for instance, that just as one’s definition of a ‘citizen’ should apply to persons who do 
not obey the law, one’s definition of ‘art’ would similarly limit its own principles in 
respect of the evaluation and appreciation of artworks.117  
With NITA, as I will explain in greater detail in the concluding section of this 
chapter, Graves demonstrates how the notions of both Danto and Dickie can be taken 
one step further. For example, the fact that Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa is 
conventionally considered to be one of the most important artistic achievements of 
Western art is not only an institutional fact, but it is also a fact that one is essentially 
expected to accept ‘on trust’. Indeed, as far as NITA is concerned, this painting can only 
be ‘properly’ seen if one looks at it through a specific atmosphere and by adopting the 
perspective of a fifteenth-century Italian art seeker.118 Effectively, it ‘is constituted as a 
masterpiece artwork by the institution of Neo-Platonic Renaissance painting in Italy’.119 
Without an appropriate context to inform one’s aesthetic experience—implying that 
there is essentially only one appropriate manner in which one can aesthetically 
experience the painting—one remains in the realm of the painting’s brute facts, and 
might thereby never truly ‘get’ what all the so-called commotion surrounding it is all 
about.120 Ultimately, however, Graves explains that since 
The rule-system constituting and governing the Artworld at large must 
also be such that it can allow for the endless variety of art forms, […] 
                                                 
116 Ibid., 153. 
117 Ibid., 161. 
118 Graves, The New Institutional Theory of Art, 40. 
119 Ibid., 38.  
120 Arguably, one usually experiences the Mona Lisa as an unexpectedly small portrait of a somewhat 
masculine lady who possesses a rather enigmatic (if not downright odd) smile, and whose eyes appear to 
follow one around the exhibition hall in the Louvre. This, to be sure, is not a proper aesthetic experience 
of what the Mona Lisa is supposed to be. 
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the mother-institution of the Artworld itself is not constituted by 
specific rules […]. Rather, the overall institution is constituted by 
schematic rules, or [...] rule-schemas. The rule-schemas defining and 
setting up the entire world of art are not specific rules, they place 
virtually no restrictions on the possible contents of the more specific 
rules that will follow from them.121 [emphasis in original]  
For Graves, NITA constitutes an attempt to challenge the ‘anything goes’ spirit of the 
1960s, which to his mind seems to have gone somewhat astray. In his own words, ‘we 
seem to have forgotten that art is something and not anything’.122 Furthermore, 
primarily as far as the ‘contemporary Artworld’ is concerned, NITA successfully suggests 
an urgently required new ‘appropriate attitude’ towards the tremendous variety of 
existing and ever-evolving works of art.123 In this respect, NITA demonstrates quite 
clearly that the Artworld had gone well beyond the point of ‘anything goes’, accepting 
anything and everything as a legitimate work of art. Nevertheless, NITA also makes it 
overwhelmingly evident that at the same time ‘not everything works’.124 The very notion 
that everything can work does not necessarily entail that everything should work. This 
is a crucial insight to understand what NITA is all about. Art, as Graves puts it, 
is a cultural institution […] a complex set of rule-systems which define 
and govern its practices, i.e. the practices of art. The new institutional 
theory regards these rule-systems as being of a constitutive nature, 
which is to say that they create the very practices that they govern. […] 
[they] determine the goals, means, roles and products of the practice. 
The rules tell us what counts. The rule-systems define the goals of the 
various artistic practices […] [they] specify the means to achieve such 
goals. […] all works of art are understood only from within the 
workings of their constitutive practices.125 [emphasis in original] 
                                                 
121 Graves, The New Institutional Theory of Art, 40. When regarding these rules, Graves employs three 
different spellings in his book: namely, ‘schema’ (or ‘schemas’, as above), ‘schemata’ and ‘schemes’. In 
this study, I have chosen the third and shall henceforth regard them as rule-schemes.  
122 Ibid., 37.  
123 Ibid.  
124 Ibid.  
125 Ibid, 38. 
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1.3 Evaluating Art: David Graves and the ‘New Institutional Theory of Art’ 
Although it was finally published in 2010, Graves began developing NITA as early as 
1994. Mentored in his postgraduate studies by philosopher and linguist Asa Kasher, with 
the guidance and supervision of Dickie himself, Graves credits them both in his 2010 
publication of NITA and refers to the theory as their collaborative effort. 
Fundamentally, NITA proposes that the Artworld consists of four basic rule-
schemes, which would necessarily apply to all and any given instances of art. 
Appropriately, they both (a) constitute the Artworld itself, defining its rules, regulations 
and boundaries, and in effect (b) ‘institute the myriad of practices of art’.126 NITA 
concludes what would count as an artwork or an artistic activity under the given 
circumstances enabled by the Artworld. In effect, it extends both its initial conception 
by Danto and its institutional understating by Dickie. Together, the four rules, addressed 
by Graves as ‘R1–R4’, appear to form a ‘constitutive’ system, in which each individual 
rule-scheme functions as something of a self-contained definition of a particular 
elementary component, without which art cannot exist.127 
The following is the constitutive core rule-system, as it appears in Graves’s book. 
By his own admission, these are based on Dickie’s five interlocking definitions.128 
R1: A practice counts as an Artworld-system if, and only if, it is a 
framework for the presentation of artworks by artists to an Artworld 
public.  
                                                 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid. 
128 In his own words: ‘there are four basic, universal constituents of art, and they are: An artist, a work of 
art that he/she produces, a public unto which the work of art is presented, and a framework (an Artworld-
system) in which all this takes place. […] this humble set is where it all begins’ [emphasis in original]. Ibid. 
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R2: An object counts as an artwork if, and only if, it is an artifact 
created by an artist, and presented to an Artworld public, within an 
Artworld-system.  
R3: A person counts as an artist if, and only if, he or she participates 
with understanding in the creating of an artwork, to be presented it to 
an Artworld public, within an Artworld-system.  
R4: A set of persons counts as an Artworld public if, and only if, its 
members are prepared in some degree to understand an artwork, 
created by an artist, which is presented to them in an Artworld-
system. 
Summarily, these four core elements imply that certain persons create certain 
artefacts—by way of which they attempt to convey some meaningful and insightful 
notion—and they present these artefacts before some other persons. Indeed, without 
R1–R4, one who might wish to be regarded as an artist, ‘would not know what to do, 
why to do it, nor how to go about doing it’.129 Likewise, a potential audience will not 
know how to comprehend what they have been presented with or why what they have 
been presented with should be perceived as artwork at all. Together, R1–R4 appear to 
convey ‘virtually nothing about these all-important aspects of what, why, who and 
how’.130 This is precisely what NITA sets out do. 
It must be also understood that the Artworld is in fact not restrictive at all.131 
Effectively, as a schematic definition, NITA is essentially restriction-free. At the same 
time, as shall be further elaborated upon in the forthcoming chapter, this is only the 
case as long as one observes all the rules (R1–R4). In brief, while they surely establish 
the object, the artist and the audience as necessary minimum requirements, these rules 
are simultaneously indiscriminate, and, indeed, completely open to what might count 
                                                 
129 Graves, The New Institutional Theory of Art, 44. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Graves, The New Institutional Theory of Art, 45. 
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as an object, or who the artist and his/her/their audience can be. Consequently, 
practically anything can count as an object, and indeed anyone can be either an artist 
or a member of an audience—as long as each role accords with the requirements of the 
general institutional category.  
The following is the structure of the artistic institution, as it is presented by 
Graves in his book: 
AW Level: The Artworld: The mother institution, the set of all artistic 
institutions. The rules at AW level are precisely the rule-schemata R1–
R4. They are the most general rules. 
M-b Level: Medium-based institutions: Painting, Literature, Film, 
Sculpture, Poetry, Music etc. The rule-systems we will find on this level 
are rules governing the “material” aspects of art practices, selection 
of material as medium, use of medium, and the like. They are also of 
a general nature, but they are more specific than AW level rules in that 
they place constraints upon the material aspects for each M-b 
institution. 
BT Level: Big Theory institutions: Realism, Expressionism, 
Romanticism, Idealism, Cubism, etc. The rule-systems we will find on 
this level are rules governing the “ideological” aspects of art practices, 
(which is why they are usually denoted by “isms”). […] [W]e do not 
mean political ideology, necessarily, even though those may be 
acceptable as well, in certain local cases, if so constituted by the 
Artworld-system in question. Rather, we mean a very general attitude 
of the practitioners of the system regarding what they hold to be the 
nature of art (or of their art). […] As a general guideline, BT institutions 
are Artworld theories of art, as distinguished from Artworld-external 
theories, such as philosophical, psychological or sociological theories 
of art. To be sure, Artworld Big Theories are influenced by the external 
theories, and have some influence over them, as well. The important 
point is that they are the general theoretical stances which artists 
actually assume in their work. 
WT Level: Working Theory institutions: Pointillism, Action Painting, 
Futurism, French Impressionist Painting, Film Noire [sic], etc. This is 
the bottom of our institutional hierarchy, this is where the theories of 
the higher levels are actually put to practice, where material meets up 
with ideology, as it were. At this level, the rule-systems governing the 
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institutions will be most specific, both with regard to the material 
aspects and with regard to the ideological aspects of the practice, and 
the relationships between material and ideology. […] Thus, […] what 
is applicable to all and any artist is that they work within some sub-
institution which specifies both the material and the ideological 
aspects of their art practice, i.e. some Working-Theory-institution. 
Hence, as far as [NITA] is concerned, as a general theory of art, the WT 
level is the most specific level. […] the products of the Artworld are 
always produced, strictly, within an institution of the lowest level, i.e. 
within some WT institution, the domain of activity where a specific set 
of rules (which is actually a body of theory) is actually practiced by 
artists to actually produce works of art.132 
According to Graves, the mistaken notion that one is able to specify considerations 
regarding the ‘what, why, who and how’ of all the Artworld’s products and procedures 
has in the past resulted in theories about art being overthrown. He argues that the 
mistake was not in questioning whether one could define art, but in identifying the kind 
of definition art requires.133 In a sense, it is R1–R4 that force considerations such as why, 
what and how upon the Artworld—and it is within the Artworld that they ‘find their 
structural expression in these institutional levels’.134 The structure of the Artworld 
demonstrates that these considerations essentially require practical decision-making 
and responsibilities—on the part of both the artists and the audience. As Graves 
explains, 
Medium-based institutions mainly deal with the "what?". What sort of 
artifact is to be made, what materials are to be used? Big Theory 
institutions mainly deal with the "why?". Why make art in the first 
place, why create and use an artifact to do what one wishes to do? 
Finally, Working Theory institutions deal with the "how?", focusing on 
one of the key questions of all artistic activity: how does one employ 
one’s chosen material means so as to manifest one’s chosen artistic 
ideology? WT institutions are geared to answer that key question, 
                                                 
132 Graves, The New Institutional Theory of Art, 51–52.  
133 Ibid., 45. 
134 Ibid., 53. 
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providing one of the most fundamental principles of art criticism and 
evaluation, that of technique.135 
Consequently, it would seem that NITA fully complies with what one expects of a 
comprehensive theory or a definition of art: namely, that it identifies the elements that 
all art must have, in that anything possessing them is art.136 Indeed, it appears as though 
NITA does just that.137 
Although Stecker engages in his study with Graves’s PhD dissertation—no doubt 
an early attempt at outlining what would later become his publication of NITA—some 
of his insights can still be applied to the fully formed theory. For example, he notes that 
Graves’s conception of art as an institution implies and includes a variety of ‘sub-
institutions’ (i.e., the different genres or sub-categories of art), which are derived from 
and comply with the general rules of the larger institutional system. Additionally, 
Stecker argues that the rules of the institution in Graves’s approach ‘not only 
(purportedly) determine which items are artworks, but also determine principles of 
interpretation and […] principles of artistic value’.138 Accordingly, he finds that they 
contribute, at least to some degree, to what one would perceive as ‘principles of artistic 
value’.139 He thus considers Graves’s approach innovative not only in respect of 
interpreting artworks but also apropos their evaluation.140 In an essay defending artistic 
                                                 
135 Ibid., 53–54. 
136 Stephen Davies, The Philosophy of Art (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 26. 
137 While he does not in fact engage with NITA explicitly, as it had not yet been published, Davies seems 
to remain unconvinced about the effectiveness and/or efficiency of the institutional approach to account 
for all and any artwork. He finds that it lacks the ability to explain the earliest artworks due to the simple 
fact that ‘institutions imply the existence of established traditions, and none were in place when the first 
artworks were created.’ Ibid., 39. Nevertheless, his understanding of the institutional approach—in 
respect of NITA—seems to be wrong and misleading. 
138 Stecker, Artworks: Definition, Meaning, Value, 69. 
139 Ibid., 259. 
140 While the classification of artworks has been scrutinised since the dawn of art, their evaluation seems 
have established itself as a completely separate field of interest. In these respects, Graves was surely 
among the handful of philosophers to explore the institutional approach of both classification and 
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value, Stecker maintains that what one might consider to be valuable artworks may 
have aesthetic value, and that even the artistic value of artworks that do have aesthetic 
value ‘is not exhausted by their aesthetic value’.141 In brief, he argues that artworks 
should have a kind of value that is ‘not identical with, but that may include, aesthetic 
value’.142 Consequently, as far as Stecker is concerned, ‘artistic value derives from what 
artists successfully intend to do in their works as mediated by functions of the art forms 
and genres to which the works belong’ [emphasis in original].143  
To be sure, NITA equips one with ‘clear theoretical mechanisms for carrying the 
major activities involved in theorizing about art: how to classify a work of art, how to 
interpret a work of art, and how to evaluate a work of art’.144 Ultimately, no other theory 
to date has succeeded in ‘mapping out’ with such precision and elegance what it is that 
actually makes something into an artwork—and in doing so suggests the necessity of 
both one’s engagement with an artwork and of bringing forth the question of aesthetic 
value.145 
Now, does an artwork have to be aesthetic? In respect of NITA and its conception 
of the Artworld, the answer appears to be that it most definitely does not. Art, in fact, 
can be quite literally deprived of so-called ‘beautiful’ qualities. ‘Beauty’, to be sure, does 
not define art. Nonetheless, NITA seems to re-direct the question of necessity, and 
                                                 
evaluation. Thus, as Stecker puts it, ‘Something is an artistic value only if a principle of artistic value 
derived from an artworld institution says it is. Hence artistic value invariably comes from within the 
artworld, for Graves, and is unique to artworks’. Stecker, Artworks: Definition, Meaning, Value, 69.  
141 Robert Stecker, "Artistic Value Defended", Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 70, no. 4 (Fall 2012), 
355. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Ibid., 357. 
144 Graves, The New Institutional Theory of Art, 57. 
145 This, in essence, is why I find that one can potentially apply NITA to any given artistic genre. 
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frame it in the context of appropriateness: whether or not a work of art should be 
aesthetic. As Graves points out, 
[T]he standard theory of aesthetics assumes that art is embodied 
meaning. That assumption is false, as an assumption […] The 
institutional theory, on the other hand, made no such aesthetic 
assumption. We defined art quite conclusively in purely institutional 
terms, and assumed only as much: an artifact created by an artist, and 
so on. As we focused upon art as a cultural practice, we got our reward 
for our theoretical diligence: the institutional theory showed us what 
art is, when actually and properly practiced. The very structure of the 
institution showed us that art is a matter of embodied meaning. The 
logical difference is absolute—we did not assume that art is embodied 
meaning, we concluded it. […] "art is embodied meaning" is a 
conclusion about art, not an assumption. […] a conclusion of the 
institutional theory […] Embodying the meaning of a work of art so as 
to get it across, means to use the sensate, concrete, feeling-oriented 
and intuitively understood aspects of the medium to manifest that 
meaning. This entails aesthetics. This is why aesthetics is so important 
to art, even if not definitive. If art is embodied meaning, and the point 
of embodiment is to involve sensate cognition (aesthetics) as well as 
intellectual cognition, then we get the most intriguing conclusion: 
What the institutional theory is in fact telling us is that art need not 
necessarily be aesthetic, but it should be.146 [emphasis in original] 
Thus, when examining the workings of NITA ‘vertically’,147 the idea of ‘embodied 
meaning’ appears to become essential to the artist’s responsibilities.148 Put simply, an 
artist endeavours to convey some kind of idea to his/her audience, and effectively 
attempts to embody that idea within a concrete object. The audience, in turn, 
experiences that object (i.e. the artwork) predominantly through one’s senses. Likewise, 
when reviewing NITA ‘horizontally’, it becomes evident that an artwork is a vehicle for 
communicating ideas or thoughts that could not otherwise be expressed. Effectively, as 
both the vertical and horizontal perspectives seem to form a necessary depiction of 
                                                 
146 Graves, The New Institutional Theory of Art, 86–87. 
147 For a better sense of the answer, it is recommended to refer to the visual diagram provide by Graves 
in his book. See Ibid., 89.  
148 The role of embodied meaning will be addressed in detail in the following chapter.  
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what the artistic process is, in its core, NITA demonstrates that art could be perceived 
as a form of ‘inter-subjective’ communication. 
As will become clear in a later chapter, my application of NITA will demonstrate 
the wide-ranging implications that this theory offers in the field of aesthetics: explicitly, 
the potential it contains in respect of identifying—and literally creating—new aesthetic 
categories. My application of NITA, re-forming its constitutive rule-system (R1–R4) will 
formulate a new distinctive artistic institution in its own right. It, in turn, will establish 
that the roles of the artists, their artwork and their audience all ‘converge’ under the 
given circumstances of the artistic framework governed by my suggested new genre. 
Yet before attending to this application of NITA, there is an additional philosophical 
notion that cannot remain unaddressed. I find that it is both deeply rooted within NITA, 
and also quite inherent in the aesthetic appreciation of artworks. As will presently be 
made clear, these notions pertain to the existence of what will be regarded throughout 
as the ‘internal logic’ of an artwork. It, in turn, will play an integral role in my suggested 
new aesthetic category. As the forthcoming chapter will explain, the notion of internal 
logic is not explicitly addressed in NITA. Yet its implied allusion to the importance of 
aesthetic evaluation and appreciation (thus, extending itself well beyond the 
‘classificatory confines’ of original theory) renders this notion inescapable.149 
 
 
                                                 
149 As I will demonstrate in the forthcoming chapter, the notion of ‘internal logic’ will play a dual role in 
the evaluation and appreciation of the artworks I will examine in my newly formulated aesthetic category. 
Indeed, one will be required to consider two different kinds of internal logic.   
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2. The Notion of ‘Internal Logic’ 
 
2.1 Phrase or Term? 
In his aforementioned essay, "To See a Sunset and Die", Graves defines the term 
‘beautiful’ as follows: ‘A particular object is deemed beautiful, when, and to the degree 
that, it embodies and exhibits the internal logic of its own world’.150 This unique 
definition of beauty pertains to the very core of what it means for something to be 
‘beautiful’. It not only captures what the idea of artistic beauty should be, but also 
introduces a conception of beauty that extends well beyond the so-called confines of 
the Artworld. 
Although Graves did not include this definition in his publication of NITA, I find 
it to be one of the theory’s major conclusions—particularly in respect of the manner in 
which he employs the phrase ‘internal logic’.151 Notwithstanding, it must be pointed out 
that at present this phrase remains no more than a mere notion, a philosophical idea. 
As a so-called ‘proper’ term, it has not yet been explicitly defined. At the same time, the 
phrase itself does appear in Graves’s publication of NITA only once. It is mentioned in 
                                                 
150 Graves, [To see a sunset and die], 34. 
151 Graves appears to allude to a particular quality that inheres as a property of objects. As this quality 
should be visible (or since it appeals to one’s senses), it applies to artworks and experiences, including 
those situated in the realm of aesthetics. All objects (and a fortiori all artworks) by their nature possess 
(or should possess) a unique and distinct ‘internal logic’ of their own. Appropriately, when confronted 
with a particular object, one must first and foremost identify its distinctive internal logic. At the very least, 
one should come to grips with what it should be, accepting it as a given. As I will later demonstrate, it is 
one’s minimum responsibility when engaging with works of art—and especially when one wishes to 
evaluate and appreciate them. In other words, nothing exists in a vacuum. It is only once one knows what 
a particular artwork’s internal logic should be that one will be able to determine whether or not that 
artwork succeeds in manifesting it. This essentially entails the process of both attaining an understanding 
and at the same time being able to experience a realised and concrete manifestation. This will later be 
addressed in detail.  
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passing and employed in respect of his discussion on ‘really identifying a work of art’, 
which Graves demonstrates through an explanation of Cubism.152 Its interpretation is 
thus established as a ‘given’—one which the reader surmises from the context. The 
following is the passage as it appears in Graves’s book:     
The Cubists, taking their lead from Cézanne, set out to create a new 
order, an artistic world which behaves in accordance with its own 
logic, as the natural world behaves in accordance with its logic. The 
logic of the natural world has to do with the very constituents of 
nature, thus, they say, the logic of an “art world” must have to do with 
the constituents of an art form. If it be painting, then that world abides 
by the internal logic of the line, the angle, the plane, the hue. […] The 
Cubists most purposefully set out to show us a world never seen 
before, one that could not be seen before, because it is a Cubist 
world.153 [emphasis in original] 
The phrase is then contextualised by Graves’s explanation of what the theory of Cubism 
is.154 Albeit in somewhat broad strokes—and on what he regards as an ‘intuitive level’—
Graves explicitly articulates the ‘logic’ that is manifested by the Cubist style: ‘the logic 
of the painting itself determines how the forms and colors are to be arranged on the 
plane, and not, say, the logic of physical nature’.155 Despite his declared intention to 
subsequently term his ‘intuitive’ conclusion as ‘the internal lawfulness of the painting’, 
this is in fact the final instance where Graves employs this phrase.156 He does, however, 
utilise it earlier—when considering what it is that one sees when one encounters 
                                                 
152 Graves, The New Institutional Theory of Art, 66. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Cubism, as Graves puts it, ‘is entirely based on the theory of equivalents: an equivalent for volume, an 
equivalent for aerial perspective, an equivalent for form. […] the cubist [sic] painter does not translate 
reality, any more than he evokes or interprets it, but takes his inspiration from the objects about him and 
coordinates them on the plane surface of his canvas, not according to the laws of nature, but according 
to the laws proper to that surface. Just what are those “laws proper to that surface” is something which 
cannot be specified in advance of actually creating the painting. It is something which arises of the 
painting itself, once the painting starts to bear a character of its own.’ Ibid., 68–69. 
155 Ibid., 69. 
156 Ibid. 
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Picasso’s Three Musicians (1921).157 Consequently, the manner in which Graves employs 
the notion of internal logic as a philosophical concept in his definition of beauty suggests 
that it is indispensable to the evaluation of artworks—and therefore would necessarily 
accord with NITA.158 Surmising that an artwork possesses an ‘internal logic’ of some 
kind—and indeed, that there even exists such a thing as a particular painting’s 
‘lawfulness’—both appear to derive from a similar premise. Both notions seem to be 
pertaining to a particular quality—one which is inherent to the ‘world’ inhabiting the 
artwork. 
Consider the following comment, made by the multi-talented English comedian 
John Cleese in a 1986 interview with Melvin Bragg. Having stated that he considers 
himself in possession of a ‘logical mind’ (which, by his own admission, has contributed 
both to his writing and to the formation of his particular comedy style),159 Cleese alludes 
to his friend and collaborator Marty Feldman, recounting that   
He [Feldman] went on at great length about what he used to call the 
‘internal logic’ of a sketch—which is that you can have everybody 
sitting in dustbins or dressed as carrots, but if somebody walks into 
the room who isn’t dressed as a carrot or isn't wheeled in in a 
                                                 
157 As Graves explains, ‘They are Artworld musicians, instruments and dog, not natural ones. They abide 
by different laws than do natural ones. They are synthetic signs for a lawfully ordered reality which can 
exist only in the Artworld institution of Cubism. That is the heart and soul of the Cubist endeavor. The ten 
blue and ten white patches, arranged among the black and brown, establish a good deal of that internal 
lawfulness, by establishing a rhythm and sense of highly-contrastive balance of that particular and 
synthetic “world” of the 'Three Musicians'. Could that internal lawfulness of the Musicians' world be 
expressed otherwise, as, say, an equation or deductive argument? Picasso raises a bewildered brow, for 
he knows that there is only one way to be able to identify that particular sense of order, only one way to 
understand that particular lawfulness. […] We can follow the Cubists as they take ordinary everyday 
objects and rework them in accord with an internal lawfulness of breaking it down (analysis) into more 
basic geometrical forms, extracting it from physical space, removing it from natural light and color, and 
then recreating that ordinary object into a vision the likes of which no one could have imagined prior to 
its actually being done’ [emphasis in original]. Ibid., 64–65. 
158 As stated earlier, even if not explicitly expressed, it would seem that NITA advocates that the 
evaluation and appreciation of artworks is not only as important as classification but also unavoidable. 
159 In his own words, ‘this has given me in the past the ability to get the structure of things right’. The 
South Bank Show, ITV/LWT, January 12, 1986, edited and presented by Melvin Bragg. 
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dustbin—then you have to explain why not. […] So you start with 
anything, and no matter how crazy, but that it’s got to be founded on 
that in solid logic.160  
Its anecdotal nature notwithstanding, I find Feldman’s paradigm rather illuminating in 
respect of my own application of what the notion of internal logic is supposed to be. 
Not only does it suggest that one can identify (and indeed create) an internal logic in a 
variety of different fields but it also appears to imply that appreciation, almost 
consistently, goes hand in hand with one’s comprehension of an internal logic. Being 
able to appreciate what makes a particular sketch funny is grounded on the same 
process that enables one to evaluate what makes a particular artwork beautiful (or 
aesthetically good). Nevertheless, that one is able to merely intuit what it means cannot 
be enough. Indeed, that all artworks possess, or at the very least should possess, a 
distinctive internal logic of their own is paramount. My endeavour in this chapter 
therefore focuses on suggesting an appropriate explanation of the notion of internal 
logic—especially as I subsequently employ it throughout this dissertation and regard it 
as essential to properly appreciating artworks.161 
 
2.2 A Precursor to a Suggested Definition 
In his explanation of the term ‘deconstruction’, Kanavillil Rajagopalan employs the 
phrase ‘internal logic’ twice: 
The idea that one can define one’s terms once and for all rests on the 
assumption that there are such things as meanings that can remain 
stable over a period of time and which could be captured and 
                                                 
160 Ibid. 
161 Put simply, the objectives of this chapter, on the whole, are (a) to underline the importance of this 
phrase in the context of this study, and (b) to make it absolutely clear what I mean when I reference or 
employ it as a practical term.  
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'imprisoned' in the form of rigorous definitions. Well, among other 
things, deconstruction is, as we have seen, concerned with reminding 
us that there are no such stable meanings to begin with, and so the 
quest for definitions is a wild goose chase. Rather, the meaning of a 
given text is […] that which comes out different every time one repeats 
it, as bizarre as this might indeed appear at first blush. It is […] an 
amalgam of deferral and difference. Derrida maintained throughout 
that deconstruction is a form of close reading, where all that one 
needs to mobilise is the text’s own internal logic. In other words, texts 
deconstruct themselves as it were when subjected to relentless close 
reading. All that a reader needs to do is to press ahead with its own 
internal logic. That logic, Derrida insisted, is built around the notion of 
logocentrism, the belief that there are stable meanings out there and 
that it is the business of the reader to tease it out of specific texts. The 
process of unravelling a text’s putative meaning begins the moment 
one notices that the dichotomies that a text’s author posits in order 
to construct his arguments are actually relations of hierarchies, often 
ingeniously camouflaged in order to be presented as symmetric. In 
other words, it is invariably the case that, in a dichotomous pair, one 
side is privileged to the detriment of the other.162 [my emphasis] 
Much like Graves, Rajagopalan makes no effort to explain what ‘internal logic’ actually 
means. The reader is ostensibly forgotten, and left to deduce it for his/herself. 
Nonetheless, Rajagopalan does appear to contextualise the phrase very well in respect 
of the general argument.  
In an insightful, lengthy footnote, Daniel Herwitz draws a line between Derrida 
and Danto.163 Derrida’s forte predominantly emphasised the subversive reading of 
texts.164 As I have already drawn the line between Danto and Graves, having now 
suggested that a line can be drawn between Graves and Derrida, I find that Herwitz’s 
                                                 
162 Kanavillil Rajagopalan, "Deconstruction", in Key Ideas in Linguistics and the Philosophy of Language, 
ed. Siobhan Chapman and Christopher Routledge (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 46.   
163 Daniel Herwitz, Making History: On the Authority of Avant-Garde (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1993), 340–41n25.  
164 According to Stuart Sim, Derrida based his notions of textual analysis on the assumption that ‘texts, 
like language, are marked by instability and indeterminacy of meaning’ and that therefore ‘neither 
philosophy nor criticism can have any claim to authority as regards textual interpretation’—which should 
be regarded as ‘a free-ranging activity more akin to game-playing than to traditional analysis’. Stuart Sim, 
"Deconstruction", in A Companion to Aesthetics, 2nd ed., ed. Stephen Davies, Kathleen Marie Higgins, 
Robert Hopkins, Robert Stecker, and David E. Cooper (Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 229.   
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insights can further contextualise Rajagopalan’s passage in respect of the notion of 
internal logic: 
Paradoxically, Danto’s strategy of opening up a world of readings 
without constraint aligns with Derrida’s strategy of exploding the 
canons of reading by presenting a near infinity of possible alternative 
readings of a picture (or of a text generally). […] his postmodern 
rhetoric for challenging all canonizations of reading, all principles of 
how to read, and all assertions of meaning has its own good reasons. 
But Derrida, too, dispenses with the questions of visual constraints on 
these readings, with questions about their relative degrees of their 
plausibility, about […] how far we must go in accepting one reading as 
opposed to the other. There are no easy answers to such questions, 
yet few are prepared to accept the equal plausibility of all his 
readings.165 
Art, as far as the premise of this dissertation is concerned, constitutes a cultural 
institution.166 As such, extending the previous discussion of NITA, it could be perceived 
as a kind of general category—an overarching sociocultural system or structure—which 
consists of an elaborate system of signs and meanings. When confronted with such a 
system, it is one’s responsibility to identify what kind of system it is. Subsequently, one 
should interpret what it means.167 Art, therefore, like any other such ‘system’, includes 
and comprises its own distinctive system of signs and meanings. These include, for 
instance, a particular artwork’s style or genre, its philosophical and sociocultural 
contexts, its contents and the ‘story’ that it endeavours to tell, its medium, and so forth. 
Once one grasps the various signs and their putative meanings, one should be able to 
                                                 
165 Herwitz, Making History, 340–41n25. 
166 Unlike what he identifies as its ‘major competitor’ (referencing the ‘neo-Wittgensteinian’ approach), 
Carroll maintains that the institutional theory places ‘the significance of social context on the agenda of 
contemporary philosophy of art.’ Noël Carroll, "Dickie, George", in A Companion to Aesthetics, 2nd ed., 
ed. Stephen Davies, Kathleen Marie Higgins, Robert Hopkins, Robert Stecker, and David E. Cooper 
(Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 249.  
167 For Danto, interpretation of artworks counts as a constitutive feature of any judgement concluding 
that a particular artwork is just that—a work of art. Arthur Danto, The Philosophical Disenfranchisement 
of Art (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 39–46.  
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identify not only what kind of artwork one is confronted with (e.g. mimetic, realistic or 
abstract-impressionistic), but also the purpose for which it had been created (i.e. the 
core ideas and insights that the artist wished to instil it with). Works of art could 
therefore be considered just like any kind of ‘text’.168 As such, drawing on Dickie’s notion 
of the ‘candidate for appreciation’, they constitute a candidate for deconstruction. 
Consequently, one would be required to identify and interpret the various meaningful 
elements inhabiting the ‘world’ of a particular artwork, as well as the relationship that 
exists between them. 
All cultural institutions necessarily possess a distinctive and individual internal 
logic of their own.169 As culture can be characterised as dynamic, most cultures are 
endowed with the tendency to sprout and create corresponding ‘sub-institutions’. 
These, in turn, prescribe different kinds of internal logic which are unique to them.170 
Accordingly, whereas the Artworld at large can be perceived as Art’s ‘mother 
institution’, Art’s ‘sub-institutions’ appropriately comply with the various artistic genres 
and different forms of artistic media.171 Thus, when attending to the appreciation of 
                                                 
168 This appears to correspond with Derrida’s notion of a reader’s ‘active interpretation’ (demonstrating 
the perception of deconstruction as a ‘style of literary criticism’). As Sim explains it, ‘the point of 
deconstructive reading is to destroy the illusion of stable meaning in texts. […] Signs that are without 
fault, truth, or origin are signs whose meaning has not been fixed in advance […] Their meaning at any 
given point will depend on the ingenuity of the reader’s 'active interpretation.' Reading becomes a 
creative process rather than an exercise in the recovery of meaning.’ Sim, "Deconstruction", 229. 
169 In order to succeed in fulfilling the purpose for which they were conceived and constructed to begin 
with, cultural institutions must work in accordance with some kind of internal logic. In other words, a 
cultural institution deprived of an internal logic is redundant. 
170 As implied earlier (see section 1.3), the ‘sub- institutions’ pertain to and elicit various sub-categories 
(or sub-genres). While the individual internal logic of a ‘sub-institution’ may correspond (at least to some 
degree) with the particular internal logic of the ‘mother institution’ (or the ‘general category’), it is 
consequently expected to follow its own accord, complying with the discrete nature and distinctive 
prescriptions of its own ‘world’. 
171 NITA, in this respect, assists one in identifying and selecting the structural elements that can be 
deemed meaningful and relevant both to the particular artwork in question and subsequently to its 
aesthetic evaluation. 
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paintings, for instance, one would be required to consider what the general internal 
logic of paintings is, while also taking into account their place in the Artworld at large. 
At the same time, one must be aware that appreciating, for example, Jackson Pollock’s 
Convergence (1952), requires being acquainted with a different kind of internal logic 
than is needed to appreciate, say, Raphael’s Madonna and Child with Saint John the 
Baptist (1507), Rembrandt’s The Night Watch (1642), Caspar David Friedrich’s Wanderer 
Above the Sea of Fog (1818) or Manet’s A Bar at the Folies-Bergère (1882)—even though 
all works are, to all intents and purposes, generally identified as paintings.172 Similarly, 
even paintings created by the same artist—which one might expect to exhibit similar 
themes or at least corresponding aesthetic properties—could very well possess 
different kinds of internal logic. Consider, for instance, Picasso’s The Old Guitarist 
(1903–04) as opposed to his Girl with Mandolin (1910), Harlequin with a Guitar (1917) 
or Still Life with Guitar (1921).173 Indeed, one is required to aesthetically appreciate each 
one of these paintings in accordance with its own internal logic.174 
                                                 
172 Similarly, and in respect of Cleese’s account of Feldman’s insight, it can be established that different 
comedy sketches abide by different kinds of internal logics. Feldman’s notion of a sketch featuring 
characters dressed as a carrot, who are subsequently confronted with a character who is not likewise 
attired, possesses a distinct internal logic of its own—which conceivably requires some form of built-in 
explanation within the sketch itself. It constitutes a different kind of sketch compared to, for instance, an 
ostensibly generic ‘Pete and Dud’ skit—the internal logic of which both springs from and is constructed 
around the unique dynamic that existed between legendary English comedians, Peter Cook and Dudley 
Moore, conducting (‘in-character’) a largely improvised debate about nothing in particular and anything 
at all. Thus, although both cases answer the minimum requirement (or, rather, institutional definition) of 
what a comedy sketch is supposed to be (i.e. they are both supposed to be funny and elicit laughter), they 
meet that requirement in two different ways (i.e. they are not both funny for the same reasons). 
173 Similarly, Cook and Moore’s ‘Pete and Dud’ possess a completely different kind of internal logic from 
that of their somewhat darker and intentionally cruder ostensible alter-egos, ‘Derek and Clive’. Although 
both sets of characters constitute a fundamentally unscripted double-act—ignited by the same unique 
dynamic between Cook and Moore—the two are almost polar opposites. In brief, while both creations 
exist as comedy sketches, and are thereby meant to elicit laughter, the reason for and manner in which 
they do so is not one and the same. Rather, they are rooted in different approaches to what might enter 
the cultural and institutional definition of what counts as funny. This, to a large extent, is what informs 
the distinct internal logic of each set of characters. 
174 To some extent, this alludes to how all the various elements inhabiting the overarching system (or 
general category) interconnect with one another—while at the same time manifesting the manner in 
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Games also constitute examples of a unique cultural institution. Art, much like 
games, abides by certain rules. In order, for instance, to play a game of chess, it would 
not be enough to merely possess an understanding of the ‘laws of chess’. Ultimately, 
the rules of the game can only specify what the goal of the game is, and they govern the 
game in that they define what possible moves a player can make. Art works in a similar 
manner.175 Both art and chess abide by something other than their inherent rules. In 
chess, it can be identified to a large extent as the proverbial ‘spirit’ of the game. As such, 
it counts as an inherent element of its internal logic. At the same time, while it is 
something that one is surely able to identify and grasp by employing one’s senses, one 
is arguably unable to distinctly define what it actually is.  
A computer, for instance, quite simply cannot comprehend, or rather sense, the 
‘spirit’ of a game of chess. Inevitably, although one is able to ‘teach’ a computer the 
‘laws of chess’, a computer (no matter how advanced or intelligently designed) would 
never really be able to play. Likewise, if one knows how to play chess (i.e. merely in 
respect of what one can and cannot do during the course of a game), but at the same 
time one simply ‘doesn’t get’ the ‘point’ of the game, then it can safely be said that one 
is in fact not actually playing the game either. Similarly, while a computer might indeed 
be programmed to ‘play’ sheet music, it would not be able to ‘properly’ play any 
                                                 
which they accord with and abide by the system itself. This could also explain Danto’s aforementioned 
insight in respect of a particular object’s aesthetic properties not being what defines that object as an 
artwork. Accordingly, when paintings are perceived as the products of a cultural institutional system, their 
aesthetic quality, as Graves suggests, would manifest in the degree to which a particular painting succeeds 
in exhibiting the internal logic of its own world. Thus, engaging with artworks requires one to constantly 
adjust the ‘lens’ through which a particular internal logic is perceived. 
175 As Graves points out, ‘The rules do not formulate something that we already know about art any more 
than the rules of Chess formulate something that we already know about Chess. The rules of art are what 
we know, when we know what art is. […] The rules of art are no more expendable for us, than the rules 
of Chess are for the Chess master. Without the rules, we say, the realm simply does not exist.’ Graves, 
The New Institutional Theory of Art, 43. 
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particular piece.176 In the same vein, as Graves points out, when considering a game of 
football, to claim that it consists of nothing more than a social activity involving one 
‘kicking a ball into a framed net’ (i.e. a ‘brute fact’), would constitute the description of 
one who simply does not ‘get’ football.177 Indeed, it might even count as a rather unfair 
depiction of one who actually does.178 
Despite what might arguably be construed as a self-consciously analytical 
description, if one wishes to classify and evaluate artworks, and if one follows NITA with 
the notion of the internal logic in mind, then the due process one undergoes is as 
follows. One is required to identify not only the particular ‘medium-based’ level utilised 
                                                 
176 Arguably, and the problematic comparison notwithstanding, the same can be said in respect of even 
the most musically gifted autistic savant: While a musical savant might be able to produce an absolutely 
pitch-perfect manifestation of a particular partitur, his/her achievement would, for the most part, be 
missing the undefined ‘something’ that has to do with the so-called ‘spirit’ of the piece. By way of 
illustration, consider the 60 Minutes (CBS) profile story, "Catching Up With Rex", dedicated to the 
prodigious American musical savant, Rex Lewis-Clack, accessed April 30, 2016, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cCF1xSgyKXg. Particular attention should be paid to what is stated 
08:20 minutes into the programme by David Pinto, founder of the Academy of Music for the Blind (AMB), 
and Lewis-Clack’s music teacher. In brief, Pinto argues that Lewis-Clack’s greatest challenge as a musician 
presents something of a paradox: his gift as a savant—which is what endows him with his prodigious 
talent—is also the very thing which appears to deprive him of one of the core aspects that make music 
so powerful: namely, real emotion. According to Pinto, elements such as loudness and softness in music 
require emotion. They entail ‘conveying meaning on an emotional human level’. Lewis-Clack, as Pinto 
explains it, ‘doesn't naturally take to those things’, and while he may indeed hear them, he simply appears 
to find them ‘unimportant’.     
177 As Graves puts it, ‘What is actually happening here is a two-fold act of cultural creation. First, we are 
taking a certain fact, and changing it into a different fact. […] We change the brute fact of kicking a ball 
into a net to the institutional fact of scoring a goal […] We turn the pointless act of kicking a ball into a 
net, and turn it into the very heart and soul of one of mankind’s most beloved of cultural pastimes. In this 
way, we create a world of culture, in which things matter, in which values and meanings are realized, and 
come alive in a most impressive way.’ Graves, The New Institutional Theory of Art, 35.  
178 If one indeed ‘gets’ football (i.e. possesses a comprehensive understanding of the game—both of its 
rules and of its spirit), one will be able to experience a football game, as a spectator, and appreciate it. 
That is to say, one will be able to determine whether or not (and to what extent) a particular football 
match succeeds in embodying and exhibiting the ‘internal logic’ of the distinctive ‘world’ of football. 
Likewise, if one becomes a so-called ‘expert’ in this field, one should also be able to identify whether or 
not a certain player succeeded in achieving what can be described as a brilliant move, or alternatively, a 
‘stroke of genius’. Potentially, one might even be able to identify and evaluate a player’s move in real 
time—and arguably, at least in some cases, even before the player actually made the move him- or 
herself. By the same token, consider, for example, occasions in which one is able to ‘predict’ the response 
of a particular character in a film or a play—especially in respect of distinctive genres or when one is well 
acquainted with the characters in a particular series. 
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by an artwork (i.e. painting, theatre, literature, music, dance, etc.), but also what ‘big 
theory’ or what ideology and/or philosophy the artist wished to convey in his/her 
artwork (i.e. Realism, Impressionism, Romanticism, and so forth). Accordingly, one must 
be aware that each artistic style or movement constitutes an individual ‘sub-
(institutional)-category’ of the Artworld, and is thus inhabited by its own distinctive 
internal logic. Subsequently, one should evaluate whether or not and to what extent 
that particular internal logic is exhibited in the artwork. In effect, the ‘working theory’ 
level establishes the artist’s need for a technique—that is to say, the manner in which 
one employs the tools of one’s chosen medium for ‘showing’ that which cannot be ‘said’ 
or expressed any other way. This should not be confused with a so-called mechanical 
application of instructions or rules. Rather, this should be understood as a depiction of 
how the Artworld, as a cultural institution, can explain the creation of artworks. Artists 
seldom employ deductive reasoning. Intuition—a term I will address at length in the 
second section of this chapter—is predominantly at work when artworks are created. 
Nevertheless, even as an intuitive process, an artist should be able to figure out how to 
utilise different media in order to convey different concepts and ideas.179 
All things considered, there does remain an inherent theoretical and 
philosophical problem with the phrase ‘internal logic’ which cannot remain un-
addressed: logic, by its nature, is ‘internal’, and will always remain so. The phrase might 
                                                 
179 Potentially, an artist should be able to justify, at least to some degree, either the choice of a particular 
medium, or the use of a particular medium’s tools, for conveying an idea in the form of the putative 
artwork. In this respect, the ‘working theory’ level assists one in identifying the manner in which 
something theoretical has been rendered into something concrete. (In general terms, it can also be said 
to describe the very notion of ‘embodied meaning’—which, as will presently be explained—is deeply 
rooted within what internal logic is supposed to be).  
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therefore be construed as a tautology.180 Some scholars even have argued that not only 
should the notion of an ‘internal’ logic be null and void, but there could not in fact be 
such a thing as an external logic either.181 These notions, however, can be negated.182 
Furthermore, one might argue that the French notion of raison d'être183 alludes 
precisely to what the idea of an internal logic is all about. They both appear to stem 
from a similar conjecture, pertaining to some kind of an ‘internal purposiveness’. 
Nonetheless, the two differ from one another particularly in respect of their 
philosophical attempt to form an explicit definition.184 This conundrum 
notwithstanding, the notion of internal logic should certainly be precisely articulated.  
Since the concept of internal logic is crucial to the elaboration of my thesis—and 
because it has never been properly defined as a philosophical term—I feel obliged to 
explain precisely what I mean when I use these two words. In doing so, I aim to explain 
                                                 
180 If, in effect, one were to replace the phrase and to describe it without actually naming it, particularly 
in respect of the manner in which it is referred to in the confines of this dissertation, the notion of internal 
logic would be depicted as follows: The internal organization of elements within a sensuous manifold, 
appearing in the form of an aesthetic object. It, in turn, would count as something in the same vein as 
Dickie’s ‘candidate for appreciation’. 
181 See, for instance, V. A. Smirnov, "Internal and External Logic", Bulletin of the Section of Logic 17, no. 
3/4 (1988): 170–76, accessed November 20, 2015, 
http://www.filozof.uni.lodz.pl/bulletin/pdf/17_34_9.pdf.  
182 As Ralph Wedgwood’s evaluation of Timothy Williamson’s arguments against ‘the idea that cognition 
can be factorized into internal and external components’ concludes, ‘these arguments fail to cast any 
doubt either on the idea that cognitive science should be largely concerned with internal mental 
processes, or on the idea that cognition can be analysed in terms of the existence of a suitable connection 
between internal and external components. […] There is every reason to think that at least a large part of 
cognitive science will consist in the study of these purely internal causal processes.’ Ralph Wedgwood, 
"The Internal and External Components of Cognition", in Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science, ed. 
Robert J. Stainton (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), 307. 
183 The notion of raison d'être (first used in 1864) calls for some kind of a justification for a particular 
thing’s very existence. Similarly to the notion of internal logic, it seems to pertain to the necessity of an 
inherent ‘ingredient’, as it were, that is able to explain what a particular thing is by way or articulating the 
manner in which that particular thing works appropriately to some kind of distinct accord.     
184 In the attempt to define what the necessary ‘ingredient’ is supposed to be, it seems as though the idea 
of raison d'être alludes to the fact that it can be defined ‘empirically’—whereas, with internal logic an 
overall empirical definition would in fact be missing the point. This will be made clear in the forthcoming 
discussion of the role of intuition in the notion of internal logic.  
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it as both a philosophical term and a practical evaluative tool: the notion of ‘internal 
logic’ pertains to the organization of its sensible constituents. It primarily applies to 
cultural institutional systems. Every particular cultural institution manifests an 
individual internal logic of its own. Since cultural institutions are subject to change (i.e. 
complying with the changes that one’s culture undergoes), the organizational 
properties of the internal logic can be described as ‘elastic’ in that they, too, can change 
along with the nature of a particular cultural institution.185 The manner in which the 
internal logic manifests its organizational quality should correspond with the set of 
values and frames of reference that both inhabit and are in essence valorised by the 
particular cultural system. It should appropriately conform to its socio-chronological 
cultural acceptance. To support this explanation, consider the following passage—from 
the abstract of a recent lecture by Graves—whose insights highlight the connection I 
find between NITA and what the notion of internal logic appears to allude to: 
[J]udgments of correctness and incorrectness in cultural practices like 
art or the law are, essentially, logical judgments. […] logical 
understanding itself is the ability to understand necessity. […] the 
conclusion of a logically valid argument is not merely true if the 
premises are, it is necessarily so. This concept of necessity […] is un-
derstood by sense. It is a deep-seated and fundamental intuition […] 
construed as necessity. This basic sense […] is then carried over to 
other cultural endeavors. Any field governed by a system of rules will 
bear its own unique internal logic. In fact, that internal logic is precisely 
what makes the system a system. Hence, all such cultural practices, 
like art, the law, games etc., will, in a crucial respect, behave the same 
way: logically. When one is engaged in the practice of such a field […] 
that very same “intuition of necessity” that logic expounds is at work. 
                                                 
185 For a particular cultural institution to change, it would entail a change in the framework which governs 
and dictates the praxis associated with the cultural institution in question. Consider, for instance, the 
institutions of education, marriage and religion. As ‘frameworks’, they have undergone various changes 
over time. In turn, they have included or excluded different ideas and values. The same thing can be said 
about the Artworld. As NITA demonstrates, it appears to be the most ‘pluralistic’ of all cultural 
institutions—in respect of what its ‘framework’ is willing to include. Arguably, the internal logic is 
principally responsible for constructing a governing framework. Thus, it, too, should accordingly 
demonstrate whatever change an institution undergoes. 
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[…] an aesthetic judgment, for instance, as to the correctness or 
incorrectness of a particular feature in a work of art is, in essence, a 
logical judgment.186 [my emphasis] 
Now, to elaborate my understanding of the notion of internal logic, I turn to a more 
detailed analysis of how ‘embodied meaning’ and ‘intuition’ help shape one’s 
understanding of its role—explicitly in respect of evaluating and appreciating artworks. 
(As will presently be made clear, I find them both to possess essential philosophical 
meanings that not only directly correspond with what the notion of internal logic should 
be, but also contribute to a fuller understanding of how it appears to ‘work’ in respect 
of aesthetic evaluation and appreciation). Subsequently, I will argue that there is an 
additional aspect at work when one evaluates artworks, which requires one to employ 
a sense of what I will regard as ‘informed intuition’, which, in brief, can be explained as 
a qualifying property that plays a role in the aesthetic evaluation of artworks.187 
 
2.3 The Role of Embodied Meaning in the Notion of Internal Logic  
Danto’s insights, particularly those he achieved later in his career, emphasised the 
inherent importance of the role of embodied meaning in the field of aesthetics:  
In a crude way, my definition had two main components in it: 
something is a work of art when it is has [sic] a meaning—is about 
something—and when that meaning is embodied in the work—which 
usually means: is embodied in the object in which the work of art 
                                                 
186 David Graves, "Logic and the Sense of Necessity", in Book of Abstracts, the 15th Congress of Logic, 
Methodology and Philosophy of Science (aka CLMPS) 2015, 225, accessed November 20, 2015, 
http://clmps.helsinki.fi/materials/CLMPS_LC_book%20of%20abstracts%2029.7.2015.pdf. 
187 Chapter 3 will illustrate the manner in which this property corresponds with the construction of my 
proposed new aesthetic category. As will be explained in detail, my aim is to identify and evaluate aural 
performances as artworks, which I will subsequently demonstrate via the extended analyses of my case 
studies. I will later propose that one’s ‘informed intuition’ can consequently be utilised for explaining the 
craft of casting aural performances. 
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materially consists. My theory, in brief, is that works of art are 
embodied meanings.188 
While it is precisely due to works such as Warhol’s Brillo Box that he could not include 
aesthetics in his definition of what art is, Danto does not deny that aesthetics play a 
major role in what art should be.189 Nevertheless, the conclusion that art is embodied 
meaning, or that one should even perceive it as such, does not originate from Danto.190 
Rather, it is an idea which is at least as old as Aristotle’s notion of art being a 
‘materialized idea’.191 In brief, it exists as a literal and concrete manifestation of an 
abstract idea or concept.192 For Graves, the notion of embodied meaning should be 
identified as the distinct logic of the Artworld as a ‘structured institution’.193As such, the 
‘inner workings’ of the Artworld ‘institute art as embodied meaning’.194 Graves argues 
that ‘this in itself would be sufficient to reinstate the aesthetic as being internal to the 
enterprise of art’.195 At the same time, as alluded to earlier, the Artworld is quite open 
and pluralistic: that is to say, despite the particular parameters that it sets, as a 
structured institution, it does not in fact hold any specific aesthetic requirement from 
any of the putative artistic manifestations.196 In her study of the aesthetic properties of 
                                                 
188 Danto, What Art Is, 149. 
189 Danto argues, for instance, that ‘most of the art being made today does not have the provision of 
aesthetic experience as its main goal. […] On the other hand, there is unmistakably an aesthetic 
component in much traditional and in some contemporary art. […] I think it is true that when there is an 
intended aesthetic component in art, it is a means to whatever the point of the art may be. […] In brief, 
the reconsideration of aesthetics, whether in philosophy or in aesthetics, can tell us a great deal worth 
knowing about art, whatever our approach to it may be, as well as about the social world or— the world 
as objective spirit.’ Ibid., 149–51. 
190 David Graves, "Art and the Zen Master’s Tea Pot: The Role of Aesthetics in the Institutional Theory of 
Art", Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 60, no. 4 (Autumn 2002): 351n18.    
191 Ibid. 
192 Graves, by his own admission, concludes that NITA does not ‘reinvent’ what art is, but rather 
endeavours to ‘describe’ what it is. Ibid. 
193 Ibid., 345. 
194 Ibid. 
195 Ibid. 
196 Ibid., 347.  
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artworks, Madeleine Schechter considers the place of embodied meaning explicitly in 
respect of Danto and Graves, and addresses their different approaches to aesthetics.197 
Regarding Danto, for instance, she maintains that    
from a Hegelian point of view (in Danto’s version), the artwork as a 
symbolic expression that embodies its meaning, although not 
conveying metaphysical knowledge, does provide an understanding of 
cultural context. […] In close relationship with its interdependence of 
form and content in expressing meaning by embodying it, Danto 
shares with Hegel a predilection for an expressionist theory of art, 
rather than a representational or a formalist one […]198  
Graves, as Schechter explains it, proposes a ‘new stage’ of the institutional theory, 
emphasizing the essential role of aesthetics, and in effect ‘returns to the essential 
connection between the meaning of and the 'body' of the artwork, otherwise neglected 
by the contextual approach’.199 In favouring aesthetic contextualism, and thereby taking 
on what she defines as a ‘formalist slant’, Schechter argues that Graves’s interpretation 
of the institutional interest in aesthetics renders the notion of embodied meaning its 
conclusion rather than its assumption.200 Graves himself maintains that once Danto’s 
conception of the embodied meanings of artworks is placed in the context of Dickie’s 
institutional approach to the Artworld, one is able to justify the application of a set of 
universal constraints upon any work of art.201 Fundamentally, the notion of an 
embodied meaning could be perceived as dependent on the existence of a distinctive 
                                                 
197 Schechter predominantly addresses the possibilities one has at one’s disposal for discovering the 
various meanings that are inherent in artworks. She considers the notion of embodied meaning pertaining 
to the terms ‘symbol’ and ‘imagination’. Her study journeys through the Romantic view on the theory of 
aesthetics, meaning and truth—and leads to Immanuel Kant, Umberto Eco and Danto. See Madeleine 
Schechter, Semiotics and Art Theory: Between Autonomism and Contextualism (Würzburg: Königshausen 
& Neumann, 2008), 96–109.  
198 Schechter, Semiotics and Art Theory, 162. 
199 Ibid., 17–18.  
200 Ibid.  
201 Graves, "Art and the Zen Master’s Tea Pot", 349. 
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and inherent internal logic. The two notions complement each other. By identifying a 
particular internal logic, one is able to determine the discrete meaning which is 
embodied. Graves breaks down the ‘logic of the artworld’ into three distinctive 
‘components’, namely, the artefact one sets out to make, the idea one wishes the 
artefact to exhibit, and the manner in which one would go about doing just that. As 
Graves points out, the very idea of utilizing art in order to embody meaning constitutes 
‘one of the West’s oldest and most venerated conceptions of art. It maintains that there 
are certain sorts of things that need be said, but cannot be said in simple words’. He 
then explains that  
[s]ince we cannot explain them using our good ole scientific concepts, 
we do something else. We show them. […] using means that appeal to 
our senses (as well as our intellect) […] whereas western culture has 
assumed that art is embodied meaning for thousands of years, the 
institutional theory has demonstrated it.202 [emphasis in original]  
 
2.4 The Role of Intuition in the Notion of Internal Logic 
According to Oxford Dictionaries online, the term ‘intuition’ is defined both as ‘the 
ability to understand something immediately, without the need for conscious reasoning’ 
and as ‘a thing that one knows or considers likely from instinctive feeling rather than 
conscious reasoning.’203 The online version of Merriam-Webster’s Learner's Dictionary 
defines the term as ‘a natural ability or power that makes it possible to know something 
without any proof or evidence’, ‘a feeling that guides a person to act a certain way 
without fully understanding why’, and ‘something that is known or understood without 
                                                 
202 Graves, The New Institutional Theory of Art, 85-86. 
203 Oxford Dictionaries Online, s.v. "intuition", accessed October 29, 2015, 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/intuition. 
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proof or evidence’.204 Wikipedia concludes, quite appropriately in fact, that intuition 
refers to one’s ‘ability to acquire knowledge without inference or the use of reason’.205 
Intuition, according to Noddings and Shore, is a "function that contacts objects 
directly in phenomena. This direct contact yields something we might call ‘knowledge’ 
in that it guides our actions and is precipitated by our own quest for meaning".206 
According to Jerome Bruner, the term refers to ‘the act of grasping the meaning, 
significance, or structure of a problem or situation without explicit reliance on the 
analytic apparatus of one’s craft’.207 Baylor suggests that intuition comprises three 
components: (a) immediacy,208 (b) an ability to sense relationships, and (c) reason (or 
rather, a certain ‘mode of reasoning that ironically incorporates analytical processes 
while functioning in contrast to them’).209 Her insights follow a ‘comprehensive review 
of the published literature’ available to her at the time. Referencing Arthur Koestler’s 
The Act of Creation (1964), Baylor notes that ‘the act of intuition is generally considered 
to be a moment of truth, or the sudden emergence of a new insight.’210 In her suggested 
‘model of intuition’, Baylor considers these three suggested components to be both 
interactive and influential in the identification of what intuition is.211 
                                                 
204 Merriam-Webster Online, s.v. "intuition", accessed October 29, 2015, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/intuition. 
205 Wikipedia, s.v. "intuition", accessed October 29, 2015, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intuition. 
206 Nel Noddings and Paul J. Shore, Awakening The Inner Eye: Intuition in Education (New York: Teachers 
College Press, 1984), 57. 
207 Jerome S. Bruner, The Process of Education (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 60.  
208 Amy L. Baylor, "A Three-Component Conception of Intuition: Immediacy, Sensing Relationships and 
Reason", New Ideas in Psychology 15, no. 2 (August 1997): 188. 
209 Ibid., 188–89. 
210 Ibid., 185. 
211 Ibid.  
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Ultimately, while there are quite a few conceptions of what intuition is, when 
considering the notion of intuition with specific regard to that of internal logic and 
focusing on its role in the Artworld, it seems to correspond almost directly to the 
manner in which intuition had been conceived and developed by thinkers such as 
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten and Immanuel Kant.212 The seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries customarily mark the periods in which modern science and analytical thinking 
began acquiring an almost unprecedented popularity amongst scholars, scientists and 
the general public alike. (Empirical science, for instance, which entails the presentation 
of evidence and the process of analysis, gradually became the field one would turn to in 
order to understand the distinct given properties of almost any given object in the 
world). So rapidly have these fields developed that soon enough science (i.e. as an 
ostensible ‘agency’ in its own right) not only categorically opposed anything ‘non-
scientific’ (e.g. art and other such ‘unimportant’ and arguably ‘weak’ disciplines), but 
also began ‘brewing’ an overwhelming desire to ‘monopolize’, conceivably, every given 
field of study one can think of.213 Nevertheless, both Kant and Baumgarten seemed to 
                                                 
212 Baumgarten was an eighteenth-century German professor and scientist who worked in the fields of 
philology, logic, history and psychology. He coined the term ‘aesthetics’. Kant was a nineteenth-century 
German philosopher. His extensive works proved illuminating in respect of the field of aesthetics as a 
philosophical discipline. His insights made a paramount contribution to understanding the manner in 
which one acquires knowledge and attains reason. His studies (particularly his critiques) concerning the 
concept of taste and the manner in which one employs judgement can to a large extent be linked to 
appreciating artworks. Nonetheless, it is not my intention to present an expanded analysis of either of 
their works. Rather, I wish to utilise their contribution to the understanding of human perception in order 
to draw a line between the notion of internal logic (as a conclusion of NITA), aesthetic evaluation and 
what I will later explain as one’s ‘informed intuition’.       
213 Advocated primarily since Sir Isaac Newton gained his renown, and no doubt influenced by the ideas 
of eminent scholars such as René Descartes, this premise seems to stem from the notion that empirical 
science can be used to explain every single ‘thing’ (i.e. object) in the world or essentially any given 
phenomenon one might come across. It would seem that the very existence of the field known as 
psychoanalysis demonstrates the extent to which this is believed to be true even to this day. One is 
essentially supposed to use one’s cognitive analytical tools for understanding and deciphering ‘objects’. 
Applying those tools for the purpose of understanding human psyche—which, essentially, and to a great 
extent, is something which belongs to a different ‘realm’—just should not ‘work’.   
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have arrived at the conclusion that there will always remain certain fields or phenomena 
in the world that fall under the category of that which cannot be explained by science. 
According to Elizabeth Prettejohn, 
[i]n his Master’s dissertation of 1735, Baumgarten introduced the 
term "aesthetic" (which he devised from a Greek word for "things 
perceived by the senses", as opposed to "things known by the mind"), 
and called for the establishment of a science of aesthetics—a science 
that would deal with human perception, something different from the 
well-established science that dealt with logical knowledge. Unlike 
previous philosophers who considered sensory perception to be 
nothing but undigested raw material, Baumgarten introduced the 
possibility that perception might have its own excellence—that a vivid 
sensory experience (say the sight of the starry sky at midnight) might 
offer something special that would not be improved by analysing it 
rationally (say by calculating the exact distances of each of the stars 
from earth). The something special—what perception offers that 
logical thought does not—can be called the beautiful. […] By 1790, 
when Kant published his major discussion of aesthetics in The Critique 
of Judgement, the enquiry into the beautiful adumbrated in 
Baumgarten’s dissertation had become a recognized branch of 
philosophy. […] Aesthetics in its earliest stages as a philosophical 
discipline was radical and oppositional, closely associated with the 
Enlightenment political ideals of liberty and equality, and resolutely 
opposed to aristocratic cultural traditions that prescribed rules and 
precepts for the arts.214 
Notwithstanding the almost supreme power of modern science, and despite its proven 
potential (i.e. first and foremost, in explaining, preserving and prolonging humankind’s 
life-expectancy), Baumgarten proposed that aside from one’s so-called ‘analytical’ 
mental faculty (which is ostensibly ‘in charge’ of one’s power to grasp such things as 
mathematics and science), one also possesses an additional cognitive ‘tool’. Effectively 
alluding to what could be construed as intuition—or what is more colloquially regarded 
as one’s ubiquitous ‘sixth sense’—Baumgarten regarded it as a kind of ‘sensitive 
                                                 
214 Elizabeth Prettejohn, Beauty and Art: 1750–2000, Oxford History of Art Series (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 40–41. 
- 55 - 
 
knowing’, which he termed Ars combinationis.215 In brief, it manifests one’s capacity to 
amalgamate, unify or ‘fuse’ the types of knowledge that one acquires via one’s 
senses.216 
While the capacity for analytical thinking serves us as the tool for explaining and 
deciphering ‘objects’ (i.e., for the purpose of this argument, ‘things possessing certain 
given properties’), intuition serves as a tool for comprehending and understanding 
‘subjects’ (i.e. ostensible agents possessing certain characteristics).217 Fundamentally, 
these two forms of understanding can be perceived as two sides of the same coin as 
they represent parallel cognitive abilities. Intuitions, on the one hand, are usually 
dismissed as nothing more than a ‘hunch’ or a ‘gut feeling’. Indeed, they are seldom 
considered to be truths and are usually frowned upon.218 On the other hand, the fact 
                                                 
215 These two aspects of a person’s consciousness are understood to make one a sentient being. They 
each represent mutually exclusive ostensible sources of knowledge, possessed by everyone. In essence, 
they are utilised in order to understand the sensible world that one inhabits. Drawing to some extent on 
Plato’s notion of noesis (in brief, one’s perceptual cognitive capability), Baumgarten set out to decipher 
how one attains an understanding about things that cannot be explained by empirical science. He focused 
on phenomena that cannot be understood by way of mathematical equations or ‘taken apart’ (i.e. 
analysed) in a laboratory. In other words: things that exist in the world, and yet, cannot be defined. 
Baumgarten’s notion of ‘sensitive knowing’ pertains to the manner in which one grasps precisely these 
kinds of things: namely, by way of sense. Consequently, they can only be understood in the ‘here and 
now’, through first-hand experience. And this is done intuitively.  
216 Meeting a friend for lunch in a new restaurant, for instance, could constitute a first-hand experience 
of what Baumgarten regarded as a ‘complex sensory compound’. In such an instance, one would no doubt 
‘take in’ his surroundings. In doing so, one may factor in the smile of the hostess, the live music playing 
in the background, the pink flamingo ice sculptures, the lustre of the cutlery, the typography design in 
the menu, the exotic names given to the courses, the obscenely overpriced asparagus and truffle oil 
risotto, the ‘We apologise, sir, but we do not serve tap water’ policy, and so forth. Attempting, in effect, 
to ‘figure out’ what precisely this restaurant is ‘all about’, one may very well realise, in a sudden burst of 
recognition that the new restaurant is quite ‘pretentious’. Now, such thing as a ‘pretension barometer’ 
does not exist. A sense of ‘pretentiousness’ cannot really be measured. Although one might not be able 
to prove this feeling ‘empirically’, one nevertheless can definitely sense it. Arguably, as far as Baumgarten 
would be concerned, whether or not one’s sense of the restaurant’s pretentiousness is correct is 
unimportant. Rather, what is important is that one sensed it.  
217 Subjectivity, for instance, should not—as it often is—be conflated with or understood as a matter of 
personal opinion. Rather, it should be perceived as the process through which one judges (i.e. evaluates) 
the nature of a particular agent’s characteristics and properties. Thus, this kind of evaluative judgement 
is rendered as a sort ‘subjective truth’, which is arrived at by employing intuition. 
218 Science essentially has absolutely no idea what ‘to do’ with gut feelings. Its tools for discovery and 
analysis do not apply. At the risk of stating the obvious, there is a very good reason why an intuition, 
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that one cannot empirically prove one’s intuitions (i.e. as so-called objective truths) 
does not necessarily mean that these intuitions are less true as something that one 
can.219 Effectively, the employment of logical thinking—that is to say, the innate (and 
arguably universal) ability to grasp and deduce something logically—can be perceived 
as an intuitive process.220 
In his acclaimed book, Thinking, Fast and Slow,221 Israeli-American psychologist, 
and winner of the 2002 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, Daniel Kahneman 
appears to have achieved similar insights in respect of this dichotomy.222 In brief, 
Kahneman depicts the two modes of thinking through which one attains conclusions 
and consequently employs judgement. He regards these two modes as ‘System 1’ and 
                                                 
fundamentally, cannot be proven empirically. Summarily, empirical science cannot ‘understand’ or cope 
with the process through which intuition ‘works’. As opposed to what the advocates of modern science 
and analytical thinking may lead one to believe, one is sure to come across certain phenomena that 
cannot be explained or understood by applying ‘analytical’ tools. Indeed, there are certainly occasional 
experiences which are inherently ‘subjective’, and therefore belong to the realm of intuition. 
219 Kant, so it seems, did not identify any kind of ‘hierarchy’ between these two parallel perceptive 
faculties. Baumgarten, however, evidently considered one’s ‘sensitive knowing’ inferior to one’s capacity 
for analysis. (As a scientist, he also appears to regard aesthetics as a distinct ‘scientific’ field). Indeed, the 
idea of acting on an ‘emotional decision’, for instance, is customarily perceived as taking action without, 
as it were, really thinking. (Conceivably, it is for precisely this reason that intuition was—and, regretfully, 
still is—usually ‘discarded’ as an inherently ‘feminine’ trait. By contrast, the realms of science and 
analytical thinking were always perceived as predominantly masculine). Nevertheless, to regard either 
one of these innate faculties as being in some way ‘better’ than the other would be somewhat misguided. 
Rather, the prevailing dichotomy between the two should predominantly entail that they each serve as a 
different cognitive tool for comprehending different kinds of things (i.e. phenomena). Thus, one is used 
to acquire knowledge analytically, whereas the other is used to acquire knowledge intuitively.  
220 Logic, contrary to common conception, does not merely belong to the realm of science. Despite what 
might be described as a so-called ‘prejudice’ prevailing against it, scientists do in fact employ intuition 
(even if they might, arguably, not wish to admit it). Andrew Johnson, for instance, notes that Western 
culture has traditionally ‘valued logic and reason and devalued intuition and emotion’ and maintains that 
both ‘[i]ntuition (and emotion), have been seen as weaknesses in the problem solving and decision-
making process’. Andrew Johnson "Creativity and Intuition" (excerpt), in Education Psychology: Theories 
of Learning and Human Development (2014). Accessed 6 June 2016, 
https://www.academia.edu/8274065/CREATIVITY_AND_INTUITION. 
221 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011). 
222 As Andrei Shleifer points out, the book ‘summarizes, but also integrates, the research that Kahneman 
has done over the past forty years, beginning with his path-breaking work with the late Amos Tversky. 
The broad theme of this research is that human beings are intuitive thinkers and that human intuition is 
imperfect, with the result that judgements and choices often deviate substantially from the predictions 
of normative statistical and economic models.’ Andrei Shleifer, "Psychologists at the Gate: A Review of 
Daniel Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow", Journal of Economic Literature 50, no. 4 (2012): 1–12.  
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‘System 2’. The latter is characterised as slow, analytical, deliberate, infrequent, 
effortful and conscious. The former, by contrast, is fast, intuitive, frequent, guided by 
association and metaphor, and predominantly dictated by one’s unconscious mind. 
Whereas System 1 proposes, System 2 disposes. Nevertheless, it would still appear that 
although one system may indeed be faster in Kahneman’s view, it is not necessarily 
‘better’ than its counterpart.223 Of course, as with many of what might commonly be 
identified as ‘modern’ or contemporary insights, Plato and Aristotle were there first.224 
Consider, in this respect, the classic Platonic idea pertaining to intuition as one’s ability 
to ‘see something clearly’.225 
                                                 
223 As Jim Holt explains it, System 1 produces ‘a quick and dirty draft of reality, which System 2 draws on 
to arrive at explicit beliefs and reasoned choices. So System 2 would seem to be the boss, right? In 
principle, yes. But System 2, in addition to being more deliberate and rational, is also lazy. […] Too often, 
instead of slowing things down and analyzing them, System 2 is content to accept the easy but unreliable 
story about the world that System 1 feeds to it. 'Although System 2 believes itself to be where the action 
is,' Kahneman writes, 'the automatic System 1 is the hero of this book.' System 2 is especially quiescent, 
it seems, when your mood is a happy one. […] Are they actually a pair of little agents in our head, each 
with its distinctive personality? Not really, says Kahneman. Rather, they are 'useful fictions'—useful 
because they help explain the quirks of the human mind.’ Jim Holt, "Two Brains Running", New York 
Times, November 25, 2011, accessed November 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/27/books/review/thinking-fast-and-slow-by-daniel-kahneman-book-
review.html. 
224 R. E. Allen, for instance, notes that some philosophers find ‘a strain in the Socratic dialectic, a tension 
between intuition and logic.’ He illustrates his point by citing R. G. Collingwood for noting that Plato’s 
‘methodology splits philosophy into two parts: one an arid waste of ingenious logic-chopping, the other 
an intuitive vision of ultimate reality.’ R. E. Allen, Plato’s 'Euthyphro' and the Earlier Theory of Forms: A 
Re-interpretation of the Republic (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2013), 104–5. In the same vein, Carlo Cellucci 
notes that ‘Aristotle considers two concepts of truth, truth as correspondence and truth as intuition of 
the essence. […] Aristotle concludes that his concept of truth cannot be used in practice, and hence 'must 
be set aside' […] according to Aristotle, we do have a faculty—intuition—capable of apprehending the 
essence of things.’ Carlo Cellucci, Rethinking Logic: Logic in Relation to Mathematics, Evolution, and 
Method (New York: Springer, 2013), 51–52.  
225 As John Cottingham notes, ‘the term 'intuition' has ancient roots in philosophy. The Latin verb intueri 
means to see, or to look upon. And as used in the seventeenth century, for example in Descartes, intuition 
refers to the intellectual faculty whereby I see certain truths hold, or that certain things are good or to be 
pursued. The underlying metaphor, which goes back to Plato, is one of seeing something clearly in the 
light of day, right there in front of you. Curiously enough, Descartes, like Plato before him, actually 
thought that the ordinary sense of sight (seeing with the eyes) was problematic and unreliable as a guide 
to reality. But both philosophers were nevertheless happy to use the corporeal vision as an analogue for 
the process of direct intellectual intuition.’ John Cottingham, "Intuition and Genealogy", in Intuition, 
Theory, and Anti-Theory in Ethics, ed. Sophie Grace Chappell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 9. 
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Artworks constitute things that can be understood intuitively.226 In effect, one’s 
so-called ‘intuitive understanding’ is rendered a necessary part of the process through 
which one grasps and acknowledges internal logic. Particularly in respect of the 
aesthetic evaluation of artworks, intuition alone is not enough. Rather, the notion of 
employing what can be identified as ‘informed intuition’ seems more appropriate and 
indeed more useful.227 While achieving a logical conclusion requires one to employ 
one’s intuition, evaluating the validity of a logical conclusion (that is to say, assessing to 
what extent intuition can be established as true) would require something more than 
‘pure’ intuition (which arguably may not even exist). At the same time, one’s intuition—
as a level of awareness, contextualised only through sense and one’s first-hand 
experiences—is also likely to be informed by insights and conclusions attained via 
theoretical analysis and understanding. Likewise, there might also be certain things that 
could prevent one from achieving a correct intuition—or, alternatively, lead one to be 
wrongly informed—thereby eliciting an inaccurate intuitive conclusion. The manner in 
which one would be able to substantiate an intuition does not involve the same 
analytical tools that one would usually utilise when endeavouring to prove something 
empirically. When considering the Artworld, knowing ‘intuitively’ whether or not a 
particular artwork is necessarily good would require one to possess a certain degree of 
                                                 
226 Nevertheless, as NITA demonstrates, to fully understand artworks—to see them, in both senses of the 
word—one requires both sides of the proverbial coin: that is to say, to understand the work intuitively 
while at the same bearing in mind the analytical deconstruction of what the work should be. 
227 While it may still be ‘intuition’, one surely does intuit something ‘out of nowhere’ and does not just 
‘suddenly’ sense it. A deeper examination of Kahneman’s work would assist one in better understating 
this notion. In the same vein, one might also find it illuminating to explore some of the insights attained 
by Koestler in his 1949 book Insight and Outlook. Consider, for instance, the following passage: ‘As to the 
equation of science with logic or reason, art with intuition and the unconscious, this is one of the oldest 
popular fallacies. […] no discovery was ever made by logical deduction; each original scientific 
achievement is a bisociative act on the same mental pattern as the creation of wit and—as the following 
section seeks to prove—the creation of art.’ Arthur Koestler, Insight and Outlook: An Inquiry into the 
Common Foundations of Science, Art and Social Ethics (New York: Macmillan, 1949). 
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knowledge about that particular work. For instance, one should know what is 
considered a so-called ‘good example’ of that particular artwork’s ‘genre’—that is to 
say, what should make that particular artwork a good work of art. According to Eddy M. 
Zemach, for instance, in order to classify anything at all, one must first go through the 
process of appreciating the very thing one wishes to classify. As the title of his essay 
suggests, there is ‘no identification without evaluation’.228 Ultimately, for Zemach, one 
should identify what makes something a ‘good instance of its kind’.229 In other words, 
before one classifies an artwork, one evaluates it. Thus, classifying an artwork as an 
artwork becomes the second stage in the process. Only once one evaluates and 
appreciates something is one able to both identify and understand what that something 
actually is, and how to categorise it.230 By the same token, only when confronted with 
an artwork would one be able to employ one’s ‘informed intuition’ appropriately. Thus, 
attaining an understanding of an object’s internal logic would entail recognizing, 
logically, what that something necessarily should be. In Art, one would thus acquire 
knowledge informing one’s intuition by grasping a particular artwork’s distinctive 
internal logic. 
 
                                                 
228 Eddy M. Zemach, "No Identification Without Evaluation", British Journal of Aesthetics 26, no. 3 
(Summer 1986): 239–51. 
229 Ibid., 242. 
230 Despite the fact that Zemach does not reference Dickie’s theory or any variation thereof—even though 
Dickie’s original version had at that time been around for over 10 years—I consider his approach to be 
distinctly institutional in nature. This is quite evident from what appears as his general idea, and the 
illuminating examples and frames of reference he employs in his essay. As Zemach himself asks in the 
opening lines of his essay, ‘should not identification precede evaluation? It seems that one needs, first of 
all, to identify the object one intends to evaluate in order to evaluate it.’ Ibid., 239. In similar respects, 
Graves argues that when one interprets a work of art, seeking out its meanings and messages, one 
essentially assembles a ‘package’ that consists of the particular ‘artworld systems’ which are deemed 
‘relevant’ to the particular work in question. This ‘package’ which one assembles contains the very 
essence of what enables one to classify the work of art and determine its identity. Graves, The New 
Institutional Theory of Art, 80. 
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3. The Institution of Audio Performance: Defining a New Aesthetic Category  
 
3.1 Audio Performance: A ‘Mother-Institution’ for Classification and Appreciation 
To define Audio Performance (AP)—as both an artistic institution and aesthetic 
category—I begin by following the structure of NITA, paying close attention its four basic 
rule-schemes (i.e. R1 through R4). As stated earlier, they reside in the very core of NITA. 
Together, they define the artistic institution itself, constituting its aforementioned 
‘inflected’ nature,231 thereby articulating what can and cannot be identified (and 
subsequently evaluated) as art. As Graves points out, ‘this humble set is where it all 
begins. […] unpacking it, as we will, should reveal the surprisingly rich and complex 
institutional conception of art that we seek.’232 Appropriately, since the institution of AP 
should fundamentally be rendered an Artworld system in and of itself, one arguably 
cannot begin explaining what AP is without first establishing its own of set of basic rule-
schemes. With my application of R1–R4, I wish to demonstrate the manner in which one 
is able to utilise NITA for articulating new institutional rules—thereby identifying, and 
potentially creating, completely new artistic genres. These, in effect, would constitute 
previously undefined aesthetic categories—and thereby unique artistic institutions in 
their own right. 
In brief, as a classificatory apparatus—complying with what the original versions 
of NITA set out to achieve—the institution of AP should enable one to identify what 
counts as an ‘AP artwork’: that is to say, it sets the context—the given circumstances—
                                                 
231 Ibid., 30–32, 43, 56, 58, 69, 94. 
232 Ibid., 40. 
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under which one is able to regard a ‘recorded text’ as an aural performance.233 
Audiobooks, for example—as alluded to in my introductory chapter—should be 
identified as unique AP artworks. Indeed, they should not merely be regarded as aurally 
recorded written texts—that have simply been transferred from the printed page into 
a recording device—but rather they should be perceived as part of a singular artistic 
genre. Furthermore—as has also been pointed out earlier—while they constitute one 
of the major examples of what an AP artwork is, audiobooks are not the only form of 
aural performance that can be identified as such. Rather, they should be classified as a 
‘sub-(institutional)-category’, belonging to a larger ‘mother institution’ of AP. 
Correspondingly, as an evaluative tool—highlighting the unique contribution of 
NITA to the artistic appreciation, and at the same time demonstrating the manner in 
which this approach can be applied to further artistic fields—the institution of AP can 
be employed for demonstrating what makes a particular AP artwork aesthetically good, 
or, indeed, aesthetically deficient. In essence, this process of evaluation would entail 
three stages of analysis: First, one would evaluate the performance in its own right—
that is to say, a performance of a given work—as a work of art in and of itself. Next, one 
would evaluate its own distinct nature as an aural performance—considering the 
internal logic of the medium. Finally, one would be required to examine the unique 
                                                 
233 Just as NITA fundamentally distinguishes between ‘art’ and ‘not art’, the institution of AP essentially 
forms the distinction between a performed text and the mere reading of text into a tape recorder. Indeed, 
establishing what counts as AP answers a number of questions, all pertaining to the very nature of the 
aesthetic category itself. For example: What is it that quite literally makes an audiobook a product of the 
Artworld (and thereby an artwork in its own right)? When is an audience expected to understand or 
perceive a particular so-called ‘spoken word’ recording as an aural performance (i.e. rather than a mere 
‘reading’ or nothing more than a mere recording of the original text)? When, if at all, can the person(s) 
featured on such a recording be regarded as an artist? Alternatively, one could ask whether or not one 
should distinguish between the ‘performing artist’ and ‘the’ artist, the latter—a director, for instance, or 
a casting director—being the creator of the artwork. Indeed, an argument could also be made that the 
role of the performing artist might in fact be akin to the role of the artist with regard to NITA’s R3.  
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internal logic inhabiting the original text being performed—as it would to a large extent 
determine the manner in which the text should be performed.234 Thus, to properly 
evaluate a particular AP artwork, one is effectively required to follow two different sets 
of internal logic: that of the original work and that of its aural performance. 
In focusing my attention on the realm of audiobooks, it is my intention to utilise 
my forthcoming case studies for illustrating the manner in which the study of AP 
artworks can contribute to a better understanding of the actual process of aesthetic 
evaluation. As expressed in my introduction to this study, I endeavour to illustrate this 
matter by highlighting the unique craft of casting aural performances, which I find to be 
inherently related to the particular intuition that informs it. As Rubery points out, ‘Fit 
between speaker and script [is] a delicate matter’, and the task of ‘finding a suitable 
narrator’ entails ‘matching the speaker to the fictional character’s […] audible markers 
of identity’.235 As alluded to earlier, I would argue that assigning a specific text to a 
particular performer is essentially informed by having already evaluated in one’s mind’s 
ear whether or not the putative performance should be aesthetically good.236 
 
                                                 
234 Fundamentally, the first and final stages would be carried out almost simultaneously, and both stages 
are arguably guided by or derived from one’s informed intuition. Now, in light of what will later in this 
chapter be referred to as the classic ontological distinction between ‘types’ and ‘tokens’—which is usually 
applied when regarding performances as works of art in their own right—one might be tempted to argue 
that the final stage contradicts the first. Nevertheless, as I will show, this apparent contradiction can in 
fact be resolved by abandoning this distinction and adopting a different perspective—which, in brief, is 
rooted in the assertion that one is required to take on the responsibility of attaining a comprehensive 
understanding of the very thing that one wishes to evaluate. As Graves puts it, ‘in the context of 
evaluating a work of art, […] 'if one does not understand, one should not judge'’. Graves, The New 
Institutional Theory of Art, 71.       
235 Rubery, The Untold Story of the Talking Book, 98.  
236 In what will eventually form part of this study’s conclusions, this not only appears to be in the core of 
the craft of casting, but it also demonstrates a dynamic relationship between casting, informed intuition 
and aesthetic appreciation. 
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3.2 Audio Performance: A New Aesthetic Category Defined 
As aforementioned, I find that a close reading and comprehensive understanding of the 
core institutional structure of NITA facilitates an extended application of its four basic 
rule-schemes (R1–R4), which one can effectively utilise for identifying and creating new 
artistic genres and aesthetic categories. Thus, presented herein is my proposed set of 
applied rule-schemes—that, in effect, establish the inner-workings of AP as a distinct 
artistic institution. It, in turn, institutes the criteria and parameters for what does and 
what does not count as an AP artwork. 
[R1] Audio Performance (AP) counts as an Artworld-relevant system of rules if, 
and only if, it creates the framework for the governing of a very specific practice: 
namely, one which (a) entails the recording of written texts by a performer, and (b) 
presents them as solely aurally-oriented artworks, to a designated Artworld public who 
consume AP artworks.  
[R2] A written text counts as an AP Artwork if, and only if, the written text is (a) 
recorded by a performer, solely for an aural format, and (b) presented (in its recorded 
incarnation) to a designated Artworld public within an Artworld system. 
[R3] A(n) (audio)-performer is one who participates, with understanding, in 
creating AP artworks and presenting them to a designated Artworld public within an 
Artworld system. 
[R4] An AP audience is a set of persons who count as the section of the Artworld 
public who consume AP artworks if, and only if, its members are prepared to take upon 
themselves a minimum degree of responsibility of understanding when to regard and 
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experience an aurally recorded text as an AP artwork. Correspondingly, it should be 
created by an audio-performer, and presented to an AP audience within the framework 
of an Artworld system. 
Although these predominantly set the context for classification, it cannot be 
stressed enough that aesthetic evaluation is just as crucial. While NITA surely 
demonstrates its strength in classifying particular objects as distinct artworks, it also 
implies that classification is not enough. Rather, as stated, in order to fully comprehend 
what a particular artwork is all about, that act of evaluation cannot be set aside. As 
Graves explains it, 
[T]he institutional theory of art provides us with clear theoretical 
mechanisms for carrying the major activities involved in theorizing 
about art: how to classify a work of art, how to interpret a work of art, 
and how to evaluate a work of art […] We have decided to offer a 
presentation of the institutional theory of art’s major theoretical 
mechanisms along the traditional lines of the main activities involved 
in the theoretical study of works of art: classification, interpretation, 
and evaluation. Each activity is designed to answer a basic question 
concerning the work of art: "what is it?", "what does it mean?", and 
"is it good?". We tend to think that these are three different sorts of 
activities, since these are three distinct questions which make good 
sense, and we can expect three distinct answers.237  
To be sure, one of the most popular and commonly held theories about art asserts that 
‘beauty is in the eye of the beholder’. However, it should be quite clear by now why this 
is a gross misconception. In brief, while this statement may tell one a thing or two about 
the beholder, it conveys absolutely nothing about art or about what the beholder 
beholds. In essence, a ‘beholder’—who might hold the role of the audience in respect 
of NITA and the Artworld—is required to be ‘prepared in some degree to understand’ 
                                                 
237 Graves, The New Institutional Theory of Art, 57. 
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the very thing that one is beholding, rather than merely stating what one finds to his/her 
liking.238 Appropriately, as alluded to earlier, an AP audience is expected to be prepared 
to fully understand what they are listening to.239 Moreover, just as a performer is 
expected to know how to perform a particular written text as an AP artwork—in 
accordance with the internal logic of the original text and that of the aural medium—an 
AP audience is expected to determine whether or not, and to what extent, a performer 
has succeeded in doing his/her job.240 Helen Roach, for instance, points out in this 
respect that ‘many records have not been well done’, which results in ‘new listeners’ 
being ‘turned away by poor recordings before hearing others which make for rewarding 
listening.’ She asserts that ‘some records are indeed works of art’ and that ‘a frequent 
                                                 
238 By way of illustration, consider one’s first-ever encounter with a typical Vincent van Gogh ‘Cypress’ 
painting. If, when asked one’s thoughts on such a painting, one would assert that it is not a good 
painting—and when asked why, one would reply something along the lines of ‘because it doesn't look 
like an actual tree’—one’s answer cannot be justified by stating that ‘beauty is in the eye of the beholder’. 
Indeed, such a statement would demonstrate that one had not taken the minimum responsibility of 
acquiring even the slightest degree of learned knowledge about Van Gogh’s painting—explicitly, that a 
typical Van Gogh ‘Cypress’ painting is simply not supposed to be a painting ‘of’ an actual tree. In effect, 
one would be required to examine such a painting through the lens of its appropriate artistic institution, 
and thereby in accordance with its own distinctive internal logic. Indeed, since it is most definitely not a 
realistic painting, examining to what extent it may or may not look like an actual tree, one that exists ‘out 
there’ in some concrete forest, constitutes a completely extraneous effort. In other words, examining a 
non-realistic artwork in terms of ‘how realistic’ it is might lead one to conclude that it is a bad artwork. 
Nonetheless, if one knows the internal logic of the artwork one happens to engage with—in this case, 
Post-Impressionism (or, as some might argue, Expressionism)—one would be able to appropriately 
evaluate its aesthetic quality in the right terms. 
239 In other words, one is essentially required to identify whether or not a particular recording can be 
listened to and experienced as an AP artwork. Indeed, as will presently be explained in the succeeding 
section of this chapter, listening to an audiobook constitutes an aesthetic experience in its own right—
and it should not be perceived as an alternative to reading.   
240 Consider, for example, the craft of stand-up comedy, and imagine an encounter with a stand-up 
comedian who either has no sense of comic timing or is incapable of appropriately delivering a joke. Even 
if one may not necessarily fail in these two aspects—which arguably constitute the two minimum 
requirements of any stand-up comedian—the very notion of a stand-up comedian who is simply not funny 
is more than a contradiction in terms. Indeed, when one engages with a stand-up comedy act that does 
not succeed in exhibiting the internal logic of stand-up—that is to say, when one experiences something 
that should be funny, but in fact is not—it would imply one of the following: either the performer did not 
do his/her job correctly, or, alternatively, the audience, simply put, did not ‘get it’. The former may justify 
what was once the tradition of bringing one’s rotten vegetables to live performances (just in case). The 
latter justifies that if one does not ‘get it’ then it is one’s responsibility to discern the reason why. Although 
this would surely require a study in its own right, I would argue that this demonstrates, potentially, that 
the fact that something is ‘funny’ is, at its core, an institutional fact.   
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case of poor recordings has been failure to adapt to the new medium. Even actors with 
considerable stage experience have not always made the adjustment’.241 Consequently, 
just as certain objects may on the one hand comply with what NITA defines as art, yet 
on the other hand may not necessarily comply with what constitutes good art—certain 
recordings of aurally-delivered written texts might accord with what an AP artwork is 
supposed to be, but at the same time might not be considered particularly good.242  
 
3.3 What Counts as Audio Performance: Complying with the Aesthetic Category  
In her exploration of the recorded materials found in libraries—to which she refers 
broadly, rather than explicitly to audiobooks—Tracy asserts that since scholars in fields 
such as ‘languages, medicine, zoology, political science, history, literature, drama, and 
anthropology’ can surely all be regarded as the potential users of these recordings, she 
was surprised to discover that academic libraries have customarily been slow to collect 
such recorded material, and ‘particularly in non-musical areas of investigation.’243 She 
concludes that there has been a tendency 
[a]mong librarians in academic and research institutions […] to regard 
phonograph records as mere entertainment, like paperback detective 
novels, and therefore more appropriately collected by public libraries. 
[…] Such indifference toward a new medium for preserving human 
                                                 
241 Helen Roach, Spoken Records, 3rd ed. (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1970), 8.  
242 Referring, for instance, to what at the time was the ‘new crop’ of spoken records released by Caedmon, 
J. Peter Bergman asserts that while they all constitute great works of literature, they are ‘not all great 
aural literature, for not all the readers bring to our ears the best intentions of the authors they represent’. 
J. Peter Bergman, "British Nostalgia/Spoken Word Issues", Association for Recorded Sound Collections 
Journal 13, no. 3 (1981): 133, accessed October 27, 2016, http://www.arsc-audio.org/journals/v13/-
v13n3p131-136.pdf. 
243 Tracy, "Echoes in a Bottle", 24–25. 
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thought, history, and personality cannot endure very long against the 
general electronic revolution now upon us.244 
In point of fact, despite the intense and prosperous proliferation of ‘aurality’ in a 
number of interdisciplinary fields, audiobooks are seldom listed amongst other artistic 
genres or practices.245 Consider, for instance, the following heartfelt letter by veteran 
American audiobook narrator George Guidall, submitted in 2011 to the New York Times: 
To the Editor:  Discussing the popularity of audiobooks, James Parker 
notes that they "are on the rise" ("The Mind’s Ear," Nov. 27). But are 
they "on the rise" because they've just been discovered, or is it that 
The New York Times has finally conceded their importance after years 
of denying them the status they deserve? Having narrated more than 
900 unabridged novels over the past 20 years, I can attest to the fact 
that audiobooks long ago rose to achieve a most respected place in 
the minds and ears of those who appreciate the narrative art form 
along with the beauty of classic literature. Letters thanking me for 
bringing Proust, Dostoyevsky, and Cervantes to life; for "telling" the 
stories of Tony Hillerman, Wally Lamb and Lilian Jackson Braun; and 
for heightening the experience of books previously read speak to a 
facet of audiobooks’ success that seems to have been overlooked: the 
relationship generated between narrator and listener. The 
relationship is based on an unspoken intimacy, matching empathy and 
the emotional honesty the narrator provides. It’s not a fad. It’s not 
something with which to pass the time, although it helps. It’s an art 
form and, when well executed, should be appreciated as such.  
GEORGE GUIDALL246 
                                                 
244 Ibid., 25. 
245 As Hibbitts explains it, ‘Slowly, sound began to have a discernible impact on a variety of different 
disciplines and undertakings. In linguistics, Ferdinand de Saussure departed from then-conventional 
academic wisdom to argue that true language was speech, as opposed to some combination of speech 
and writing. […] A variety of European and American poets abandoned the visualist analogy between 
poetry and painting (ut pictura poesis) that had held intellectual sway since the eighteenth century and 
instead began to explore the inherently aural relationship between poetry and music. […] Sound even 
had an impact on the visual arts. […] artists like […] Kandinsky openly likened the process of painting to 
musical composition […] A few artists even ventured into the relatively untested waters of “performance” 
where sound could be directly manipulated in the context of other media.’ Hibbitts, "Making Sense of 
Metaphors", [3.14]. In the same vein, Tracy asserts that while one cannot ‘put off thinking about changes 
until the century has actually turned’, attention should be paid to the then ‘present state of things.’ She 
argues that although aural recordings appear to be ‘infiltrating academic library collections, […] it is often 
impossible to tell what kind of recordings a given institution is collecting, since no distinction is generally 
made between musical and nonmusical recordings in annual reports or in the professional literature.’ 
Tracy, "Echoes in a Bottle", 25. 
246 George Guidall, letter to the editor, New York Times, December 23, 2011. 
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Indeed, Guidall’s frustration and disappointment are not unreasonable. Consequently, 
by establishing an appropriate aesthetic context—the given circumstances for 
understanding these aural performances as art—one is not only able to classify (and, 
subsequently, evaluate) both audiobooks and radio plays as AP artworks, but also to 
identify additional cases of aural performance. In other words, the criteria and 
parameters prescribed by the general aesthetic category—the institution of AP—should 
assist one in recognizing and appreciating any phenomena that can be said to comply 
with the institution itself. As I will later show, in addition to these two so-called standard 
and predominant cases (i.e. audiobooks and radio drama), there appear to be a number 
of ‘non-standard’ artistic manifestations of the same general aesthetic category.247 
Borrowing from Rubery, one might well be inclined to categorise audiobooks 
somewhere ‘on the borderline between performance and adaptation’.248 In considering 
the latter, while audiobooks may indeed exist as adaptations of literary works (or, 
alternatively, as something akin to performative interpretations), I would argue that 
they nonetheless do not entirely comply with the routine kind of adaptations one might 
be accustomed to.249 Indeed, as opposed to most literary adaptations for stage and 
screen, audiobooks customarily include all of the words in the original printed work.250 
                                                 
247 As will be further elaborated upon in Chapter 6—in which I further investigate the parameters for what 
counts as an AP artwork by way of illuminating what effectively does not—these cases include what is 
regarded as audio-vérité recordings and the concept of the audio commentary track on DVDs. 
248 Matthew Rubery, introduction to Audiobooks, Literature, and Sound Studies, 13. 
249 Referencing a term that inherently corresponds with Bolter and Grusin’s ambitious study pertaining to 
the ‘mediality’ of representations, James Jesson argues that ‘adaptations of works between media are 
not necessarily remediations’. James Jesson, "A Library on the Air—Literary Dramatization and Orson 
Welles’s Mercury Theatre", in Audiobooks, Literature, and Sound Studies, ed. Matthew Rubery (New York: 
Routledge, 2011), 46. For a detailed reflection on the notion of ‘remediation’, see Jay David Bolter and 
Richard Grusin, Remediation: Understanding New Media (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999). 
250 In brief, the text is adapted by the printed words being transformed into spoken words, thereby 
becoming an aural performance. Indeed, the fact that the spoken words are conveyed by a performer, as 
a mediator of sorts, and that the performance is in effect filtered through the performer’s artistic choices 
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While complete and unabridged recordings conventionally prevail as the gold 
standard, one is sure to come across abridged recordings as well.251 Although 
abridgements fully meet the definition of what an audiobook is—and thus may also 
potentially comply with what an AP artwork should be (i.e. in respect of R1–R4)—they 
nevertheless constitute a somewhat different kind of audiobook, as they do not consist 
of the complete printed version of the text. Prevailing as something of a sub-
(institutional)-category of the audiobook genre—in itself a sub-category of the larger 
mother institution—abridgements appear to be more easily categorised as adaptations 
than unabridged audiobooks since the original written text is not only transformed into 
spoken word but also undergoes a literal reformation. For this reason, abridgements 
arguably constitute a somewhat easier target for criticism.252 Nevertheless, their 
apparent existence as a shorter version of an original work should not factor into the 
equation of evaluation.253 
Cost-effectiveness and economizing shelf-space notwithstanding, abridged 
audiobooks should be perceived as having been created within the specific context of 
                                                 
(including those conceived by the director or the production’s creative team) surely count as essential 
aspects of an adaptation.  
251 In November 2013, I interviewed British casting director Patrick McQuaid at his office at ID Audio Ltd 
in London. (A recording is provided on the USB flash drive). According to McQuaid, abridgements were 
initially created for two main reasons: cost-effectiveness and shelf-space. He points out that audiobooks 
gained their popularity at a time when audio cassettes were the standard-issue available format. Hence, 
if producing a single unabridged audiobook would require one to spread it over, say, fourteen cassette 
tapes, one would be unable to sell it to a consumer for fourteen times the price of what one cassette tape 
used to cost. He argues that retailers, in effect, preferred selling a number of abridged audiobooks, usually 
spread over two or four cassette tapes each, rather than one unabridged 14-cassette box set.   
252 One could argue, for instance, that their apparent existence as ostensibly incomplete representation 
of the original literary work essentially prevents one from experiencing the actual work, thereby 
potentially affecting one’s aesthetic evaluation of the work itself. One might even go so far as to argue 
that the very act of shortening an existing complete work in effect ‘butchers’ the original book.  
253 Although one might sympathise to some degree with the criticism rejecting them, I would argue that 
this matter should not necessarily pose an aesthetic conundrum. Overall, the exploration of 
abridgements—as a phenomenon—might benefit from being investigated in terms of the moral 
implications of ostensibly intervening with the given aesthetics of a particular work. 
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the Artworld—thereby constituting deliberately designed abridged versions of a written 
text. In fact, quite a significant number of authors have not only approved the 
abridgement of their own work for the purpose of releasing it as an audiobook, but have 
also themselves participated in making the assumed necessary cuts and edits. 
Moreover, some recordings even feature an author him/herself narrating the abridged 
version of his/her own work. This demonstrates that authors no doubt understand that 
(a) listening to an audiobook is not a substitute for reading the original book, and that 
(b) an aural performance, under certain circumstances, might require employing some 
so-called adjustments to the original printed work. Consequently, abridgements prevail 
as interpretations of the original written work—and the fact that an audiobook happens 
to be an abridged version of the original text should simply necessarily affect the process 
of aesthetically appreciating an audiobook as an AP artwork.254 
 
3.4 Reading vs. Listening: Identifying the Aesthetic Experience  
To understand audiobooks as AP artworks—in the context of the applied four rule-
schemes—attention must be paid to distinguishing two kinds of experiences: listening 
to an audiobook and reading an original printed work. To be sure, listening to an 
                                                 
254 When considering an abridged audiobook in terms of what NITA regards as a ‘candidate for 
appreciation’, one should examine the aural performance itself rather than the quality or aesthetic 
properties of the abridgement. At the same time, one should not altogether ‘ignore’ the fact that any 
audiobook consists of an original work, which possesses a unique and individual internal logic of its own, 
and that it, in turn, would predominantly determine the aesthetic nature of its putative aural 
performance. Even when, for whatever reason, a particular work undergoes some form of change (e.g., 
an adaptation or edit), its original internal logic would essentially underscore the manner in which that 
particular text should be performed. Conceivably, the very same internal logic would likewise inform the 
aesthetic nature of an abridgement. (Hypothetically, evaluating an abridged version of the original work 
as an aesthetically good abridgment does not necessarily entail that abridged audiobook would in turn 
be evaluated as an aesthetically good aural performance). 
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audiobook constitutes a considerably different experience than that which one 
undergoes when reading a book. Despite the apparent presence of the exact ‘same’ 
text, which one merely encounters through two different forms (i.e. in its original 
printed form on the one hand, and as its aural performance on the other), these two 
experiences are different in more ways than one. First and foremost, one does not 
experience the text in the same mode. It must therefore be made clear that listening to 
an audiobook is not, nor should it be, regarded as something one does as a so-called 
alternative to actually reading the printed book.255 The act of reading a book should 
similarly not be considered as supposedly better (i.e. culturally higher and more 
important) than the act of listening to an audiobook. As T. M. Luhrmann points out, 
We tend to regard reading with our eyes as more serious, more 
highbrow, than hearing a book read out loud. [...] The great linguist 
Ferdinand de Saussure thought we treated writing as more important 
than speaking because writing is visual. Speech is ephemeral—you 
hear a word, and then it is gone. The word written down remains, and 
so we attach more significance to it. Saussure wrote that when we 
imagined text as more important than speech, it was as if we thought 
we would learn more about someone from his photograph than from 
his face. [...] The ability to read has always been invested with more 
importance than mere speech. When only a small priestly elite could 
read, books were sacred mysteries. When more people could read, 
literacy became a means to move forward in the world. These days, 
                                                 
255 KJ Dell’Antonia, for instance, poses the question of whether or not listening to audiobooks counts as 
what is regarded as a ‘school reading’, and if so, under what circumstances. According to Dell’Antonia, 
‘Adults debate the point often, with lovers of print sometimes deriding audio-biblio-philes […] and lovers 
of audio books defending their choice […]. For literary purposes […] listening versus reading the words 
may be a matter of preference (a somewhat dated study, published in 1990, found no significant 
differences in comprehension in those who read as opposed to those who listened), but for gaining 
fluency and speed in the act of reading itself, as well as increased familiarity with punctuation and spelling, 
listening is, indeed, no substitute for reading. […] Cultural literacy can be increased by listening; literacy 
with respect to the mechanics of the written word cannot.’ KJ Dell’Antonia, "When Audio Books Do and 
Don't Count for School", Motherlode (blog), New York Times, September 7, 2012, accessed July 20, 2016, 
http://parenting.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/07/when-audio-books-do-and-dont-count-for-school.    
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the ability to read is a prerequisite for full participation in the social 
order.256 
By the same token, it would be wrong to dismiss audiobooks as a purportedly easier 
task to tackle since it appears to excuse one from having to endure actually reading a 
book oneself.257 Indeed, an overt misconception appears to prevail in respect of the so-
called intellectual challenge involved in both activities—developing, in turn, an evident 
hierarchy that clearly lends itself to printed books, and thereby generating a 
predominantly heated debate with regard to the nature of their recorded 
incarnations.258 According to Sara Knox, audiobook critics and listeners alike appear to 
vigorously dispute the notion that listening to audiobooks, as opposed to reading, 
constitutes ‘a more passive interpretive activity […] precisely because the interpretive 
act of voicing has already been surrendered by the listener’.259 In the same vein, Rubery 
frequently points out that questions pertaining to the authenticity of audiobooks—that 
is to say, their status as so-called ‘real’ books—have always been in the centre of the 
criticism against them:  
The alleged passivity of audiobook reception is largely responsible for 
suspicions that it is "not really reading." […] The defensiveness of 
                                                 
256 T. M. Luhrmann, "Audiobooks and the Return of Storytelling", New York Times, February 22, 2014, 
accessed July 20, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/23/opinion/sunday/luhrmann-audiobooks-
and-the-return-of-storytelling.html. 
257 Just as it surely would not suffice to merely view the film version of a certain novel rather than actually 
read it, one most definitely should not listen to an audiobook version of a particular book instead of 
engaging with the original work. In this respect, just as one should not evaluate the original novel based 
on one’s experience of a stage or screen adaptation, one should not, for the most part, evaluate a novel 
based on its audiobook version. Moreover, if, for instance, one happened to engage with a particularly 
bad audiobook—in that it does not, for the sake of argument, successfully exhibit the internal logic of its 
world—one might be tempted to criticise the entire concept of audiobooks, and consequently discard 
them as an art form altogether.     
258 As Rubery observes, ‘readers who express discomfort toward hearing printed books read aloud seldom 
express the same unease toward reading oral scripts in print’. The Untold Story of the Talking Book, 35.  
Conceivably, it was the novel’s fundamental ‘association with print […] [that had] set it apart from other 
genres originally intended for aural reception’. Ibid., 37.      
259 Sara Knox, "Hearing Hardy, Talking Tolstoy: The Audiobook Narrator’s Voice and Reader Experience", 
in Audiobooks, Literature, and Sound Studies, ed. Matthew Rubery (New York: Routledge, 2011), 128. 
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audiobook listeners is evident in their frequent apologies for listening 
to rather than reading a book. […] A nostalgic preference for the 
material book underpins the discomfort many readers feel toward an 
act of reception involving no tangible manuscript. Listening to a book 
is not a sensuous experience in the same way as is holding a book in 
one’s hands, with the heft of its binding and the texture of its pages. 
The proximity of the audiobook to the printed book is unsettling 
because it threatens the very identity of reading in a way that is not 
true of other forms of adaptation easily set apart as secondary to the 
printed text.260 
Ultimately, listening to an audiobook should be identified as an aesthetic experience in 
its own right—one which entails engaging with the performed text as an audience 
member, accepting it as an AP artwork.261 As Knox puts it, ‘a listener meets each reading 
as a distinct textual encounter, both in terms of the personality of the reader and the 
auditory space of listening.’262 Arguably, once listening to audiobooks is recognised as 
an aesthetic experience—effectively establishing audiobooks themselves as a unique 
kind of artefact—the concern that they might make reading obsolete (i.e. by providing 
idle persons with a so-called excuse not to engage with ‘real’ books) can be said to be 
quite preposterous. Indeed, to experience an audiobook as an AP artwork is most 
definitely not a passive (and thereby arguably easier) activity than reading a printed 
work. It does not—indeed, should not—supersede reading. Fundamentally, it should be 
considered in respect of its own terms, as a particular kind of activity that is inherently 
concerned with the aesthetic experience. 
                                                 
260 Rubery, introduction to Audiobooks, Literature, and Sound Studies, 11–12. Albeit somewhat anecdotal, 
I wish to quote one Ms. Amy Stodola, who in 2011 submitted a letter to the editor of the New York Times, 
referencing an essay by John Schwartz, and expressing her annoyance with Schwartz’s assertion that 
listening to audiobooks can be considered a kind of ‘reading’. In what clearly demonstrates the kind of 
critical reactions that audiobooks seem to evoke, Ms. Stodola quite casually remarks that, ‘while it can be 
enjoyable and stimulating, listening to audiobooks is no more a kind of reading than riding a train is a kind 
of walking.’ Amy Stodola, letter to the editor, New York Times, December 23, 2011. 
261 Again, this will become evident through my forthcoming formulation of the institution of AP. 
262 Knox, "Hearing Hardy, Talking Tolstoy", 139.  
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3.5 Audiobooks as (Aural) Performances 
Rubery’s allusion to audiobooks as performances no doubt supports my decision to 
employ the word ‘performance’ when naming my suggested new aesthetic category. 
Indeed, it highlights the notion that performances can be perceived as works of art in 
their own right. As Hilde Hein, for instance, points out, performances should be 
perceived as an ‘aesthetic phenomenon of primary significance’, and therefore require 
a new aesthetic category of their own.263 Although the spectrum of what is considered 
performance continuously broadens, and performance praxis progressively evolves—
since its inception, in fact, scholars and artists alike have proposed a variety of 
explanations, understandings and interpretations pertaining to what a performance 
actually is264—the meaning of the term itself, as stated in my introduction to this thesis, 
should be considered a given. Fundamentally, a performance constitutes a behaviour 
that has been consciously created for an audience. Arguably, this concise definition also 
appears very much akin to the frame of thinking established by NITA—as it essentially 
forms a distinction between the brute and the institutional facts pertaining to the 
particular behaviour in question.265 Thus, in order to regard a particular type of 
                                                 
263 Hilde Hein, "Performance as an Aesthetic Category", Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 28, no. 3 
(Spring 1970): 384.  
264 Marvin Carlson, for instance, regards performance as an antidiscipline and argues that it ‘resists 
conclusions, just as it resists the sort of definitions, boundaries, and limits so useful to traditional 
academic writing and academic structures.’ See Marvin Carlson, Performance: A Critical Introduction 
(London: Routledge, 1996), 206. At the same time, certain scholar-practitioners, such as Richard 
Schechner, have even gone so far as to argue that essentially anything and everything can be perceived 
or studied as an ostensible performance. Nevertheless, this approach appears to go well beyond what 
might be regarded as theatrical performance, as it appears to be focused more on identifying aspects of 
performativity in different fields—which are not necessarily artistic and thereby cannot comply with NITA. 
265 Drawing on Max Herrmann’s assertion that performance is ‘a game in which everyone, actors and 
spectators, participates’, Erika Fischer-Lichte identifies four central elements that constitute a 
performance (namely: mediality, materiality, semioticity and aestheticity). Erika Fischer-Lichte, The 
Routledge Introduction to Theatre and Performance Studies (London: Routledge, 2014), 18. These, she 
maintains, ‘exist in all kinds of performance’. [emphasis in original]. Ibid., 44. Fischer-Lichte herself 
defines performance as ‘any event in which all the participants find themselves in the same place at the 
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behaviour as a performance one would be required to identify the given (institutional) 
circumstances under which a particular behaviour counts as a performance.266 
Audiobooks—as AP artworks—can be identified as the aural performances of 
written texts. At the same time, audiobooks are distinct in that the written text which 
constitutes the basis for the aural performance already exists as a literary work of art in 
its own right. As Knox points out, 
[t]hat major audiobook distributors […] offer alternative recordings of 
canonical works […] follows the basic commodity logic of the provision 
of buyer choice: voices and performance styles for a listener to choose 
from. Certainly the “narrator wars” of the listener reviews […] attest 
to this: there’s a definite pattern of buyer-beware advice […] about 
the perils of making the wrong choice […]. Explaining the Naxos 
production of the unabridged Tess of the d’Urbervilles, the producer 
Roy Macmillan invokes the altruism of service to excellence (“Tess . . . 
is one of the great English novels, and that would have been reason 
enough for Naxos audiobooks to record it”), then moves to the nitty-
gritty: the need to compete: “Even if other publishers have recorded 
it in the past, or will do so again, it was important to [the managing 
director] of Naxos Audiobooks, to have the title in bookshops, record 
stores and on their virtual shelves.”267 
It is commonly agreed in the studies of aesthetics that there can only be one single work 
of art. Now, in light of what I earlier regarded as the necessity to articulate the two 
different sets of internal logic when aesthetically appreciating an AP artwork—i.e. that 
of the original work and that of its aural performance—one appears to be faced with 
something of an ontological and philosophical obstacle. Thus, one could argue that a 
                                                 
same time, partaking in a circumscribed set of activities. The participants can be actors or spectators, and 
the roles of these actors and spectators may switch, so that the same person could fulfill the part of an 
actor for a given period of time, and then turn into an observer. The performance is created out of the 
interactions of participants.’ Ibid., 18. By her own admission, this definition can be applied to ‘a wide 
variety of events’ that are not all necessarily performative in nature. Ibid.     
266 Likewise—in the context of the Artworld at large—once one identifies performances as artworks, an 
argument could be made that every performance should in effect possess its own unique kind of internal 
logic, and could thereby potentially comply with different kinds of sub-(institutional)-categories. 
267 Knox, "Hearing Hardy, Talking Tolstoy", 137. 
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particular work of art (e.g. a novel) and the performance thereof (i.e. a particular novel’s 
audiobook version) can never be perceived as one and the same. 268 To distinguish 
between a ‘performance’ (i.e. as a singular artwork in its own right) and a ‘performance 
of’ an already existing work (i.e. which is in itself singular and unique) effectively 
becomes imperative.269   
In these respects, if one follows what is customarily considered the classic 
ontological distinction between ‘types’ and ‘tokens’, evaluating a performance of an 
already existing work—especially a performance that is established as an artwork in its 
own right—would effectively require refraining from referring to the original work.270 In 
                                                 
268 Scholars and artists alike have long contemplated the ontological identity of the work itself. In 
considering a novel, for instance, one might question precisely where the artwork that one engages with 
in the mere form of the novel actually resides. Indeed, one might regard the author’s manuscript, the 
original first edition, or, alternatively, the very inception of the idea that the author had in his/her mind 
as valid prospects. Fundamentally, it is commonly agreed that there can only be one such possibility. Since 
the work itself is unique, it simply cannot assume any kind of alternative version.  
269 As David Davies explains, ‘the primary purpose of the performing arts is to prepare and present ‘artistic 
performances’ […] that either are themselves the appreciative focuses of works of art or are instances of 
other things that are works of art. […] The performance may itself be [...] the 'focus of appreciation' of an 
artwork, an artistic vehicle whose observable features directly articulate, perhaps in association with 
contextual factors, the representational, expressive and formal properties that make up the artistic 
content of the work. […] The performance may play an essential part in the appreciation of something 
else that is an artwork through being one among a possible multiplicity of instances of that work. […] 
[Thus, it is rendered] a performance of an independent work. In such cases, we can term the artwork 
appreciated a performed work and the instance through which it is appreciated a work performance. An 
artistic practice in which acknowledged artworks are designed to be performed works can be termed a 
performed art. […] [Ultimately,] certain qualities of those works, relevant to their being appreciated as 
the particular works that they are, are only realizable, and thereby made available to receivers, in those 
performances. The need to experience a performance of a performed work in order to properly 
appreciate that work is thus the analogue, in the performed arts, of the need to perceptually engage with 
a particular visible surface in order to properly appreciate a visual artwork. Drama, music and dance are 
traditionally taken to be performed arts in this sense. […] It is assumed that the model applicable to such 
examples—what we may term the 'classical paradigm'—also applies, with very few exceptions, to 
performances in other musical genres and to performances in other performance media.’ [emphasis in 
original] David Davies, "Work and Performance in the Performing Arts", Philosophy Compass 4, no. 5 
(September 2009): 744–45. 
270 Summarily, the ‘type-token’ paradigm identifies a so-called ‘general law’ contra its particular concrete 
instances (the latter being, in other words, the particular cases demonstrating the praxis of how the 
general law actually works). In effect, one is required to distinguish between the work of art (i.e. the 
singular type or prototype) and its literal or concrete manifestations (i.e. the various tokens of that one 
particular type). Recommended for further reading is David Osipovich’s account of what he identifies as 
the ‘literary theory’ of theatrical performance—following its re-formulation by the eminent scholars Noël 
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the performing arts, as John Dilworth explains it, one would customarily regards plays, 
pieces of music, dance choreographies, and so forth, as ‘types’—and the particular 
performances of these kinds of works as ‘tokens’ of those types. According to Dilworth, 
‘such “type” views are also common for non-performing arts such as literature and film, 
and even as applied to apparently particular artworks such as paintings’.271 
Consequently, when embarking on aesthetically evaluating audiobooks as AP artworks, 
one might assume that one should completely ignore the original text, and accordingly 
focus solely on the nature of the performed work. 
As I will presently demonstrate, although this matter appears to render my 
suggested prerequisite of identifying two different sets of internal logic as somewhat 
problematic, it nonetheless merely poses an intellectual hurdle that can in fact be 
defeated. In brief, in order for one to attain a better understanding of (a) the institution 
of AP, and (b) the phenomenon of audiobooks as its artistic product, a different 
approach should be taken—one that can subsequently serve as a more appropriate 
evaluative tool for aesthetic appreciation. As Dilworth maintains, 
plays, symphonies and other works in the performing arts are 
generally regarded, ontologically speaking, as being types, with 
individual performances of those works being regarded as tokens of 
those types. But […] there is a logical feature of type theory which 
makes it impossible for such a theory to satisfactorily explain a "double 
performance" case […] one in which a single play performance is 
actually a performance of two different plays. Hence type theories fail, 
both for plays and for the related performing art of music as well.272 
[emphasis in original] 
                                                 
Carroll and Richard Wollheim. See David Osipovich, "What Is a Theatrical Performance?", Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art 64, no. 4 (Fall 2006): 462–63.  
271 John Dilworth, "Theatre, Representation, Types and Interpretation", American Philosophical Quarterly 
39, no. 2 (April 2002): 201. 
272 John Dilworth, "A Counter-Example to Theatrical Type Theories", Philosophia 31, nos. 1–2 (2003): 165. 
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In conjunction with modern semiotic theories—and particularly the distinction made by 
Patrice Pavis between a ‘written text’ and a ‘performance text’—it can be established 
that virtually every text possesses two ostensible identities.273 As a ‘written text’, it 
exists as a scenario for performance, and thereby it inherently contains instructions for 
a performance—determining, at least in part, what the ‘performance text’ should 
consequently be. As a ‘performance text’, it is predominantly based on a reading of the 
written text—which may involve the act of interpreting it, translating it (or certain 
aspects thereof) into performative terms, as well as editing or cutting it.274 To be sure, 
although this distinction may appear to parallel the aforementioned notion of types and 
tokens, it in fact contradicts it. Explicitly, it does so in its insistence that every written 
text essentially embodies a particular and unique range of various possibilities for 
performance, which, in turn, prevail as the fullest realization of the text’s embodied 
potential. In terms of this dissertation, the fullest realization of a particular text’s 
potential can be identified as the internal logic of its own world. Thus, a performance 
text should effectively embody and manifest its own internal logic—or at least certain 
aspects thereof. 
In an online video masterclass, American screenwriter Aaron Sorkin presents an 
eloquent analogy between dialogue and music. He explicitly expresses his conviction 
                                                 
273 For further reading, see (i) Patrice Pavice, Theatre at the Crossroads of Culture (London: Routledge, 
1992) and (ii) Patrice Pavice, Contemporary Mise en Scène: Staging Theatre Today, trans. Joel Anderson 
(New York: Routledge, 2013). 
274 A performance text is predominantly influenced by one’s reading of the written text as a candidate for 
a specific production. The work of and relationship between a particular director and an ensemble of 
actors can surely inform the reading of a written text as one of the initial stages in creating a performance. 
Although written texts in these respects might be perceived as incomplete—in that they constitute a pre-
text for a performance—regarding a written text as a work of literature would entail being mindful of the 
possible performance texts it elicits (i.e. all the various productions of the play that can be generated by 
the written text). Effectively, regarding Shakespeare’s Hamlet, for instance, as a ‘performance text’ would 
both entail and be dependent upon a production-specific consideration.  
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that the task of writing a screenplay entails writing for the purpose of performance. 
Implicitly, I would argue, Sorkin’s insight expresses one of the distinct aspects of the 
internal logic of both the craft of screenwriting and that of performing these kinds of 
written texts. In his own words:  
It’s not just that dialogue sounds like music to me—it actually is music. 
Any time someone is speaking for the purpose of performance […] all 
the rules of music apply. Cadence, and tone, and volume […] So, when 
I'm writing, what the words sound like […] is as important to me as 
what the words mean. It’s a lot about rhythm. The actors will know if 
they have dropped a syllable or added a syllable accidentally, they'll 
know that something was wrong. The same way […] if you're playing 
music, and there’s a time signature at the beginning of it, it says four-
four-time—that means there are four beats in a measure and a 
quarter-note gets one beat—there can't be five beats in a measure, 
there can't be three beats in a measure. And the actors know if they've 
dropped something […] and I know when I'm writing if that […] didn't 
quite work, what I was doing. […] If you look at the whole piece—say, 
a two-hour play, a two-hour movie, a one-hour episode of television—
[…] it has a lot of the same properties as a long piece of music like a 
symphony does or an opera. It’s got solos and duets, it’s got allegros 
and adagios, it’s got arias— and sometimes they're good and 
sometimes they're bad, but it is music nonetheless.275  
Fundamentally, although the written text is separate from the performance text—
thereby constituting a blueprint for a performance or a working script—when one 
aesthetically evaluates a performance, the original written text simply cannot be 
rendered irrelevant. Indeed, no matter how a putative performance text turns out, it 
would always be in reference to the written text.276 
                                                 
275 Aaron Sorkin, "Writing Captivating Dialogue", in Masterclass: Aaron Sorkin Teaches Screenwriting 
(2016) Week 5, Lecture 21, 01m54sec–03m50sec. See URL: accessed February 12, 2017,  
https://www.masterclass.com/classes/aaron-sorkin-teaches-screenwriting. 
276 As written texts, play are ostensibly incomplete or un-finished works, which can fulfil their artistic end 
only once they become staged or produced performance texts. As a blueprint, it might effectively be 
rendered as a non-artistic text that requires an artistic interpretation. Similarly, AP artworks conceivably 
do not ‘exist’ until they are heard and experienced by an audience. Indeed, they too—just like plays, 
scripts or sheet music—appear to necessitate a literal performance. The can only fulfil their purpose once 
they are actualised and thereby attain their aesthetic identity. 
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Reading a written text effectively includes an awareness of the various theories 
associated with the written text, its historical connections and connotations, and indeed 
both its past and putative possibilities (and limitations) for performance—all of which, 
to one degree or another, can be identified as the various parts that together construct 
a particular text’s internal logic. A performance text necessarily includes the written 
text—or at least the segments of it that a director finds necessary. It effectively 
incorporates a director’s conceptual commentary on the written text—that is to say, 
his/her interpretation of the aforementioned embodied potential for realization.277 
This, predominantly, is what requires one to analyse and appreciate performances as 
distinct works of art in their own right. Appropriately, to evaluate a performance text, 
one utilises his/her interpretation and understanding of the written text as a guideline, 
effectively ascertaining whether or not (and the degree of success to which) a 
performance actualises the written text. Since any written text inherently elicits either 
a singular putative performance or a whole series of possible putative performances, 
the distinction between types and tokens no longer poses an intellectual hurdle.278 
Consequently, there prevails a perpetual interaction between the written text 
and performance text. As a result, the latter should be identified, interpreted and 
                                                 
277 An audience, in turn, experiences the manner in which a certain written text—which they may or may 
not be acquainted with—has been embedded within the performance, thereby constituting an aspect of 
the performance text. In other words, an audience may be aware, to some degree, of the certain set of 
instructions that a particular play would require its performance text to consist of. To be sure, an audience 
might even have their own idea about what an aesthetically good performance should be. 
278 According to Hein, one of the most significant properties of performances can be identified as change 
and process. This, she argues, is a missing feature in most traditional concepts of what aesthetics is—
since aesthetic categories have predominantly been analysed by way of highlighting either their ‘static 
features’ or their ‘end points’. Hein, "Performance as an Aesthetic Category", 384. As an aesthetic 
category, different performance texts—of the same written texts—would thus need to be evaluated 
differently, each as a unique work in its own right. At the same time, however, precisely because of the 
shared original written text, evaluating a performance text would necessarily have to consider the written 
text and the internal logic which it embodies. 
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evaluated as merely one among a number of many possible versions. Arguably, in 
considering Zemach’s aforementioned assertion that the act of evaluation precedes 
that classification, one implied challenge appears to involve the identification, 
interpretation and evaluation of the version that counts as a ‘good instance of its kind’. 
Indeed, doing so should effectively establish an ostensible hierarchy with regard to (a) 
the range of various possibilities for performance (that are embodied in the written text) 
and (b) whether or not the performances themselves succeed in fully realizing that 
particular range. This, in essence, would demonstrate the extent to which a particular 
performance succeeds in manifesting the internal logic of that text’s own world, or at 
least certain essential aspects thereof. At the same time, it must be emphasised that if 
a performance does not constitute an overall faithful rendering of the written text into 
performative terms, it would not necessarily be evaluated as an aesthetically bad 
artwork. To be sure, some performances purposely set out to create, embody and 
manifest a new kind of internal logic—which, in turn, would constitute an inherently 
different one from that embedded in the original written text. To properly evaluate such 
a performance—that is to say, in accordance with its own terms—one would be 
required to identify the particular internal logic of its world. Nonetheless, as stated 
earlier, even a performance that embodies its own so-called new internal logic—
although it should surely be regarded as a work of art in its own right—will forever 
remain rooted in the internal logic of the original work. To some degree or another, the 
performance would constitute a comment on, an interpretation of, or deconstruction 
of the internal logic embodied within the pre-existing written text.279 
                                                 
279 Even the most uncompromising playwright should know full well that each production is unique, and 
should therefore be willing to consider his/her play a so-called blueprint that may indeed be subjected to 
change. A play (or at least certain aspects thereof) could be argued to have implicit suggestions for a 
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It is precisely in these respects that I would argue that although the medium of 
the novel does not constitute a written text intended for performance, a particular 
novel’s iteration in the medium of the audiobook does constitute a performance text. 
Effectively, as an aesthetic category for defining aural performances, audiobooks 
encompass the two different sets of internal logic: the internal logic of the original work 
on the one hand, and the internal logic of its particular aural performance on the other. 
As a rule, I find that when aesthetically appreciating AP artworks—and particularly when 
dealing with canonical texts and well-recognised artworks—the original internal logic 
not only cannot be ignored, but, in fact, must be taken into consideration. 
 
3.6 Audiobooks as Artworks: the Aural Artefacts of a Distinct Artistic Genre 
The distinction between the printed word and its performed equivalent can also allude 
to the particular manner in which the written text should be spoken. As Wittkower 
points out, 
[i]n the written word, the particular modes of relevance of one word 
upon another are not communicated through grammatical roles alone 
but also take place through the occult actions of punctuation marks. 
In the spoken word, similar signals are given through precisely timed 
pauses and changes in tone. The commas used to offset modifying or 
explanatory clauses, such as those surrounding this aside, are 
intended to be heard differently, and to construct meaning differently, 
than those within a list. […] The modifying or explanatory clause—set 
off by commas or em dashes, like this—is lowered in pitch relative to 
the primary “timeline” of the sentence.280  
                                                 
putative performance, rather than explicit instructions. Yet, having said so, I am confident that every play 
is nevertheless required to express a precise and determined internal logic that cannot (indeed, should 
not) undergo a change. 
280 Wittkower, "A Preliminary Phenomenology", 221. 
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I am reminded by this of some insightful remarks made by renowned English theatre 
director, Peter Hall, in respect of the manner in which Harold Pinter—surely one of the 
most important and influential English playwrights of his time—customarily employed 
punctuation to indicate the differences between silences and pauses in his plays.281 
Pinter himself jokingly alluded in one of his speeches to the manner in which his critics 
and interpreters have scrutinised his apparently different use of a ‘dot, dot, dot’ as 
opposed to a dash.282 On the one hand, if the two are not one and the same, one can 
argue that they would surely sound quite different from one another when ‘spoken’ 
aloud. On the other hand, one could argue that the difference between them is quite 
irrelevant, and that investigating what each one is supposed to sound like is ultimately 
nothing more than nitpicking. Nevertheless, I would maintain that Hall’s insights do 
appear to explain the manner in which Pinter’s text can inform one about the preferred 
kinds of pauses that a performance should elicit.283 
                                                 
281 ‘There is a difference in Pinter between a pause and a silence and three dots. A pause is really a bridge 
where the audience thinks that you’re this side of the river, then when you speak again, you’re the other 
side. That’s a pause. And it’s alarming, often. It’s a gap, which retrospectively gets filled in. It’s not a dead 
stop—that’s a silence, where the confrontation has become so extreme, there is nothing to be said until 
either the temperature has gone down, or the temperature has gone up, and then something quite new 
happens. Three dots is a very tiny hesitation, but it’s there, and it’s different from a semicolon, which 
Pinter almost never uses, and it’s different from a comma. A comma is something that you catch up on, 
you go through it. And a full stop’s just a full stop. You stop.’ Peter Hall, "Directing Pinter", in Harold Pinter: 
You Never Heard Such Silence, ed. Alan Bold (London: Vision Press Limited, 1984), 26. 
282 ‘I've had two full-length plays produced in London. The first ran a week and the second ran a year. Of 
course, there are differences between the two plays. In The Birthday Party I employed a certain amount 
of dashes in the text, between phrases. In The Caretaker I cut out the dashes and used dots instead. So 
that instead of, say: ‘Look, dash, who, dash, I, dash, dash, dash,’ the text would read: ‘Look, dot, dot, dot, 
who, dot, dot dot, I, dot, dot, dot, dot.’ So it’s possible to deduce from this that dots are more popular 
than dashes and that’s why The Caretaker had a longer run than The Birthday Party. The fact that in 
neither case could you hear the dots and dashes in performance is beside the point. You can't fool the 
critics for long. They can tell a dot from a dash a mile off, even if they can hear neither.’ Harold Pinter, 
"Writing for the Theatre", in Various Voices: Sixty Years of Prose, Poetry, Politics, 1948–1998 (New York: 
Grove Press, 1998), 19–25. 
283 Conceivably, this aspect constitutes part of the internal logic of Pinter’s writing. In drawing a line 
between Pinter and Samuel Beckett, Hall explains that ‘a pause in Pinter is as important as a line. They 
are all there for a reason. Three dots is a hesitation, a pause is a fairly mundane crisis and a silence is 
some sort of crisis. Beckett started it and Harold took it over to express that which is inexpressible in a 
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Following a comprehensive exploration of Western acting and performance 
praxis since the nineteenth century, and in establishing a panoramic comparative survey 
of their socio-historical evolution and relationship to one another, Robert Gordon 
suggests six definitive categories, all of which, I would argue, can surely be identified as 
aesthetic.284 Each category appears to demonstrate a distinctive internal logic of its 
own.285 In effect, each category can be identified as a discrete style of acting—particular 
and individual genres—that correspond with each other within a larger framework. 
With respect to my own study, it in turn can be identified as a general aesthetic 
category—demonstrating the internal logic of performance praxis and acting—and can 
likewise be allocated within the artistic institution of the theatre and stage arts. Indeed, 
Gordon’s illuminating study constitutes a synthesis of all the principal theories of 
dramatic performance that have influenced and informed the past two centuries. If 
Gordon’s book could be seen as an apparatus for practitioners—which, I would argue, 
it most definitely can be—it appears to successfully contextualise and concretise the 
types of knowledge one would be required to possess in order to enrich one’s praxis. In 
essence, different kinds of texts would require different kinds of theories, approaches 
                                                 
very original and particular way, and made them something which is his.’ Peter Hall, "Interview with 
Catherine Itzin and Simon Trussler", Theatre Quarterly 4, no. 16 (1974/5): 130. 
284 Slightly paraphrasing, Gordon’s categories are as follows: (a) the notion of acting as the realistic 
characterization of a kind of psychological truth; (b) the perception of the actor as a scenographic 
instrument, and the notion of performance as artifice; (c) the identification of theatre-making and 
performance praxis as play—i.e. a manifestation of notions pertaining to games and improvisation; (d) 
the notion of theatre as a political tool, and the identification of rehearsal as a medium for creating social 
change; (e) the notion of performance and acting as a vehicle for both self-exploration and an encounter 
with the other; and (f) the notion of performance as cultural exchange and an opportunity for playing (or 
‘becoming’) that which one is not. Robert Gordon, The Purpose of Playing: Modern Acting Theories in 
Perspective (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 6. 
285 Accordingly, (a) corresponds with the notions and theories of practitioners such as Konstantin 
Stanislavski, Yevgeny Vakhtangov, Lee Strasberg and Michael Chekhov; (b) with those of Adolphe Appia, 
Gordon Craig and Vsevolod Meyerhold; (c) with Jacques Copeau, Michel Saint-Denis, Rudolf von Laban 
and Jacques Lecoq; (d) with Bertolt Brecht and Augusto Boal; (e) with Antonin Artaud and Jerzy Grotowski; 
(f) with Peter Brook and Eugenio Barba. 
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and praxes. Gordon’s book demonstrates that one should be sensitive to the different 
types of texts one works with. Acting in a play by Chekhov, for instance, while following 
the praxis of Brecht will simply not exhibit the internal logic of either one.286  
Consequently, one could very well identify a Pinteresque ‘dot, dot, dot’ and 
arguably hear—on the page—what it is supposed to sound like. Likewise, one could also 
be able to identify the Pinteresque dash, which possesses its own distinctive sound, in 
respect of the particular kind of pause it is supposed to elicit.287 Now, Various Voices 
was also released as an abridged audiobook, featuring Pinter himself performing a 
selection of the works incorporated therein. "Writing for the Theatre" opens the 
recording. As Pinter himself was a professional actor, listening to him performing his 
own writing constitutes quite a unique aesthetic experience—not so much as this 
recording presents one with an opportunity to hear an author reading his work, but 
rather as Pinter’s vocal dramatization is exceptional. He appears to be performing his 
own instructions, almost musically, reading as a director—and in effect delivering what 
one could identify as the ‘performance text’ form of his written texts.288 Even in his 
aforementioned remark, poking fun at the different meanings one finds in his 
punctuation, one is still able to hear the different punctuations in his delivery.289 Overall, 
                                                 
286 Alternatively, one could also consider the different approaches to performing Shakespeare. For 
example, while John Gielgud or Laurence Olivier may have been considered the authorities in their time, 
if one compares their approaches to those of, say, the RSC or Kenneth Branagh, one could, potentially, 
begin identifying which approach, and to what extent, might be said to better ‘serve’ the internal logic of 
a particular work. Ultimately, one would need to identify the two sets of internal logic: namely, that of 
the work in question, and that of the praxis that would conceivably comply with it.    
287 In other words, one can distinguish between the ostensible brute fact of Pinter’s punctuation (i.e. 
employed as a grammatical tool used for separating sentences and clarifying their meaning) as opposed 
to its institutional fact (i.e. rendering it Pinteresque—and thereby potentially making it mean something 
different than it would in other dramatic texts).   
288 Harold Pinter, Various Voices: Prose, Poetry, Politics: 1948–1998, read by the author, Faber/Penguin 
Audiobooks (ISBN: 0-14-086846-1/978-0-14-086846-3), 1998, 2 audio cassettes. See USB flash drive for 
Pinter’s recording of "Writing for the Theatre". Ibid., 01m14sec–02m02sec.  
289 Arguably, when the same play is performed through two different types of media, even the distinctive 
Pinteresque ‘dot, dot, dot’ (or ‘dash’) would not sound exactly the same. Indeed, while it should sustain 
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the recording clearly demonstrates the manner in which Pinter succeeds in sketching 
out his interpretation of his own writing specifically for the aural medium, bestowing on 
his words the intended pace for creating his desired meaning, as he is speaking to a 
designated audience who is not actually there. 
The aural medium, so it seems, constitutes an inherent aspect of the internal 
logic of audiobooks. Notwithstanding, since both audiobooks and radio plays should be 
identified as belonging to the same aesthetic category, certain insights pertaining to the 
latter can surely be applied to the former. What Knox, for instance, regards as the 
audiobook’s ‘auditory space of listening’,290 appears to be in the same vein as Frances 
Gray’s assertion of what makes one’s experience listening to radio so unique. In 
describing the aesthetics of the medium, Gray maintains that  
the stage of the radio is darkness and silence, the darkness of the 
listener’s skull. On it the dramatist can bring anyone or anything 
without the trouble and expense of a scenic artist. This is the first stage 
that most of us encounter, the stage of the bedtime story in which we 
create, with assistance, an alternative reality. The process of building 
it is simple; the words are spoken, and we become designers, 
producers, scenes shifters and the theatre itself.291 
Explicitly alluding to one’s experience when listening to radio plays, John Drakakis 
argues that ‘the process of listening became analogous to that of reading’ [emphasis in 
original].292 This, I would argue, should not be understood necessarily as a comparison 
between two kinds of activities per se. Rather, the analogous process resides in what 
might be identified as their aesthetic significance. Indeed, reading a book, hearing an 
                                                 
its own internal logic, one would need to know how to convey it in accordance with the internal logic of 
each medium. The same can said about most any given genre. 
290 Knox, "Hearing Hardy, Talking Tolstoy", 139. 
291 Frances Gray, "The Nature of Radio Drama", in Radio Drama, ed. Peter Lewis (London: Longman, 1981), 
48–49. 
292 John Drakakis, British Radio Drama (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 113. 
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audiobook and listening to a radio play are all, at their core, mutually exclusive aesthetic 
experiences. As Gray points out, ‘as soon as we hear a word […] we are close to the 
experience it signifies; in fact the sound is literally inside us.’293 
In order for one’s aesthetic experience as an audience member to prevail, the 
reader/narrator (who, as aforementioned, essentially holds in AP the institutional role 
of the artist) must be aware that s/he is performing for an implied listening audience.294 
In the realm of audiobooks ‘the narrating voice’, as Knox puts it, ‘is explicitly addressing 
a listener’.295 This to a large extent demonstrates why audiobooks should be perceived 
as performances, as well as why they deserve an aesthetic category of their own.296 
According to Roach, when one speaks for one’s own ear one ‘adjusts the tone in terms 
of already present vibrations’ that already exist in one’s own head,297 and one thereby 
‘produces a different sounding voice from the normal one of speech directed to 
another’s ear’.298  
                                                 
293 Gray, "The Nature of Radio Drama", 51. In the same vein, Tammy La Gorce refers to Donald Katz, 
founder of Audible Inc.—cited as ‘the world’s largest seller and producer of audiobooks’—and to his 
notion of the ‘sound of literature’. La Gorce maintains that this is precisely what Katz has succeeded in 
making ‘more accessible’ and quotes him as stating that ‘audiobooks are a long-arc experience that can 
be very meaningful’. Tammy La Gorce, "At Audible, Work Speaks Volumes", New York Times, June 13, 
2015, accessed July 20, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/nyregion/the-work-speaks-
volumes.html. Rubery similarly points out, that ‘companies like Audible […] have begun promoting 
audiobooks as an independent art form in its own right, one that can do things other books cannot’. 
Rubery, The Untold Story of the Talking Book, 245. 
294 In other words, to simply transform the printed words into spoken words and create an aural recording 
of the text is not enough—and would merely constitute the ‘brute’ fact of the matter. Rather, a performer 
is required to perform the text—which, as the institutional fact of the matter, necessitates an audience.  
295 Knox, "Hearing Hardy, Talking Tolstoy", 128.  
296 As Carlson points out, a performance ‘is always performance for someone, some audience that 
recognizes and validates it as performance.’ [emphasis in original] Carlson, Performance, 5. 
297 Hibbitts, in these respects, claims that ‘a variety of commentators and critics […] argue that writing 
(and reading) are […] metaphorically dialogic (if not yet actually aural) processes, and that the written 
'text' is not so much a thing as an ongoing negotiation of meaning between writer and reader, much as a 
conversation is between speaker and listener.’ Hibbitts, "Making Sense of Metaphors", [3.7].  
298 Roach, Spoken Records, 51. 
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Ultimately, a performer should therefore make special effort in directing his/her 
performance to a designated audience due to the fact that their audience is not 
physically present, but rather exists somewhere ‘out there’, for lack of a better term.299 
The audience, in turn, will only hear and experience the eventual completed recording 
at a later point in time. Appropriately, when perceiving audiobooks as artworks, these 
constitute some of the main reasons why audiobooks should fundamentally be 
recorded by professional readers, actors and performers.300 Indeed, even Edison had 
identified the potential of his invention to enhance the enjoyment that one attains from 
listening to a book narrated by an ‘elocutionist’ as opposed to the ‘average reader’.301 
The former, for Edison, possesses the ability to endow the words ‘with the finest grade 
of feeling and accent’.302 In the same vein, as Stan Godlovitch explains it, the skills a 
performer possesses can be identified as ‘technical’ on the one hand—which ‘involve 
causing objectively determinable and (often) quantitatively measurable acoustic 
                                                 
299 Radio, for instance, according to Rudolf Arnheim, can connect between the ‘speaker’ and the ‘hearer’ 
without either of them necessarily sharing a ‘physical presence or personal acquaintance’. See John 
Durham Peters, Speaking into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1999) 211, accessed 31 October 2016, 
http://web.mit.edu/uricchio/Public/television/Peters.pdf.  
300 Audible, for instance, employed in 2015 around one hundred narrators (or, rather, ‘voiceover artists’, 
as La Gorce puts it), about a fifth of whom work as professional actors, and many of whom have Broadway 
credits. La Gorce, "At Audible, Work Speaks Volumes". At the same time, one is sure to come across audio 
recordings featuring non-professional narrators. These include: (a) volunteer readers—who, flawed 
narration skills notwithstanding, could literally be anyone willing to invest his/her time, or (b) authors, 
poets and writers—while whose unique talent as wordsmiths may be unparalleled, their skills as narrators 
might (in fact, more often than not do) leave much to be desired. Indeed, in contrast to the common and, 
arguably, nearly automatic conviction, an author’s recording of his/her own work does not necessarily 
secure a better performance. These will be addressed at a later point—either in further elaborating upon 
what counts as AP (that is to say, what phenomena accord with this aesthetic category), or, indeed, by 
way of more explicitly illustrating what does not. In respect of the latter, in particular, I will also attend to 
an additional kind of so-called ‘audiobook’ that exists in the form of digitized recordings, created by text-
to-sound computer programs. As a precursor, and as will become evident at the end of this chapter, it 
must be underlined that these most definitely cannot be identified as AP artworks. 
301 Rubery, The Untold Story of the Talking Book, 35. 
302 Ibid., 37. 
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effects,’ and ‘interpretive’ on the other—which ‘involve aesthetic effects for which no 
obvious quantitative measure exists, and typically emphasize ‘expression’.’303 
While conventionally performed by a single narrator, there nonetheless exists a 
variety of audiobooks that are recorded by more than one individual, thereby taking the 
form of a fully-dramatized aural production.304 As Roach, for instance, quite rightly 
points out, the direction of a recording is just as important as the actual performance.305 
Appropriately, just as one can form the distinction between the role of the composer 
and that of the conductor, the musician or the singer (i.e. the performing artist who will 
eventually bring life to the composer’s given piece of music), one should similarly 
differentiate between the role of the playwright and that of the director or actor.306 
Conceivably, this applies to all art forms requiring a performer to convey or 
mediate an original work to a designated audience. The only exception, according to 
Hein, resides in the relationship between an audience and the person whom she 
identifies as the ‘expert’: a person who possesses the ability to interpret some kind of 
‘score or schema’, and subsequently ‘perform the work […] without mediation.’307 Her 
‘expert’ can surely be perceived as a kind of ‘performing artist’, whose ability is 
fundamentally to (a) identify what the internal logic of a particular work is (or, at least, 
                                                 
303 Stan Godlovitch, Musical Performance: A Philosophical Study (London: Routledge, 1998), 54. 
304 Audiobooks predominantly constitute a collaborative effort. Their creative process—much like that 
which exists in the realms of theatre and cinema—requires a number of skilled professional craftsmen: a 
director or casting director, a sound designer, a text-to-audio editor, a producer, and so forth. 
Nonetheless, as my definition of the institution of AP endeavours to demonstrate, vis-à-vis NITA, the role 
of the reader/narrator should, to a large extent, be perceived as the (performing-)artist.  
305 For Roach, ‘poor direction or the complete lack of it explains some failures in spoken recordings […] 
That so many good recordings do exist is due in large part to the good directors experienced in the 
medium. […] [They] have contributed knowledge, experience and a pioneering spirit without which so 
much that is valuable in spoken recordings might not have been achieved.’ Roach, Spoken Records, 13. 
306 Hein, "Performance as an Aesthetic Category", 383–85.  
307 Ibid., 383.  
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what it should be), and (b) utilise his/her talents and skills to properly convey that 
internal logic to the designated audience. Ultimately, Hein appears to be focused on 
establishing precisely why performances are a primary art form in its own right.308 I thus 
find her frame of thinking inherently ‘institutional’.309 Indeed, her insights demonstrate 
an understanding that performances deserve an aesthetic category of their own, 
effectively highlighting their ‘aesthetic identity’.310  
 
                                                 
308 As aforementioned, one of the fundamental ideas that NITA is based on the notion that institutions 
not only institute facts, but that one’s cultural institutions are subject to change (e.g., in accordance with 
the manner in which one’s particular society evolves, or, alternatively, complying with the change that 
one’s conception of one’s own values undergoes). New and re-examined cultural institutions can give 
birth to new aesthetic categories. Hein seems to focus on ‘instituting’ a category that accounts for the 
role of the performer: ‘The new trends within the arts pose a challenge to standard aesthetic 
categorization, suggesting that new categories might well be adopted, categories which place the role of 
performer in primary perspective. […] innovations in art invite us to reconsider the old art forms as well 
as the new in the light of aesthetic categories […]’. Hein, "Performance as an Aesthetic Category", 386. 
309 Hein explicitly points out that ‘every social institution and every intellectual system of the modern era 
has accommodated itself to change as a fundamental value’, and argues that one could benefit from re-
examining ‘the classic categories of aesthetics by bringing to bear upon them the dynamic elements of 
the category of performance’. Ibid., 384. Furthermore, her notion of the ‘appreciator-critic’ (see Ibid., 
382) appears to resonate quite strongly with the ‘candidate for appreciation’ in NITA: ‘people do what 
they do because they think that there is something worthy of appreciation about the things they present 
to the Artworld. This is what Dickie called “conferring the status of candidate for appreciation”. The 
sculpture, the book, the movie, or the painting being offered to the public, is but a candidate for the 
public’s appreciation’. Graves, The New Institutional Theory of Art, 20 
310 While Hein does not set out to define art, she does appear to have a rather clear idea of what art is 
and what aesthetics should be. In the same vein, Osipovich, drawing on David Saltz explicitly points out 
that performances possess an ‘aesthetic identity’ of their own. He argues that the ‘interpretation’ of a 
particular play both constitutes and is dependent upon the ‘framework for a performance’ established by 
the written text. Osipovich, "What Is a Theatrical Performance?", 46. Also noteworthy is David Davies’s 
book review of Peter Kivy’s The Performance of Reading: An Essay in the Philosophy of Literature (2008). 
Kivy, in brief, looks upon the reading of literary works as a certain kind of performance. For Davies, Kivy’s 
‘bold thesis in this very engaging and stimulating monograph is that literature in general—not just drama 
or even poetry but also the novel—should be viewed as a performance art, analogous to music, where 
the instances of works through which they are appreciated are performances enacted by readers. Reading 
itself, then, is a performing art. […] Tokens of the musical work are performances, and tokens of the novel 
are readings, construed as datable events. […] [A] novel can be viewed as a performance […] literature in 
general […] is properly viewed as a performance art. […] [T]he case for a performative element in 
literature may serve to awaken us to the significance of such aspects of literary experience, even if, as I 
have suggested, the case for viewing literature as a performance art requires further argument and 
elucidation.’ David Davies, review of The Performance of Reading: An Essay in the Philosophy of Literature, 
by Peter Kivy, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 66, no. 1 (Winter 2008): 89–91. Arguably, these 
insights could well be applied to audiobooks as well—and particularly to the manner in which one 
experiences them, aesthetically, through listening. 
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4. Mark Twain’s Adventures of Huckleberry Finn: An Aural Case Study (1) 
 
4.1 Comprehending the Written Text: Identifying the Internal Logic 
As established earlier, reading a novel and listening to an audiobook constitute two 
different kinds of aesthetic experiences. Respectively, to achieve a proper aesthetic 
evaluation of a particular audiobook (or of any AP artwork for that matter), one must 
possess an understanding of the unique internal logic of the text which is being 
performed—in addition, of course, to having grasped the discrete workings of an 
inherently aural medium.311 
I find that Mark Twain’s Adventures of Huckleberry Finn (1884) serves as an 
interesting case study. As such, before commencing an analysis of this novel’s iteration 
as an AP artwork, one must begin by understanding the internal logic of the written text 
that would consequently inform its aural performance. Nevertheless, it must be 
emphasised that purporting to present a rigorous and comprehensive reading of the 
entire novel could well prove counterproductive. In fact, no explicit property, facet or 
attribute can provide one with a luculent indication of what the internal logic of the 
novel actually is. Indeed, to achieve an all-inclusive and thorough interpretation of any 
                                                 
311 Arguably, any kind of mediation effectively dictates its own rules—which, in turn, inform the aesthetic 
experience that one undergoes. When reading a novel, for instance, as one essentially engages with the 
written text first-hand, the rules entail that a mental visualisation in one’s head is evoked directly by the 
printed words on the page. A play, by contrast, essentially evokes a mental visualisation of what the world 
of any particular play is supposed to look like on a stage. As a performance text, its rules require one to 
possess a certain amount of experience with theatrical productions in order to properly visualise. Indeed, 
when one employs the rules of reading a novel while engaging with a play, one risks distorting or 
misinterpreting it, as one is sure to bypass or neglect certain embedded performative aspects. While 
listening to an audiobook may not necessarily require the same type of training as that desired for 
properly reading plays, I would argue that the ability to aesthetically experience an audiobook as 
something more than the written text merely spoken aloud, surely invites its own type of practice and 
proficiency. Consequently, when listening to an audiobook, one’s first-hand experience is grounded in the 
written text’s iteration as a performed text—that is to say, in the manner in which the printed words are 
aurally conveyed through a recording of spoken words. 
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internal logic is arguably altogether impossible.312 Yet, there are, however, a number of 
dimensions to the novel—all of which, as I will show, are essential in their contribution 
to both formulating and grasping what the internal logic is supposed to be. Ultimately, 
in considering the generally accepted perception of the novel’s status as a literary 
masterpiece, and in drawing on all that I have absorbed from the different critics I have 
observed, it appears as though a number of particular and definitive attributes can be 
established as being inherently constitutive in understanding the novel. 
Any internal logic embodies varied shades of meaning, any one of which remains 
relevant as long as it does not exceed the limitations established by a given range of 
acceptable possibilities. Although one may have the artistic license to go beyond these 
when interpreting a particular work, if one adopts an ‘alternative’ reading, one makes 
one’s reasons for doing so abundantly clear.313 While I do not intend to propose my own 
personal analysis or interpretation of Twain’s novel, my intention is to convey a concise 
understanding of the novel—focusing on its most essential aspects. 
Summarily, in order for anybody to begin to grasp the complexities of Huck 
Finn314 and identify its internal logic—or at least what it should be—one must consider 
                                                 
312 As alluded to earlier, vis-à-vis Derrida, one can fundamentally never arrive at a single complete reading 
of any text. There will surely always be additional provisional readings, effectively going on ad infinitum. 
Notwithstanding, these are only ostensibly infinite insofar as the particular restricted range of 
appropriate possibilities enables them to be. Consequently, virtually any text embodies two distinct limits 
beyond which one cannot go. As they establish the parameters of a particular text’s internal logic, they in 
effect determine which readings are and are not appropriate. As aforementioned, grasping any kind of 
internal logic is attained by way of first-hand experience, rather than theoretical analysis. 
313 So-called unorthodox readings or interpretations effectively establish a new kind of internal logic, or 
at least offer a re-imagined one for consideration. As Algernon Tassin asserts, ‘the interpreter, like the 
creator, gives shape and expression to something which was there before but had hitherto existed 
unperceived by him’. Roach, Spoken Records, 13. The artistic manifestation of such a work would 
predominantly prevail more as a comment or critique, which can either violate or throw interesting light 
on the original work. Consequently, one is required to evaluate such a work in accordance with its own 
(newly instituted) internal logic. Nonetheless, much like performances of already existing works, these 
interpretations are forever informed by the original internal logic—which, in effect, can never be 
completely cast aside. Indeed, it should remain a constant point of reference. 
314 From this point onwards, I will use this accepted abbreviated title.  
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and be mindful of the following key facets: (a) the novel’s status as an ostensible memoir 
or autobiography; (b) the varying number of American dialects embedded in Twain’s 
text; (c) the dissonance that prevails between the author and narrator;315 and (d) the 
controversy surrounding the novel with respect to its characterisation of race—and the 
accusations of racial insensitivities to which it has been subject since its publication.316 
Now, although these strands may not necessarily constitute the novel’s overall 
‘meaning’, they are indeed constitutive of any attempt to read or interpret it. They are 
definitely not arbitrary. Identifying what they are informs the process one undergoes in 
journeying through Huck Finn, attempting to unravel and capture what the novel is all 
about. Effectively, every reader who engages with Huck Finn should be able to recognise 
that the novel works within these particular parameters. As crucial constituents for 
comprehending the novel, they establish the infrastructure for the internal logic around 
which any reading would revolve. In exploring Huck Finn as a performance text, every 
reader—and, indeed, every performer of a putative audiobook—would thus be required 
to both observe and work within these constituents when reconstituting Twain’s text as 
an AP artwork. Consequently, any audiobook version of the novel would necessarily 
entail a comprehensive understanding of these particular strands of meaning. Overall, 
                                                 
315 In brief, Twain’s mature and ironic literary voice, his inherent socio-cultural criticism, and his identity 
as the novel’s author—all extending well beyond his own time and sustaining their relevance even in 
present times—as opposed to the fictional identity of Huck’s character, his perception of the world he 
inhabits, and his own distinct voice as the novel’s first-person adolescent narrator.  
316 As Michael Patrick Hearn points out, the novel prevails as a praised literary classic, which has also been 
both condemned and banned: ‘It has been called both a literary masterpiece and racist trash. It has been 
marketed as a gift book for boys and girls; it has been removed from the children’s rooms of public 
libraries across the country. It is required reading in universities both in American and abroad; it is banned 
from the curricula of elementary and high school systems’. Michael Patrick Hearn, introduction to the 
Annotated Huckleberry Finn, in Mark Twain, Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, in The Annotated 
Huckleberry Finn, ed. Michael Patrick Hearn (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), xiii. According to Hearn, the 
first institution to ban the book was the Concord Free Library—a committee member of which claimed to 
have found the novel ‘the veriest trash’, asserting that had it not been for Twain’s reputation, ‘the book 
would undoubtedly meet with severe criticism’. Ibid., Ixxvii. 
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once one accepts the idea that something (i.e., a particular object) is considered 
beautiful when it embodies and manifests the internal logic of its own world, one should 
appropriately recognise the key aspects of the novel as inherent to its iteration as an 
aural performance.317 
 
4.2 Huck as an Autobiographical Narrator  
Huck Finn is generally regarded as a sequel to Twain’s own The Adventures of Tom 
Sawyer (1876). Both novels take place in the fictional town of St. Petersburg, 
Missouri.318 The events in Huck Finn occur about one year after those depicted in Tom 
Sawyer319—which, in brief, concludes with the characters of Tom and Huck, two 
adolescent boys, coming into a considerable sum of money having found a stash of gold 
hidden by a group of robbers. The fictional time span of the novel is supposedly around 
half a century before its publication (1884). 
Unlike Tom Sawyer, which is told to its readers by an omniscient narrator, Huck 
Finn is purposely written as a first-person narrative account—told through the eyes and 
distinct point of view of an American boy in his early teens, namely the character of 
Huckleberry (aka ‘Huck’) Finn.320 With an abusive drunk for a father, Huck basically lives 
the life of an orphan. As the novel begins, Huck informs the readers that he was placed 
under the guardianship of a character he refers to as the Widow Douglas. Together with 
                                                 
317 As will be made clear in Chapter 5, when aesthetically evaluating an audiobook version of Huck Finn 
as an AP artwork, one should examine whether or not (and to what extent) the novel’s most essential 
strands effectively inform the manner in which the novel’s internal logic is embodied and manifested in 
practice.  
318 Arguably, this town is based on the actual town of Hannibal, Missouri, where Twain was raised.  
319 From this point onwards, I will use this abbreviation when referencing this book. 
320 Huck’s character is described in Chapter 17 as being ‘thirteen or fourteen or along there’. Mark Twain, 
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, in The Annotated Huckleberry Finn, ed. Michael Patrick Hearn (New York: 
W. W. Norton, 2001), 167.   
- 95 - 
 
her sister, Miss Watson, she attempts to teach Huck the Holy Scriptures and religion in 
an effort of ‘sivilizing’ him.321 When his father learns about Huck’s fortune, he returns 
to town in order to kidnap his son with the aim of obtaining the money. Huck chooses 
to escape by faking his own death. He proceeds to hide in a place called Jackson’s Island, 
located in the middle of the Mississippi River.322 It is there that Huck encounters Jim, 
whom he recognises as one of Miss Watson’s slaves. Huck learns that Jim has apparently 
run away from Miss Watson, after hearing her talk about selling him to a plantation, 
where he would no doubt be treated horribly and be separated from his family. Huck 
makes the decision to help Jim escape, which leads to their voyage together—their 
‘adventures’—travelling on a raft along the Mississippi. 
Ernest Hemingway once remarked that Huck Finn can be perceived as the 
quintessential modern American novel.323 Corresponding with this remark, Stephen 
Railton maintains that Twain’s novel could also be perceived as the first post-modern 
American literary work.324 The first chapter of Huck Finn begins as follows: 
You don't know about me, without you have read a book by the name 
of The Adventures of Tom Sawyer; but that ain't no matter. That book 
was made by Mr. Mark Twain, and he told the truth, mainly. There was 
things which he stretched, but mainly he told the truth. That is 
nothing. I never seen anybody but lied one time or another […] all told 
                                                 
321 This word is misspelt intentionally. As Huck is the narrator of the novel, and, at the same times, 
happens to be illiterate—so much so, in fact, that he is unable to write even his own name—Twain’s 
misspelling of certain words depicts the manner in which Huck’s speaks them. In considering the novel’s 
iteration as an audiobook, one might ask whether or not one is indeed able know that a word is misspelt 
merely through listening—especially if one happens to be unacquainted with the novel. This matter will 
presently be clarified. Summarily, it is one’s responsibility to know that this aspect of Twain’s novel 
constitutes part of its internal logic. One should simply know what one is listening to—especially if one 
wishes to properly evaluate it. Yet, it would also be the performer’s responsibility to appropriately 
embody this aspect of the novel’s internal logic in his performance. Indeed, while he may not necessarily 
be able to make a word sound misspelt, he should be able to underline it somehow—effectively making 
a listener identify that Huck’s pronunciation is a bit ‘off’.  
322 The Mississippi is distinctly identified with Twain and his writing, prevailing in Huck Finn, as an 
ostensible character in its own right. 
323 Ernest Hemingway, The Green Hills of Africa (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1935), 22.  
324 Stephen Railton, Mark Twain: A Short Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 50. 
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about in that book, which is mostly a true book, with some stretchers, 
as I said before.325 
Thus, the novel opens with Huck’s character acknowledging not only the existence of 
the novel which precedes the novel one is holding in one’s hands as one is reading those 
very lines, but also the fact that he himself was written about in that book.326 What is 
more, they both actually exist in the world of the readers. Put simply, while they may 
be works of fiction, their concrete existence is most definitely not. As Victor A. Doyno 
points out, ‘there may be other books which similarly insist upon their special status and 
origin as books, but they must be rare’.327 The monumental novel Don Quixote by Miguel 
de Cervantes is a good comparison, which surely served as a source of inspiration for 
Twain in more ways than one.328 For Doyno, it is the second paragraph—beginning with 
the words ‘Now the way that book winds up is this:’329—that explicitly presents readers 
with Huck’s ‘summary’ of what his character had undergone in the previous novel, and 
in effect his ‘conclusion’.330 In his introduction to the novel’s 1950 edition, T. S. Eliot 
maintains that  
                                                 
325 Twain, Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, 9. 
326 This, for Railton, is part of what makes Twain’s construction of Huck Finn an almost radical re-
envisioning of Tom Sawyer, precisely demonstrating his ‘postmodern sensibility’. He references, for 
instance, Jean Rhys’s Wide Sargasso Sea (1966), as a first-person narrative which is delivered by a 
character from a completely different novel: namely, Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre (1847). Rhys’s novel 
offers a radically different reading of Brontë’s novel, effectively reframing it to serve her own purposes. 
Railton, Mark Twain, 50. In the same vein, one might also refer to Tom Stoppard’s famous play, 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead (1966). Indeed, although not a work of fiction, it is constructed 
around two characters originally appearing in the work of a different playwright: namely, William 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet—which itself includes allusions to Shakespeare’s own Julius Caesar.  
327 Victor A. Doyno, Writing Huck Finn: Mark Twain’s Creative Process (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1991), 42.  
328 In the second volume of Don Quixote, published in 1615, Cervantes made his protagonists aware that 
a book exists that had not only been written about them, but that had also achieved some high acclaim: 
indeed, the first volume of Don Quixote, originally published ten years earlier. Both volumes have a 
concrete existence in the empirical world of the readers. Now, although Tom Sawyer was not yet 
recognised as a classic when Twain began writing Huck Finn, and notwithstanding the fact that it had not 
yet even been published, that Huck not only acknowledges but also directly references both the previous 
novel and its author could be perceived as Twain’s homage to Cervantes’s literary device. 
329 Twain, Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, 9. 
330 Doyno, Writing Huck Finn, 43. 
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Tom Sawyer did not prepare me for what I was to find its sequel to be. 
Tom Sawyer seems to me to be a boys’ book, and a very good one. [...] 
But the point of view of the narrator is that of an adult observing a 
boy. [...] Tom is, I suppose, very much the boy that Mark Twain had 
been […] Huck Finn, on the other hand, is the boy that Mark Twain still 
was, at the time of writing his adventures. […] The two boys are not 
merely different types; they were brought into existence by different 
processes.331 
To some extent, Huck Finn is not only a mere sequel to Tom Sawyer, but also its re-
envisioning. For instance, the relationship between Tom and Huck could be understood 
as Twain’s attempt to re-enact or re-imagine—and, at the same time, to both satirise 
and parody—the particular camaraderie that existed between protagonists in classic 
European literature. Again, the famous literary partnership of the characters Don 
Quixote and Sancho Panza is probably the most appropriate analogy.332 
As it is Huck who narrates the novel, he in effect asserts his personal point of 
view not only in light of what he depicts (i.e., the events or the plot of the previous 
book), but also with respect to his own identity. On the one hand, his explicit objective 
seems to be to re-tell (or, perhaps, ‘un-tell’) what had previously been told by Twain.333 
                                                 
331 T. S. Eliot, "An Introduction to Huckleberry Finn", in Huck Finn, Bloom’s Major Literary Characters, ed. 
Harold Bloom (Philadelphia: Chelsea House, 2004), 18. 
332 If in Tom Sawyer Huck’s character might be an analogous Sancho Panza to Tom’s Don Quixote, in Huck 
Finn, Huck assumes the typical Don Quixote role. Indeed, Huck’s character becomes not only the 
eponymous protagonist, but also asserts responsibility for narrating ‘his own story’. According to Doyno, 
it is precisely through his narration that Huck distinguishes himself as Tom’s ‘polar opposite’. Doyno, 
Writing Huck Finn, 39–40. Moreover, while Tom remains Huck’s close friend and confidant, his main 
counterpart in the novel appears in the form of Jim, the African-American slave. Thus, Jim takes on Huck’s 
role from Tom Sawyer and becomes a Panza-esque character to Huck’s Quixote. In this respect, Eliot quite 
rightly points out that ‘Huck in fact would be incomplete without Jim, who is almost as notable a creation 
as Huck himself. Huck is the passive observer of men and events, Jim the submissive sufferer from them; 
and they are equal in dignity’. Eliot, "An Introduction to Huckleberry Finn," 20. At the same time, Eliot 
maintains that despite Huck’s role as storyteller, he remains an inherently solitary figure. Ibid., 18. 
(Arguably, this may also be another point of reference to Cervantes’s characterisation of Don Quixote, 
who both requires his companionship with Sancho Panza in order to continue his journey and at the same 
time is inherently confined to his own self and his own outlook on the world he inhabits).  
333 Railton suggests that while one should not ponder on whether or not Huck could possibly have read a 
book that would only be published many years later, ‘it is with this gesture that Huck defines himself, and 
not only against Twain as a maker of books but also against nearly everyone else in the story as readers 
of books’. Railton, Mark Twain, 51.  
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On the other hand, Huck also appears to imply that while the chapters that follow should 
consist of ‘his’ truth, they might also constitute a somewhat ‘stretched’ version 
thereof.334 Alternatively, that Huck does seem to know the difference between true and 
false could indicate that while he possesses the ability to lie, and although he may very 
well lie to other characters he encounters throughout his adventures, he has no 
intention of lying to his readers.335 What nevertheless seems to be quite clear is that 
Huck asserts his individuality from the novel’s inception. Indeed, he establishes his own 
authority over the novel, affirming his status as the storyteller. In delivering the story of 
the novel himself to the readers, Huck becomes his own personal story. Effectively, his 
character constitutes something of an agent in its own right—that is to say, one who is 
separate from the persona he refers to as ‘Mr. Mark Twain’. Had Twain been responsible 
for ‘making’ or telling Huck Finn himself, while the story or general plot might have 
essentially remained the same, the novel would not have turned out quite the same. 
Thus, one can argue that the fact that it is Huck’s character who is delivering his own 
story to the readers makes for a different type of novel not only in tone and structure, 
but also with respect to the various details (i.e., things that Huck is able to report from 
first-hand observation, using his words, but which Twain, for his part, is not). As will 
later be illustrated, all these issues need to be taken into account when referring to the 
institution of AP, and the audiobook versions of the novel as aural performances. 
                                                 
334 This is arguably because (a) Huck may have gathered that in order to ‘make’ books one is required to 
‘stretch’ truth—as Twain does, and since (b) Huck too, just like everybody else he has encountered in his 
life, is most likely to have ‘lied one time or another’, he might very well have also lied, at least to some 
extent, when telling his story.  
335 Although Huck endeavours throughout the novel to set Jim free, it is ultimately revealed that he was 
in fact already legally set free, following the death of Miss Watson and in accordance with her will. 
Unbeknownst to Huck, Tom knew this full well, yet preferred to play along merely for the sake of 
adventure. Arguably, this is a dual deception at play: one the one hand, Tom’s deceiving of Huck; on the 
other hand, as the story is told after the fact, Huck’s deceiving of the readers.  
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It is interesting to note in this respect that one of the novel’s manuscripts, 
according to Doyno, reveals the words ‘Reported by Mark Twain’ written in Twain’s 
handwriting on the top of the first page.336 Effectively, as the novel’s narrator, Huck can 
be understood as a character who both (a) does not fully understand what it is that he 
sees and experiences, and (b) reveals through narrating the reality of the world he 
inhabits. Huck’s perception of his literary world in many respects embodies Twain’s 
socio-cultural criticism of his (and the readers’) shared literal reality.337 This no doubt 
strengthens the sense that one of Twain’s possible objectives was to have the readers 
identify the novel not so much as his own work, but rather as Huck’s, notwithstanding 
Huck’s inability to read or write. For example, after Huck’s raft crashes near their home, 
the Grangerfords take Huck in, feed him and clothe him. Under their care, Huck is also 
introduced to their life of advantage coupled with what he realises to be senseless 
violence. The Shepherdsons are the family whose feud with Huck’s hosts leads him to 
question the virtue and sanity of prolonging a fight for generations, especially since it 
registers with him that none of them seem to even remember what their feud is actually 
about. Eliot considers the passages depicting the feud between the two families as a 
‘masterpiece’ on Twain’s part. He maintains that had Twain written them in his own 
voice or as an omniscient storyteller, rather than in Huck’s voice and as Huck’s own 
story, Twain could not have employed the ‘economy and restraint, with just the right 
details’ that essentially enable the readers to exercise their ‘own moral reflections’.338 
                                                 
336 Doyno, Writing Huck Finn, 40. 
337 Referring, for instance, to the humour and language employed in the novel, Hearn explains that the 
voice of the narrator effectively evokes the overall tone of the novel: ‘Suggestion is an important element 
of humour, and Twain knew just how far he could go with implied vulgarity. […] Twain through Huck was 
a master of euphemism. […] Maybe Sam Clemens swore, but it is not in Huck Finn’s nature […] to use 
profanity.’ Hearn, introduction to the Annotated Huckleberry Finn, xxxiii-xxxiv. 
338 Eliot, "An Introduction to Huckleberry Finn," 19. 
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According to Doyno, Twain’s choice to create a novel with ‘an almost illiterate 
narrator’ raises a number of major issues, and he argues, for instance, that ‘Twain’s 
exploration of the value of fiction is affected by his choice of a narrative 
consciousness’.339 In limiting the narration of the novel to Huck’s voice, Twain essentially 
imposes a reading that requires one to consistently account for the singular perspective 
of Huck’s character.340 Doyno argues that while Twain successfully sustains a ‘child’s 
tone’, one must nevertheless ‘be continuously sensitive to the possibility of overlap of 
authorial and narrator’s voices, since both are planners, relaters, and commentators’.341 
In contrast to the refined prose that a so-called standard literary work might otherwise 
require, Twain appears to employ Huck’s illiteracy as a kind of rhetorical device aimed 
at making his character seem more honest than any other typical narrator or author 
might be presumed to be. In essence, Huck’s character, both in what he says and in how 
he says it, appears to give one a sense of confidence that he will spare his readers from 
any editing or stylisation and honestly present them with the raw unvarnished facts of 
the matter.342 Nevertheless, and notwithstanding his being the narrator, one should 
obviously not confuse Huck’s linguistic proficiency with that of Twain.343 Appropriately, 
when considering an audiobook version of the novel, a proficient performer would thus 
                                                 
339 Doyno, Writing Huck Finn, 40. 
340 Railton similarly maintains that Twain apparently found Huck’s illiteracy the most useful way to 
emphasise his place at the margins of society. He argues that the fact that Huck is illiterate not only fulfils 
one of the postmodern criteria, but is also what allows Twain to realise his ‘project as a 19th-century 
realist writer’. Railton, Mark Twain, 51 
341 Doyno, Writing Huck Finn,  45. 
342 In Doyno’s own words, ‘Huck does not appreciate restrictions or need boundaries. He keeps letting the 
reader share his situation […] and the process creates a sympathetic identification of reader with narrator. 
Because Huck sounds confident and trustworthy, the reader enters Huck’s world confident that a mixed 
condition is better.’ Doyno, Writing Huck Finn, 44.  
343 Just as Twain endowed Tom Sawyer with a narrator who speaks in the standard correct American 
English of an educated adult, he endowed Huck Finn with a narrator who conveys his own story in an 
ungrammatical vernacular. Huck’s illiteracy, in effect, manifests Twain’s literary proficiency.  
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be required to manifest their own skills as a performer who is very much proficient in 
language and words by portraying Huck’s lack thereof. 
 
4.3 Embedded Dialects 
In considering the relationship between reading and listening, I find that Huck Finn 
constitutes a unique exception that in effect proves the rule. Indeed, its construction 
appears to demonstrate that there are, in fact, certain audiobooks that can, under 
certain circumstances, replace the actual reading of the original book. This is particularly 
evident in cases where the recorded performance is able to provide one with something 
that the original printed work cannot. Although both the original printed work and its 
audiobook version would essentially consist of the same written text, the exploration of 
the audiobook versions of Huck Finn has the potential of contributing a new outlook to 
one’s aesthetic experience of aural performances as artworks.344 
In some respects, one might argue that an audiobook has the potential to evoke 
Huck’s illiteracy by giving him the opportunity of literally telling his story, instead of 
struggling with his inability to express it in writing. Railton, in this respect, not only 
maintains that Huck’s voice is ‘vividly conversational’, but also points out that it had 
been suggested that, in effect, his story ‘should be read essentially as an oral 
narrative’.345 Effectively, listening to a good aural version of the novel could greatly 
enhance one’s aesthetic experience of the novel. There exists a particularly delicate 
balance in the novel between Huck’s point of view and Twain’s own social criticism, wit 
                                                 
344 Arguably, while the average listener may only hear one audiobook version of the novel, an avid listener 
could enjoy comparing different performances. Indeed, as an aesthetic experience, even the average film-
goer could potentially enjoy seeing two different adaptations of the same work. 
345 Railton, Mark Twain, 53. 
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and satire. Twain’s distinctive literary voice should be apprehended through Huck’s 
fictional voice and his telling of the story. Huck’s character is obviously not at all aware 
that the story he wishes to tell (i.e., to those whom he perceives as his readers) 
encompasses all that Twain wishes to deliver to his readers. On the printed page, this 
becomes evident through Twain’s construction of the manner in which Huck conveys 
his story. Appropriately, this would also dictate the manner in which a performer might 
choose to portray Huck’s character in an audiobook. Indeed, a performer would be 
required to maintain an appropriate balance between Huck’s telling of his own story 
and the fact that the novel itself was written by Twain. Furthermore, since Huck is, after 
all, a young boy, what can be regarded as his innocence, for instance, serves as a vehicle 
for articulating Twain’s criticism. His youth, predominantly, seems to underline his 
inability to comprehend moral decisions that adults are required to make. As Doyno 
points out, 
Huck’s unique blend of innocence, practicality, spiritedness, and 
literalness create a disarmingly appealing, lifelike character. And these 
attributes carry thematic importance and may coincide with or reflect 
parts of a putative national character. Twain’s achievement involves 
the use of Huck’s voice, full of freshness and eagerness, as a wistfully 
striking contrast to the world’s bleak reality.346 
Similarly, Eliot maintains that the style of the novel is in fact the ‘style of Huck’ and thus 
there is essentially nothing in Twain’s use of dialect, intentional misspelling of words or 
grammatical and idiomatic idiosyncrasies that can ‘destroy the illusion that these are 
Huck’s own words. It is not only in the way in which he tells his story, but in the details 
he remembers, that Huck is true to himself’.347 As will be further explained in the section 
concerning issues of racial sensitivity which the novel famously challenges, it should be 
                                                 
346 Doyno, Writing Huck Finn, 40–41. 
347 Eliot, "An Introduction to Huckleberry Finn," 19. 
- 103 - 
 
pointed out that Huck’s character has literally no sense that his words, or even his 
distinct outlook, might in any way be offending anyone—be they a character in the novel 
or the readers. Consider, for example, Huck’s innocent assumption that Jim is the 
rightful property of Miss Watson.348 Huck’s naivety, in this respect, seems to represent 
another aspect which distinguishes his character from Tom’s. This is also rooted in the 
fact that Huck narrates his own novel.349 While both boys perceive the world they 
inhabit through the eyes of children, their perspectives, and the manner in which they 
comprehend their surroundings, are depicted quite differently: namely, whereas Tom’s 
understanding of his world is representative of the kinds of books he reads, Huck’s 
seems to derive from first-hand experience.350 When listening to any audiobook version 
of Twain’s novel, this too would be something worth bearing in mind. That is to say, one 
should evaluate whether or not (and to what extent) this characterisation of Huck 
appears to be taken into consideration by any particular performer. Consequently, a 
performer would be required to make decisions concerning the nature of Huck’s 
character and the manner in which he tells his story. 
                                                 
348 That Huck proclaims this notion, and indeed quite unapologetically, will be discussed in the 
forthcoming section, examining the role that racial issues play with respect to this novel’s internal logic.    
349 Tom’s innocence takes the form of childhood nostalgia and explicit refusal to grow up, told from the 
point of view of a narrator reflecting on past events. Tom’s character seems to live his life and define the 
value of his actions according to the books he has read (such as the Bible, the stories in The Arabian Nights 
and his references to books about pirates and robbers). His perception of reality is in effect achieved 
through the prism of literary stories. Huck’s narration and perception of reality seems to demonstrate the 
problems that might arise from seeing the world through Tom’s eyes. 
350 Railton points out that while robbers, for instance, are perceived by Tom as chivalrous and brave and 
that one should therefore aspire to join them, Huck’s actual life experience has taught him that they are 
usually mean, they stink of whisky and that one should thus aim to avoid them. Railton argues that this 
notion encompasses ‘the rhythm of realist novels as a genre’, which underlines the ‘stark actualities’ of 
one’s world, rather than some romantic ideal which cannot be realised. Railton, Mark Twain, 52–53. In 
the same vein, Eliot maintains that Huck’s character appears both passive and impassive, and seems to 
remain a victim of events in the world he inhabits, regardless of whether or not Huck takes part in these 
events. Nevertheless, Eliot argues that ‘in his acceptance of his world and of what it does to him and 
others, he is more powerful than his world, because he is more aware than any other person in it.’ Eliot, 
"An Introduction to Huckleberry Finn," 18. 
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Twain also endows Huck Finn with a unique literary device that underlines the 
variety of distinctively American dialects and vernaculars spoken by the characters. This 
device, when exploited correctly in an aural performance, demonstrates the manner in 
which an aesthetically good audiobook version of this particular novel, could serve as a 
possible substitute for reading the actual book. The novel includes a famous opening 
‘Explanatory’ which reads as follows:   
IN this book a number of dialects are used, to wit: the Missouri Negro 
dialect; the extremest form of the backwoods South-Western dialect; 
the ordinary “Pike-County” dialect; and four modified varieties of this 
last. The shadings have not been done in a haphazard fashion, or by 
guess-work; but pains-takingly, and with the trustworthy guidance 
and support of personal familiarity with these several forms of speech. 
I make this explanation for the reason that without it many 
readers would suppose that all these characters were trying to talk 
alike and not succeeding. 
THE AUTHOR.351  
Twain’s novel constitutes the first American vernacular work of literary fiction. The 
different speech patterns reflect the different levels of intellect and/or education of the 
various characters, as well as their sophistication and socio-economic status, race, and 
gender. This serves as a remarkable device in the novel’s development of 
characterisation. Ultimately, as the different dialects, accents, speech patterns, etc., 
exist merely in print, Twain essentially makes one hear them by means of spelling, 
grammar, syntax, vocabulary and so forth. Thus, the different manner in which 
individual characters speak and sound like is quite literally ‘sounded out’ by the readers 
in their own heads, as they follow Twain’s construction of the words on the page. 
                                                 
351 Twain, Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, 5. 
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Herein, however, resides the precise reason why Huck Finn is an exception and 
one of the reasons why it constitutes an interesting case study: it raises the question for 
readers who may never in their lives have actually heard the various dialects that Twain 
has deployed throughout his book. As these readers would simply be unable to identify 
the dialects from the printed page, not only would their understanding and experience 
of the book not be fully realised, but also their putative aesthetic evaluation of the book 
would be impaired.352 Thus, when one sets out to aesthetically evaluate an audiobook 
version of Twain’s Huck Finn one would need to consider whether or not a particular 
performer had indeed succeeded in adequately portraying these dialects in the aural 
performance.353 In other words, one would need to examine the extent to which the 
performer manifests and exhibits the internal logic of Twain’s novel.354 If one happens 
to be ill-acquainted with the dialects that Twain had utilised in the text, one will not be 
able to identify whether or not the performer has successfully done his/her job. 
Subsequently one would not be able to properly evaluate the degree to which the 
performed text, as an AP work, helps one better distinguish one dialect from another. 
Hence, if one is indeed not acquainted with Twain’s dialects, one might in fact benefit 
more from listening to a good audiobook version of Twain’s novel than from actually 
reading the original work. If one reads the book, without fully understanding what one 
                                                 
352 Arguably, the novel itself should allow one to imagine or hear in one’s head the different dialects that 
are rendered by the words on the printed page. Nevertheless, one would surely need to be acquainted 
with what they actually sound like. 
353 Knox, for instance, when referring to Leo Tolstoy’s War and Peace (1869), maintains that the novel’s 
cast of characters ‘is so large that it has traditionally presented problems to translators needing to bring 
to the English language the idiosyncratic argot, vernacular, and diverse characteristics of speech of a wide 
variety of stations and classes of persons’, and by the same token, ‘presents […] an almost overwhelming 
challenge to a performer doing a voice performance of the work. Thus [...] the defrayed labor of listening 
is gained at the expense of the phenomenal amount of work involved in voicing the performance. But the 
labor of performance gives body to voice and is instrumental in shaping the presence of the narrator.’ 
Knox, "Hearing Hardy, Talking Tolstoy," 128.  
354 This would constitute an example of how Graves’s notion of beauty works in practice. 
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is supposed to hear in one’s own head, one might very well miss out on just about the 
same things one might miss out on when listening to an inadequate performance.355  
If one is unable to identify the various dialects in the printed form of Huck Finn, 
one will have no idea how a particular character is supposed to sound. Effectively, if the 
aesthetic quality of a particular performance happened to escape one, one could 
subsequently form a misguided aesthetic evaluation of that performance (i.e., 
evaluating it as bad, when it might in fact be good).356 Those who are acquainted with 
the dialects in Twain’s book and their various degrees of subtlety, will not only be able 
to identify them when reading the book (due, to a large extent, to Twain’s ingenious 
engineering of words on the page), but they should also be able to identify them in a 
particular audiobook recording. Just as the performer of an audiobook is expected to 
know how to perform a particular text, the audience is expected to know how to listen 
to it. Furthermore, the very act of listening to an audiobook—absorbing a particular 
work through this distinctive aesthetic experience—has the potential of helping one 
understand how to listen to this kind of aural performance as the recording 
progresses.357 When confronted with a number of audiobook versions, a person who is 
                                                 
355 According to Wittkower, since readers of poetry might find themselves, on occasion, sensing some 
bewilderment in terms of the proper manner in which a particular phrase should be read or uttered, one 
might find the special nature of the audiobook quite helpful. Wittkower, "A Preliminary Phenomenology," 
224–25. If audiobooks indeed have the power to assist one in reading a poem, essentially by hearing the 
manner in which it is supposed to be read, audiobooks should likewise assist one in comprehending the 
appropriate reading of any given text.   
356 Following NITA’s R4 (i.e., the ‘Artworld Public’), the audience of AP would similarly be required to be 
‘prepared in some degree to understand an artwork’. One of the most popular and commonly held 
theories about art concludes that ‘beauty is in the eye of the beholder’. Notwithstanding its massive 
popularity, as NITA quite clearly demonstrates, the deficiency of this notion lies in the fact that it simply 
has nothing do to with art. In essence, while this statement may tell one a thing or two about the 
‘beholder’, it nevertheless tells one absolutely nothing about art or about what the beholder beholds. If 
the beholder, however, is indeed ‘prepared in some degree to understand’ what s/he is beholding—
rather than what s/he finds to their liking—that is a different matter altogether. As stated, it is their 
minimum responsibility. 
357 Now, consider again the manner in which one should engage a typical Van Gogh ‘Cypress’ painting. 
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not acquainted with or unable to identify an aesthetically good performance of Twain’s 
novel would be required to take that evaluation on trust from an expert.358 By the same 
token, a well-performed aural recording of Huck Finn would provide a person who is 
acquainted with the various specific American dialects an enhanced aesthetic 
experience of both Twain’s novel as an AP artwork, and of the AP artwork in its own 
right. 
Since it is Huck who narrates the novel and conveys the story to the readers, 
Twain’s language can be said to mimic Huck’s own regional speech patterns. In effect, 
the novel sounds as if it is told in one distinct voice. Huck is to some extent obliged to 
mimic the distinct speech patterns of others. All the other characters are filtered 
through Huck’s narration. When they speak, they are in fact heard via Huck’s voice and 
point of view. Twain’s use of regional dialect includes the local colour of Huck’s 
surroundings. Huck could therefore be perceived as ‘mimicking’ the speech patterns of 
the other characters, and in effect delivering his rendition of their speech patterns.359 In 
creating an audiobook version of the novel, a performer would be required to choose 
whether or not to bestow different voices on the other characters in the book, 
maintaining their distinct regional dialects as they appear on the page. Alternatively, a 
                                                 
358 One would for the most part trust an expert’s assertion that the Mona Lisa is one of the greatest 
paintings in history. One would not necessarily have to attain a comprehensive understanding of 
sixteenth-century Neoplatonic artworks (even though, as NITA demonstrates, one should). In the same 
vein, one would also usually take ‘on trust’ that a particular vineyard of a particular region is sensational 
in producing a particular kind of wine. Nevertheless, just as one possesses the ability to see for oneself—
in both senses of the word—why the Mona Lisa is a remarkable painting or why a particular vineyard is 
exceptional, one can also learn what constitutes a good AP artwork. When one both identifies and 
experiences a particular internal logic, one is able to intensify one’s aesthetic experience. This is arguably 
evident with any kind of cultural institution, from the Artworld and religion to wine and world cuisine. In 
other words, a fuller and more comprehensive grasp of an internal logic makes for a more rewarding 
aesthetic experience. As will be made clear later on, casting directors, too, in this respect, are essentially 
required to possess the ability to sense which actor should be best suited for recording a certain text for 
an audiobook release. 
359 I will dedicate the forthcoming section of this chapter to precisely the importance of Huck’s narration 
and point of view.  
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performer could narrate the novel as if Huck were ‘impersonating’ them, in effect 
emphasising his point of view, how he hears them, and the impression they left on him. 
Thus, whether an aural performance should embody a variety of idiosyncratic voices, or 
convey a consistent vocal identity (i.e., of Huck’s voice, or rather the performer’s 
interpretation thereof) surely constitutes an essential question that the creators of an 
audiobook version would be required to consider. Consequently, a performer is 
required to bear in mind that the audiobook should manifest the fact that although the 
novel is narrated by Huck, it is, after all, written by Twain. Huck’s distinctive voice as the 
storyteller notwithstanding, the novel also manifests Twain’s unique voice as an 
author.360 As this is an inherent aspect of the novel’s internal logic, a good audiobook 
version of the novel should accordingly embody and manifest this quality. 
 
4.4 Two Voices: Huck, the Narrator vs. Twain, the Humourist 
Although it addresses such issues as slavery in nineteenth-century America or the Civil 
War, and despite assuming the guise of an epic adventure chronicle, Huck Finn remains 
an exceptionally humorous novel. As Sacvan Bercovitch points out, ‘It is universally 
acknowledged that Mark Twain’s Adventures of Huckleberry Finn is funny. That’s one of 
the few points of consensus, amidst all the controversies over its meaning’.361 Twain’s 
remarkable wit, for instance, and finely-tuned ability to satirise the follies of his society 
and surroundings, are to this day held in very high esteem. Quite often with Twain, 
                                                 
360 Arguably, what might appear as Huck’s filtering of the regional dialects of the other characters, could 
be regarded as Twain’s satirised version of what they sound like. Similarly, one could argue that in 
distinguishing the various characters on the listener’s behalf, a performer is required to express Huck’s 
perception of how the other characters are supposed to be heard. 
361 Sacvan Bercovitch, "Deadpan Huck: Or, What’s Funny about Interpretation," Kenyon Review 24, no. 
3/4 (Summer–Autumn 2002): 90. 
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attention must be paid to the manner in which he treats solemn matters from a comic 
perspective. Therefore, despite Eliot’s suggestion that the style of the novel is rooted in 
the style of Huck’s character, the distinct style of its author is no less important. 
Appropriately, when considering the aural performances of Twain’s novel, one must 
take into account the manner in which Twain’s humour should be manifested. Indeed, 
the performer cannot be a stranger to comedy. To perform Huck Finn well, it is essential 
that at the very least one possesses the ability to tell a joke. Similarly, a performer 
should also be aware, for instance, that a large number of passages in the novel are 
implicitly ironic as opposed to other passages that are more obviously humorous. 
It is with the above in mind that I now turn to Twain’s inclusion of the short 
opening ‘Notice’ addressing the readers of the novel. I have purposely delayed referring 
to this Notice, even though it appears before the aforementioned opening ‘Explanatory’ 
alluding to the novel’s use of regional dialects. In fact, the Notice constitutes the first 
piece of text that the readers encounter as they begin reading the novel: 
PERSONS attempting to find a motive in this narrative will be 
prosecuted; persons attempting to find a moral in it will be banished; 
persons attempting to find a plot in it will be shot. 
BY ORDER OF THE AUTHOR,  
PER G. G., CHIEF OF ORDNANCE.362 
Explicitly identifying what is known as ‘deadpan’,363 Bercovitch explains why the Notice 
is crucial to interpreting the primary type of humour with which Twain endows the 
                                                 
362 Twain, Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, 3.  
363 Deadpan, according to Wikipedia, is ‘an adjective, describing a deliberately emotionless and otherwise 
impassive, matter-of-fact manner’. Wikipedia, s.v. "deadpan," accessed December 30, 2015, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/deadpan. Merriam-Webster regards the term as both an adjective and 
adverb, explicitly referencing ‘deadpan comedy’. It is defined as being ‘marked by an impassive matter-
of-fact manner, style, or expression’. Merriam-Webster Online, s.v. "deadpan," accessed December 30, 
2015, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/deadpan.  
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novel. He asserts that it is ‘the comic form familiar to Americans through a wide range 
of folklore […] and particularly the Western Tall Tale. […] In Twain’s case, the joke often 
reflects the peculiar historical conditions of the Southwestern frontier’.364 For 
Bercovitch, 
The deadpan connective, “G. G.,” links all the above (narrative, reader, 
author, and protagonist), and the Notice itself is a directive […] against 
interpretation […] but a deadpan directive, which therefore requires 
interpretation. For obviously the Notice is a form of kidding around, a 
prank of sorts; and then, too, there’s a satirical side to it, a subversive 
laughter in the “order” that ridicules authority.365  
The Notice certainly seems to set a particular tone for the novel, particularly of what is 
yet to come. It is integral to the novel in that it ostensibly offers guidelines for how to 
read it.366 In effect, it even dictates the appropriate manner in which a performer should 
narrate these particular lines. Moreover, in addition to its serving as an introduction to 
the kind of humour one might expect to encounter throughout the novel, the particular 
wording proves essential in another aspect as well, and corresponds with the fact that 
the novel is delivered in the first-person.367 As an autobiography, it could be perceived 
as an extended monologue. This is crucial, especially as the novel declares itself as such 
before the ‘actual’ narrative commences.  
As I will demonstrate with the audiobook versions of Huck Finn, as well as with 
my forthcoming case studies, it would appear that the audiobook, as an AP artwork, 
constitutes the obvious medium for manifesting those texts which can be perceived as 
                                                 
364 Sacvan Bercovitch, "What’s Funny About Huck Finn," New England Review 20, no. 1 (Winter 1999): 8. 
365 Ibid., 12. 
366 Its inherent importance notwithstanding, as I will show in the section dedicated to my concrete 
analyses, some audiobook versions have apparently made the decision not to include it. The reasons for 
such a course of action completely elude me. 
367 According to Hearn, Twain had originally chosen to write the Notice with the word ‘book’ instead of 
‘narrative’. He most likely chose the latter in order to reinforce the illusion of the novel as Huck’s 
autobiography. Hearn, introduction to the Annotated Huckleberry Finn, 3. 
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extended monologues, memoirs or autobiographies. When played by a performer, the 
speaker in the text ‘becomes’ a narrator who exists, virtually, within the confines of the 
aural medium. Moreover, one’s engagement with a particular audiobook takes on a 
distinctively personal quality. In effect, the fact that Huck is telling his own personal 
story becomes a virtual testimony in an audiobook, rather than the work of fiction that 
it actually is. Thus, there are a number of important aesthetic questions one should ask 
when setting out to produce an audiobook version of Twain’s novel. For example, 
whether or not the novel should be performed by a young actor, and perhaps even by 
a child who should be roughly the same age as Huck is in the book.368 Ultimately, a good 
performer would be required to convey the nature of Twain’s novel both as a pseudo-
autobiography while at the same time evincing Twain’s intentions as the actual author—
part of which involves the unique humour with which he endows the novel. 
According to Bercovitch, Twain scholars have calculated a body-count of 33 
corpses mentioned in the novel. Thus, he argues, ‘getting killed is a key to the novel’s 
plot-line’ and that the ‘ordnance’ quite appropriately warns the readers that seeking a 
plot is punishable by death.369 It is precisely in such aspects that he identifies Twain’s 
deadpan comedy.370 The Notice, in this respect, indicates to the reader at the very 
                                                 
368 As I will demonstrate in the final section of this chapter—which is dedicated to my concrete analysis 
and comparison of different audiobook versions of Huck Finn—it appears as though the novel has 
predominantly been recorded by older performers. 
369 Bercovitch, "What’s Funny About Huck Finn", 18. 
370 In his own words: ‘usually deadpan artists specialize in one or another of these ways of being funny—
[…] innocent, satirical, and sinister—but the humor reaches its highest pitch […] when the joke 
reverberates with all three layers of fun […]. What makes [Huck Finn] distinctive […] is Twain’s deliberate 
and sustained use of the third, sinister […] virtually a reversal of conventional techniques. The novel is […] 
a great work of social satire whose comic mode overturns the very tradition of deadpan it builds upon. 
Ostensibly that tradition belongs to the narrator-hero. Huck speaks "gravely" and often plays the 
Trickster; but the funny thing is, he’s not a humorist […] Huck has a stylized deadpan; his voice may sound 
comic to the comically disposed listener, but actually it’s troubled, earnest. […] For of course the "teller" 
is really Mark Twain, the Comic Writer, and this deadpan artist is not straight-faced (as Huck is), but 
smiling. […] [T]he deadpan artist is Mark Twain, wearing the Comic Mask, doing his best to conceal the 
fact that he even dimly suspects that there’s anything grave, let alone sinister, about his story […] [.] […] 
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beginning precisely what should and what should not be taken seriously. Conceivably, 
its three short lines contain the implied instructions for the inherently comic way they 
are supposed to sound. Bercovitch’s analysis in this respect appears to be both simple 
and insightful: 
[T]hink of the penalties for trespassing (prosecution, banishment, 
death), and the deadly pun that reinforces them: "ordnance" is not 
(just) a colloquial misspelling; technically it means "cannon or 
artillery"; a "Chief of Ordnance" is an officer ready to blow you to 
pieces. All this makes for an especially funny situation with regard to 
the act of interpretation. For the narrative itself—the book that’s the 
subject of the directive against interpretation—demands 
interpretation all the time. We can't get any of its jokes without 
figuring out motive and plot, and we can't possibly do that without 
assuming a moral position. [...] There’s a joke here that involves us in 
a contradiction: the official order prohibits interpretation but the 
narrative demands interpretation. The nub or snapper is that the 
Notice is calling attention to interpretation. It’s reminding us of our 
tendency to look for plot, moral, and motive, and then the narrative 
itself does the rest of the work: it virtually forces us to interpret. […] 
There’s something funny about this invitation to interpret—it’s a 
Trickster’s invitation.371 [emphases in original] 
Twain’s own essay, ‘How To Tell a Story’, illustrates this matter quite well in describing 
his approach to the humorous story as literary form.372 Predominantly, this essay 
appears to underline the seemingly simple fact that there should be distinctly different 
of ways of telling particular types of stories. Twain confesses, ‘I do not claim that I can 
tell a story as it ought to be told. I only claim to know how a story ought to be told, for I 
have been almost daily in the company of the most expert storytellers for many 
years’.373 He makes it clear that the manner of telling a particular story, while 
                                                 
This Trickster has conned us, somehow diverted our attention away from the real point, and we have to 
go back over the story in order to recognize its nub.’ Ibid., 9–10 
371 Ibid., 12–13. 
372 Although extrinsic to the novel itself, one might associate its insights with Twain’s overarching literary 
voice, thereby potentially utilising this essay to inform one’s understating of the distinct role of humour 
in the internal logic of Huck Finn.  
373 Mark Twain, "How To Tell a Story," in How To Tell a Story and Other Essays (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1898), 3. 
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appropriate and unique for the telling of that one, would not necessarily accord with 
telling another. In essence, different stories can be said to require different ways of 
telling them. Twain appears to be implying that each particular story requires a distinctly 
different kind of internal logic. He maintains, for example, that of the several kinds of 
stories in existence, there is only one which can be regarded as difficult: namely, that 
which he refers to as the humorous kind.374 Subsequently, he both describes its 
distinctive artistry and highlights the importance of the manner in which this particular 
kind of story should be told:  
[T]he humorous story depends for its effect on the manner of the 
telling; the comic story and the witty story upon the matter. […] The 
humorous story is strictly a work of art,—high and delicate art,—[sic] 
and only an artist can tell it; but no art is necessary in telling the comic 
and the witty story; anybody can do it.375 [emphases in original] 
Twain also clearly differentiates between the manner in which the telling of a story 
would appear on the page and the manner it should be delivered ‘by word of mouth’.376 
Furthermore, in a manner which could arguably be compared with the immortal advice 
that Hamlet affords the company of Players who arrive at Elsinore, Twain argues that 
The art of telling a humorous story—understand, I mean by word of 
mouth, not print—was created in America, and has remained at home. 
The humorous story is told gravely; the teller does his best to conceal 
the fact that he even dimly suspects that there is anything funny about 
it; but the teller of the comic story tells you beforehand that it is one 
of the funniest things he has ever heard, then tells it with eager 
delight, and is the first person to laugh when he gets through. Very 
often […] the rambling and disjointed humorous story finishes with a 
nub, point, snapper, or whatever you like to call it. Then the listener 
must be alert, for in many cases the teller will divert attention from 
that nub by dropping it in a carefully casual and indifferent way, with 
the pretense that he does not know it is a nub. […] But the teller of the 
                                                 
374 In deciphering what this particular kind of story is, Twain in effect identifies and distinguishes three 
kinds of literary genres: ‘the humorous story is American, the comic story is English, the witty story is 
French’. Twain, "How To Tell a Story," 3.  
375 Ibid., 3–4. 
376 Ibid., 4.  
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comic story does not slur the nub; he shouts at you—every time. And 
when he prints it, in England, France, Germany and Italy, he italicises 
it, puts some whooping exclamation-points after it, and sometimes 
explains it in a parenthesis. All of which is very depressing, and makes 
one want to renounce joking and lead a better life.377 
To be sure, this distinction between the possible ways of telling is essential. Ultimately, 
it contributes to understanding precisely how a particular story should be told. I find this 
is to some extent Twain’s way of emphasising the internal logic of his own work. That 
‘the listener must be alert’, for instance, and focus his/her attention on the teller so that 
the ‘nub’ does not go unnoticed, hints at the manner in which one might approach the 
aesthetic evaluation of a performance.  
In one of his major examples, Bercovitch refers to a famous passage in Chapter 
32 of the novel, where once Huck’s adventures on the river come to an end, he meets 
the character of Sally Phelps, Tom’s aunt, who mistakes him for her nephew. As happens 
elsewhere in the novel—in a passage I shall refer to later on—Huck plays along and takes 
on the identity of another (in this case Tom’s). Once he discovers that Sally was 
expecting Tom, who was supposed to have arrived via steamboat, Huck proceeds (in the 
guise of Tom) to improvise an excuse accounting for his tardiness. Huck’s explanation 
shows what makes this particular passage ‘a key joint of the narrative’.378 The following 
is a short excerpt from their exchange: 
“We been expecting you a couple of days and more. What kep’ you?—
boat get aground?”  
“Yes’m—she—” 
“Don’t say yes’m—say Aunt Sally. Where’d she get aground?”  
I didn’t rightly know what to say, because I didn’t know whether the 
boat would be coming up the river or down. But I go a good deal on 
instinct; and my instinct said she would be coming up—from down 
towards Orleans. That didn’t help me much, though; for I didn’t know 
the names of bars down that way. I see I’d got to invent a bar, or forget 
                                                 
377 Twain, "How To Tell a Story," 4–5. 
378 Bercovitch, "What’s Funny About Huck Finn," 17. 
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the name of the one we got aground on—or—Now I struck an idea, 
and fetched it out:  
“It warn’t the grounding—that didn’t keep us back but a little. We 
blowed out a cylinder-head.”  
“Good gracious! anybody hurt?”  
“No’m. Killed a nigger.”  
“Well, it’s lucky; because sometimes people do get hurt. Two years 
ago last Christmas your uncle Silas was coming up from Newrleans on 
the old Lally Rook, and she blowed out a cylinder-head and crippled a 
man. And I think he died afterwards. He was a Baptist. Your uncle Silas 
knowed a family in Baton Rouge that knowed his people very well. Yes, 
I remember now, he did die. Mortification set in, and they had to 
amputate him. But it didn’t save him. Yes, it was mortification— that 
was it. He turned blue all over, and died in the hope of a glorious 
resurrection. They say he was a sight to look at.”379 
According to Bercovitch, this passage ‘unites all three sections of the novel (Hannibal, 
where Tom figures prominently; the journey down the river; and Huck’s adventures at 
the Phelps); and it connects all three layers of Trickster fun (innocent, satirical, and 
sinister)’.380 He argues that it also ‘demonstrates Twain’s hermeneutical imperative’ in 
that one has no choice but to ‘interpret this scene’, which is a direct consequence of its 
humour.381 The joke implicit in Huck’s lie—namely, that nobody was hurt, with the 
exception of the ‘nigger’ being killed—is diverted by Twain through Aunt Sally’s 
response and the casual manner in which she plunges into the story of uncle Silas. 
Bercovitch concludes that one should bear in mind Twain’s ‘instruction’ calling for a 
listener to be ‘alert’ to the teller’s diversions from the nub. Thus, Aunt Sally’s Baptist 
story is rendered an elaborate ‘decoy’ on Twain’s part.382 Beyond the seven points he 
outlines with respect to Huck’s ‘throwaway line’,383 what seems most important about 
Bercovitch’s analysis is that the analysis itself presupposes not only what a reader (or 
                                                 
379 Twain, Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, 350.  
380 Bercovitch, "What’s Funny About Huck Finn," 10. 
381 Ibid., 17.  
382 Ibid. 
383 Ibid. 
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listener, when audiobooks are concerned) is supposedly meant to receive from the text, 
but also in what manner the teller (or performer) is supposed to deliver it.384 
Conceivably, the implication of Twain’s aforementioned insights alluding to how 
certain stories should be told, coupled with the fact that he famously held public 
readings of his own work, appears to be that his work virtually extends an invitation to 
be read aloud.385 Effectively, one might argue that when creating an audiobook of his 
work, a performer would benefit from considering Twain’s insights as ostensible 
instructions for a proper delivery performance. Now, on the one hand, Twain initially 
asserted that 
written things are not for speech, […] their form is literary; they are 
stiff, inflexible; and will not lend themselves to happy and effective 
delivery with the tongue—where their purpose is merely to entertain, 
not to instruct; they have to be […] broken up […] and turned into the 
common forms of unpremeditated talk—otherwise they will bore the 
house, not entertain it.386  
On the other hand, following a week of performing his work, in the form of memorised 
passages, Twain concluded that the words ‘transformed themselves into flexible talk, 
with all their obstructing precisenesses and formalities gone out of them for good.’387 
Arguably, the success of Twain’s public readings potentially constitutes an additional 
strand for consideration in respect of the novel’s internal logic. 
                                                 
384 Drawing on Twain himself, Bercovitch regards this matter in terms of ‘listener’ and ‘teller’. This appears 
to comply with (a) one’s aesthetic experience of Twain’s novel (following a comprehensive understanding 
of all aspects of its internal logic), and (b) the notion of evaluating the audiobook versions of Huck Finn as 
AP artworks (particularly with respect to the manner in which a performer is inclined to deliver, or 
succeeds in appropriately delivering, Twain’s humour). 
385 Twain, after being ‘hit by the Panic of 1884 […], decided to “stump the Union” on a four-month public 
reading tour; his first since 1874’. Hearn, introduction to the Annotated Huckleberry Finn," il. Although 
urged to go on a solo tour—due to public demand—Twain felt unable to cope with the strain of sustaining 
an entire evening’s performance. Consequently, Twain toured alongside his fiend, Southern novelist 
George Washington Cable. The latter, Hearn explains, was ‘a perfect partner for Twain, an experienced 
public speaker with a different aesthetic sensibility from Twain’s. Cable could provide the pathos and 
Twain the Comedy’. Ibid., li–lii. 
386 Ibid., Ivii.  
387 Ibid. 
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In the same vein, recognising the identity of the novel as a ‘performance text’—
or, rather as a written text that includes a number of passages identified by the manner 
in which Twain performed them for an audience—could serve as guideline for creating 
a putative audiobook version. Notwithstanding, despite being praised by most reviews 
and generally adored by audiences (so much so, in fact, that Twain and Cable often 
performed twice a day), the live readings appeared to prevail as an innovative and 
unconventional marketing ploy, and thereby were not well-received by all. As Hearn 
points out, they were even relegated to an act that degrades literature.388 At the same 
time, this also demonstrates that questions concerning a so-called aesthetic hierarchy 
(corresponding with the aforementioned reading vs. listening conundrum) are surely 
not a novelty. Consequently, I find that this in fact strengthens my own approach to 
audiobooks, highlighting the need to assign them a unique aesthetic category of their 
own. Once one similarly identifies Twain’s live readings as a kind of performance that 
evokes an aesthetic experience in its own right, one need not be concerned with 
questions pertaining to the ostensible degradation of literature as an art form.389 
 
                                                 
388 Ibid., Iiii–Iv. 
389 Consider, for instance, Western writer Hamlin Garland’s account of Twain’s live reading. Hamlin 
describes Twain’s voice as ‘flexible and with a fine compass. Running to very fine deep notes easily. He 
hits off his most delicious things with a raspy, dry, “rosen” voice. He has a habit of coughing drily that 
adds to his quizzical wit. […] Never the ghost of a smile. Is an excellent elocutionist. Sighs deeply at times, 
with an irresistibly comic effect’. Ibid., liv. While some of Hamlin’s notes might be insightful in light of 
aurally performing Twain’s work, his account predominantly prevails as a reaction evoked by the 
aesthetics of a live event. Now, as a precursor to Chapter 6 of this study, it should be made clear that 
neither a public or ‘live’ reading, nor audio recordings thereof, can be classified as an AP artwork. Indeed, 
they do not comply with the aesthetic category. Cantril and Allport, for instance, identify a distinct 
difference between seeing a speaker talk at a public lecture and hearing that speaker on the radio. With 
the medium of radio, they explain, one is essentially ‘forced to grasp both obvious and subtle meanings’ 
relying on nothing but one’s ears—which consequently greatly reduces one’s ‘cues for judging the 
personality of a speaker and for comprehending his meaning’. Hadley Cantril and Gordon W. Allport, 
History of Broadcasting: Radio to Television (New York: Arno Press, 1971), 10. What they regard as ‘cues 
for judging’ appears to constitute an inherent aspect of what informs one’s aesthetic appreciation. 
Conceivably, one can utilise those ‘cues’ for identifying a particular work’s internal logic.  
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4.5 Taking Offence: An ‘Institutionally’ Unrewarding Reading 
Huck Finn can surely be regarded as Twain’s masterpiece.390 At the same time, an 
inherent aspect of the novel’s internal logic relates to its status as a fundamentally 
controversial work.391 To this day, the novel seems to provoke a great deal of criticism 
both in light of its assumed lack of moral propriety in language and perceived racial 
insensitivity—what has been construed as its unapologetically racist content. Its place 
in the Western literary canon is often questioned and offered for re-consideration. 
Nonetheless, I would argue that its status as a legitimate work of literature cannot be 
questioned.392 My intention throughout has been, and still remains, to analyse, compare 
and aesthetically appreciate a number of its audiobook manifestations. I do, however, 
sympathise with the concerns about the novel’s apparently inherent racist nature. The 
handful of other objections pertaining to the novel’s lack of sensitivity—in light of, for 
instance, gender, politics, and its own socio-cultural background—are likewise quite 
valid.393 To a great extent, these issues—particularly those associated with race and 
identity—have become an inherent aspect of the novel’s internal logic. They prevail as 
                                                 
390 Arnold Weinstein, "Huckleberry Finn—The Banned Classic," Lecture #38, Classics of American 
Literature (The Great Courses, The Teaching Company). See URL: accessed March 19, 2016, 
www.thegreatcourses.com/courses/classics-of-american-literature.html. 
391 As Hearn points out, Huck shows up for the first time in Chapter 6 of Tom Sawyer, where he is described 
as ‘the juvenile pariah of the village’. Hearn, introduction to the Annotated Huckleberry Finn, 10. Arguably, 
Huck Finn itself similarly became something of a ‘pariah’ on its own merits. 
392 Having acquainted oneself with the workings of NITA, and attained an understanding of what can or 
cannot be regarded as an artwork under particular institutional circumstances, the novel’s literary 
legitimacy cannot be challenged. In other words, it is a legitimate literary work. The question of whether 
or not it can be regarded as racist is a different matter altogether, and indeed a legitimate question. In 
viewing it as racist, one could find oneself facing the moral quandary of whether or not the novel should 
be accepted as part of the literary canon at all. As a moral question, one should seek an appropriate 
answer through exploring, for example, the role of ethics in the field of aesthetics. 
393 The objections to Huck Finn, which one can trace back to its publication, have not always been raised 
for the same reasons. The portrayal of the Southerners, for instance, as ignorant and dim-witted sparked 
many reservations. The violence represented in the text, which can be said to be overt, uncompromising 
and cruel, is another aspect of the novel that some objected to. Nevertheless, it would appear that most 
objections pertain to the discomfort that readers and critics alike have experienced by being taken on a 
journey that is based on an unsettling companionship between an adult black male slave and a white 
male adolescent. 
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part of its world. Indeed, as these issues have been associated with the novel’s milieu 
since its publication, they have effectively contributed to the place it holds in literary 
history. Consequently, one cannot simply discard or ignore them altogether. Thus, I wish 
to address the predominant challenges one might be confronted with when listening to 
an audiobook version of the novel, while taking into account the assumed objections 
regarding race, identity and cultural insensitivity. 
Jim is one of the novel’s two major characters. He is also one of the most famous 
in literary history. To be sure, his character became one of the reasons why Twain’s book 
had in the past been (and, in fact, still is) subject to great controversy and debate. Even 
if one considers turning the proverbial blind eye to Jim’s depiction as an African-
American slave, there remains another major issue which has caused much concern: 
namely, the very fact that what the current trend in political correctness dictates one 
refer to as the ‘N-word’ appears throughout the novel no less than 219 times.394 This 
fact alone has prompted some school authorities to exclude Twain’s book from their 
curriculum—including the Mark Twain Intermediate School of Fairfax, Virginia. Indeed, 
the extent of the perceived offence caused by the existence of this word in Twain’s novel 
has even resulted in the publication of a number of ‘nigger’ devoid versions of the 
novel.395  
Notwithstanding, to deliberately remove that word from the novel, making a 
point of replacing it with another, could, conceivably, not so much strengthen its ill-
                                                 
394 Julie Bosman, "Publisher Tinkers With Twain," New York Times, January 4, 2011, accessed March 19, 
2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/05/books/05huck.html. 
395 One such version was edited in 1982 by a teacher named John Wallace; another was edited by a 
professor of English named Alan Gribben and published in 2011 by NewSouth Books. In what can arguably 
be regarded as something of a grotesque misunderstanding of Twain’s novel, both versions replaced the 
N-word with the word ‘slave’. I am deliberately avoiding concerning myself with whether or not one can 
regard these ‘nigger’ devoid versions as censored. It is obviously much more than an issue of semantics, 
and interesting as it may be, this study is surely not the place to resolve it.   
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reputed offensive connotation, but rather effectively emphasise the misinterpretation 
of its use in the novel.396 American novelist Toni Morrison, for instance, identifies this 
as ‘a narrow notion of how to handle the offense Mark Twain’s use of the term "nigger" 
would occasion for black students and the corrosive effect it would have on white 
ones.’397 She states that it strikes her ‘as a purist yet elementary kind of censorship 
designed to appease adults rather than educate children. Amputate the problem, band-
aid the solution’.398 Nonetheless, prior to establishing claims pertaining to racism, one 
should acquaint oneself with the novel’s socio-historical context. Morrison recounts, for 
instance, her initial encounter with Twain’s novel. Having chosen it ‘randomly’, reading 
it ‘without guidance or recommendation’, she depicts her experience as ‘deeply 
disturbing’, leaving her with sensations of ‘fear and alarm’.399 It was only when she 
reread the novel through the prisms of such scholars as Leslie Fiedler and Lionel Trilling 
that Morrison understood the importance of placing the novel within a particular 
context. By her own admission, reading the novel with their analysis in mind had 
enhanced her aesthetic experience considerably, with her initial response paling in 
comparison. She explains that while their insights helped her see things she had not 
noticed when engaging with the novel on her own, it was only because Fiedler and 
Trilling had essentially ‘ignored or rendered trivial’ the very things that made her feel ill 
                                                 
396 The words one uses can also be understood in terms of the distinction between institutional and brute 
facts—chiefly as this distinction is predominantly rooted in Nietzsche’s approach to language and 
ostensible ‘word games’. Words, by and large, need not be likened to ‘semitrailers’ that carry and lead 
their meaning wherever they go. Rather, it is one’s intention—instituted amid a particular given context—
that bestows a discrete meaning on a certain word. Accordingly, in order, for instance, to cause offence, 
one would need to purposefully utilise a particular word with that specific intent in mind. By way of 
illustration, and with its dictionary definition notwithstanding, the word ‘bastard’, for example, can be 
utilised both as profanity and as a somewhat whimsical way of depicting one’s fortunate stroke of luck.  
397 Toni Morrison, "Huckleberry Finn: An Amazing, Troubling Book," in Ethics, Literature, and Theory: An 
Introductory Reader, ed. Stephen K. George (Lanham, Maryland: Rowan & Littlefield, 2005), 280.   
398 Ibid.   
399 Ibid., 279. 
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at ease.400 Ultimately, to see the novel in its proper context, one should be obliged to 
acquire a degree of historical understanding. For instance, one should be mindful of the 
fact that the novel is firmly grounded in a particular American geography and 
consciousness. Explicitly, one should realise that what is now regarded as degrading and 
offensive was in the 1840s a colloquial term commonly used by whites and blacks alike. 
Fundamentally, one would need to understand that Twain incorporates the word 
‘nigger’ in his book not as a racial slur, but as an elementary component of Huck’s 
regional dialect. Thus, his use of the word becomes essential to Huck’s vernacular 
narrative and to the entire style of the novel.401 Arguably, had Twain employed any 
other word in place of the N-word, he would have in fact falsified Huck’s voice. By 
endowing Huck with an unadulterated use of the word ‘nigger’, Twain ensures that the 
novel remains in tune with its own internal logic. At the same time, it enables him to 
amplify the ironic tone of the novel, thereby provoking one to criticise Huck’s 
environment and what appears to be its automatically-prompted racist discourse.  
An aural performance of the novel should therefore appropriately make full use 
of this word, as part of Huck’s narration of his own story. It would obviously be a mistake 
to confuse the author’s point of view with that of his characters.402 One must not forget 
                                                 
400 Ibid., 280. 
401 Even if one might insist on perceiving the novel as inherently racist, it could be argued that the internal 
logic of the novel is dependent upon and stems from the fact Twain himself was raised in a racist South, 
which shaped his personal identity, and in effect the nature of his writing. Arguably, in this respect, even 
if he finds the white society which he depicts in the novel to be no less than deplorable, one could also 
maintain that Twain could not fully free himself from the stereotypes with which he grew up—dictating 
that he will in his perception forever remain superior to black slaves of his time. 
402 Particularly with Huck Finn, making that error results in a misinterpretation of the novel, wrongful 
accusations and condemnations, as well as the regretful (and arguably avoidable) taking of offence. When 
one reads the depiction of Jim, for instance, as ‘Miss Watson’s nigger’, one should understand that these 
are Huck’s words rather than Twain’s. One should understand that this depiction manifests the socio-
cultural perception that operated at that particular time in history. By the same token, a performer of an 
audiobook would be required to identify particular passages spoken by Huck as explicitly conveying the 
literary voice of Twain himself. Indeed, by allowing Huck to narrate his own story, Twain is able to say 
certain things he otherwise would not have been able to say. 
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Huck is telling the story. His narration—his distinctive voice—depicts his vision of his 
world. In a sense, this becomes the moral heart of the novel, and should therefore 
manifest in the audiobook version thereof. The performer should serve as a ‘vehicle’ for 
Huck’s voice and perception. Especially once acquainted with the scope of Twain’s 
writing, his distinct style, his humour and ironic outlook, one should make a distinction 
between the kind of language that Huck employs, on the one hand, and the literary 
manner in which Twain utilises it on the other. It is in this respect that Twain’s irony 
reveals itself loud and strong. 
The PBS documentary Born to Trouble: Adventures of Huck Finn (2001), exploring 
the controversy surrounding the novel, features a scene in which a high school English 
teacher explains why she simply does not say the word aloud in class when she teaches 
the novel to her students. It demonstrates that the teacher is conscious that the 
utterance of the word—even in the specific context of a lesson that is dedicated to the 
novel—could indeed cause offence. Morrison, in this respect, asserts that ‘to hear the 
dread word spoken, and therefore sanctioned’ when she read Twain’s novel in the 
eighth grade, was embarrassing enough, and to read it hundreds of times in print 
embarrassed, bored and annoyed her, yet did not disturb her composure.403 Hence, an 
argument could be made that while seeing the word ‘nigger’ on the printed page may 
cause one to feel ill at ease, to hear the word, actually uttered aloud could be construed 
as even more offensive and disconcerting.404 Morrison, in my own terms, essentially 
managed to distinguish between the ‘brute’ facts (i.e., Twain’s employment of racist 
                                                 
403 Morrison, "Huckleberry Finn," 280. 
404 Yet, just as one would be required to identify the particular context that justifies Twain’s use of the N-
word—thereby setting aside the possible immediate offence it might provoke—one would likewise be 
required to accept the justifiable context of hearing the word spoken aloud on an audiobook version of 
the novel. Morrison, evidentially, required a number of close readings to do so. Ibid., 280–81. 
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and offensive words and themes) and the ‘institutional’ ones (i.e., the internal logic of 
the novel).405 Thus, to record an audiobook version of the novel and replace the N-word 
just because one might be more offended when hearing it spoken aloud than one might 
be when reading it in print, is quite simply not a good enough reason. In her own words, 
Morrison recounts,  
The source of my unease reading this amazing, troubling book now 
seems clear: an imperfect coming to terms with three matters Twain 
addresses—Huck Finn’s estrangement, soleness and morbidity as an 
outcast child; the disproportionate sadness at the center of Jim’s and 
his relationship; and the secrecy in which Huck’s engagement with 
(rather than escape from) a racist society is necessarily conducted. It 
is also clear that the rewards of my effort to come to terms have been 
abundant. […] For a hundred years, the argument that this novel is has 
been identified, reidentified, examined, waged and advanced. What it 
cannot be is dismissed. It is classic literature, which is to say it heaves, 
manifests and lasts.406  
Ultimately, Huck’s perception is constructed by his culture. His attitudes are a direct 
result of his nurture and education.407 His depiction of the world he inhabits is 
dependent upon the way he was taught to see it.408 When Huck realises that Jim is not 
merely a runaway slave, but is also a person, it emphasises the contrast between Huck’s 
                                                 
405 A major reason for the disdain of the book in late nineteenth-century America would have been rooted 
in a moralistic social sensitivity. Twain’s biting satire would surely have required some getting used to. 
Twain’s criticism of Christian morality seems to have surfaced more in twentieth-century readings. Given 
Twain’s overtly ironic construction of Huck’s character and conclusive criticism of the White American 
South, it is surprising that the novel has often been accused of delivering Twain’s own racist and biased 
point of view. Rather than criticising Twain for being ostensibly over-critical of American culture or the 
South, it would seem that critics have been more inclined to accuse Twain of adopting the value system 
he was in fact satirising. Twain’s irony constitutes an essential aspect of the novel’s internal logic. 
Nonetheless, even when it is indeed identified, it would seem that Twain’s depiction of Jim in particular—
representing the ‘Black’ character as inferior, uneducated and somewhat dim-witted, coupled with an 
ostensibly unadulterated employment of the N-Word—are largely perceived as a vehicle of conveying 
Twain’s own views—manifesting and sustaining racist stereotypes.  
406 Morrison, "Huckleberry Finn,” 287–88.  
407 Huck has absorbed the mindset of his culture to such an extent that it has, in effect, become almost 
second nature. These are precisely the themes and ideas that readers would, and to a certain extent quite 
rightly, find offensive, disturbing and unconscionable. 
408 Indeed, the world of the novel takes place before the Civil War, and prior to the Emancipation 
Proclamation—during which time African-American slaves were identified as the rightful property of their 
owner, rather than considered as actual human beings. 
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understanding of the world and the racist concepts that shaped his culture and 
upbringing. In what Railton considers the novel’s ‘best known scene’,409 Huck resolves 
that he would rather ‘go to hell’ than turn Jim over to Miss Watson:    
But somehow I couldn’t seem to strike no places to harden me against 
him, but only the other kind. I’d see him standing my watch […] so I 
could go on sleeping […] and do everything he could think of for me, 
and how good he always was; and at last I struck the time I saved him 
by telling the men we had small-pox aboard, and he was so grateful, 
and said I was the best friend old Jim ever had in the world […] and 
then I happened to look around and see that paper. […] I took it up, 
and held it in my hand. I was atrembling, because I'd got to decide, 
forever, betwixt two things, and I knowed it. I studied a minute, sort 
of holding my breath, and then says to myself: "All right, then, I’ll go 
to hell"—and tore it up.410 
This passage eloquently demonstrates Huck’s internal struggle and instinct for 
compassion. It highlights his understanding and arguable acceptance of how the world 
works (i.e., complying with his internalisation of the politics and ideology of the culture 
that raised him) as opposed to how he feels that things ought to be (i.e., corresponding 
with what his conscience tells him).411 Conceivably, just as he knows under what 
circumstances it would be acceptable to play the role of the trickster, he is also very 
much aware of what it is to be a decent human being. Thus, Huck wholeheartedly 
accepts that he may ‘go to hell’ (complying with the moral code he was raised with), yet 
he makes a point of going there on his own terms, having done what he knows to be 
right.412 
                                                 
409 Railton, Mark Twain, 59. 
410 Twain, Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, 345. 
411 As Weinstein points out, Twain endows Huck with an instinctive sense of right and wrong—thereby 
allowing him to re-evaluate the moral code of his culture. Arnold Weinstein, "Huckleberry Finn—A Child’s 
Voice," Lecture #39, Classics of American Literature (The Great Courses, The Teaching Company). See URL: 
accessed March 19, 2016, www.thegreatcourses.com/courses/classics-of-american-literature.html. 
412 It would be interesting to evaluate the manner in which a performer would convey Huck’s resolution 
in an aural performance. If this particular passage can be identified, for instance, as an ostensible point 
of departure in which Huck’s character undergoes a discernible change (i.e., with respect to his point of 
view and his observation and perception of the people he subsequently encounters), one would be 
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5. The Institution of Audiobooks: Huck Finn as a Performance Text 
 
5.1 Aesthetically Evaluating Audiobooks: A Precursor to a Concrete Analysis 
According to Roach, the recordings discussed in her book have been chosen ‘on the basis 
of excellence in execution, literary or historic merit, interest and entertainment 
value’.413 Her aim, by her own admission, had been ‘to include those items which may 
prove to be of lasting value’.414 She asserts that ‘looking hopefully towards the future, 
one can say that among the best spoken records today is an elite group which 
communicates more than entertainment’.415 This accords with my own point of view, 
which is rooted in NITA and the notion of internal logic. It quite clearly indicates that 
Roach both identifies and calls for a hierarchy in this genre—indeed, not only that one 
can evaluate certain AP artworks as better than others, but that one should.416 
Audiobook reviewer Mary Thompson describes her professional process as 
follows.417 When reviewing an audiobook, if she has either not read the original printed 
work, or is completely unfamiliar with the book and its author, she begins by conducting 
                                                 
required to examine whether or not a performer succeeds in demonstrating Huck’s change. If the change 
that Huck undergoes in the novel could account for a possible distinctive change in the tone of his 
narration—that is to say, if he sounds (in print) more mature than before—it should also be recognised 
and exhibited by the performer in the audiobook version. 
413 Roach, Spoken Records, 10. 
414 Ibid. 
415 Ibid., 13 
416 As Knox points out, as a result of the ‘doubling of authorship’ that inhabits audiobooks, coupled with 
‘the investiture of the presence of the narrator in the voice-body of the text’, there appears to be an 
‘implicit invitation to readers to listen to different audio productions of the same work’. Additionally, she 
argues, ‘that there is such a variety of unabridged recordings of a single work (particularly of those no 
longer under copyright) facilitates the consumption of multiple productions of a work, even if it does not 
assume it. […] The "hear-over" is something the audiobook listening experience implicitly invites. […] If 
[…] the narrator assumes a significant presence—is the body as well as the soul of the reading—then a 
listener discovers not only a new text but forms the (one-sided, admittedly) acquaintanceship with the 
new speaker’. Knox, "Hearing Hardy, Talking Tolstoy," 138–39. 
417 I contacted Ms. Thompson via the LinkedIn Corporation, an online community and business-oriented 
social networking service. See Thompson’s user profile: accessed February 10, 2016, 
www.linkedin.com/in/mary-thompson-02641a27?authType=name&authToken=msBu&trk=wonton-
desktop. All quotes are directly extracted from our correspondence.   
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a certain amount of research on that particular title.418 As she listens, Thompson makes 
notes in which she identifies and references the ‘special qualities’, as she calls it, of the 
narration. This, as far as she is concerned, entails paying particular attention to a 
number of distinctive aspects—for instance, whether or not the voices appear to 
‘match’ the ‘emotion’ that resides within the story.419 If, indeed, as Thompson suggests, 
the voices inhabiting audiobooks are supposed to ‘match’ what she regards as the 
‘emotion of the story’, it would imply that there is surely a particular emotion she has 
in mind. Thus, one should be able to identify a distinctive emotion as an inherent 
element of the story, and subsequently determine whether or not, and to what extent, 
that emotion is either present or appropriately manifested in the aural recording of the 
story.420 According to Thompson, she examines aspects such as whether or not a 
particular character’s accent is ‘done correctly’, the proficiency of the performer’s 
pronunciation, as well as the degree of ‘consistency’ in light of the voice with which the 
narrator endows the character. Indeed, an audiobook might suffer from a variety of 
apparent inconsistencies, creating in effect a flawed aesthetic experience.421 By her own 
                                                 
418 What Thompson describes appears to accord with my own effort in researching Huck Finn. Indeed, the 
aim of this kind of research—both my own, as well as, arguably, Thompson’s—is to try and identify the 
internal logic of a particular novel. As I have demonstrated, the explicit internal logic of Huck Finn can be 
identified, explored and explained through focusing on (a) the novel’s being written in dialect, (b) Huck’s 
identity, his distinctive voice and point of view, and (c) questions of race and racism.   
419 While this may appear as a given, this is in fact quite essential for appreciating the aesthetic nature of 
the performance. As I have underlined earlier, the performer needs to be able to identify the manner in 
which a particular text should be performed. As Tassin maintains, ‘the theory of reading aloud can be 
entirely summed up in one statement. The reader is taking the place of the writer and simply talking what 
he has to say. Literature is talk made permanent. […] True, it may sometimes happen that he will fail to 
deliver the meaning when he has got it. But that is merely because the customary attitude of people in 
speaking printed words is absurdly different from their attitude in speaking their own. […] It is in reading 
aloud that the difference in the general attitude toward the printed and the spoken word is most glaring’. 
Roach, Spoken Records, 11-12. 
420 If one cannot distinguish a single emotion, at the very least there exists a discrete limited range of 
emotions, arguably linked together or expressing the same general sentiment. 
421 If, for instance, when reading a book, one happens to lose track of the plot, one can easily find one’s 
place by turning back the pages. Arguably, with audiobooks, all one has to do is to simply rewind the 
recording. Yet, if a performer (or, indeed, a director or producer) fails in his/her job, the inconsistencies 
would effectively remain embedded in the AP artwork. Simply rewinding, therefore, will be to no avail. 
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admission, Thompson also listens for any ‘awkward pauses in speech’, ‘noticeable 
swallowing’ or any other ‘mouth noises’, as she terms it, in addition to any possible 
‘background noise’ or what she regards as ‘production issues’. 
In my own terms, all of these can be identified as ostensible ‘aesthetic lapses’ 
since they all appear to predominantly relate to the listener’s experience. Surely these 
can be regarded as the audiobook equivalents of the occasional typo, the odd page 
unintentionally left blank, or any other ‘factory defect’ that one might encounter in the 
world of printed books. I would also argue that what Thompson regards as ‘awkward 
pauses’ and what she identifies as a ‘noticeable’ interference in the recording pose a 
somewhat more serious aesthetic issue. For the most part, the fact that such aspects of 
a recording are noticeable at all is precisely where the deficiency of that recording, as 
an AP artwork, would reside. Likewise, what Thompson describes as ‘awkward’ implies 
an aesthetic flaw with respect to the aural performance itself. In terms of this study, I 
find that her sense of awkwardness suggests a lack of appropriateness—that is to say, 
an unsuccessful attempt to appropriately convey the internal logic of the text in an aural 
performance.422 
In her process of evaluation, Thompson considers the extent to which the aural 
medium affects the original work—i.e., what does the audio do to augment the written 
material or detract from it. She endeavours to identify, for instance, whether or not the 
‘pacing’ succeeds in sustaining her ‘attention’ as a listener.423 Indeed, once one 
                                                 
422 A performer is no doubt free to choose at which point in his/her performance he or he might see fit to 
pause. Nevertheless, not all pauses necessarily have their place, and not every choice would comply 
appropriately with what a particular text dictates in accordance with its distinctive rhythm. 
423 These aspects can be compared with the particular pacing and rhythm of a stage performance. It would 
likewise help explain one’s ostensible fortitude in resisting a variety of soporific effects thrust upon one 
by the stage spectacle and overcoming them until the curtain call.    
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identifies an audiobook as an AP artwork—thereby rendering the act of listening to an 
audiobook an aesthetic experience—the listener’s attention becomes intrinsic.424 To be 
sure, just as a performer is expected to know how to perform within the confines of the 
aural medium, a listener, in turn, is expected to know how to listen within the same 
aural boundaries.425 At the same time, as alluded to earlier, both the listener and the 
performer hold a shared responsibility to identify the internal logic of the aural 
medium—through which the performance is delivered. Similarly, they are mutually 
required to grasp the internal logic of the work itself, which is being performed.426 
Consequently, when aesthetically evaluating audiobooks, one would need to 
consider both sets of internal logic.427 Thompson, I would argue, should be identified as 
                                                 
424 Wittkower, in this respect, maintains that ‘like the conductor holding her hand aloft, the narrator can 
signal to the audience not to move on, not to be distracted, and not to stop paying attention’. Wittkower, 
"A Preliminary Phenomenology," 224–25. Effectively, the listener’s role prevails as a necessary 
constituent of the institution of AP.  
425 Unlike with visual art forms, listening to an audiobook or radio play can be done while driving, knitting 
or doing household chores. One of the unique things about this art form is that one can listen to an 
audiobook and at the same time do all those things without missing any red lights, pricking one’s finger, 
or, perhaps most importantly, without losing the plot. As Luhrmann puts it, ‘What happens when you 
hear a text rather than read it? The obvious thing is that you can do something else with your eyes. That 
is why I can listen to books when I garden. My hands and eyes can work. And so listening to a book is a 
different sensory experience than reading it. The inner imagining of the story becomes commingled with 
the outer senses—my hands on the trowel, the scent of tansy in the breeze.’ Luhrmann, "Audiobooks and 
the Return of Storytelling". Also noteworthy is an advertising campaign by Random House—one which 
even promoted its own website (TryAudiobooks.com)—that, according to Andrew Adam Newman, 
appears to be ‘directed at consumers who may never have bought an audiobook but whose hobbies may 
predispose them to listening to one’. Evidently, the themes that this campaign attempts to associate with 
listening to audiobooks include such images as needles stuck into a ball of yarn, running shoes, an 
airplane—all with earbuds wrapped around them. Andrew Adam Newman, "Expanding the Market for 
Audiobooks Beyond Commuters," New York Times, June 1, 2013, accessed July 20, 2016, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/12/business/media/expanding-the-market-for-audiobooks-beyond-
commuters.html.  
426 I find that Wittkower’s attempt to identify what he regards as a phenomenology of audiobooks appears 
to parallel my own endeavour to demonstrate the significance of their internal logic. Wittkower argues, 
for example, that audiobooks follow a ‘rhythm and pace’ of their own, which resides ‘in between the 
starting and stopping of playback’, and when one listens to an audiobook, it ‘proceeds at the same 
inexorable rate while the audience drifts in and out of attention’. Wittkower, "A Preliminary 
Phenomenology," 222.  
427 Inevitably, in evaluating any performance as an artwork, one is able to either (a) establish that the 
performance is aesthetically good and that the audience is merely ill-equipped to properly experience it, 
or (b) determine that the performance happens to be aesthetically deficient and thus the audience may 
be justified in falling asleep. As Fischer-Lichte points out, ‘Being present in a performance implies a level 
of consent with the performance. Those who object to the performance have to make their criticism 
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a responsible, learned and avid listener. As such, she quite obviously knows how to 
experience an audiobook. She is surely able to identify, at least to some degree, whether 
or not a performer has appropriately done his/her job, and, indeed, she is also aware of 
her responsibility and knows how to do her job as a listener.428 As Roach maintains,  
An experienced listener is quick to recognize a performer’s intrusion 
with personal feelings of shyness, indifference, resentment, tiredness 
or laziness. He knows, too when the performer, instead of being 
concentrated with meaning, is thinking of the way he is doing it, the 
way it sounds, or some other aspect of his craft. […] It takes supervised 
experience, much like that acquired in a chemistry lab, to develop the 
skill needed to bring life to material embalmed in print.429  
According to American casting director and production manager Claudia Howard, a 
particular casting choice begins to make sense as soon as she can ‘see’ a picture in her 
head of the narrator—suggesting that the words on the page give rise to a visual image 
of a narrator’s identity.430 She argues that the human voice is able to do so in a way that 
the written word alone simply cannot.431 McQuaid, to whom I have alluded earlier, 
similarly maintains that part of his job, as a casting director, is to identify which 
performer will be able to ‘convincingly’ portray a particular narrator. He explains that 
the first thing he considers is the designated form in which the narrative is presented in 
the text, and the challenge of achieving some level of ‘authenticity’. According to 
                                                 
known or leave the space. By remaining part of the performance, participants also take responsibility for 
it’. Fischer-Lichte, The Routledge Introduction to Theatre, 22. 
428 The ‘Artworld Public’, as NITA articulates it, is required to be ‘prepared in some degree to understand 
an artwork’. Therein resides the core responsibilities of an AP audience—they are required to understand 
audiobooks. By its nature, Thompson’s profession appears to elicit a ‘heightened state’ of said 
responsibilities. In some respects, she might be indefinable as the preferred (perhaps even ideal) AP 
audience. She both understands audiobooks and knows how to listen to them. As playwright and poet 
William Alfred maintains, ‘a great text makes its demand of truth on audience as well as performers: we 
must prepare to listen as they must prepare to read, by bringing ourselves to a reverent sense of that 
text’s full nature’. William Alfred, preface to Spoken Records, v.  
429 Roach, Spoken Records, 10-11. 
430 All references to Howard’s insights, as well as any direct quotes, pertain to an interview I conducted 
with her via Skype in May 2013. (Recording provided on the enclosed USB flash drive). 
431 To some extent, this echoes Rubery’s reference to R. Balmer, who regarded the ‘full realization of what 
the printed book was intended to do”. Rubery, The Untold Story of the Talking Book, 254.  
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Howard, performers seem to be more attracted to books written in the first-person. 
Predominantly, she argues, ‘they tend to embrace a text where they get to say “I did 
this, I feel this, this happened to me” and so on’—rather than narrating a description in 
the third-person. Her insight strengthens the notion that audiobooks prevail as the most 
appropriate medium for written texts that constitute ostensible extended 
monologues.432 According to McQuaid, when confronted with a first-person narrative, 
a performer’s objective is to ‘become’ that voice, which, he asserts, is inherently a 
‘property’ of the written text itself.433 My concrete analyses of the audiobook versions 
of Huck Finn will demonstrate the manner in which this insight informs one’s aesthetic 
evaluation. 
Audiobooks should essentially deploy the range of possibilities evoked by the 
internal logic of the aural medium itself. At the same time, as with any medium, one 
must also be mindful of its particular limitations. Alan Beck, for example, in his 
consideration of radio acting, explains that the existence of the characters is almost 
entirely ‘word-based’ and that ‘it is radio’s strength that it speaks and that it is logic-
                                                 
432 Arguably, the more personal the narrative—or, rather, the more personally connected or involved a 
performer can become with a certain narrative—the more an aural performance could benefit from 
having the narrative spoken directly to the listeners. 
433 McQuaid considers Solomon Northup’s memoir, Twelve Years a Slave (1853) a good example. He 
distinguishes between a ‘voice’ and an ‘accent’, and argues that while this book is written in a Black 
American voice, there are not many actors in London who actually possess the ability to portray it. He 
argues that an audiobook version of this particular memoir requires a voice that is based more on the 
narrator’s ethnic identity, rather than whether or not they are a good actor. According to McQuaid, had 
the audiobook been recorded by a Black British actor—such as Chiwetel Ejiofor, who portrayed the lead 
role in the Academy Award winning 2013 film version of the memoir—it simply would not have worked. 
In brief, he argues that a narration featuring any voice other than that which exists in the text itself would 
simply sound wrong. McQuaid asserts that ‘you'd need him to be American’. He argues that although 
there are some people who might be able to do it, for the most part, one cannot simply ‘fake it’ when it 
comes to such things as dialect, lilt or a particular internal rhythm. Sustaining them throughout the 
reading of an entire book is likewise virtually impossible. McQuaid explains that when he looks at these 
kinds of texts, he usually refers to—and, in fact, literally hears in his head—the Morgan Freeman 
voiceover in Shawshank Redemption (1994; dir. Frank Darabont). He recounts that this is precisely what 
he told one of the actors who came in to audition for reading Northup’s memoir. He argues that it is just 
how an audience is supposed to experience it.  
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based—that is logic as it is originally derived from the Greek for word and reason’.434 In 
identifying one aspect of that logic—which I would regard as its internal logic as a sub-
(institutional)-category of AP—Beck asserts that when actors on radio sound like 
nothing more than ‘talking heads’ (i.e., as if they are merely reading the words into the 
microphone rather than properly performing them), the listeners tend to perceive the 
acting as unconvincing.435 Now, on the one hand, this sentiment appears to comply with 
my distinction between performing a text (i.e., an institutional fact; creating an AP 
artwork), and merely reading a text into a microphone (a brute fact; not art). On the 
other hand, I would argue that what Beck identifies as ‘talking heads’ should not be 
altogether discarded. Indeed, some texts, under certain circumstances, might even 
require precisely this kind of performance, and would be dictated by the internal logic 
of the text. As a brute fact, the notion of what precisely a ‘talking head’ constitutes can 
be interpreted as either unconvincing acting or not acting at all. At the same time, as an 
institutional fact, a ‘talking head’ can be established as a particular style of acting that 
is appropriate for certain kinds of texts. The aptly titled Talking Heads television series 
and its subsequent radio version is a good example.436 As I will show with my second 
case study—focusing on a comparison between the aural adaptations of Samuel 
                                                 
434 Alan Beck, Radio Acting (London: A & C Black, 1997), 83.  
435 Ibid., 6. 
436 Originally screened in the late 1980s, the series consisted of dramatic monologues written by the 
prolific English playwright and author Alan Bennett. In the late 1990s, the series was adapted for radio, 
and the monologues were re-recorded. Now, it is not my intention to compare the two versions by way 
of analysis, but rather to utilise the fact that these different versions exist, thereby demonstrating that 
the actors were required to adjust their delivery so as to comply with the internal logic of the particular 
medium at hand. To be sure, all the performers in this case are not only highly accomplished in their own 
right, but also skilled interpreters of Bennett’s distinctive style. In brief, although the two versions of each 
monologue constitute the same text, and while performed by the same principle actor, the aesthetic 
difference remains apparent. On television, the characters speak directly to the camera, becoming almost 
literally a ‘talking head’ on the screen. As an aural performance, the said ‘talking head’ narrates the 
spoken words out of the darkness. In both cases, the performances sustain the text’s own unique internal 
logic despite the different kinds of mediation. See USB flash drive for samples of both versions.  
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Beckett’s novel Molloy (1955)—the so-called ‘talking head’ style delivery, as an aural 
performance, arguably complies quite well with the kind of audiobooks that one can 
identify as extended first-person monologues. 
The best audiobook narrators, as far as Howard is concerned, consist of 
performers who know that they are performing for an audience. They always have a 
designated listener in mind. Those who do not, she quite rightly asserts, sound as if they 
are merely ‘reading to themselves’.437 Good narrators, for Howard, become the book—
a notion which seems to comply with being able to manifest its internal logic. Knox, in 
this respect, argues that a novel, its characters, and the narrator who brings them to life 
‘merge into one another and take form’, which is subsequently ‘underpinned by the 
rationale for the choice of narrator’.438 She maintains that although the Naxos record 
label, for instance, predominantly follows the general rule proclaiming that ‘if a man 
wrote it’ then ‘the book should be read by a man’, for their release of Thomas Hardy’s 
Tess of the d’Urbervilles (1891) they concluded that having the entire novel narrated by 
a female voice ‘seemed the only way to proceed’.439 This, she asserts, ‘suggests an act 
of transmutation, but also a kind of political or ethical representation: the 
enfranchisement of literary character. […] To “capture the essence” of the book is to 
give it a body, and to give that body voice’.440 Indeed, the primary objective in my 
forthcoming concrete analysis of the different audiobooks of Huck Finn is to identify 
precisely in which of those recordings this occurs. 
                                                 
437 Indeed, even though their audience is not actually in their presence at the time, good performers 
should always direct their reading at an implied audience. The listeners, for their part, should be aware 
(and should be made well aware) that the text featured on the recording is made explicitly for them. Put 
simply, the listeners should know that they are listening to a performance. As explained earlier, it is a 
requirement of their institutional role. 
438 Knox, "Hearing Hardy, Talking Tolstoy," 138. 
439 Ibid. 
440 Ibid. 
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5.2 Evaluating the Huck Finn Audiobook Versions as AP Artworks 
The number of commercially available audiobook versions of Huck Finn is extensive.441 
There exist both abridged and unabridged versions, professional and non-professional 
readings (e.g., recordings created by amateur performers and volunteers reading for 
blind people and visually impaired). As will be explicitly addressed in Chapter 6 (which 
presents a further elaborate consideration of the aesthetic category), it must be 
understood that non-professional recordings, for the most part, do not comply with the 
institution of AP, and thus cannot constitute AP artworks. My intention is therefore to 
neither analyse nor evaluate them, but rather to focus on the professional recordings, 
produced and released as official audiobooks. Now, for the purpose of this study, I have 
surveyed over thirty recordings.442 Listed alphabetically, in order of the performer’s 
surname, the featured narrators are as follows: Matt Armstrong, Thomas Becker, Tim 
Behrens, Dick Cavett, Jason Damron, Denny Delk, Norman Dietz, Jim Donaldson, Eric G. 
Dove, William Dufris, Robin Field, Patrick Fraley, William Fortier, Grover Gardner,443 Don 
Hagen, Garrick Hagon, B.J. Harrison, Johnny Heller, Johnny Heller, Dick Hill, Garrison 
Keillor, Jack Lemmon, Mike McShane, Alan Munro, Michael Prichard, Kerry Shale, 
Stephen L. Vernon, Will Wheaton, Trevor White, and Elijah Wood. 
                                                 
441 As Rubery points out, ‘by the 1990s, fans could hear [Huck Finn] read by Ed Begley, Dick Cavett, Jackie 
Cooper, David Crawford, Alfred Gingold, Hal Holbrook, Robert Lewis, Hiram Sherman, Peter Thomas, and 
Jack Whitaker’. Rubery, The Untold Story of the Talking Book, 254. 
442 Some of these releases have apparently added the word ‘the’ to the book’s title. I therefore 
consistently cite in my references the manner in which the novel is named in the recordings themselves. 
443 Gardner, who has been recording audiobooks since the early 1980s, released several titles under the 
pseudonyms ‘Alexander Adams’ and ‘Tom Parker’. Evidentially, he recorded Huck Finn twice—once under 
his own name and once as the said Tom Parker. See Mark Twain, Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, 
unabridged, narrated by Grover Gardner (Audio Book Contractors, Inc., 1994); and Mark Twain, The 
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, unabridged, read by Tom Parker (Blackstone Audio, 2014). To identify 
the differences between his narrations, one can compare, for instance, the opening of the novel. See USB 
flash drive for the ‘Tom Parker’ recording; and See URL for online sample of that which credits Gardner: 
accessed February 20, 2017, www.audible.co.uk/pd/Classics/Adventures-of-Huckleberry-Finn-
Audiobook/1606460544/ref=a_search_c4_1_22_srTtl?qid=1487594161&sr=1-22.  
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Of all the versions listed above, the Dietz recording represents the best aural 
manifestation of Twain’s novel.444 Dietz, first and foremost, stands out as a masterful 
and engaging narrator. His vocal properties—e.g., the tone of his voice, its timbre and 
texture—all underline the immediacy of the audiobook as an AP artwork. His narration 
effectively creates a distinct sense of intimacy that allows one to engage with Huck’s 
telling of his own personal story. His narration clearly endows Huck with a clear speech 
pattern and a consistent kind of rhythm, highlighting his perspective as the storyteller. 
He often allows tension to build (either to create a dramatic effect, or to allow Twain’s 
points to get across beyond Huck’s first-person narration). The particular pace of his 
narration is quite satisfactorily listenable. He neither runs though the text, reading the 
various passages rapidly (like Garrison Keillor, for instance, whom I will shortly address), 
nor does he leisurely stray through the chapters, achieving a rather dreary kind of 
reading (like those of Michael Prichard or Thomas Becker—both of whom I will also 
presently regard).445 Fundamentally, Dietz delivers a captivating aural rendition in that 
he succeeds in transforming Twain’s depictions into a riveting aural world, which 
appears quite vivid as one listens to the narrative. This happens with Dietz more than 
with any other performer. 
In comparing, for instance, Dietz’s reading of the novel’s opening chapter to that 
of Jason Damron,446 it becomes evident that whereas Dietz engages the listener from 
the very beginning—making every word resonate loud and clear, thereby 
                                                 
444 See Mark Twain, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, unabridged, narrated by Norman Dietz (Recorded 
Books, 1980). 
445 A good sense of pace and rhythm has little to do with a particular recording’s actual running-time. For 
instance, while both Dietz and Prichard’s recordings are complete and unabridged, whereas the Dietz’s 
runs over 11.5-hours, Prichard’s last about 10.5-hours. Nonetheless, as should become clear through my 
forthcoming examples, Prichard’s narration simply sounds much slower. See Mark Twain, Adventures of 
Huckleberry Finn, unabridged, read by Michael Prichard (Books on Tape, 1977). 
446 See Mark Twain, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, read by Jason Damron (ABN, 2012). 
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demonstrating that he is a storyteller who wants his audience to listen to him—
Damron’s narration can be described as the polar opposite.447 Explicitly, Damron 
appears to be rushing through the text without allowing himself to breath or pause, 
thereby quite literally reading at double-speed. Furthermore, his narration seems to 
employ the same kinds of inflections and emphases in almost every sentence. As a 
storyteller, he is anything but engaging. While his narration does appear to manifest a 
surge of enthusiasm, which arguably contributes to depicting Huck’s adolescence, I 
would nevertheless maintain that it sounds both over-enthusiastic and devoid of any 
context. It consequently cannot be aesthetically justified. 
In considering Chapter 31—in which, as alluded to earlier, Huck fundamentally 
resolves to do what he believes in his heart to be right, while accepting the possibility 
that he might ‘go to hell’ for doing so—Damron’s narration appears to be particularly 
deprived of any kind of emotion. Ultimately, his narration manifests virtually none of 
the aspects of the novel’s internal logic. Moreover, it clearly does not appear to comply 
with what a proper aural performance should be, in that one does not sense that he is 
in fact performing for an audience. Consider his performance of the following passage 
in particular:448 
Once I said to myself it would be a thousand times better for Jim to be 
a slave at home where his family was, as long as he’d got to be a slave, 
and so I’d better write a letter to Tom Sawyer and tell him to tell Miss 
Watson where he was. But I soon give up that notion for two things: 
she’d be mad and disgusted at his rascality and ungratefulness for 
leaving her, and so she’d sell him straight down the river again; and if 
she didn’t, everybody naturally despises an ungrateful nigger, and 
                                                 
447 See USB flash drive for Dietz’s recording; and See URL for online sample of Damron’s: accessed 
February 20, 2017, www.audible.co.uk/pd/Classics/The-Adventures-of-Huckleberry-Finn-Dramatized-
Audiobook/B008XA39HU/ref=a_search_c4_2_37_srTtl?qid=1487604289&sr=2-37). 
448 See URL for online sample: accessed February 20, 2017, www.audible.co.uk/pd/Film-Radio-TV/The-
Adventures-of-Huckleberry-Finn-Chapter-31-
Audiobook/B00YIPK22E/ref=a_search_c4_1_33_srTtl?qid=1487614929&sr=1-33 
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they’d make Jim feel it all the time, and so he’d feel ornery and 
disgraced. And then think of me! It would get all around that Huck Finn 
helped a nigger to get his freedom; and if I was ever to see anybody 
from that town again I’d be ready to get down and lick his boots for 
shame. That’s just the way: a person does a lowdown thing, and then 
he don’t want to take no consequences of it. Thinks as long as he can 
hide, it ain’t no disgrace. That was my fix exactly. The more I studied 
about this the more my conscience went to grinding me, and the more 
wicked and low-down and ornery I got to feeling. And at last, when it 
hit me all of a sudden that here was the plain hand of Providence 
slapping me in the face and letting me know my wickedness was being 
watched all the time from up there in heaven, whilst I was stealing a 
poor old woman’s nigger that hadn’t ever done me no harm, and now 
was showing me there’s One that’s always on the lookout, and ain’t a-
going to allow no such miserable doings to go only just so fur and no 
further, I most dropped in my tracks I was so scared. Well, I tried the 
best I could to kinder soften it up somehow for myself by saying I was 
brung up wicked, and so I warn’t so much to blame; but something 
inside of me kept saying, “There was the Sunday-school, you could a 
gone to it; and if you’d a done it they’d a learnt you there that people 
that acts as I’d been acting about that nigger goes to everlasting fire.” 
It made me shiver. And I about made up my mind to pray, and see if I 
couldn’t try to quit being the kind of a boy I was and be better. So I 
kneeled down. But the words wouldn’t come. Why wouldn’t they? It 
warn’t no use to try and hide it from Him. Nor from me, neither. I 
knowed very well why they wouldn’t come. It was because my heart 
warn’t right; it was because I warn’t square; it was because I was 
playing double. I was letting on to give up sin, but away inside of me I 
was holding on to the biggest one of all. I was trying to make my mouth 
say I would do the right thing and the clean thing, and go and write to 
that nigger’s owner and tell where he was; but deep down in me I 
knowed it was a lie, and He knowed it. You can’t pray a lie—I found 
that out.’449 
Dietz, on the other hand, conveys Huck’s thought process and soul-searching 
contemplations very poignantly, gradually building up towards his final resolution.450 
Grover Gardner’s ‘Tom Parker’ rendition of the same passage is similarly well-
performed.451 I would argue that his performance, overall, is among the better aural 
iterations of the novel. His storytelling not only appropriately complies with what an 
                                                 
449 Twain, Adventure of Huckleberry Finn, 341–343. 
450 See USB flash drive for Dietz’s recording of Chapter 31, 07m45sec–11m20sec. 
451 See USB flash drive for the ‘Tom Parker’ recording of Chapter 31, 05m51sec–08m30sec. 
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aural performance requires with respect to the medium, but it also successfully 
manifests the internal logic of the novel.  
Both Dietz and Gardner successfully develop the novel’s individual characters—
endowing them with individual voices, identities, and appropriate regional dialects—
thereby distinguishing them from Huck. By contrast, Michael Prichard’s narration of the 
various characters seems, overall, somewhat emotionally detached—that is to say, as if 
he merely conveys the facts of the matter for the voice-over of a documentary film.452 
In the same vein, the sense that one is listening to a drab voice-over also applies to the 
Don Hagen narration. While Hagen possesses a pleasant and quite easy-to-listen-to kind 
of voice, one gets the sense that he is not performing the text for an audience.453 
Prichard, in this respect, does in fact endow the different characters with a voice of their 
own, they nevertheless are not all well-performed.454 I will presently address a 
particular scene in the novel where the reader is required to imagine a particular 
transition between two ostensibly different voices, and would thereby influence the 
manner in which this scene would be heard as an aural performance.  
Although I find it to be the best audiobook version of the novel currently 
available, Dietz’s recording does appear to exhibit one particular flaw, explicitly 
pertaining to the novel’s aforementioned Notice. As expressed, the importance of the 
Notice to the internal logic of the novel cannot be questioned. So much so, in fact, that 
                                                 
452 See USB flash drive for Prichard’s recording, e.g., Chapter 3. 
453 Although his vocal properties do seem to comply with what an aural performance requires, Hagen’s 
particular voice, at least in respect of Huck Finn, appears to be quite miscast. See Mark Twain, Adventures 
of Huckleberry Finn, unabridged, read by Don Hagen (Gildan Media, 2010); and See URL for online sample: 
accessed February 20, 2017, http://www.audible.co.uk/pd/Classics/The-Adventures-of-Huckleberry-
Finn-Audiobook/B004FTU24G/ref=a_search_c4_2_25_srTtl?qid=1495817041&sr=2-25.  
454 In considering, for instance, the appearance of the drunken Pap in Chapter 5, it seems that whereas 
Prichard’s narration makes his character sound more like a caricature, Dietz’s delivery is quite powerful 
and succeeds in overcoming the potential so-called obstacle of over-playing the aspect of his 
drunkenness. See USB flash drive for both the Norman Dietz and Michael Prichard recordings. 
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I was both surprised and bewildered to discover that some recordings do not feature 
the Notice at all (e.g., William Dufris’s and Patrick Fraley’s recordings—despite both 
presenting themselves as ‘Complete and Unabridged’). To be sure, there is no apparent 
aesthetic justification for the exclusion. As a kind of precursor to the no less important 
Explanatory—which, for reasons beyond understanding, has also found its way out of 
some of the aural versions—the Notice effectively contributes to setting the tone of 
voice for the entire novel. (e.g., Dick Hill’s, Jack Lemmon’s and Garrison Keillor’s 
recordings, which fail to include either).455 In addition to setting the tone, they both 
indicate the type of humour one should expect, effectively forming a manual for 
working with the embedded dialects. Fundamentally, they constitute an inherent 
referential criterion for evaluating the audiobook versions of the novel. I therefore 
cannot fathom why one would wilfully choose to exclude them, even from an abridged 
version. Now, while the two are indeed featured on the recording, it is nevertheless not 
performed by Dietz. Rather, it is included amid the spoken introduction to the novel, 
provided for the listener by the audiobook’s production company. Inadvertently, this 
decision detaches the voice of the introduction from the voice of the novel as a whole. 
There is essentially no reason why Dietz should not read the Notice himself, while 
sustaining the delicate balance between performing the text as Huck while also 
conveying Twain’s literary voice. 
Ultimately, Dietz’s achievement is also noteworthy in that he succeeds in 
capturing and conveying to the listener what could be perceived as the most 
                                                 
455 Interestingly enough, Dick Hill, much like Gardner, appears to have recorded two audiobook versions. 
As opposed to the version included on the enclosed USB flash drive, an audio sample of the other version 
reveals that Hill does in fact narrate these two essential passages. See Mark Twain, The Adventures of 
Huckleberry Finn, unbridged, read by Dick Hill (Brilliance, 1992); and See URL: accessed February 20, 2017, 
www.scribd.com/audiobook/315847399/The-Adventures-of-Huckleberry-Finn.  
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appropriate voice for Huck. Indeed, one could argue that this represents the most 
difficult task in aurally performing the novel. As has already been established, Huck’s 
first-person narration is quite literally the voice of the novel—while at the same time, 
as one engages with the novel, one should be aware of Twain’s own literary voice as the 
author. Dietz not only succeeds in conveying a believable portrayal of Huck’s character, 
but his delivery appears to be sympathetic and without judgement or criticism. As I will 
presently illustrate, utilising two recordings as ostensible binary opposition—Elijah 
Wood and Jack Lemmon—Huck cannot sound too young and cannot sound too old. 
In considering the potential aesthetic implications involved with having a mature 
or older actor narrate a novel that arguably requires the voice of a young adolescent, 
one could argue that to perform the novel in the voice of an actual child seems to 
comply with the novel’s internal logic (i.e., having Huck tell his story in his own voice).456 
At the same time, however, it is uncertain how many so-called ‘child-actors’ would be 
up to the task. Indeed, a reader would not only be required to sustain a professional 
aural performance throughout the entire recording (and, in effect, be able to enthral his 
listeners), but he would also need to possess both the skill and experience of modulating 
between the portrayal of Huck’s character while suggesting Twain’s literary voice. This 
would constitute a difficult enough task for professional and experienced actors. As 
audiobooks can be perceived as a singular form of adaptation, it is interesting to note 
that while all the novel’s cinematic and televised adaptations consistently employ child 
actors, I have yet to discover one single audiobook version narrated by someone the 
same age as Huck. 
                                                 
456 Prichard’s narration, for instance, is predominantly inconsistent in his conveying to the listeners the 
sense that Huck is a young boy. See USB flash drive for Prichard’s recording, e.g., Chapter 9. 
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Evidentially, some narrators make an explicit attempt to sound like a young 
child, albeit, so it seems, predominantly unsuccessfully. Yet, the only professional 
recording that appears to stand out in this respect is the version performed by Elijah 
Wood.457 Largely due to the particularly youthful, slightly high-pitched and almost 
feminine quality of his voice, Wood’s performance differs from most of the other 
narrations precisely in that it makes his rendition of Huck’s character sound the most 
youthful. At the same time, however, I find that his recording relies more on Wood’s 
vocal qualities and less on a successful aural interpretation of Huck’s character. 
Consequently, despite an apparent resonating youthfulness, I would argue that Wood’s 
performance does not properly sustain an aural performance of the entire novel. His 
portrayal of Huck does not sound young enough to convey the thought processes of a 
child, and, at the same time, does not appear old enough to be delivering his recollected 
adolescent memories.458 Arguably, one can consider in the same vein the performances 
of Eric G. Dove,459 Johnny Heller,460 and Will Wheaton461 as all three appear to succeed 
in making Huck’s character sound distinctly young, while at the same time convey a 
certain sense of maturity.462 
                                                 
457 Mark Twain, Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, unabridged, read by Elijah Wood Audible, Inc., 2014). 
Although born in 1981, and hence hardly a child, Wood nevertheless is the youngest of all the performers 
discussed herein. (Wood, incidentally, as a child-actor, portrayed Huck in a 1993 film adaptation).  
458 See USB flash drive for the Elijah Wood recording.  
459 Mark Twain, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, unabridged read by Eric G. Dove (Dreamscape Media, 
2013). See URL for online sample: accessed February 20, 2017, 
www.scribd.com/audiobook/237980627/The-Adventures-of-Huckleberry-Finn.  
460 Mark Twain, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, unabridged read by Johnny Heller 
(Listen2aBook.com, 2015). See URL for online sample:  accessed 20 Feb 2017, 
www.audible.co.uk/pd/Classics/The-Adventures-of-Huckleberry-Finn-
Audiobook/B0195A5P5K/ref=a_search_c4_1_25_srTtl?qid=1487758377&sr=1-25; 
461 Mark Twain, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, abridged, read by Will Wheaton (Phoenix Books, 
2014). See URL for online sample: accessed February 17, 2017, 
https://www.overdrive.com/media/2122090/the-adventures-of-huckleberry-finn.  
462 Wheaton’s narration in particular appears to manifest Huck’s age very well. His characterisation of 
Huck appears expressive and convincing. (Nonetheless, his performance is not without faults—explicitly 
with respect to certain noticeable mispronunciations of the Midwestern accents). By contrast, both 
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Alternatively, given the unique nature of the narrator’s voice in Twain’s novel—
conveying Twain’s literary voice through Huck’s distinct first-person storytelling—one 
could argue that an audiobook of the novel might actually work better when performed 
by an older actor. Since the novel assumes the guise of an authentic autobiography, its 
performance by a mature actor—or perhaps one who may sound older than he actually 
is—could assist in creating a sense for the listener that he is recording his memories and 
recollections.463 Moreover, since the novel depicts a particular period in history (both 
with respect to the time of its publication, and even more so in present times), it might 
even seem quite appropriate to hear the story told by an older voice who is making an 
attempt to re-enact his own past experiences.  
In this respect, Jack Lemmon’s recording can be placed on the other end of the 
spectrum. Having passed away in 2001 at the age of 76, Lemmon’s voice in this 
recording, which is dated 2000, sounds like that of a relatively old man, or of an 
individual who has lived a long life. His narration of the novel gives one the sense that 
one is listening to a man looking back upon his youth from a distance.464 In effect, he 
succeeds in making Huck sound as if he is conveying his own experiences from his own 
perspective. At the same time, I would argue that this kind of possible interpretation—
well-performed as it may be—does not fully accord with the novel’s internal logic. 
                                                 
Patrick Fraley and William Dufris appear to over-emphasise the childish aspects of Huck in their portrayal 
of his character, rather than his child-like point of view. See individual recordings on USB flash drive, e.g., 
Chapter 14. Although Dufris does so to a lesser extent, one might argue that they both fail in making the 
listener aware that although Huck is a child, he is nevertheless not immature. 
463 Conceivably, while told through a child’s voice, Huck’s narrative could not have been written by a child. 
Rather, as with most autobiographies, it would have been written by a person who has lived a 
considerable number of years. 
464 Mark Twain, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, abridged, performed by Jack Lemmon (Simon & 
Schuster Audio, 2000). See URL for online sample: accessed December 20, 2016, 
http://www.audible.co.uk/pd/Classics/The-Adventures-of-Huckleberry-Finn-
Audiobook/B004F1W59E/ref=a_search_c4_1_3_srTtl?qid=1495805074&sr=1-3. 
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Ultimately, although Lemmon is surely a remarkable performer—whose persona as the 
American Everyman conceivably contributes to one’s listening experience in identifying 
Huck’s character as a typical American boy—the main deficiency of his performance is 
that he sounds too old for the part. Indeed, one’s aesthetic experience of Twain’s novel 
depends upon Huck’s first-person narration.465 Consequently, finding an actual voice for 
properly conveying Huck’s point of view is imperative. Whereas Wood’s narration is 
ostensibly neither here nor there with respect to Huck’s voice, Lemmon’s performance 
makes Huck sound as old as Lemmon himself—which simply does not comply with the 
world of the novel. Even when one applies a willing suspension of disbelief, something 
nevertheless gets lost in one’s aesthetic experience when hearing the novel through the 
voice of an old man. 
To be sure, Lemmon’s audiobook version is also noteworthy merely in that it 
presents one with the opportunity to listen to an aural performance by Jack Lemmon. 
As he ranks among the most remarkable and well-respected actors in his profession, a 
listener is in many respects invited to tune-in to his/her informed intuition—much like 
the casting director—and thus ostensibly superimpose what one knows about a 
                                                 
465 In referencing Hardy’s Tess of the d’Urbervilles (1891), Knox alludes to her own ‘deep in despair at (or 
during?) the Flo Gibson narration’ of the novel: ‘Not that I wanted to hurry the suffering Tess on to her 
death on the gallows—quite the opposite. I'd once or twice pleaded with the MP3 player as if it was the 
ear of an innocent Tess. [...] Whether Tess’s end came fast or slow, it was coming, and neither Flo Gibson 
nor I could do anything about it. My desire to tinker was prompted by the quaver in Flo Gibson’s voice, 
those eloquent cracks and dips and warbles that—like the voice of the actress Thora Hird in the audio 
version of Alan Bennett’s 'A Cream Cracker under the Settee' [sic]—are the remonstration of the text 
outside of the text, letting you know that you are listening to the main character and the voice talent 
teeter on the brink of death; reminding you that what you are hearing is time passing. The implicit body—
the body behind the voice, the body laboring in the reading—was what prompted me to reach for a 
technical fix. If the narrator’s voice was too old for the winsome Tess, might I not make it the voice of a 
breathless young girl? For Gibson’s age is one of the things a listener quickly identifies in her voice, and 
during those first few hours of listening to Tess it seemed the thing most amenable to change. So I put 
Gibson on double-time […] The result was Flo Gibson on helium. All the menace had gone out of Alec 
d'Urberville […] That the critical scene had raced past me was galling: Tess at a merry clip, and none the 
younger for it’. Knox, "Hearing Hardy, Talking Tolstoy," 135–36. 
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particular performer and his/her work, together with what one knows about the text 
being performed. (Arguably, with performers such as Lemmon, one might even regard 
having the opportunity to experience their performance as something of a privilege—
especially when their aural performances are scarce).466 Even from a marketing point of 
view, if one knows that a particular audiobook happens to be narrated by a certain 
celebrated performer, one could deduce that it should thereby potentially evoke both 
an enriching and entertaining aesthetic experience, and thus one should purchase it.467 
Nevertheless, in further evaluating Lemmon’s narration, one could argue that his 
audiobook version is also somewhat deficient in two additional aspects: (a) Lemmon’s 
delivery of the embedded dialects, and (b) the racially sensitive censorship that this 
particular version has been subject to. With respect to the former, while he does employ 
different voices when narrating different characters (such as, for instance, Miss Watson 
and Jim), and although he appropriately performs them in accordance with Twain’s 
variations in spelling, he does not in fact appear to endow them with a distinctive 
dialect. With respect to the latter, Lemmon uses the word ‘slave’ rather than the 
dreaded N-word. 
Albeit (arguably) self-evident, it should nevertheless be stressed that in addition 
to one’s aforementioned proficiency as (audio)-performer, s/he is essentially required 
                                                 
466 Lemmon’s narration of Huck Finn constitutes but one of a handful of audiobooks he recorded. It was 
released by Simon & Schuster both individually and as part of a ‘Family Audio Classics’ box set, including 
abridged versions of Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures In Wonderland (1865) and Mark Twain’s The 
Adventures of Tom Sawyer (1876), narrated by Sally Field and Paul Newman, respectively.      
467 Audible’s ‘a-list’ collection is surely another good example. See URL: accessed January 14, 2016, 
www.audible.co.uk/mt/hollywood/narrow. Although one would be required to aesthetically evaluate 
each audiobook on a case by case basis, these cases demonstrate the manner in which one utilises one’s 
informed intuition to identify that these particular performances should be exceptionally good. As 
Luhrmann points out—referring to the Simon & Schuster audiobook production of Colm Toibin’s short 
novel, Testament of Mary (2012), narrated by Meryl Streep—publishers in recent years appear to be 
paying more attention to production value, which manifests here in the choice of narrator. Luhrmann, 
"Audiobooks and the Return of Storytelling". 
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to possess a unique (i.e., an above-average) vocal quality.468 As Knox points out, the 
human voice, ‘as a species of sound, […] has particularly strong capacities for affect’.469 
Similarly, in referring to what he counts as ‘good technique’ in radio acting, Beck 
maintains that in addition to being articulate and owning skills in ‘language, dialect, 
pace, pitch and rhythm’, one has to possess a ‘must-be-listened-to’ voice.470 I would 
argue that more than half of the narrators discussed herein most definitely possess 
these kinds of vocal qualities.471 Ultimately, drawing to some extent on Thompson’s 
insights, an audiobook should most definitely captivate its audience.472 
Now, to further illustrate the problem involved in identifying and conveying the 
internal logic of the novel in the form of an audiobook, it is interesting to consider the 
manner in which several performers have approached the shift in dialect that appears, 
for instance, in the opening scene of Chapter 11. Here, Huck’s character—who at this 
point has disguised himself as a girl—meets the character of Judith Loftus, whose 
vernacular is that of a Missouri housewife. Although a minor character in the novel, she 
does seem to leave a profound impression on Huck. The previous chapter sets up Huck’s 
meeting with Loftus. Having already been assisted by Jim to dress up like a girl, Huck 
ends the chapter with the following words:  
                                                 
468 To be sure, in addition to his/her acting abilities, skill, talent and craftsmanship, an (audio)-performer 
should be able (a) to identify how a particular text is supposed to be read (i.e., with respect to the written 
text’s own aesthetic context and unique internal logic), and (b) to possess the ability of performing the 
text in question within the confines and limitations of an inherently aural medium. 
469 Knox, "Hearing Hardy, Talking Tolstoy," 128. 
470 Beck, Radio Acting, 2.  
471 At the same time, just as not all artworks are necessarily aesthetically good, my analysis should make 
it clear that not every recording that effectively complies with the definition of an aural performance 
necessarily succeeds in properly manifesting the required aspects of a particular work’s internal logic. 
472 As has been established, listening to an audiobook constitutes an aesthetic experience in its own right 
(i.e., rather than an alternative to reading). Now, since a novel is surely to captivate one through the act 
of reading itself, I would argue that what Thompson implies is that audiobooks—especially when one can 
identify them as AP artworks—should essentially find a way to engage with their listeners in a manner 
that would accord with the confines of the distinct aural medium. 
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I practiced around all day to get the hang of the things, and by and by 
I could do pretty well in them, only Jim said I didn’t walk like a girl […] 
I took notice, and done better. […] the drift of the current fetched me 
in at the bottom of the town. […] There was a woman about forty year 
old in there knitting by a candle that was on a pine table. I didn’t know 
her face; she was a stranger, for you couldn’t start a face in that town 
that I didn’t know. Now this was lucky […] if this woman had been in 
such a little town two days she could tell me all I wanted to know; so I 
knocked at the door, and made up my mind I wouldn’t forget I was a 
girl.473 
The next chapter begins as follows: 
"Come in," says the woman, and I did. She says: "Take a cheer."  
I done it. She looked me all over with her little shiny eyes, and says: 
"What might your name be?" 
"Sarah Williams."474  
The misspelling of the word chair immediately indicates the peculiar regional dialect of 
Loftus. More importantly, following the set-up from the previous chapter, a reader 
would effectively need to imagine what Huck sounds like as he is speaking with Loftus. 
A performer, in turn, would be required to know how to perform Huck’s attempt at 
sounding like a girl. Loftus, for her part, does not take very long to realise ‘Sarah’ is in 
fact a young boy: ‘You do a girl tolerable poor, but you might fool men, maybe’.475 
Nevertheless, she treats Huck with kindness and teaches him how a real girl is supposed 
to act. Consequently, although a reader receives the information of Huck’s poor 
impersonation of a girl only near the end of their conversation (making for a comic relief, 
of sorts), the task of a performer would be to appropriately convey Huck’s poor attempt 
right from the start.  
                                                 
473 Twain, Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, 109. 
474 Ibid., 110. 
475 Ibid., 118.  
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A possible choice a performer would need to make in this respect is whether or 
not, and the degree to which, Huck’s voice might change. Should one, for instance, 
perform Huck’s attempt in an exaggerated fashion with much emphasis on how Huck 
knows nothing about what girls really sound like, or should one not make any change in 
Huck’s voice at all—effectively emphasising the irony in having Huck’s sound exactly the 
same, arguably making his disguise even more see-through?476 Much like the 
aforementioned scene with Aunt Polly, in which Huck assumes the role of Tom, the 
performer’s delivery of Twain’s lines is crucial. Choosing an appropriate narrator should 
therefore not only depend on the manner in which a performer decides to perform 
Huck’s character (in light of the novel as a whole), but also take into consideration 
Twain’s satire.  
When listening to some of the available audiobook versions of Twain’s novel, 
this problem becomes clearly seen (or rather heard) when evaluating the work of the 
performer. To be sure, different performers employ different choices. One should not 
only examine and evaluate the choices of a particular performer (who may or may not 
possess the necessary qualities for performing this particular novel) but also analyse 
their choices and the extent to which they comply, if at all, both with the novel’s internal 
logic and with that of the aural medium itself. 
In Dietz’s version, the character of Loftus sounds like a relatively young woman, 
and seems to match her depiction—which, according to Huck’s calculation, is around 
                                                 
476 English teacher Sarah Burgess suggested to me an additional complication that resides herein, 
pertaining to the narrator’s gender. As an avid listener of audiobooks, Burgess finds that male narrators 
seldom ‘get’ the female voice ‘just right’. This is indeed an important insight. In the case at hand, a listener 
is essentially confronted with a grown male narrator trying to sound like a young boy who is himself trying 
to sound like a young girl, and, at the same time, the grown male narrator is himself making an attempt 
to successfully sound like a grown woman who in the novel calls Huck out on his miserable attempt at 
actually sounding like a young girl.  
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forty. Dietz succeeds in delivering this aspect of Loftus's character from her very first 
utterance. His rendition of the word ‘cheer’ makes it sound like her natural way of 
speaking—both in terms of her assumed age and her regional dialect. He does not over 
emphasise the fact that this word is misspelt. Indeed, that it appears misspelt on the 
page is merely the ‘brute fact’ of the matter. However, the ‘institutional fact’—that is 
to say, the fact that actually counts—is that its spelling is supposed to indicate this 
particular character’s regional dialect. It should therefore sound effortless. A listener, in 
effect, should hear Loftus rather than Dietz. In addition, although Loftus is given a 
distinct voice of her own, Dietz excels in filtering it through Huck’s first-person account 
as the storyteller. A clear distinction is similarly evident in the shorthand transition 
between his portrayal of Huck (as the narrator) and Huck’s portrayal of Sarah Williams. 
One can hear, for example, at least to some extent, Huck’s youthful joy and a kind of 
playfulness in trying to get away with his scheme. Ultimately, Dietz succeeds in 
consistently conveying the voices with which Twain endows the characters throughout 
the entire novel. His achievement is quite remarkable.477 
In Thomas Becker’s recording, on the other hand, the word ‘cheer’ does not 
sound as natural as it does in Dietz’s. While Becker arguably demonstrates that Loftus 
speaks in her own distinct way, it nevertheless does not sound like a particular regional 
dialect. In fact, in Becker’s reading, it sounds more like the ostensible brute fact of its 
being misspelt—or rather, in this case, mispronounced. Additionally, Becker’s reading 
appears to be insufficient in two key respects: namely, (a) the age of Loftus's character—
which sounds like a woman who is well over forty, and (b) the inconclusive transition 
                                                 
477 See USB flash drive for Dietz’s recording of Chapter 11. 
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between Huck’s voice as the narrator and what should be Huck’s somewhat altered 
voice when disguised as a girl. With Becker, this transition appears to build up gradually. 
He makes Huck sound as if he is improvising Sarah Williams ‘on the spot’–as indeed Huck 
does. On the one hand, this surely constitutes a viable and interesting choice on the 
performer’s part. On the other hand, if this had indeed been his choice, its execution is 
nonetheless inconsistent in that the performance does not appropriately convey it. 
Rather, the recording gives one the sense that Becker is unsure whether or not he 
should utilise a girl’s voice to begin with.478 
The two different renditions recorded by Grover Gardner (i.e., credited to 
himself and ‘Tom Parker’), the Loftus scene both properly express her age and 
successfully convey her correct regional dialect. Particularly well done is the seemingly 
simple utterance ‘”No”, I says’, as the transition between his portrayal of Huck and his 
performance of Huck’s portrayal of the girl.479 Much like Dietz, Gardner’s performance 
(in both his recordings) seems almost effortless, naturally delivering the world of the 
novel to the listeners. 
In an abridged version performed by renowned American storyteller and radio 
personality, Garrison Keillor, there prevails an evident difference between his narration 
of Huck’s voice as the ‘voice’ of the novel (i.e., speaking directly to the listener) and 
Huck’s reporting of his conversations with other characters.480 He establishes a unique 
tone for Huck’s character, making him sound child-like without sounding child-ish.481 
                                                 
478 See Mark Twain. The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, unabridged, read by Thomas Becker (In Audio, 
2003); and See USB flash drive for his recording of Chapter 11. 
479 See USB flash drive for the ‘Tom Parker’ recording of Chapter 11. 
480 See USB flash drive for Keillor’s recording, 45m10sec. 
481 As alluded to earlier, making Huck sound child-like highlights his innocence. The danger in making him 
sound too childish is that it would not comply with his evident journey into adulthood and his growing 
understanding that the ways of his society are not necessarily conscionable. 
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Indeed, while Huck is indeed a child, and although the story is told from a child’s point 
of view, portraying his character as childish seems a less appropriate way to actualise 
the novel’s internal logic. To be sure, this is precisely what one can sense in Wood’s 
performance in that he makes Huck sound too young.482 Ultimately, Keillor’s narration 
complements Huck’s storytelling in that it highlights the fact Huck is telling the story, in 
his voice, as he experienced it, even when he refers to and uses the words spoken by 
other characters. Keillor’s use of the dialect in this respect seems natural and 
effortless—as it should have been for Huck, with regard to his experience of the world 
and society that surrounded him. He performs the passage with charm and enthusiasm, 
allowing Twain’s wit to be heard loud and clear. In the Loftus scene, succeeding where 
Becker fails, Keillor appropriately conveys Huck’s assumed improvisation when faced 
with the challenge of changing his voice to sound like a girl. 
Dufris’s narration, although endowing Huck with a kind of child-like innocence, 
sounds over-enthusiastic to the extent that it makes Huck sound fundamentally 
immature.483 As can be heard in the Loftus scene, yet evident throughout, Dufris endows 
each character with a distinctive voice. His reading of Loftus appropriately succeeds in 
suggesting her imagined age. At the same time, however, whereas Dietz and Keillor 
succeed in consistently making their portrayal of Huck’s voice present in the words and 
                                                 
482 In the same vein, even a cursory listening to Robin Field’s recording one gets the sense that his 
portrayal of Huck sounds too childish. Furthermore, his narration also manifests a rather problematic 
sense of pace and timing. Consider, for example, the arguably unnecessary pause in his utterance of the 
words ‘free and satisfied’. (Although there is surely nothing wrong with pronouncing a certain word or 
phrase differently from anyone else, I find that this small example clearly demonstrates that not every 
choice works for every text). Consequently, I would argue that prolonged listening to Field’s narration 
would evoke a completely unrewarding aesthetic experience. See Mark Twain, The Adventures of 
Huckleberry Finn, unabridged, read by Robin Field (Mission Audio, 2011); and See URL for online sample: 
accessed December 20, 2016, www.audible.co.uk/pd/Classics/The-Adventures-of-Huckleberry-Finn-
Audiobook/B0057AOL6M/ref=a_search_c4_1_9_srTtl?qid=1487352187&sr=1-9.  
483 See USB flash drive for Dufris’s recording of Chapter 11. 
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voices of the other characters, Dufris does not. Effectively, as one listens to Dufris, as 
Huck, telling his own story, one seems to constantly be made aware of his effort to act 
the part. So much so, in fact, that one might even reject his narration as overacting, and 
thereby render his aural performance aesthetically flawed.484 
In Dick Hill’s performance, Huck’s voice remains exactly the same throughout 
the entire recording.485 In the Loftus scene, Hill takes no pains to make Huck sound like 
a girl or to convey to the listener whether or not Huck is at all worried about Loftus 
exposing his scheme. His performance lacks consistency in its aural characterisation of 
Huck. Hill’s overall performance—much like that of Dufris—is marred by overacting.486 
(At the same time, his overacting might arguably be perceived as somewhat helpful in 
this particular scene, as it amplifies Huck’s situation: namely, it potentially conveys 
Huck’s attempt in trying to sustain the guise of a girl). Furthermore, although Hill also 
fails to give Loftus any specific regional dialect, he does utilise a distinctively different 
voice for her character—one which appropriately matches her assumed age. 
Nevertheless, as with his characterisation of Huck, his performance fails in consistently 
sustaining a complete and concrete sense of her character. 
                                                 
484 While considerably more so than Dufris, I would argue that Stephen L. Vernon’s narration constitutes 
a similarly so-called ‘good bad-example’ of what an audiobook version of Huck Finn should sound like. 
See Mark Twain, Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, unabridged, read by Stephen L. Vernon (A.R.N. 
Publications, 2015); and See URL for online sample: accessed February 22, 2017, 
www.audible.co.uk/pd/Classics/Adventures-of-Huckleberry-Finn-
Audiobook/B0108KAWZ4/ref=a_search_c4_1_16_srTtl?qid=1487758377&sr=1-16 
485 See USB flash drive for Hill’s recording of Chapter 11. 
486 According to Knox, listeners, narrators and producers alike are very much aware of the risks involved 
with an ‘over-the-top performance’ in audiobooks. Knox, "Hearing Hardy, Talking Tolstoy," 131. Referring 
to Under the Greenwood Tree (1872)—where she finds Hardy’s ‘concerted attempt to put down on paper’ 
and ‘make audible’ the dialect and voices ‘of his home country’—Knox maintains that ‘the labor of voicing 
a literary work for an audiobook is precisely to put “it into words and speak it,” and with such a force of 
presence that the “voice” previously to the fore in the reader’s encounter with the printed text is dropped 
to the rear’. Ibid., 130–31. 
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A cursory listening to the performance by Patrick Fraley might lead one to 
conclude that it is just as good as that of Dietz. In brief, it both appropriately complies 
with the requirements of the aural medium and succeeds in manifesting the major 
aspects of the novel’s internal logic. Yet, a close listening to Loftus makes it clear that 
Fraley’s rendition of her character’s regional dialect, for example, sounds quite forced 
and ostensibly mechanical.487 Consider, explicitly, his rendition of the word ‘cheer’, 
which is fundamentally closer to Becker’s flawed delivery.488 
Garrick Hagon’s narration maintains a predominantly consistent rhythm and 
pace throughout his performance. So much so, in fact, that it seems to neglect some of 
the novel’s more dramatic passages.489 In the Loftus scene, however, Hagon’s portrayal 
of the character makes her sound well beyond the age of forty, and her regional dialect 
is heard quite distinctly—and the same can be said about his portrayal of additional 
characters in the novel. This scene also demonstrates Hagon’s clear transition between 
Huck’s voice as the narrator and Huck’s portrayal of the girl.490 In his portrayal of Huck 
in disguise, he seems to have taken a somewhat different approach to that of the other 
readers discussed: namely, rather than conveying Huck’s sense of playfulness or 
adventure, Hagon’s rendition conveys more of Huck’s fear of being exposed. 
                                                 
487 Fraley—much like Dufris, although to a lesser extent—appears to portray Huck more as childish, rather 
than highlight his child-like point of view. In this respect, both Dufris and Fraley seem to fail in making a 
listener aware that although Huck is a child, he nevertheless does not lack maturity. At the same time, 
both their performances demonstrate the understanding that Huck should not sound completely like an 
adult male narrator. See Mark Twain, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, unabridged, read by Patrick 
Fraley (Audio Partners, 1999); and See USB flash drive for his recording of Chapter 11. 
488 Prichard’s recording similarly suffers from a lack of consistency in conveying to the listeners the sense 
that Huck is a young boy. Neither he nor Becker succeed in endowing Huck with a clear speech pattern or 
a particular rhythm that manifests his perspective as the storyteller. Prichard does, however, meet the 
requirement of altering his voice to indicate Huck’s impersonating the girl in the Loftus scene. He also 
provides Loftus with a distinctive voice, rather than portraying her through Huck. See USB flash drive for 
Prichard’s recording of Chapter 11. 
489 Mark Twain, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, unabridged, read by Garrick Hagon. (Naxos, 2007). 
See USB flash drive for Hagon’s recording, for instance, of Chapter 31, 00m00sec–06m00sec.  
490 See USB flash drive for Hagon’s recording of Chapter 11. 
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Consequently, this aesthetic choice is not only interesting but also appears to work quite 
well in enhancing the listener’s aesthetic experience. In brief, it draws the listener into 
the dramatic situation, making one simply compelled to listen. 
Wood’s delivery of the Loftus scene is a playful, child-like performance of Huck’s 
attempt to sound like a girl.491 His narration of Huck appears to subtly demonstrate 
Huck’s illiteracy. At the same time, in contrast to other narrators who may have over-
emphasised the various characters in the novel by endowing them with distinctive 
voices, Wood’s performance seems to do the opposite. The variations of characters are 
consequently not distinctive enough and they also are not necessarily ‘filtered’ through 
his rendition of Huck’s voice. Effectively, a listener might even become confused and 
lose track of which character is in fact speaking.492 
As will later be made clear with my additional extended case studies, my 
intention is to further examine the audiobook as the most appropriate medium for the 
first-person narrative—with particular emphasis on the manner in which casting an 
aural performance reflects on one’s informed intuition in aesthetic appreciation of 
artworks. As aural performances—manifesting in the form of extended monologues, 
delivered by narrators who appear to require an audience to whom they must speak 
their narrative—they enrich one’s aesthetic experience to a considerable and 
compelling degree, showing how an internal logic works in action. 
 
 
                                                 
491 See USB flash drive for Wood’s recording, 01hr58m51sec. 
492 While he does succeed in making the characters of Huck and Jim sound different from one another, 
this problem is particularly evident in Wood’s reading of the characters of Pap, the Duke and the King—
all of whom sound almost identical.  
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6. Sub-(Institutional)-Categories: An Extended Analysis of AP Artworks  
 
6.1 Stephen Hawking, LibriVox and other ‘Earsores’: What Does Not Count as AP 
Before I turn to my second major case study, having already surveyed a classic and 
comparatively standard nineteenth-century novel—utilising it for identifying the unique 
manner in which audiobooks, as the primary aural artefacts of AP, effectively facilitate 
the performative aspects of the first-person narrative—I wish to present an extended 
analysis of the aesthetic category itself. Indeed, I find it necessary to better articulate 
what sub-(institutional)-categories the institution of AP evokes—thereby developing a 
more comprehensive understanding of the institution itself. By way of illustrating what 
essentially does not comply with the mother institution, my intention is to make 
abundantly clear what in fact does.493 Thus, examined herein are two distinct 
phenomena associated with the realm of audiobooks: (i) books for the blind and visually 
impaired—explored through the volunteer-based website libriVox.org,494 and (ii) 
computer-generated audiobooks—commonly identified by their ostensible Stephen 
Hawking ‘soundalike’ quality. 
LibriVox is a ‘Web 2.0’495 community. As such, according to Michael Hancher, 
they are able to conduct themselves in ways that typical commercial audiobook 
publications simply cannot: not only are they immune to issues of copyright (as they 
                                                 
493 In brief, my objectives with this intermediary chapter are to (a) identify so-called ‘false friends’: 
namely, cases in which one merely appears to identify an AP artwork—when in fact the work in question 
does not comply with what an AP artwork should be, and (b) extend my evaluative analysis of AP artworks 
by underlining the comprehensive importance of appreciating artworks.  
494 LibriVox, in essence, is a volunteer-based Internet community, devoted to the creation and online 
distribution of audiobooks. 
495 The term ‘Web 2.0’ describes World Wide Web sites emphasising user-generated content, usability, 
and interoperability. Similarly, these websites enable interaction and collaboration between users, who 
function as both creators and consumers, taking part in a dialogue, within social media as part of a virtual 
community. Wikipedia, s.v. "web 2.0," accessed March 1, 2016, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_2.0. 
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concern themselves exclusively with works in the public domain),496 but they also 
appear impervious to ‘constraints of the literary tastes’ evoked either by the readers 
(i.e., the volunteers who record the books) or the listeners (i.e., the community’s 
members who consume the recorded material).497 As is evidently underscored by the 
slogan embedded in the LibriVox logo, the community’s self-confessed and overt 
objective appears to unapologetically advocate their devotion to the ‘acoustical 
liberation of books in the public domain’.498 Their ostensible manifesto asserts that 
‘LibriVox volunteers record chapters of books in the public domain and publish the audio 
files on the Internet. Our goal is to record all the books in the public domain’.499 
Effectively, their so-called ‘call to action’ appears to be simple. As LibriVox founder, 
Hugh McGuire, puts it, ‘It’s easy to volunteer. All you need is a computer, some free 
recording software, and your own voice’.500 
Now, McGuire’s perception of the LibriVox volunteer—as well as his implied 
assertion about him/her lacking any obstacles in the process of recording a printed 
book—both stand in direct contrast to the conception of the (audio)-performer and 
his/her crucial role in defining what constitutes an AP artwork.501 Predominantly, 
McGuire’s perception appears to outwardly oppose the notion that an audiobook 
requires a professional performer. Additionally, he seems to completely ignore the no 
                                                 
496 Works that are regarded as being in and/or belonging to the public domain are essentially ‘those whose 
exclusive intellectual property rights have expired, have been forfeited, or are inapplicable’ Wikipedia, 
s.v. "public domain", accessed March 1, 2016, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_domain. 
497 Michael Hancher, "Learning from LibriVox," in Audiobooks, Literature, and Sound Studies, ed. Matthew 
Rubery (New York: Routledge, 2011), 201. 
498 See URL: accessed November 14, 2014, www.librivox.org.  
499 Hancher, "Learning from LibriVox,” 204-205.  
500 Wikipedia, s.v. "Hugh McGuire," accessed March 1, 2016, 
https://en.wikinews.org/wiki/Interview_with_LibriVox_founder_Hugh_McGuire.  
501 As has been established throughout, in constituting one of the four rule-schemes constructing the 
intuition of AP as whole, the (audio)-performer is essential for articulating all the other three.  
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less crucial factor of performing for a designated audience. To be sure, their 
spatiotemporal absence notwithstanding, there is an audience who will consequently 
listen to the recording and experience it as an AP artwork. Effectively, to properly 
perform an AP artwork, one is required be proficient precisely in performing for an 
audience who essentially is not there. Thus, as LibriVox abandons any and all notions 
pertaining to criteria, neither its recorded products nor their recording creators can be 
aesthetically evaluated.502 Fundamentally, although it might be quite ‘easy’ to become 
a volunteer and record a book (i.e., in light of the technology required for the process), 
I would argue that it is nonetheless most definitely not ‘all you need’. Quite the contrary. 
To perform an audiobook—and, in effect, to create an AP artwork—is unequivocally not 
an easy task. Surely it is a challenge that requires investing far more effort than merely 
knowing how to read and work a tape recorder. 
While most files on LibriVox can be found under the ‘human-read’ category, their 
website also dedicates a designated category for archiving computer-generated 
audiobooks. Hancher asserts that since computers have already succeeded in defeating 
chess masters—a point I will presently address myself—one might surmise that they 
could soon pose ‘serious competition’ to LibriVox volunteers, especially since 
‘increasingly sophisticated text-to-speech (TTS) synthesizer programmes are now 
common features on computers and a variety of portable devices’.503 For Hancher, the 
current frontier is focused on the manner in which ‘expression’ can be represented in 
computer-generated speech. He therefore maintains that when expression is 
                                                 
502 Hancher appropriately describes the LibriVox phenomenon as one that can be identified precisely for 
what it is not: namely, ‘it is not the result of special training, although all of its participants have been 
schooled in one way or another; and, with few exceptions, it is not the product of professional skills’.  
Hancher, "Learning from LibriVox," 199.  
503 Ibid., 210.  
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represented successfully, one might be tempted to identify it as a manifestation of 
‘emotion’—or some kind of blending between the two, subtle as they both may be.504 
Since Hancher considers most poems to constitute a challenge to almost any (human) 
reader, he argues that they surely present a challenge for computer programmers as 
well.505 Yet, expression and emotion could, conceivably, be more accurately 
characterised by employing the notion of common sense. Indeed, technological 
advances notwithstanding, none of the currently available TTS programmes encompass 
the innate ability to employ common sense in the process of decision making. 
Computers may be able to ostensibly ‘translate’ printed words into sound—perhaps 
even to a high degree of precision—nevertheless, they do not, indeed cannot, possess 
the knowledge of how a particular phrase or sentence should be spoken.506 A sentient 
human being, however, most definitely possesses the ability of understanding, indeed 
knowing, just how a particular text is supposed to sound when spoken aloud in a 
putative performance.507 Consequently, I would argue that these so-called synthetic 
                                                 
504 Hancher, "Learning from LibriVox," 210-211.  
505 On the one hand, it seems as though Hancher implies that there is indeed a correct or proper way of 
reading a particular text—at least with respect to poetry. In this respect, the fact that reading a poem 
might pose a challenge clearly entails that not every reading is acceptable. Moreover, the fact that 
programmers are attempting to teach computers how to read poems demonstrates that there is indeed 
a particular way of reading certain poems—which is thus inherently different from reading other kinds of 
texts. On the other hand, despite the fact that Hancher appears to recognise the importance of 
classification and evaluation, LibriVox quite blatantly renounces them both. 
506 Even the most advanced computer cannot employ a literal comprehension of context, and quite 
plausibly will never be able to. Borrowing from Graves’s example in NITA, consider, for instance, the 
famous chess matches between Russian Chess Grandmaster, Garry Kasparov, and IBM’s Deep Blue. 
Graves, The New Institutional Theory of Art, 65. In essence, unlike Kasparov, Deep Blue did not play the 
game while fully employing either common sense or any degree of intuitive process. Advanced and 
sophisticated as ‘he’ was, all he could do was calculate moves. He may have done that incredibly well, yet 
that was literally all he did. Chess, after all, is a game. It has its own institutional rules and it consists of a 
unique and distinctive internal logic. Thus, to really play a game of chess, one needs to grasp its workings. 
A computer—even Deep Blue—is simply unable to do so.   
507 In March 2013, Google’s A.I. system, AlphaGo (developed by their DeepMind programmers) defeated 
Lee Sedol, champion of the ancient Chinese Go board game—which is considered one of the most creative 
and complex games ever created, posing an almost infinite number of possible moves. It is well 
established that prominent Go players depend to a large extent on intuition in order to determine what 
move to make at any given point in the game. It had been assumed that a computer might be able to 
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recorded books cannot be regarded as proper audiobooks. They are most definitely not 
performances and they cannot be considered artworks. Rather, these recordings consist 
of nothing more than the mere computer-generated translation of text to sound. To be 
sure, no matter what degree of skills, talent or intelligence one might possess, a person 
who for whatever reason is only able to speak using the assistance of some computer-
generated vocal software (e.g., Professor Stephen Hawking) simply cannot be 
considered an appropriate choice for recording an audiobook.508 
Having already alluded to both Deep Blue and AlphaGo, consider now the variety 
of ‘joke responses’ (for lack of a better term) that one can elicit from Siri—Apple Inc.’s 
artificially-intelligent personal assistant and ‘knowledge navigator’, employed in Apple’s 
mobile operating system (iOs). Asking Siri questions such as ‘What is the meaning of 
life?’, ‘Will you marry me?’, ‘What is the airspeed velocity of an unladen swallow?’, ‘How 
much wood could a woodchuck chuck if a woodchuck could chuck wood?’, to name but 
a few, can result in very amusing answers. In some instances, the same question may 
even elicit more than one single response. At the same time, although Siri is able to 
simulate responses in a number of different languages, accents and genders, she/he/it 
is not in fact responsible for eliciting laughter. Ultimately, all Siri does is merely translate 
                                                 
defeat a human player only by 2025. The fact that AlphaGo actually won the first match demonstrates 
the incredible advances in A.I. technology. Nevertheless, its impressive simulation of creative thinking 
and the fulfilment of complex tasks notwithstanding, to argue that AlphaGo has learned intuition—as was 
indeed suggested—would be somewhat preposterous. Learning intuition is a contradiction in terms. 
Google’s AlphaGo may be more advanced than IBM’s Deep Blue, but it too, at the end of the day, cannot 
really get the internal logic of the game. As stated earlier (see Chapter 2), intuition, common sense, and 
the inner-workings of any internal logic can only be sensed, felt, developed and employed by a first-hand 
experience.     
508 TTS programmes are not able to express tonality, rhythm, emphases, inflections and so forth. 
Effectively, only a sentient human being possesses the ability of knowing how a particular text should be 
performed. As a source of knowledge, one attains it via an informed intuition. By way of illustration, see 
USB flash drive for what I find is a good bad-example of a computer ‘reading’ first chapter of H. G. Wells’s 
novel The War of the Worlds (1898).  
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into sound the particular schematic responses that were fed into her/his/its system by 
a team of human designers. Siri her/his/itself cannot deliver comedy, and, indeed, is not 
even aware that her/his/its responses are supposed to be funny. Thus, although Siri 
delivers these replies aurally, they do not comply with the institution of AP.509 
In the same vein, as Philip Auslander points out, ‘there is currently no machine 
capable of presenting a performance of the Kreutzer Sonata, Hamlet, or Swan Lake that 
would pass muster with the relevant audiences’.510 Nonetheless, in attempting to 
ascertain whether or not machines are able to perform511—a question prompted by his 
encounter with Sergei Shutov’s installation, Abacus (2001)512—Auslander, by his own 
admission, asserts that machines can in fact be perceived as performers.513 He insists 
that robots can possess and employ the technical skills required for creating a 
performance, yet, at the same time, he does not argue that they can possess and 
                                                 
509 While the notion that Siri appears to reply it/her/himself may be funny in its own right, the fact that 
Siri’s developers have managed to anticipate and predict what its users might ask Siri and appropriately 
simulate its replies can indeed be perceived as quite a feat. 
510 Philip Auslander, "Humanoid Boogie: Reflections on Robotic Performance", in David Krasner & David 
Z. Saltz (eds.), Staging Philosophy: Intersections of Theater, Performance, and Philosophy (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2006) 91. 
511 For Auslander, ‘at the most basic level, the question [...] can only be answered in the affirmative. After 
all, the primary meaning of the verb to perform is simply “to do.” Inasmuch as machines (or human beings) 
do things, they perform. Moving from that basic level to the context of art practices, however, the 
definition of performance proves to be context-specific, not universal; it changes according to the 
particular aesthetic form and tradition under consideration. What it means to perform a piece of classical 
music is not the same as what it means to perform jazz, and neither musical definition of performance is 
applicable to the theater, dance, or performance art. […] If the definition of performance is context-
dependent, so is the determination of what counts as a performer’. Ibid., 88.  
512 Abacus, as Auslander depicts it, ‘consists of over forty crouching figures draped in black, which face an 
open door and pray in numerous languages representing a multitude of faiths while making the 
reverential movements appropriate to prayer. Nearby video monitors display the texts of the prayers in 
their many alphabets. […] the figures performing […] are not human beings—they are robots programmed 
by a computer to engage in dahvening (Jewish prayer) movements accompanied by the recorded sounds 
of ecumenical prayer’. Ibid., 87.   
513 Auslander is ‘not proposing that machines can perform in all of the ways that human beings can. One 
element common to most traditional definitions of performance is an emphasis on the agency of the 
performer as the interpreter of a text of some kind and an artist who expresses something of her own 
through interpretation’. Ibid., 90. 
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execute interpretive skills.514 According to Auslander, since machines might 
predominantly be perceived either as ‘surrogates’ for sentient human beings or as 
metaphors for human conditions, one is able to interpret pieces performed by a 
machine in the same way that one would interpret ‘the same piece […] if performed by 
a human being. […] The question of what it means to have the actions that define the 
piece performed by a machine provides for a further, enriched level of 
interpretation’.515 Consequently, he maintains that ‘there are many possibilities for 
interpretation that arise from defining such a piece as a performance undertaken by 
machines and addressing directly both the ways in which the machines can be seen as 
metaphoric humans and the implications of using a machine in the particular context of 
the piece’.516 Even though it may be context dependent, I am doubtful that one is able 
to define such cases—in which the ostensible performers constitute machines and 
robots—as proper performances. Furthermore, I am confident that to regard them as 
artworks would be altogether impossible. In the realm of audiobooks, if one would 
compare a recording of a novel performed by a human being—indeed, by a professional 
performer—with a recording of the same novel as ‘read’ by a computer, one would 
surely realise that the latter cannot be considered a performance. 
Books for blind and visually impaired constitute a similar example. James Parker, 
for instance—a writer for The New York Times who also writes the Entertainment 
column for The Atlantic—alludes in one of his articles to a blind friend of his who  
                                                 
514 In his own words: ‘This, it seems to me, is the crucial distinction between robotic performers and 
human performers: although robots are capable of executing technical assignments, they lack 
consciousness, intelligence, and emotions—all the ingredients that presumably contribute to the 
development of interpretive skills’. Ibid., 91. 
515 Ibid., 98-99. 
516 Ibid., 99. 
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makes frequent use in her reading of text-to-speech technology, 
whereby the words she summons to her computer screen are recited 
aloud in an uninflected automated-banking robo-voice. She claims to 
prefer this voice, for all its flatness and occasional glitchiness, to the 
conventional huffings and puffings of some great Narrator. ‘It 
mispronounces a ton of stuff,’ she tells me, ‘but I don’t care, because 
I’m getting the information in a way that’s most analogous to reading 
the printed word. You can learn a lot of things from a narrator’s voice, 
but that interpretation belongs to the narrator. With a synthesized 
voice there’s no interpretation’.517 
At the same time, Parker asserts that there do exist certain recordings which his friend 
‘is gaga’ for, as he puts it, and that some interpretations are quite simply ‘irresistible’.518 
Interestingly enough, however, among the number of libraries that recruit 
volunteers to record books for the blind, some explicitly instruct them not to employ a 
so-called dramatic reading. Rather, they require them to simply record the books, in 
what can best be depicted as a ‘flat’ reading.519 As Rubery describes it, ‘talking books 
made for blind people stick as closely as possible to the printed source, reading verbatim 
everything from acknowledgements to appendices, sometimes even preserving the 
original’s typos’.520 While I do sympathise, to some extent, with the sentiment 
prompting this particular decision, I would argue that this approach does more harm 
than good, both for the original books and vis-à-vis the recordings themselves. When 
considering literary classics, already recognised as remarkable artworks in their own 
right, there seems to be an ostensibly amplified insult added to injury. As there is no 
distinct difference between a so-called flat human reading and a ‘reading’ generated by 
                                                 
517 James Parker, "The Mind’s Ear,” The New York Times, 25 November 2011, accessed October 10, 2016, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/27/books/review/the-minds-ear.html. 
518 Parker considers his personal favourite audiobook to be Evelyn Waugh’s The Ordeal of Gilbert Pinfold, 
as read by Michael Cochrane—whose performance, for Parker, has become ‘inseparable’ from the 
original text: ‘I read Waugh, and I hear Cochrane’. Ibid. 
519 This approach is advocated, for instance, by Mr. Yoav Hepher, who in 2010 held the position of CEO of 
the Central Library for the Blind and Visually Impaired and Handicapped (based in the city of Netanya, 
Israel), who described his views to me in a telephone interview.       
520 Rubery, The Untold Story of the Talking Book, 3. 
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a computer or machine, it would be nearly impossible to classify such recordings as aural 
performances or AP artworks. A ‘flat’ reading—if such a thing is even possible521—does 
not demonstrate an understanding of context, and therefore cannot be considered an 
actual reading.522 If one happens, for instance, to come across the same word more than 
once when reading a particular sentence on the page, one knows that that word does 
not (or, at least, is not ‘supposed to’) sound exactly the same way if spoken aloud.523 
According to Hancher, each LibriVox reading evokes a so-called invitation to 
another reading.524 Granted, there is more than one single way of reading a particular 
text. As every performer is aware, there is more than one way of delivering a line. 
Nevertheless, as every good performer should be aware—and notwithstanding what 
appears to be a common conception—this does not mean that there are an infinite 
number of readings.525 Consequently, what can be identified as indiscriminate support 
for any and all kinds of readings and readers, appears to prevail as an inherently 
problematic (anti-)aesthetic paradigm. Since the volunteers are from all over the world, 
one is sure to come across recordings that feature a number of people recording 
different chapters of the same book.526 To make matters worse, and in conjunction with 
                                                 
521 As Rubery quite rightly points out, a narrator is able to profoundly influence the reception of a 
particular book in spite of his/her ‘best efforts to remain neutral.’ Ibid., 98.  
522 Much like the ‘reading’ generated by a computer, it implies almost completely ignoring it. In effect, 
Hepher’s decision renders the final recordings somewhat futile.  
523 By the same token, if a particular sentence or phrase happens to repeat—as is quite often the case 
with dramatic texts—professional actors know that one should not pronounce it exactly in the same 
manner each time it appears. Computers, however, cannot make this distinction. It thus becomes quite 
evident why the recordings featured on Librivox cannot, for the most part, be considered as artworks. 
524 Hancher, "Learning from LibriVox," 201. 
525 In fact, once grasping a particular text’s internal logic, one might discover that quite a limited number 
of readings, and to a varied degree of compliance, would be deemed appropriate (not to mention 
aesthetically good). 
526 As Hancher explains, ‘LibriVox is catholic regarding not only the titles that it publishes but also the 
merits of its recordings. It does not discriminate in terms of the quality […] As one volunteer puts it, 
“Everyone is welcome […] regardless of language, accent, country, age, or vocal ability”’. Hancher, 
"Learning from LibriVox," 205. 
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LibriVox’s so-called ‘great scheme of things’, this is done without making any effort to 
logically assign either specific chapters or particular characters to designated readers in 
such a way that would either comply with the readers' individual abilities and or talents, 
or demonstrate some distinctive rationale in terms of casting.527 
By way of illustration, consider the CollegeHumor Originals528 comedy sketch 
featuring American comedian and actor, Gilbert Gottfried, reading passages from E. L. 
James’s erotic romance novel, Fifty Shades of Grey (2011).529 Conceivably, even if one 
had not actually read the novel, but does happen to possess enough information about 
its general theme and content, and if one is at the same time acquainted (at least to 
some degree) with Mr. Gottfried’s oeuvre—explicitly his voice, and the fact that it 
usually emanates a rather obnoxious chalk-on-a-blackboard quality—one should, 
almost unmistakably, undergo some kind of an aesthetic experience. Indeed, the aurally 
heard mental ‘image’ that one would conjure up ignited by the very notion of him 
(Gottfried) reading that (James’s literary eroticism), is sure to elicit one of two possible 
reactions: either (a) complete bewilderment, or (b) roaring laughter. Whereas the latter 
can be identified as a reaction to the brute fact of the matter, the former constitutes a 
reaction to the institutional fact.530 To be sure, the latter prevails as the very reason for 
                                                 
527 Had one been able to identify that an attempt has indeed been made to work out intelligently and 
creatively how, why and whether or not a particular book should be distributed between a number of 
readers, one might have been able to aesthetically appreciate the final recorded product as potential AP 
artwork. Similarly, if a learned reason is given with respect to why a different approach is chosen, creating 
in effect a ‘new’ internal logic, one could evaluate the final recording in light of that. 
528 A video section, featured on collegehumor.com, an original comedy website based in Los Angeles, 
created by Josh Abramson and Ricky Van Veen. The website features both in-house and user/fan-
submitted videos, pictures and articles. See URL: accessed June 10, 2015, www.collegehumor.com. 
529 See URL: "Gilbert Gottfried Reads 50 Shades of Grey", accessed June 10, 2015, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XkLqAlIETkA. (See also USB flash drive).  
530 As previously stated, I believe that a strong case can be made for advocating the analysis of humor and 
comedy through NITA and the notion of internal logic, thereby establishing what counts as funny with 
respect to certain specific contexts set upon by the potential aesthetic category. Put simply, that 
something is ‘funny’ can be established as an institutional fact. Notwithstanding, the scope of this study 
merely enables me to identify this potential, yet prevents me from further developing the insight.  
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this sketch having been made in the first place. Now, I would argue that although this 
sketch exists as a video clip—an infomercial for a new audiobook, including the visual 
element of seeing the reactions of women who are hearing Gottfried’s narration—the 
joke itself is inherently aural.  
Now, had James’s novel been in the public domain, would LibriVox accept 
Gottfried as a legitimate volunteer? The answer appears to be a resonating ‘Yes!’—
which is precisely what renders their entire philosophy as something of an aesthetic 
conundrum. As Hancher points out, ‘Listeners may sense that some LibriVox readers are 
not as good as others; variation in quality may be especially apparent when the chapters 
of a book are distributed to a mixed group of volunteers’.531 In essence, as far as LibriVox 
is concerned, ‘all voices are different; some are adequate or better; more are 
welcome’.532 On the one hand, all voices are inevitably, indeed empirically, different 
from another. On the other hand, to regard certain voices as adequate or better—
forming, in effect, an aesthetic judgement—would require one to examine the 
particular context in which the voices are heard. In this dissertation, the former should 
be perceived as the ‘brute’ fact of the matter, whereas the latter prevails as the 
‘institutional’ fact. This cannot be emphasised enough. Effectively, the idea that ‘more 
are welcome’ should be applied with caution and due consideration.533 Consequently, 
what seems to take the form of valuing quantity over quality, results in almost 
altogether abandoning any aesthetic consideration.534 
                                                 
531 Hancher, "Learning from LibriVox," 205. 
532 Ibid., 201. 
533 Following Graves’s aforementioned assertion that while anything goes not everything works, it could 
be argued that while more voices are indeed welcomed not any voice will suffice. Accordingly, while one 
should not restrict the number of possible additional voices, one should limit their given range to the 
degree it complies with a particular text’s internal logic. 
534 Athough LibriVox had in the past been asked to incorporate or formulate some kind of quality criteria 
that might grade each audio file, its founder, Hugh McGuire, ‘resists such calls for critical interference. 
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 While the LibriVox community seems to relish the fact that their recordings are 
(a) easily accessed and (b) demonstrate, to some extent, a social uniqueness (i.e., in 
their being part of an online community), little or no attention is paid to the very nature 
of the readings themselves as putative performances, potentially possessing an 
aesthetic quality as AP artworks. Ultimately, these recordings, on the whole, become no 
different than the majority of recordings designated for the blind community or the 
visually impaired community. In both cases, one primarily encounters recordings that 
are for the most part created by non-professional (albeit well-intentioned) volunteers, 
who generally do not account for aesthetics or artistic tendencies. As such, the LibriVox 
recordings are not entirely different than those produced by TTS programmes. 
The purposeful, unapologetic, and to some extent, quite brutal abandonment of 
any need to account for aesthetic quality deprives the very act of recording these works 
of any real meaning. To extract these recordings from the appropriate cultural 
institution is to render them ‘un-evaluable’. It is a decision that can be perceived as a 
blatant and irresponsible lack of respect for the works that are being recorded—
especially as most of them are recognised amongst the most pivotal works in one’s 
literary and poetic canon.535 According to Hancher, one is able to measure the 
                                                 
Instead he offers the hospitality of the free market: if a reader is unhappy with a recording of a text, that 
reader can supplement it with a reading of his/her own, which LibriVox will gladly host. […] Not only will 
LibriVox provide recordings of “all the books in the public domain”: it will provide an indefinite number 
of recordings of each [of] those books’. Hancher, "Learning from LibriVox," 205. Nevertheless, as Hancher 
points out, ‘a typical LibriVox recording will be an amateur project, in both senses of the word; not 
professional, but earnest’. Ibid., 200. Following NITA, I have attempted to employ a similar ‘pluralistic’ 
nature to my suggested institution of AP. Although an unprofessional narration would, in effect, 
constitute an aesthetically bad performance, I find LibriVox’s preference of the ‘earnest’ recording to a 
professional one quite problematic. Indeed, with respect to aesthetically evaluating such recordings, one 
should examine not only (a) what an ‘earnest’ recording is to begin with, but also (b) whether or not, and 
the extent to which, ‘earnestness’ is even relevant or has any artistic merit.   
535 In essence, one is invited to ask questions such as: What is the value, if indeed there is one, that is 
underscored by the goal of ‘having as many public-domain audio versions as possible’ just for the sake of 
having them made ‘acoustically liberated’ regardless of quality? Hancher emphasises, for instance, the 
ostensible majesty of their goal: namely, to record ‘not some such books, but all of them’. Hancher, 
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popularity of certain books given the number of downloads they receive—which he 
maintains is dependent ‘on the human embodiment that they are given by the LibriVox 
reader’s voice’.536 Arguably, one could compare this notion of ‘human embodiment’ to 
the notion of ‘embodied meaning’. Thus, to identify that a particular book can in fact 
become ‘embodied’ by a particular human voice, implies that one would necessarily be 
required to consider what in the book is being embodied, how it is being embodied, and 
finally whether or not the particular embodiment does or does not ‘work’ and why.  
At the same time, although he appears to remain focused on the issue of 
popularity, Hancher does appear to find value in identifying and appreciating the good 
performances.537 He asserts that some readings can ‘give the illusion of being the ideal 
reading of the text, perfectly realizing what the author wrote’.538 He clearly has at least 
a vague idea of what would constitute a good performance and what would not, and he 
evidently recognises the fact that particular texts should be read in a manner that is 
appropriate to them. Hancher cites Colclough and Vincent stating that readers who 
possess ‘sophisticated reading skills must often have found listening to a poor reader 
frustrating’.539 He similarly cites McGuire for indicating that ‘if a reading disappoints, 
offer a better one’, which LibriVox will publish as well.540 As Hancher points out, while 
there have indeed been multiple readings of a single work made, they have not always 
been made due to a sense of dissatisfaction with what has already been recorded. He 
explains that ‘enthusiasm for an author or a book may be enough to motivate the extra 
                                                 
"Learning from LibriVox," 205. This, he concludes, entails that volunteers ultimately will not have to 
choose what to read, simply because all would have been already read. In his own words: ‘nothing will be 
selected, because everything will be included’. Ibid.  
536 Ibid., 204. 
537 Ibid., 207-208. 
538 Ibid., 205. 
539 Hancher, "Learning from LibriVox," 206.   
540 Ibid.  
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effort. There are several dozen books that volunteers have read more than once for 
LibriVox, either as solo readers or in groups’.541 I would argue that if a reading 
‘disappoints’ there is absolutely no merit in having it eternalised in cyberspace along 
with the ones which do not.  
In the same vein, there is no apparent reason for hanging a bad painting in an 
exhibition hall—or, alternatively, hanging it and expecting an audience to come and see 
it. Effectively, audiobooks as AP artworks should be evaluated aesthetically. Even mass-
produced professional recordings, which are aesthetically deficient, should not find 
their way to the Spoken Word shelf at one’s local bookstore. Moreover, if, indeed, there 
could be such a thing as a ‘perfect’ or an ‘ideal’ reading (and Hancher seems to imply 
that there could), one cannot but consider aesthetic terms. In other words, the 
institution of AP is quite necessary for a comprehensive engagement with 
audiobooks.542 Ultimately, while one would be required to analyse each particular case 
in its own right, it can be determined that the vast majority of LibriVoX recordings (much 
like the non-professional recordings made for the blind and visually impaired) cannot 
comply with what counts as creating art.543 
                                                 
541 Ibid.  
542 In referring to the David Barnes recording of Wilkie Collins’s The Woman in White (1859), alluding 
specifically to Barnes’s rendition of the narrative of the character of Mr. Fairlie, Hancher asserts that it is 
‘exactly, preternaturally, what Wilkie Collins had in mind when he wrote that section’. Hancher, "Learning 
from LibriVox," 205. For all intents and purposes, this is an aesthetic evaluation—and one that can be said 
to resemble the evaluations employed by Roach in her aforementioned Spoken Records. Moreover, 
Hancher could only have arrived at this conclusion by first having attained some understanding of that 
novel’s internal logic. By his own admission, Hancher asserts that it is between the ‘fantastic extremes of 
perfect embodiment’ that resides ‘the commonsensical belief that skill in reading aloud is unevenly 
distributed and that some people are better at it than others’. Ibid. 
543 That one can predominantly learn more about (a) reading or listening habits, (b) popular online 
communities or download preferences, and, arguably, (c) what one does with one’s spare time, all 
indicate why conducting a sociocultural study of LibriVox will surely be far more fruitful than an aesthetic 
study of the recordings it produces. While one might be able to attain a better understating of LibriVox 
as a cultural phenomenon (arguably, in effect, leading one to some insight with respect to their internal 
logic), one cannot aesthetically evaluate LibriVox’s recordings as AP artworks.  
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Although to regard LibriVox recordings in aesthetic terms constitutes a 
significant challenge—due to their ostensible raison d'être and the simple fact that they 
are not created with an aesthetic consciousness—one is nonetheless sure to come 
across instances that will disprove the general trend. To some extent, the overall conceit 
of LibriVox is something of an illusion. It is not entirely logical (and thereby quite 
counter-intuitive) to request that listeners discard the aesthetic quality of the aural 
readings. Fundamentally, one should care about the aesthetics of the narrations. To 
experience a poorly-performed aural iteration of a good literary text—especially once a 
listener is well acquainted with that text and therefore is aware of, or at least has some 
basic idea about, the manner in which that text should be performed—would surely 
constitute a frustrating aesthetic experience. That one is in fact able to identify certain 
LibriVox recordings as ‘candidates’ for aesthetic appreciation (thereby implying that 
certain recordings are necessarily intended to be judged by listeners), appears to 
constitute a predominant consequence of the aesthetic category itself. The fact that 
some recordings seem to possess a certain aesthetic component, arguably prevails as 
an explicit reason for why this category is required to begin with. (Given the lack of a 
designated aesthetic category, a so-called good LibriVox recording would merely entail 
that the recording successfully transfers the written text from the public domain to an 
equally liberated aural iteration). As any aesthetic feature is inevitably rooted within the 
institutional artistic framework, one is able to consider certain LibriVox recordings as AP 
artworks. Subsequently, one can survey a variety of different recordings on LibriVox, 
and—predominantly on a case by case basis—distinguish their aesthetic quality.544 
                                                 
544 In brief, as alluded to earlier, the criteria and parameters established by a particular artistic institution 
are predominantly what determines the aesthetic quality of its artistic products. In considering AP, to 
identify whether or not, and the extent to which, a certain narration of performance is ostensibly pleasing 
- 168 - 
 
6.2 ‘Old Men Fighting’ vs. A Legitimate Comedy Album: What Could Count as AP 
Amongst the amalgamation of witty one-liners constituting his act (consisting of jokes 
and statements that range between the hilarious to bewildering and creating a 
distinctive borderline hybrid between comedy and haiku), American stand-up comedian 
Steven Wright has stated that he recently went to a museum where all the art was done 
by children and all the paintings were hung on refrigerators.545  
Now, in deconstructing this little joke with NITA in mind—bearing in mind the 
institutional conditions and given circumstances necessary for someone to be 
considered an ‘artist’ or something to be considered a ‘work of art’ and so forth—
Wright’s witty one-liner becomes, in fact, a potentially accurate statement.546 In 
essence, since NITA has demonstrated that in art ‘anything goes’, the putative existence 
of such an exhibition should not be too farfetched. Wright’s joke, in effect, appears to 
                                                 
to the ear of the listener, is fundamentally irrelevant to what makes a particular recording an AP artwork. 
Indeed, drawing on Danto’s insight, a pleasing voice—as an aesthetic property—does not take part in the 
definition. Consequently, one should examine whether or not, and to what extent, a particular recording 
complies with the aesthetic category itself. Subsequently, one should be able to establish if and when a 
particular recording, as AP artwork, can be identified as a good example of its kind. If one is unable to 
distinguish between the aesthetically good and aesthetically flawed, one might unwittingly listen to a bad 
audiobook, effectively forming a misguided conclusion that audiobooks, on the whole, constitute an 
untenable genre. 
545 A Steven Wright Special (HBO; 1985), 26m55se-27m05sec.  
546 As far as NITA is concerned, with respect to the institutional structure of the Artworld, children, 
predominantly, cannot be considered artists. Accordingly, the drawings they produce do not and cannot 
fall under the category of ‘art’. As Graves puts it, ‘Dickie defines the artist as the one who participates in 
all this “with understanding”. […] Kjørup gives a fair idea of just what it is that the artist needs to 
understand: the elaborate social-cultural structure of the Artworld as a whole. He must be familiar with 
the history of art in general, and more so of his particular genre or system. He must know the technical 
rules of his medium, and the semantic rules of his “artistic language”, even if he intends to break some of 
those rules. He must understand that he is trying “to say something” in his work, and the addressees of 
that saying constitute his public. He must understand their role in all of this. In short, there is an awful lot 
for an artist to understand, if he is to properly carry out his institutional role as artist. Does this mean that 
an elephant cannot be an artist? Yes, it does. The elephant may produce pretty paintings, but that is not 
enough for art, (it’s not even necessary). The same holds true for the child, precocious and pure as she 
may be. That’s why our children’s paintings go up on the fridge, and we do not love them any less for it. 
These ramifications of the institutional theory concerning the true nature of the artist annoy some people 
very deeply. We say that a child cannot be an artist, that a person who zealously creates only for himself 
is not an artist, that an artist cannot be ignorant of the rules and conventions of his genre’. Graves, The 
New Institutional Theory of Art, 31–32.  
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defeat its purpose.547 Indeed, one might very well come across recordings that while 
they comply with the institution of AP, and can thereby be regarded as AP artworks, the 
artist who created them has not necessarily contributed anything at all to their creative 
process.548 These kinds of recordings consist predominantly of what is commonly 
regarded either as ‘found-sound’ or audio-vérité. In fact, they can be identified as a sub-
(institutional)-category in its own right—deriving from the general mother institution of 
AP. 
By way of illustration, I wish to consider the collection of recordings known as 
‘Shut Up, Little Man!’ (SULM), the story of which has been depicted in the film Shut Up, 
Little Man! — An Audio Misadventure (2010), directed by Australian filmmaker Matthew 
Bates. In brief, two friends, Eddie Guerriero (aka ‘Eddie Lee Sausage’) and Mitchell 
Deprey (aka Mitchell D.)—to whom I shall henceforth refer to as Eddie and Mitch—
teamed up in 1987 for the purpose of sharing a low-rent apartment in San Francisco. 
They soon discovered the walls in their new abode were incredibly thin. So much so that 
they were subjected to hearing virtually every single argument conducted by their next-
door neighbours. The latter, Raymond Hufman and Peter J. Haskett—to whom I shall 
henceforth refer to as Ray and Pete—habitually bickered and argued on a daily basis 
                                                 
547 The child (or children) who would have hypothetically been responsible for producing the drawings 
themselves do not hold the institutional role of the artist(s). Rather, in such a scenario, this role would 
belong either to the curator or to the person responsible for coming up with and realising the aesthetic 
concept. Indeed, as far as NITA is concerned, such an exhibition would in itself consist as the work of art. 
While Wright’s joke is funny, precisely because what it depicts seems to be a bit of a stretch, its purpose 
is defeated for the very reason that the Artworld has no problem whatsoever in accepting such an 
exhibition. If indeed one were to actually open such an exhibition (i.e., that would literally consist of a 
bunch of refrigerators, upon which hang a wide collection of various children’s drawings) it would not 
only be accepted as legitimate art, but it might even turn out to be an interesting cultural event. Wright 
presents one with a purely funny visual image and something of a social criticism confronting the 
‘anything goes’ attitude (entailing that one is essentially willing to accept the premise of the existence of 
such an exhibition as a plausible concept).  
548 In brief, s/he is not the author of the original text, nor is s/he the performer featured on the recording, 
or, alternatively the director of the aural performance itself. 
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(presumably induced by an excessive consumption of alcohol). Moreover, Ray and Pete 
appeared to be particularly loud and bitter old men, and their interactions 
predominantly included all manner of profanity and explicit language. Now, 
unbeknownst to the two old men, Eddie and Mitch began recording their daily verbal 
exchanges. By their own admission, Eddie and Mitch initially began their endeavour as 
a response to their being legitimately intimidated by what they heard. Soon enough, 
however, the act of recording Ray and Pete literally abusing one another became not 
only an obsession but also a form of entertainment. After creating a handful of copies 
for a number of close personal friends, the recordings, put simply, went ‘viral’. As more 
and more people became aware of Pete and Ray—who on their part, unwittingly 
became a source of entertainment, if not mockery—Eddie and Mitch began selling the 
recordings, forming, in effect, their own little industry and establishing an audience for 
their product.549 Now, any legal and moral implications of Eddie and Mitch’s actions 
notwithstanding, before one scrutinises personal taste, comedic quality, and artistic 
value—that is to say, before evaluating these recordings as AP artworks—one would 
need to answer whether or not these recordings qualify as AP artworks to begin with. I 
would argue that they indeed do. (Enter Steven Wright). 
To be sure, the decision to sell copies of these tapes—under their own 
copyright—can very well be compared to making the decision to open an art exhibition 
featuring refrigerators with the drawings of other people’s children. Even if one might 
wish to condemn them for their actions, Eddie and Mitch would nevertheless, remain 
the holders of the creative copyrights.550 Ultimately, it is they who own the intellectual 
                                                 
549 See USB flash drive for a number of typical examples. 
550 By the same token, even if one were to discover that the children’s drawings in the so-called 
‘refrigerators' exhibition’ happened to be stolen—and for that reason would condemn, perhaps even 
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property, and it is they who have identified that recorded conversations between Ray 
and Pete could be construed as funny. Eddie and Mitch are unequivocally the ones who 
bestowed these recordings with an identity other than that of ‘old men fighting’ (which 
was, incidentally, while being a brute fact, also one of the first titles with which Eddie 
and Mitch marketed the tapes). Drawing on NITA, and thereby in accordance with the 
institution of AP, these recordings can indeed be perceived as unique AP artworks.551  
Thus, having established that these recordings can surely be classified as a 
certain kind of AP artwork—thereby allocating them a sub-(institutional)-category of 
their own within the general mother institution—one is able to contemplate their 
aesthetic quality. Indeed, as aforementioned, the classification and identification of an 
artwork, as such, is simply not enough. Rather, it is quite essential to also be able to 
evaluate whether or not it is any good. In the case of SULM, once allocating these 
recordings within the realm of AP, attention must be paid to (a) whether or not they 
have any artistic value, (b) whether or not they contribute anything to the field of 
comedy, and, of course, (c) whether they contribute anything to the study of AP 
artworks.552 
Alternatively, as the artefact of an established sub-(institutional)-category, one 
can also examine these tapes versus what in certain circles are known as the (in)famous 
                                                 
prosecute, the exhibition’s curator—it would not, in fact, hold water. Indeed, two simple institutional 
facts would remain unchallenged: the person responsible for the exhibition would forever be the artist; 
and the exhibition itself would retain the status of his/her artwork.     
551 In brief, Eddie and Mitch are the artists, who have created these aural recordings, and it is they who 
present them to a designated audience. These tapes have, in effect, become part of the Artworld. The 
question of their value and aesthetic quality, however, remains.  
552 It is my contention, on all three accounts, that they most definitely do not. Indeed, their fairly 
substantial fan-base, one might merely discard them as another ostensible ‘oddity’ in a line of examples 
demonstrating that as far as the Artworld is concerned, although surely ‘anything goes’, not everything 
necessarily works. 
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Buddy Rich ‘bootleg’ tapes,553 or the no less (in)famous outtakes of Orson Welles 
attempting to record radio commercials.554 To be sure, while one could refer to the 
latter as mere audio-vérité recordings, the fact that someone made the mindful decision 
of listening to these recordings as something funny, and someone else was willing to 
listen to them as something which might elicit laughter, is in effect the institutional fact 
that makes these recordings comic AP artworks. As Graves points out, 
That is the point of the institutional theory: the person or persons who 
normally and usually offer up the artifacts to the Artworld as 
candidates for appreciation (the status conferred), are the artists, not 
the ‘officers’. The very nature of the game changes deeply, once we 
realize that the general principle is that the artists offer up their 
artifacts for appreciation, that the artists are the pivotal players, and 
not the officers. For the institutional theory, the key institutional role 
is ‘artist’, and not ‘gallery owner’.555 
In similar respects, I would argue that an audio recording of a parent reading a bed-time 
story to their child predominantly does not constitute an AP artwork. Fundamentally, 
one does not take a recording of one’s parents reading them a story to an audio-
publishing house or a local radio station, in order to present it to a larger audience as 
an AP artwork.556 Nonetheless, one could establish certain (institutional) circumstances 
                                                 
553 These tapes are (in)famous for featuring American jazz drummer and bandleader, Buddy Rich, 
excoriating members of his band for playing too loudly, which he used to do from time to time, with pure 
rage. Apparently, at some point, someone at the back of the tour-bus turned on a tape recorder and 
forever immortalised these rants. Amongst the bonus material featured on the DVD release of the 
American T.V. series Seinfeld (1989-1998), there is a segment in which Jerry Seinfeld explains that the 
Buddy Rich tapes are a ‘legendary thing between comedians and comedy writers’. Seinfeld then presents 
three examples of how lines from the Buddy Rich tapes were incorporated in the show. See YouTube 
clips: (1) "Seinfeld & The Buddy Rich Tapes," accessed October 23, 2016, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uWP77C4StLs; (2) "Obscure Audio 1: Buddy Rich Cursing His Band," 
accessed October 23, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=covUesgI6fA. (See also USB flash drive).      
554 In what might best be described as an ostensible ‘hissy fit’, these outtakes encapsulate Welles’s 
argument with the sound engineer in the recording studio over how precisely he should be giving his 
reading to material in front of him. See YouTube clip: "Orson Welles Frozen Peas," accessed October 23, 
2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OhWM4_pIKVg. (See also USB flash drive).   
555 Graves, The Institutional Theory of Art, 26. 
556 In the same vein, despite various superlatives a parent might use to describe his/her child’s drawing 
(regardless of its actual aesthetic quality or whether or not they actually believe it), the drawing itself 
would ultimately remain alongside the assortment of magnets on the household refrigerator. Indeed, a 
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in which a recording of a well-read story, by a talented parent, could be regarded as an 
aesthetically good AP artwork for young listeners if marketed as such.557 Indeed, there 
surely is a distinct tone of voice, a style of speaking, an inflection and pronunciation that 
would be appropriate for children’s stories—and at the same time would simply not 
work with a so-called standard novel or narrative. To be sure, aural recordings of 
children’s literature should essentially constitute a sub-(institutional)-category in its 
own right, the internal logic of which would arguably consist of and/or pertain to 
precisely such aspects as one’s tone of voice, style of delivery and so forth.  
 
6.3 ‘Text-Sound Art’ as a Sub-Institutional Category  
In his study, sound-artist Joseph Sprinzak does not aim to define a specific artistic 
genre—as opposed to my own endeavour to articulate an explicit aesthetic category.558 
He employs Richard Kostelanetz’s term ‘text-sound art’ as a theoretical paradigm.559 In 
brief, it is Kostelanetz’s conviction that words and the sounds they ‘make’ together 
create a kind of coherence, namely: one that is separate from the meanings that words 
intend to signify.560 Sprinzak utilises Kostelanetz’s term to describe what he regards as 
                                                 
small number of extreme exceptions notwithstanding—e.g., the child-prodigy, deemed poet and artist, 
Akiane Kramarik (See URL: accessed September 3, 2014, https://akiane.com)—one customarily does not 
hang one’s children’s drawings in a gallery or a museum, and would not, for the most part, manufacture 
and distribute their reproductions and sell them as unique works of art. 
557 Drawing, again, on Wright’s one-liner, if one were to release a collection of recorded bed-time stories 
read by different parents—which, as an ostensible conceptual aural compilation could hypothetically be 
considered an AP artwork. Its aesthetic quality, however, would surely remain a different question. 
558 Joseph Sprinzak, “Text-Sound Art: Speech with Source and Temporality Disturbances in Avant-Garde 
and Intermedial Vocal” (PhD diss., Ben-Gurion University of the Negev: May, 2010), II.  
559 Kostelanetz coined this term to describe ‘an intermedium located between language arts and musical 
arts’, and maintains that it ‘characterises language whose principle means of coherence is sound, rather 
than syntax or semantics – where the sounds made by comprehensible words create their own coherence 
apart from denotive language’. Richard Kostelanetz, Text-Sound Texts (New York: William Morrow and 
Company, 1980), 14. 
560 Similarly, as Roger Dean and Hazel Smith point out, while Kostelanetz’s employment of the term does 
not include works which utilise ‘defined pitches’, the term is predominantly ‘used more broadly in relation 
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a unique ‘intermedium’ (which in the past would have been referred to as either 
‘Performance Poetry’ or ‘Sound Poetry’) and maintains that this approach is a direct 
result of ‘a century of interdisciplinary vocal art’.561 Nevertheless, although Sprinzak 
may not have set out to create an artistic genre in its own right, I would argue that, in 
fact, he did just that. His study appears to convey an exploration of a cultural 
phenomenon, which he finds to be based in the world of modern art. He identifies a 
variety of artistic manifestations, all demonstrating a similar kind of intermedial quality, 
thereby establishing certain criteria for aesthetic classification.562 
Fundamentally, whereas Sprinzak’s study is primarily occupied with highlighting 
unique aesthetic properties, my approach is founded on the notion of institutional 
procedures. Sprinzak’s study can therefore serve as a helpful ‘tool’ for identifying and 
interpreting the distinctive internal logic of the particular work he considers. Dean and 
Smith maintain that ‘the text-sound movement stemmed from experiments of the 
Surrealists, Dadaists and Futurists at the beginning of the century […] but re-emerged 
as a strong movement during the fifties to seventies’.563 To be sure, many of the 
artworks created in the confines of these movements manifest an individual internal 
                                                 
to verbal/text/sound interactions’. Roger Dean and Hazel Smith, Improvisation Hypermedia and the Arts 
Since 1945 (New York: Routledge, 1997), 133. 
561 Sprinzak, Text-Sound Art, I. 
562 Sprinzak’s study focuses primarily on the manner in which voice and speech are employed in so-called 
‘interdisciplinary art’. As an artistic-practitioner, his study seems to constitute an attempt at articulating 
just what he ‘does’. His aim, it seems, is to underline the conceptual process of the past one-hundred 
years in arts. The latter involve speech and are based on two central concepts: namely, (a) Kostelanetz’s 
intermedium element (with respect to its modern manifestations as text-sound art); and (b) the manner 
in which the element of sound is used in modern art (which, according to Sprinzak, includes its ‘non-
musical’, as well as other various forms). Overall, his study attends to the application of sound on visual 
arts, effectively emphasising the technological developments that enable sound-processing and 
reproduction, and, consequently, the creation of new kinds of performances. My own conception of AP 
as an artistic institution necessitates an interdisciplinary perspective, which requires one to acquaint 
oneself with more than a single artistic medium, thus assisting one to determine whether or not a 
particular recording complies with the definition of what an AP artwork should be. 
563 Dean and Smith, Improvisation Hypermedia and the Arts Since 1945, 132. 
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logic of their own. Their general affiliation to these movements notwithstanding, each 
individual Surrealist, Dadaist or Futurist work of art either pertains to, or possesses an 
internal logic in its own right. Thus, if one wishes to explore or evaluate these kinds of 
works, one would be required to study each work both as (a) part of the general 
aesthetic category or genre it belongs to, and (b) as a stand-alone case study in its own 
right. By the same token, aesthetically evaluating what Sprinzak regards as ‘text-sound’ 
works necessitates a deeper examination on a case by case basis. Thus, in order to 
aesthetically appreciate a ‘text-sound’ work one is required to employ the same kind of 
approach one would utilise when endeavouring to identify and aesthetically evaluate 
what is usually regarded either as contemporary, post-modern or ‘experimental’ 
artwork.564 Ultimately, these kinds of ‘text-sound’ works would become part of a sub-
(institutional)-category in their own right. 
Consider, for example, the Vinyl record The Medium is the Massage with 
Marshall McLuhan (1968).565 Cited as the ‘first spoken arts record you can dance to’ and 
described as being ‘designed for young people’—and thus consists of a 40-minute 
‘interface’ and intended ‘to be heard again and again and again and again and again, 
                                                 
564 As they appear to predominantly constitute a manifold, of sorts, combining live performance, plastic 
arts, and multi-media, these ostensibly ‘experimental’ recordings, as AP artworks, are arguably akin to 
what one would customarily regard as either a ‘performance piece’ or an installation artwork. Effectively, 
one is required (a) to attain a virtually comprehensive understanding of the individual internal logic of 
each element that comprises a particular ‘experimental’ work, and (b) to identify the putative overarching 
internal logic of that work as a whole. As with performance pieces or installation artwoks, these 
requirements are achieved on a case by case basis. At the same time, an argument could be made that to 
simply deem the more ‘experimental’ recording as such, is both dismissive and problematic. Indeed, much 
like Martin Esslin’s suggested definition of the theatre of the absurd, which he originally coined in 1961. 
Although Esslin’s term is customarily considered to allude to a distinctive category, explicit genre and 
unique style, his notion is in fact quite problematic. Summarily, Esslin’s critical mistake, as established by 
numerous eminent scholars, was in associating a number of different playwrights (e.g., Edward Albee, 
Samuel Beckett, Friedrich Dürrenmat, Eugène Ionesco, Harold Pinter or Luigi Pirandello), claiming that 
they all comply with his definition of the absurd—whereas each of them, without distinction, certainly 
can be identified by a unique aesthetic of their own.  
565 Marshall McLuhan, Quentin Fiore, and Jerome Agel, The Medium is the Massage with Marshall 
McLuhan. Produced by John Simon. Conceived & Coordinated by Jerome Agel. Columbia Records, 1968. 
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like a pop record’566—this album predominantly prevails as an ostensible aural 
‘extension’ and companion to a book of the same name published a year earlier.567 
Although not penned by McLuhan himself, it is considered a ground breaking text in that 
it embodies the very essence of McLuhan’s pioneering theories on media and 
technology—particularly with respect to his influential Understanding Media: The 
Extensions of Man (1964).568 In many respects, the book constitutes an attempt to quite 
literally translate McLuhan’s insights by way of presenting them in the form of a new 
kind of object: namely, a book where the very design ostensibly takes arms against the 
challenges, as well as the arguable competition, that is evoked by modern live media. It 
was particularly due to the efforts of Quentin Fiore and Jerome Agle—the former, its 
graphic designer and illustrator; the latter, its coordinator—that the book exists as a 
new kind of medium for communication. Indeed, its creators sensed that as cultural 
communication evolves and different media develop, what one would commonly refer 
to as a book, cannot, in effect, exist merely within the confines of its binding. 
Subsequently, attempting, to some extent, to mirror what they perceived as the manner 
in which knowledge is increasingly conveyed in contemporary society, Fiore and Agle 
concluded that sound—and particularly live sound, the human voice and the spoken 
word—was the most appropriate medium for extending McLuhan’s notions and 
                                                 
566 Jeffrey Schnapp and Kara Oehler, “the first spoken arts record you can dance to,” in Sensate, accessed 
October 10, 2015, http://sensatejournal.com/2011/03/jeffrey-schnapp-and-kara-oehler-first-spoken-
arts-record. 
567 Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore, The Medium is the Massage: An Inventory of Effects (New York: 
Bantam Books, 1967). 
568 Overall, it appears to constitute a pivotal reaction to the somewhat acute sense that what at the time 
was considered the more traditional form of genres and media (e.g., the industrial paperback book) would 
be required to ‘re-invent’ themselves in light of the then new, and continuously developing, model of 
cultural communication (one which can be affiliated with cyber-culture, but is surely rooted in live media 
and television). 
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communicating them with greater sensory depth.569 Following a sense that a porous 
liminality is apparent between books (as artefacts) and other existing media, the album 
version effectively utilises audio clips and outtakes of McLuhan reading from his own 
works, which are often interrupted by obscure sounds and discordant voices.570 
Beginning with the question ‘How do you like it so far?’, the aesthetic experience of 
listening to the album is simultaneously thought-provoking, amusing, bewildering and 
quite challenging.571 
Ultimately, to experience this recording as an AP artwork, one is required to find 
its distinctive internal logic—which, at its core, it is inherently related to McLuhan’s 
socio-cultural and philosophical insights. In other words, one needs to employ an 
‘institutional’ listening: that is to say, to hear the recording with the ‘ears’ of NITA—and 
subsequently to evaluate it in accordance with the institutional structure of the 
aesthetic category. Otherwise, one is left with nothing more than an ostensible ‘brute’ 
listening, and thus will not be able to appreciate the album for what it is.572 Indeed, 
                                                 
569 The book’s objective appears to be to exhibit the sense of ‘liveness’ that abides modern media. In 
these respects, it is a hybrid, of sorts, that plays with the classic conventions of what a book is supposed 
to be. It manifests as an amalgamation of images and text, graphics and typography, collages and 
montages, alongside a ‘re-mix’ of McLuhan’s insights and ideas. For further reading, see: Jeffrey T. 
Schnapp and Adam Michaels, The Electric Information Age Book (McLuhan/Agel/Fiore and the 
Experimental Paperback) (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2012). In an act that quite consciously 
extends Fiore and Agle’s aural experimentation with McLuhan’s thought, this book also received an album 
version–a limited edition vinyl record–featuring a recorded live stage performance ‘version’ of the book’s 
conceit. See URL: accessed October 22, 2016, https://wearethemasses.bandcamp.com/track/the-book-
of-the-now.  
570 See USB flash drive for the full recording. 
571 With respect to performing for an audience who, in essence, ‘is not there’, Paddy Scannel points out, 
while the audience is ‘situated elsewhere’, attention must be paid to the ‘cardinal importance of context’. 
He argues that it is the ‘communicative nature’ of the output produced by radio that assigns it ‘an 
audience-oriented communicative intentionality’. It, in turn, ‘is embodied in the organization’ of its 
particular context, and carried out ‘down to last detail: there is nothing in the discourse of radio […] that 
is not motivated, that is not intended to generate inferences fact that about what is being said by virtue 
of how it is being said’. Paddy Scannell, Broadcast Talk (London: Sage, 1991), 11. 
572 To conclude, for instance, that this LP is merely a ‘weird cacophonic experimental aural oddity’ would 
certainly be akin to concluding that Jackson Pollock’s Blue Poles (1952) are ‘ill-spilt paint droppings’, that 
Barnett Newman’s Onement VI (1953) is a ‘bad example of a wasted canvas’ or that Mark Rothko’s 
Number 10 (1960) ‘looks nothing at all like Mr. Harold Macmillan’s front door’. Similarly, it would be just 
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much like Warhol’s Brillo Box—and, in fact, as with any artwork, for that matter—the 
aesthetic properties of recordings such as the vinyl LP ‘version’ of McLuhan’s The 
Medium is the Message cannot be found in the recording itself. Although these kinds of 
recordings might arguably be perceived as ostensible borderline case-studies, and 
unique as they may be—as Sprinzak no doubt succeeds in demonstrating—they 
nevertheless deserve a deeper examination as sub-(institutional)-categories in their 
own right, belonging to the general ‘mother’ institution of AP. 
Now, in similar respects, it should also be emphasised that the audio recordings 
of live events do not (and for the most part, cannot) constitute AP artworks. Even if a 
live performance may be predominantly text-based—such as, for instance, what 
Sprinzak would perceive as a ‘text-sound’ work, or, alternatively, a live reading—the 
very fact that these kinds of events occur in front of a live audience alters the internal 
logic. In other words, these performances cannot be identified as purely aural for the 
simple fact that they were not explicitly devised for the aural medium and were not 
exclusively created within its distinctive aesthetic confines. By way of illustration, 
consider the studio-recorded version of the Monty Python’s Cheese Shop sketch—
included in their 1973 album, The Monty Python Matching Tie and Handkerchief—as 
opposed to the original version, which aired on the troupe’s revolutionary television 
series, Monty Python’s Flying Circus. Although the same performers—John Cleese and 
Michael Palin—deliver in both versions the same text, there prevails a notable 
difference between the two versions: explicitly, pertaining to the interaction between 
                                                 
like regarding the more so-called ‘Avant-guard-ish’ tracks, for lack of a better term, that are featured on 
the Yoko Ono/Plastic Ono Band (1970) as nothing more than ‘raw, un-listenable and completely 
meaningless shrieks’. Indeed, these would all constitute the wrong type of evaluation. Ultimately, without 
appropriately acquainting one’s self with the distinct artistic institution to which they belong, one will be 
unable to understand, experience or appreciate them, on their own terms, as artworks.  
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Cleese and Palin. Indeed, the rhythmic ‘ping-pong’ of the dialogue, as well as the overall 
timing of their delivery, appear much faster on the album.573 As this album did not 
include performing to a live audience—as opposed to their TV and stage shows— Cleese 
and Palin were required to alter and ‘fine tune’ their performance so that it would 
comply with the requirements of the medium of sound.574 Similarly, while the particular 
Live at Drury version of their immortal ‘Dead Parrot’ exists only as an audio recording, 
it nevertheless not an aural performance. To be sure, an audio recording of a live 
performance constitutes nothing more than an aural documentation of a live event.575 
 
6.4 Comedy Albums and Funny Audiobooks as a Sub-Institutional Category   
I would argue that what in the case of Matching Tie and Handkerchief would customarily 
be labelled a ‘comedy album’, can in fact, ultimately be evaluated as a unique kind of 
AP artwork. As such, it conceivably deserves a sub-(institutional)-category of its own. 
Indeed, with this album in particular, I find this applies in more ways than one: explicitly, 
due to the fact that it happens to be cited as the world’s first ‘three-sided LP’.  
Now, while it is obviously not possible for a vinyl LP to consist of more than its 
two ‘designated’ sides, when one acquaints oneself with the internal logic of the 
Pythons, engaging with their surreal humour, one is sure to realise why promoting the 
sales of this record by underlining its possession of three sides is not an embarrassing 
miscalculation. The joke here works on an additional level, as the LP in question has in 
                                                 
573 See USB flash drive for the ‘Cheese Emporium’. 
574 Knowing how to perform for an audience in this medium is surely a crucial aspect with any kind of 
material. Conceivably, with comedy, it constitutes an even greater challenge. 
575 The fact that they should be considered purely as documentation does not, and indeed should not, in 
any way reflect on the artistic quality and value of that live performance that is captured on the recording. 
Nevertheless, their historical, scholarly and nostalgic significance notwithstanding, the recordings cannot 
be aesthetically evaluated as AP artworks. 
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fact been designed in such a way that one is in fact able to play a ‘third’ side: this was 
done by including an additional groove on one side, which is in effect heard depending 
on where the needle of turntable is placed. The satisfaction of literally being able to play 
three sides on an object that possesses no more than two is rewarding both in respect 
of the Pythons’ humour and in respect of the aesthetics of the medium.  
In the same vein, one could also consider the audiobook version of American 
comedian David Cross’s I Drink for a Reason (2009)576—a selection of sarcastic essays 
and politically-incorrect social commentaries—also constitutes a recording that can only 
be fully appreciated as AP artwork within the so-called ‘confines’ of the medium itself. 
As the recording begins, the listeners should immediately be struck by the fact that the 
speaker’s voice that one hears reading the preface—the ‘read by the author’ guarantee 
notwithstanding—is not, in fact, that of Cross.577 Next, two-and-a-half minutes into the 
preface, it becomes evident that the un-identified narrator (whom some listeners might, 
conceivably, be able to recognise as American comedian H. Jon Benjamin), is not really 
doing justice to the material (i.e., he fails in his delivery of Cross’s distinctive style of 
comedy). A distant voice is suddenly heard in the background, growing louder as it 
seems to be advancing into the recording studio. It is immediately identified as a rather 
bewildered David Cross. A short altercation ignites between the two speakers: they 
argue about who it was in fact that was hired to record the book. It takes a little over 
three minutes for Benjamin (whose identity is by now revealed), to reluctantly leave the 
                                                 
576 David Cross. I Drink For A Reason (Hachette, 2009). 
577 On the one hand, the front cover of the commercial release clearly states that the book is ‘read by the 
author, and ‘featuring the voices of Jon Benjamin, Kristen Schaal, and Robot’, as well as ‘musical guests’ 
Les Savy Fav and Yo La Tengo. See URL, accessed 26 September 2016, 
www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/david-cross/i-drink-for-a-reason/9781600246487. Nevertheless, 
this kind of opening to the recording is not what one would customarily expect. 
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studio. Then, having finally assumed his role as author-narrator, Cross begins reading 
his book from the beginning, effectively ‘forcing’ the listeners to hear the preface once 
again—only now  allowing them to hear the text as it ‘should be’ performed.578  
To be sure, this is not necessarily because the text can only be performed by its 
author, but rather because the particular author of this specific written text happens to 
possess the ability to manifest that text’s internal logic as an aural performance. As 
Benjamin is himself no stranger to comedy, and, in fact, happens to be a close friend 
and collaborator of Cross, I would argue that in what otherwise could have been 
deemed a ‘poorly-constructed’ audiobook, Benjamin’s ill-performed delivery of Cross’s 
material is quite deliberate. In brief, it was part of a comedy routine, constituting a self-
reflective joke, which both acknowledges and is dependent upon the medium of the 
audiobook.579 Cross himself, as is evident throughout the recording, is very much aware 
of the fact that he is addressing an audience. He even explicitly ridicules the listeners 
for not purchasing the actual ‘proper’ book. In addition, to emphasise for the listeners 
the tone of the text, for instance, Cross makes a point of indicating to the listeners when 
he is using a word in quotations or where the printed text includes a footnote. For 
example, he explicitly explains that whenever he says the words, ‘as I'm writing this’, 
what he actually means is ‘as I'm reading this’. He also makes it clear to the listeners 
                                                 
578 See USB flash drive for the audiobook version of David Cross, I Drink For A Reason, disc1, tracks 1-4.  
579 A similar gag is utilised in the audiobook version of John Cleese’s autobiography So, Anyway… (2014). 
Here, the recording begins with Cleese speaking to the sound engineer. The latter explains to Cleese his 
contractual obligation to read the publisher’s introduction page—a task that Cleese confesses to find the 
boring. He asks the sound engineer what else they could do, and the latter suggest to him that they ‘could 
get Mike do it, if he didn’t mind’. The Mike in question is established as none other than Michael Palin, 
who just happens to be ‘in the other studio, downstairs’. Cleese embraces the idea, and the sound 
engineer is heard leaving the studio to go and get him. When Palin arrives, he and Cleese engage in what 
can only be described as a Pythonesque exchange. Palin ends up recording the ‘intro’ to Cleese’s 
autobiography, and is apparently forced to sit through Cleese’s own reading—only to ultimately record 
its ‘outro’ on his behalf as well. See USB flash drive for John Cleese, So, Anyway…, unabridged, read by 
the author (Penguin, 2014), 00m00sec-03m11sec.   
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that whenever he says the word ‘healthy’ he is in fact using quotations: ‘You can't see 
the book. I mean, you can, should you wanna go leap through it, but for some reason 
you bought this thing, and are listening to it, so just know that ‘healthy’ is always in 
quotes. Let’s move on. Engineer? Sorry about that last part. But, you know, I've a 
responsibility to my listening audience.’580 At a later point, a voice is heard interrupting 
Cross, asking him if he was certain whether the passage he was reading is indeed taken 
from his own book—which it was not.581 Furthermore, the audiobook version includes 
a variety of expressions, which, while sounding natural in everyday spoken 
conversation, do not in fact appear in the printed version his book. This kind of 
narration, which effectively adds words and comments that do not exist in the printed 
(and, as such, considered complete and finite) work, would surely not have been 
acceptable with a work fiction. Nonetheless, since this particular book constitutes a 
collection of essays, and when considering Cross’s stage persona, comedy style, and 
speech rhythm, it would appear as though the personal tone and everyday phrases 
contribute to the book’s iteration as an aural performance.582 Indeed, they amplify the 
manner in which this kind of material should be performed in this medium. Effectively, 
I would argue, they constitute an additional example that justifies the need to conclude 
the audiobook’s aesthetic category. 
 
                                                 
580 See USB flash drive, I Drink For A Reason, disc1, track6, 04m22sec. 
581 Ibid., disc2, track1, 01m55sec. 
582 See USB for additional recommended recordings in the same vein: Shalom Auslander’s A Foreskin’s 
Lament; Alan Alda’s Things I Overheard While Talking to Myself; Nora Ephron’s I Remember Nothing; and 
Fran Lebowitz’s The Fran Lebowitz Reader. This is merely a small number of works that, as an author-read 
audiobook, can greatly enrich one’s aesthetic expertise, predominantly due to the ability of these 
particular authors to convey their own (literary-)voice, literally, in their own voice. Nonetheless, as alluded 
to earlier, I shall approach this issue from a slightly different perspective in Chapter 8, utilising the unique 
pseudo-autobiographies of Barry Humphries’s fictional personages.         
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6.5 Audio Commentary Tracks as Aural Performances 
An Audio Commentary Track is a supplementary audio track, commonly regarded as a 
‘special feature’ included among an assembly of ‘bonus material’ on a film’s release on 
the medium of DVDs.583 Commentaries predominantly consist of either a lecture or, as 
their name implies, comments, which can delivered by one or more speakers. A 
commentary customarily plays in real-time and should correspond to what is seen on 
the screen.584 
The very first commentary track was featured on a Laser-Disc for the film King 
Kong (1933), released by the Criterion Collection in 1984, having licensed it from RKO. 
According to Jonathan Turell, CEO of the Criterion Collection, he would ‘probably give 
credit to Bob Stein, who was my former partner and founder of Criterion and Ron for 
coming up with the idea’.585 The track was recorded by Ron Haver, director at the LA 
County Museum of Art, and the commentary itself was unscripted. According to Turell, 
                                                 
583 In brief, the technology of the disc-based video format (consisting of the now out-of-circulation 
LaserDiscs, the ever-popular DVDs and BluRay Discs), enables the addition of alternate audio tracks to 
accompany feature films and television programmes. The standard types of alternate audio tracks usually 
take the form of either dubbed-dialogues (in different languages) or superior sound-encodings (such as 
Dolby Digital or DTS) which are supposed to enhance the experience of the ‘home cinema’ viewer. Special 
features predominantly consist of interviews with a particular film’s cast and creators, as well as making-
of and behind the scenes documentaries. With respect to the institution of AP, one may also come across 
certain bonus material, in addition to the audio commentaries, that comply to some degree with the 
institution of AP. For example, Elliott Gould’s reading of The Passion of Anna (featured on the 2004 MGM 
release of The Ingmar Bergman Special Edition DVD Collection); Alec Baldwin’s reading of Stephen Vincent 
Benét’s The Devil and Daniel Webster, recorded in 2003 exclusively for the Criterion Collection (Spine 
#214).  
584 Some of the commentaries that feature multiple voices were either recorded together (i.e., with all 
commentators in the same room) or on separate occasions (i.e., they were later edited together in order 
to compose a cohesive commentary). Some commentaries are scene-specific (i.e., they only cover 
selected scenes of the film); others carry throughout the entire length of the film; some commentaries 
may have large gaps in between the comments; others may consist of nonstop ramblings. Commentaries 
by actors and directors usually possess a very different feel from those carried out by scholars and critics. 
Commentaries can be either serious or entertaining; they may either present useful and insightful 
academic, historic or technical information on the craft of film-making or they can serve as an occasion, 
as it were, for the reminiscences of the film’s creators. Sometimes commentaries are constructed out of 
already existing interviews, or are recorded without the speaker actually viewing the film (or selected 
scenes thereof) in real-time. 
585 This quote refers to an e-mail correspondence I had conducted with Mr. Turell. 
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Haver simply sat down in a room, in front of a VCR, watched the movie and simply 
talked. The following is a transcript of how the commentary begins: 
Hello ladies and gentlemen. I am Ronald Haver, and I am to do 
something which we feel is rather unique: I am going to take you on a 
lecture tour of King Kong, as you watch the film. The Laserdisc 
technology offers us this opportunity and we feel it’s rather unique, 
the ability to switch back and forth between the soundtrack and this 
"lecture track". I would like to be able to tell you, during the course of 
the film; some of the stories of the making of it; about the 
personalities involved [...] we hope you will be able to appreciate more 
fully with this laserdisc edition. I've seen the film almost two hundred 
times since I first saw it in 1952, and I do have a great deal of 
knowledge that I think would be fairly interesting to most of you—
especially about, as I say, the behind the scenes events in the making 
of the film [...] Now, I won't talk constantly, there will be stretches of 
silence—so don't think there’s anything wrong with your player—it’s 
just at that particular time there really isn't too much to say.586  
Since then, however, most commentators have scripted what they are going to say. The 
perception of and approach towards audio commentaries is two-sided. On the one 
hand, directors such as Terry Gilliam or Martin Scorsese,587 who appear to relish in 
revisiting their works and elaborate on their artistic intentions, or Quentin Tarantino, 
who evidentially enjoys commenting on other people’s films.588 For the audience—their 
                                                 
586 See USB flash drive for the complete track. Haver begins speaking at 06m06sec.  
587 Scorsese also recorded a number of commentaries for the films that had affected him as a director 
and shaped his artistic vision. For example: The Life and Death of Colonel Blimp, Black Narcissus, The Red 
Shoes and The Tales of Hoffman (dir. Michael Powell & Emeric Pressburger – in 1943, 1947, 1948 and 
1951; respectively); The Set-Up (dir. Robert Wise, 1949). Scorsese’s commentaries for his own films are 
quite engaging. In the case of his own film, Who’s That Knocking at My Door? (1967), Scorsese begins the 
commentary by stating that this is not in fact a commentary, but rather background information on the 
making of his film. See USB flash drive for the complete track. While this may constitute nothing more 
than an issue of semantics, I would argue that this does give some insight with respect to how one should 
listen to his comments. In other words, it is effectively an instruction to aesthetically evaluating the 
commentary. 
588 Tarantino has recorded more commentaries for other people’s films, rather than for his own works. 
For example: the commentary he recorded along with film scholars David Chute and Elvis Mitchell for the 
film King Boxer (aka Five Fingers of Death; dir. Chang-hwa Jeong, 1972); the track recorded with director 
Jack Hill on Hill’s Switchblade Sisters (1975;) and his ‘guest’ participation in one (of the five) commentaries 
recorded for Hot Fuzz (dir. Edgar Wright, 2007). These types of commentaries–and especially in the case 
of the Hot Fuzz commentary ‘extravaganza’, as it were–can perhaps be seen as ‘fan-designed’ for the 
simple fact that essentially their contents revolve around almost any film that one could think of, aside 
from the film the commentary is being recorded for.  
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fans—to hear them speak about their works prevails as an immensely rewarding 
personal encounter. On the other hand, directors such as Woody Allen and David Lynch 
have expressed their assertion that a film should essentially speak for itself and to speak 
about a film—not to mention speak over a film, as all commentaries do—simply 
cheapens, de-mystifies and degrades the art of cinema. Arguably, for them, it appears 
to be exactly the same as a magician revealing his/her secrets, thereby destroying the 
illusion and rendering the magic trick pointless. Nonetheless, I would argue that one is 
able to perceive a commentary track as a unique kind of AP artwork. At the very least, 
commentaries have the potential to become one, predominantly are made for a 
listening audience—and some of which indeed address the audience directly. Surely, 
the main reason one listens to a commentary track to begin with is to attain some added 
element to one’s aesthetic experience. For instance, the commentary track on the 2015 
Criterion release of Fellini Satyricon (1969) is quite unique in that it essentially consist 
of an aural ‘adaptation’, of sorts, of a memoir, On the Set of “Fellini Satyricon”: A Behind-
the-Scenes Diary, written by Eileen Lanouette Hughes. The track is thus, essentially, an 
aural performance, told in the first-person, played over the feature, and it depicts 
Hughes’s experiences on the set. While it rarely corresponds with what one actually sees 
on screen (as audio commentaries are ‘supposed to’ do), it is nevertheless personal, 
informative, and indeed evokes a unique aesthetic experience.589 To be sure, much like 
the manner in which audiobooks highlight the nature of the fist-person narrative, audio 
commentaries can, potentially, give one the sense that the commentator not only is in 
the same room, watching the film with one, but also that s/he is speaking to one directly. 
                                                 
589 See USB flash drive for the Criterion Collection commentary track of Fellini Satyricon (1969).  
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As I will presently demonstrate, some filmmakers have utilised this medium in such a 
manner that results in an aesthetically rich and unique kind of aural performances. As 
such, the following examples will reinforce my contention that some commentaries, 
under certain circumstances, effectively require a sub-(institutional)-category of their 
own.590 
This Is Spinal Tap (1982), directed by Rob Reiner, is, in a nutshell, a comedy that 
pretends to be a documentary about a British rock group.591 In the world of the film, the 
documentary was made by one Marty DiBergi, who, in reality, is portrayed by Reiner 
himself. When released originally on DVD by the Criterion Collection (following their 
earlier Laser Disc edition), it included two fairly standard commentary tracks: one 
featuring Reiner alongside producer Karen Murphy, and editors Robert Leighton and 
Kent Beyda; and the other featuring the three principal actors, namely Christopher 
Guest, Michael McKean and Harry Shearer. Both tracks were informative and 
                                                 
590 Arguably, one might similarly consider certain voice-over narrations in film and television as potential 
aural performance. Most prominently, possibly the first of its kind, can be seen (or rather heard) in the 
1942 re-release of Charlie Chaplin’s The Gold Rush (1925), for which Chaplin recorded an aural narration. 
Although it does not constitute a commentary track per se, his narration is inherently performative. As it 
is delivered to his audience via spoken word, it can effectively be perceived as an AP artwork—much like 
the more unique audio commentaries discussed in this section. To be sure, some films incorporate a 
voice-over narration that prevails as a distinct character in its own right: e.g., to name but a few, Sunset 
Boulevard (dir. Billy Wilder, 1950); A Clockwork Orange (dir. Stanley Kubrick, 1971); Goodfellas (dir. 
Martin Scorsese, 1990); The Shawshank Redemption (dir. Frank Darabont, 1994), and Fight Club (dir. 
David Fincher, 1999). At the same time, these narrations differ from Chaplin’s in that they all are delivered 
either by a character (or some version thereof) who appears in the film itself. Chaplin’s narrator is clearly 
not his iconic tramp. Nonetheless, Chaplin utilises the narration as a vehicle for performing the story. 
Indeed, although it is considered very much part of the visual film, I would argue that it is consequently 
experienced as an aural performance. In the same vein, one can consider the Ron Howard narration in 
the remarkable American comedy series Arrested Development (2003-2006; 2013), in which the narrator 
prevails as a distinct and inherent off-screen character. 
591 Although customarily referred to as a ‘mockumentary’, and while it surely is considered a milestone in 
the development of the pseudo-documentary-comedy genre, their intention, as Christopher Guest points 
out, had never been to ‘mock’ anything or anyone in particular. Indeed, I find that to love the ridiculous 
and absurdity of people’s behaviour is not the same as ridiculing them. Ultimately, the film became the 
first project in a line of similar pseudo-documentary comedies—directed by Guest and featuring a mostly 
regular ensemble cast—all employing a unique kind of improvisational-based performances, one which 
is framed within a well-constructed story outline and a strict character study. 
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entertaining. Later, in 2000, MGM Home Entertainment released its ‘Special Edition’, 
which included a commentary delivered by Nigel Tufnel, David St. Hubbins and Derek 
Smalls, namely the three principal fictional characters (portrayed by Guest, McKean and 
Shearer, respectively). According to Eckart Voigts-Virchow, this commentary 
is by definition a posteriori and can never be part of the spatio-
temporal world of the narrative. This is an interesting case, however, 
because both the initial narrative 1 and the subsequent audio 
narrative 2 are fictional. In this way This is Spinal Tap extends the 
narrative space into the paratrack.592 
Unlike appearing ‘in-character’ on a talk show—for the purpose of promoting a film, for 
instance—the commentary constitutes a performance in its own right. It effectively 
prevails as an entirely new feature-length narrative, delivered to the audience through 
the spoken word. Although it is heard as the film plays forward, and while the speakers 
may refer to what is seen on screen, it is nonetheless experienced as an aural 
performance, and can therefore be identified as a unique kind of AP artwork. As the 
commentary both corresponds with and is dependent upon the original film, one cannot 
discard the original film and simply focus on the track itself.593 Fundamentally, one must 
(a) be acquainted with the band members, for the fictional characters that they are, and 
(b) be mindful of the fact that the film itself is fundamentally a finished product. Indeed, 
to experience the comprehensive aesthetics of this commentary, one must engage with 
the original film. Only then can one identify that the performance of the three actors—
manifested through the behaviour of the three characters—follows the same kind of 
predominantly improvisational expertise.594 
                                                 
592 Eckart Voigts-Virchow, "Paratracks in the Digital Age," in Intermedialities, ed. Evelyne Keitel, Gunter 
Süss and Werner Huber (Trier: WVT, 2007), 134. 
593 See USB flash drive for the in-character This Is Spinal Tap Commentary.  
594 Arguably, most of the non-lecture type of commentaries are ostensibly improvised as well—since the 
speaker/s (i.e., the director, actors or members of the film’s creative team), customarily have not seen 
- 188 - 
 
As I will later demonstrate with my third case study, examining the audiobook 
version of pseudo-autobiographies, I find that this is much more than merely playing a 
so-called tongue-in-cheek game with the audience. Rather, it demonstrates a successful 
application of a distinct performative internal logic, within the framework of the internal 
logic of the aural medium. The end-result is especially unique in that it extends the 
existence of the fictional characters. It enables the fictitious band members to allude to 
and comment on how DiBergi’s documentary about them consequently turned out. 
Although the in-character Spinal Tap commentary is no doubt an exception, it is 
nevertheless not one of its kind. It is, however, the first of its kind and has served as 
inspiration to both the few in-character commentaries that have surfaced from time to 
time, and to what can surely be identified as a genre of ‘comedy commentaries’. To be 
sure, utilising the commentary track, as a sub-(institutional)-category of AP, appears to 
easily be employed for comedic purposes. Evidently, in addition to the in-character 
commentaries, there exist a number of ostensibly fake and spoof commentaries. 
An equally interesting attempt, albeit not as successful or as ostensibly fine-
tuned, exists in the form of the in-character commentary track made for the Australian 
film, Snide and Prejudice (1997) directed by Philippe Mora. This film also takes on the 
guise of a documentary, unveiling the story of a mental institution, whose occupants 
suffer from fantasies and delusions pertaining to WWII. The main protagonists in the 
film are resident physician, Dr. Sam Choen (portrayed by Rene Auberjonois), and a 
patient named Michael Davidson (portrayed by Angus Macfadyen), who lives under the 
                                                 
the film in quite a while and they usually speak whatever comes to their mind as the film progresses in 
front of them. Commentaries featuring film scholars or experts, on the other hand, might very well have 
notes or an entire written lecture at their disposal during the recording. Yet, with Spinal Tap the 
improvisational nature prevails as an essential part of, and to a large extent, is the performance. 
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impression that he is none other than Adolf Hitler. Unlike This is Spinal Tap, which 
ostensibly announces itself as an outrageously funny creation—inferred from the 
opening monologue from its fictitious director—Snide and Prejudice appears to abide 
by an inherently darker type of humour, which effectively takes a somewhat slower 
pace to sink-in. In addition to the standard commentary track—featuring writer-director 
Mora and actor Macfadyen discussing the challenges the latter faced in approaching his 
role—the creators have included an additional track that constitutes an ostensible panel 
discussion between the two aforementioned characters and Mora—who appears to be 
portraying himself, or rather a certain ostensible version thereof. Indeed, rather than 
listening to Philippe Mora, the writer-director of Snide and Prejudice, one appears to be 
listening to ‘Philippe Mora’, the director of the ‘documentary’ about the mental 
institution. The track reveals that Davidson is feeling much healthier, taking his 
medication, still being treated by Dr. Sam Cohen, and that he no longer believes that he 
is in fact Hitler. Effectively, as with having the fictional characters of the fictional band 
comment about the fictional documentary that was made about them, the creators of 
Snide and Prejudice succeed in extending the existence of the given characters that 
inhabit a finished work. The audience, to a large extent, is invited to play an ostensible 
game with the filmmakers. In wilfully suspending one’s disbelief, one is expected to 
accept the reality of the fictional characters and bear witness to a narrative that exists 
beyond the narrative of the film itself. Consequently, the characters assume a pseudo-
real status as self-aware agencies, which become almost as real as they might have 
been, had the pseudo-documentary been a real one. This is precisely why I would argue 
that these commentaries, as AP artworks, ‘work’ remarkably well. What appears to 
enable it is a prevailing assumed pretense of reality shared by the performers and the 
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audience alike. To be sure, having a character in different types of films comment about 
themselves as if they are real would be a completely different matter. With the 
characters in pseudo-documentaries, one does not require investing any resources in 
thinking of oneself as if one is real due to the fact that one considers oneself real from 
the very beginning. 
The 2001 Universal DVD release of Joel and Ethan Coen’s Blood Simple (1984) is 
another interesting example. This release features a track recorded by Kenneth Loring, 
a restoration artistic director for ‘Forever Young Films’. Although not explicitly pointed 
out in the DVD itself, Loring is in fact a fictitious character (portrayed by British actor-
comedian Jim Piddock) and ‘Forever Young Films’ does not exist in actuality. Yet, this 
track assumes the guise of an ordinary commentary, which effectively sets out to deliver 
a lecture about the film, and was created by the filmmakers explicitly for the DVD 
release.595  
In an attempt to amplify the authenticity of what is essentially a ninety-five-
minute long joke, the filmmakers included bonus features on the DVD with a number of 
short interviews with Mortimer Young, head of ‘Forever Young Films’ (portrayed by 
actor George Ives). To be sure, as a so-called standard commentary—that is to say, one 
that features a film critic or some knowledgeable person attempting to inform one 
about the filmmakers' creative approach to their craft—this track does not constitute a 
very good one. Comments such as Lorning stating, ‘but, ehm, more on myself later, 
during the slower parts of the movie’, could never have been made in the context of a 
real commentary. Nonetheless, once one understands that this track is actually a well-
                                                 
595 See USB flash drive for the Universal commentary track to Blood Simple. 
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constructed joke, one would be required to evaluate it in accordance with its own terms. 
For example, on a very basic level, one would need to ask if it is funny, why it is funny, 
and whether the joke actually works.596 Consequently, the commentary should be 
heard, understood and experienced as a parody—one that works in accordance with 
the style and framework of the internal logic of the Coen brothers’ oeuvre. 
A similarly notable spoof commentary appears on the 2003 Universal DVD 
release of Monty Python’s The Meaning of Life (1983). Reminiscent of the equally 
Pythonesque gag employed in the 2001 Sony DVD release of Monty Python and the Holy 
Grail (1975), utilising the medium of including ‘Subtitles for Those Who Didn't Like the 
Film’, the producers of the Universal DVD employed a commentary track entitled 
‘Soundtrack for the Lonely: a soundtrack for people watching the DVD at home alone’. 
As with Blood Simple, this too is essentially a feature-long joke. In brief, what the 
audience is listening to is the sound of a man (portrayed by Michael Palin) who is 
watching the film alone in his humble abode. Every so often, he is heard muttering 
                                                 
596 In some respects, I would argue that this particular commentary could be compared with Orson 
Welles’s legendary 1938 radio adaptation of The War of the Worlds. Drawing on all the conventions of 
what a standard commentary track should sound like, I find that the so-called faux commentary made for 
Blood Simple misleads the audience by endowing one with the false sense of authenticity, and, effectively, 
runs the risk of not being identified by one and all for the joke that it is. Conceivably, Welles’s broadcast—
while prevailing as perhaps the most famous radio production of all time—can be identified as an example 
of an AP artwork that fails to manifest its own internal logic. Explicitly, it did not distinguish itself as an 
aural performance. As history reveals, the majority of Welles’s audience simply did not realise that they 
were supposed to experience the broadcast as a pre-conceived radio drama. The listening experience 
became ‘too real’. So much so, that the audience actually believed that earth was under attack by beings 
from another world, which subsequently led to mass panic. Now, deceiving his audience may have been 
part of what Welles had in mind, yet he surely could not have anticipated the extent to which the events 
of that evening had unfolded. In this respect, I would argue that although the broadcast may have 
followed the internal logic of a radio newscast (or, at least, the manner in which the medium would 
presumably cope with an attack from outer space), it did not necessarily follow the internal logic of 
performing a literary/dramatic work. Indeed, had Welles either (a) more properly complied with the 
internal logic of what an aural performance is, or (b) succeeded to manifest the ostensibly new internal 
logic of a pseudo-realistic radio broadcast, the mass panic could have been avoided. Moreover, as the 
performed work originated in the genre of science-fiction, it seems problematic, aesthetically, to deliver 
a work that amplifies the un-real through a manner that regards it as a real live occurrence. (Arguably, 
this had affected one’s ostensible immunity, even if one did in fact identify the elements of performance 
in Welles’s broadcast). 
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aimlessly at the screen in front him, munching on the odd snack, speaking over his 
telephone, or being yelled at by his next-door neighbour to ‘turn it down’. As the track 
progresses, along with the film, the somewhat darker tale of this man gradually unveils. 
Now, although this track does not feature a person speaking directly to an audience, it 
is nevertheless experienced by the audience as an aural performance—and quite a 
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7. Samuel Beckett’s Molloy: An Aural Case Study (2) 
 
7.1 Molloy: A Complex Case Study  
 In the introduction to this dissertation, I referenced Barry McGovern’s audiobook 
rendition of Samuel Beckett’s three novels,597 alluding to his suggestion that Beckett’s 
prose almost literally cries out to be read aloud—which, in effect, constitutes a 
performance. Indeed, one of this study’s major objectives aims to explain precisely why. 
Having (a) constructed and explained in detail what the institution of AP is, and thereby 
(b) illustrated both what does and what does not count as an AP artwork, I now come 
full circle: I return to the audiobook that initially ignited my interest in exploring these 
types of works. Focusing particularly on the novel Molloy (1955)—while highlighting the 
manner in which it corresponds with the complementary two novels that together form 
Beckett’s ‘trilogy’—I propose to articulate an explanation accounting for my initial 
assertion that the reading aloud of Beckett’s prose is indeed a performance. 
As stated earlier, I find the medium of the audiobook to be the most appropriate 
medium for performing texts which one might identify as extended personal 
monologues. Effectively, my exploration of Molloy endeavours to advance this study’s 
observation of the aural manifestations of literary texts that distinctly question the very 
concept of authorship and identity. Whereas Huck’s first-person narration of his own 
                                                 
597 Initially written in French between 1946 and 1949, and published in 1951, Molloy was subsequently 
translated into English by Beckett himself and published in 1955. It was followed by Malone Dies (1956) 
and The Unnamable (1958), both of which were also originally published in French (in 1951 and 1953, 
respectively) and later translated into English by Beckett. Although originally written as three individual 
works, they are commonly regarded as the components of Beckett’s ‘trilogy’ and have accordingly 
received a number of omnibus publications—constituting the last book published in Beckett’s lifetime. As 
Rónán McDonald puts it, ‘The three novels that make up the Trilogy have come to be regarded as among 
the prose masterpieces of the twentieth century’. Rónán McDonald, The Cambridge Introduction to 
Samuel Beckett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 87.  
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so-called memoir constitutes a very interesting, albeit not entirely convoluted case 
study in which Twain’s irony and input constantly prevail, Beckett’s first-person 
narrators are significantly complex. As I will show, his narrating protagonists—
particularly in Molloy, and in light of the ‘trilogy’ as a whole—deliver a predominantly 
fragmented first-person account of their own story. Their narratives call into question 
the authorship and identity of both the writer of the words that they speak, as well as 
of their own existence as the narrator who speaks them. Consequently, an audiobook 
version of Beckett’s prose appears to amplify the complexity pertaining to the 
authorship and identity—predominantly as the narrators address their implied auditor 
through literal and concrete voices. 598  
In an interview concerning his adaptation of Beckett’s novels into a one-man-
show (a recorded version of which will be addressed later on) renowned Irish actor, Jack 
MacGowran, explains that although he was admittedly ‘baffled’ by his initial reading of 
Beckett’s prose, there nonetheless was ‘some inner thing’ that made him ‘know there’s 
a quality here that needs an expression’.599 Recounting a conversation they conducted 
about this matter, MacGowran quotes Beckett saying, ‘I admit that my word on the page 
is difficult, but if it can be interpreted by […] being spoken, it would take on a dimension 
of understanding that one mightn’t get from reading it’.600 Interestingly enough, in the 
same vein, McMillan and Fehsenfeld cite Beckett as confessing to the playwright Jean 
                                                 
598 With Beckett, the designated medium is customarily considered particularly essential. He himself 
predominantly objected to having his works performed through a different medium than that for which 
a particular work was originally written. At the same time, it is evident that he was much more lenient 
with his prose. As McGovern points out, ‘adaptations of prose works are legion—on stage, TV and radio. 
[…] many of these adaptations were authorized by Beckett himself or given his blessing’. McGovern, "It’s 
a Question of Voices….," 29-32. As has been established, when one engages with any AP artwork, one 
should be mindful of the extent to which it may exist as an adaptation. 
599 Jack MacGowran, interviewed by Liam Nolan. Excerpt. (circ. 1966). See USB flash drive, 03m50sec.  
600 Ibid., 03m57sec.  
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Reavey that he never wrote a word without actually saying it out loud before putting it 
on the page.601 To be sure, this not only effectively complements MacGowran’s recount 
of what Beckett had told him, but these two references also strengthen McGovern’s 
intuitive insight about there being something in the text itself that cries out to be read 
aloud. As McMillan and Fehsenfeld point out, Beckett is known to have worked on all 
aspects of the voice with regards to the performances of his works: namely, the speed 
and tone of the various utterances, as well as in which exact direction (i.e., spatially, on 
the stage) a certain character would be speaking.602 Although one might argue that this 
predominantly applies to the stage works, it is quite plausible to assume that Beckett 
may have employed this as an ostensible methodology in writing his prose fiction as 
well. To some extent, in identifying that the text seeks out to be spoken, a performer 
effectively allows the printed word on the page to return to or re-establish itself as the 
original spoken word that Beckett uttered to himself before putting into his writing. 
Whereas Huck Finn received numerous audiobook versions, Molloy received 
only two professional unabridged audiobook releases: one by RTÉ, narrated by 
McGovern, and the other by Naxos, distinctive in that it is narrated by two performers—
Sean Barrett and Dermot Crowley.603 Nonetheless, as with my previous case study, my 
intention here is (a) to identify—at least in broad strokes—the most essential strands 
that constitute the generally accepted internal logic of Molloy, and subsequently (b) to 
compare and evaluate the different audiobook versions of the novel as AP artworks. 
McGovern’s suggestion, for instance, that Beckett’s prose elicits an actual reading aloud 
                                                 
601 Douglas McMillan and Martha Fehsenfeld, Beckett in the Theater: The Author as Practical Playwright 
and Director (London: Calder, 1988), 16.   
602 Ibid. 
603 Samuel Beckett, Molloy, unabridged, read by Sean Barrett and Dermot Crowley (Naxos Audiobooks, 
NA531912, 2003). 
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can be identified as an inherent aspect of its internal logic. As will later be addressed, 
one might similarly identify a particular strand in the overall internal logic of all three 
novels: that is to say, the ‘trilogy’ as a whole appears to evoke what particular kind of 
reading—or at least what limited range of possible readings—the texts themselves 
conceivably require. 
Summarily, in order to identify what the internal logic of the novel is—or, at least 
what it predominantly pertains to—one is required to consider and be mindful of the 
following key facets: (a) the predominantly unreliable identity of the novel’s narrating 
protagonist; (b) the contentious possibility that there might in fact be more than one 
such protagonist; (c) the conceivable relationship that prevails between the narrators in 
all three novels; (d) the distinctive thematic threads and ars poetic literary devices 
embedded in Molloy—all of which predominately pertain to the ostensible tools one 
utilises in order to substantiate one’s own existence (e.g., the very acts of writing, 
narration, and speaking aloud one’s thoughts, as well as the questionable authenticity 
of memories and the extent to which one can rely upon the voices one hears in one’s 
head); and (e) the conceivable existence of a distinctive Beckettian writing style—
persistent not only throughout the ‘trilogy’ as a whole, but also correspondingly 
associated with Beckett’s entire body of work. It, in turn, can be associated with certain 
implicit qualities such as tone, cadence and rhythm—as well as, to some extent, a 
particular diction and accent.604 
                                                 
604 Albeit, arguably, un-self-consciously—as the themes that abide in his work are customarily 
acknowledged as universal—Beckett’s writing appears to be imbued with his own native Irish speech 
patterns. Indeed, while Beckett seldom deliberately mimics or endows his character with particular 
accents, there nevertheless appears to prevail a certain sense of ‘Irishness’ to his work. It is evident not 
only with respect to the language that most of his characters speak, or the ostensible music that informs 
their speech, but also particularly in the milieu that inhabits his prose. Consequently, it can be argued that 
it is part of the text’s internal logic and should thereby appropriately be identified in a putative 
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Ultimately, in conjunction with my initial case study and exploration of the aural 
manifestations of Huck Finn, my intention now is to utilise Molloy in order to underline 
just how crucial the choice of casting the right narrator actually is. On the one hand, as 
I will show, both versions most definitely comply with what an AP artwork should be.605 
On the other hand, however, each version elicits a different kind of aesthetic 
evaluation—which is inherently connected to the understanding of the novel’s assumed 
internal logic.606 
 
7.2 Molloy and the Trilogy: The Whole vs. One of Its Parts   
Any attempt to describe the plot of Molloy will prove a difficult task, and I shall therefore 
address the overall ‘story’ merely in broad strokes. Yet, it can be established that the 
novel is divided into two parts, each consisting of its own narrative, and that both are 
delivered to the readers by two supposedly different protagonists.607 
The first part of the novel is spoken by a character named Molloy: a crippled 
derelict who owns a chainless bicycle. He appears to have no rationale for existence, 
                                                 
performance. A plausible argument could likewise be made that Beckett’s work simply sounds better in 
an Irish accent. This will later be made clear through the concrete analysis of the recordings. 
605 In brief, when examining the manner in which they comply with the institution of AP, both recordings 
consist of an existing written text which was (a) recorded by a performer and (b) presented as an 
audiobook to (c) a designated audience. In both cases, the narrators are professional, experienced and 
accomplished actors. As (audio-)performers, they participate with understanding in the act of creating an 
AP artwork. Accordingly, the designated consumers of these audiobooks constitute a set of persons who 
are prepared to take upon themselves the responsibility of understanding and experiencing these 
recorded narrations as AP artworks. 
606 As will be explained, the deficiency in Barrett and Crowley’s rendition is rooted in the explicit artistic 
choice employed by Naxos to have the novel delivered by two different actors. Indeed, McGovern’s 
performance is the better of the two. Not only does his performance successfully embody what shall be 
determined as the internal logic of Beckett’s text, but it also prevails as a captivating example of what a 
good aural performance should be. 
607 To a large extent, these two narratives can be perceived as two extended monologues. As will later be 
addressed more explicitly, identifying them as such contributes both (a) to McGovern’s intuitive 
contention that the text itself elicits its own performance, and (b) to the notion of the aural medium 
constituting the most obvious art form for certain texts.    
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save his quest of returning to his mother’s house, coupled with the basic human 
necessity of surviving in what he perceives as an unfriendly world. As Paul Davies 
explains, ‘Beckett’s characters are mostly homeless, culturally and physically, and move 
just like machines […]. It is made clear that they once had a home, a culture, education 
and parentage, not to speak of a metaphysical or spiritual “home”’.608 The novel begins 
with Molloy residing in his dead mother’s room. He seems to have no recollection either 
of how he got there or how he was eventually rescued from what one later learns was 
the ditch where he previously ended up.609 In this room, Molloy writes. Completing but 
a few pages every day, he composes—in fiction—his own account of his obstacle-ridden 
journey home. 
In the second part of the novel, the readers are introduced to the character of 
Moran—its assumed narrator.610 Like Molloy, Moran too is on a quest: to find Molloy. 
Rendering his character something of a hybrid between a secret agent and a sleuth, 
Moran is given his assignment by an undescribed (although not insignificant) superior 
named Youdi, with whom he communicates via a messenger named Gaber.611 Moran’s 
character can be described as opinionated and conventional, and he appears to be an 
                                                 
608 Paul Davies, "Three Novels and Four Nouvelles: Giving Up the Ghost Be Born At Last," in The Cambridge 
Companion to Beckett, ed. John Pilling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 46.  
609 That the novel begins with what is effectively the accomplishment of his quest is addressed later on. 
610 As stated, the novel puts into question matters of authorship and identity. Thus, although Moran 
essentially introduces himself—thereby arguably assuming authorship of a monologue of his own—his 
narrative, as will later be made clear, may not necessarily be his, and, similarly, one may dispute whether 
it is in fact he who narrates it.      
611 The inclusion of an undescribed character in a medium composed of words seems to resonate with 
Beckett’s Waiting for Godot, which features perhaps the most famous ‘unseen’ and at the same time 
constantly-present character in the history of Western theatre (i.e., Godot). In the same vein, Beckett’s 
employment of a blind character in his All That Fall—a play that was written for the ‘blind’ medium of 
radio—could likewise be identified as a kind of aesthetic inconsistency, and thereby as a comment on the 
nature of the medium itself. Indeed, these cases demonstrate the manner in which Beckett utilises his 
particular choice of medium for the purpose of endowing his works with a distinctive internal logic. As 
will later be explained, Molloy (and, indeed, the ‘trilogy’ as a whole) is obsessed with the fundamental 
question of what the novelistic medium is: writing and narration. Consequently, the protagonists’ quests 
seem to be rooted in these two activities. 
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outwardly devout puritan. As his narrative progresses, he continually asks himself 
philosophically difficult and somewhat self-torturing questions.612 Gradually identifying 
with the subject of his inquiry, Moran’s journey consequently leads him in search of his 
own self—which in effect results in his finding Molloy, albeit not in the literal sense.613 
Each narrative can be perceived as the antithesis of the other—not only in light 
of the novel’s structure, but also in terms of the narrating character who is delivering 
the story to the readers. They both appear to take the form of their narrators’ 
continuous ramblings—which, conceivably, revolve around anything and everything, 
and at the same time are about nothing in particular.614 Nonetheless, one needs to be 
able to read beyond the words on the page.615 As Davies points out, ‘the rambling, 
formless appearance […] is only skin-deep’.616 Similarly, H. Porter Abbott argues that 
‘though the trilogy is technically endless, it defined a progression which made, in 
retrospect, an arrow of meaning. It organized what went before and gave the various 
                                                 
612 Quite often in Beckett’s work, the comedy stems from what could be identified as a bleak, poignant 
and poetic view of human existence (and, indeed, non-existence). While tragicomedy and black comedy 
have existed in dramatic works as early as Sophocles, it also suggests the philosophical milieu that 
Beckett’s writing is usually associated with: namely, existentialism—or rather to the manner in which this 
tradition is represented by authors and works such as Albert Camus’s The Myth of Sisyphus (1942) and 
Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness (1943). In the same vein, MacGowran points out that on reading 
Beckett’s novels he found ‘they had a great dramatic and humorous effect—either ironic or what they 
call today “black humor”, sardonic humour—but humour of a very definite sort’. See USB flash drive for 
MacGowran’s interview with Nolan, 00m15sec–00m31sec.   
613 According to McDonald, ’the story of Molloy and Moran may, as some critics hold, be a perplexing 
inversion—the initial bourgeois robustness of Moran mutates during his narrative to the debilitated 
character which so resembles the object of his search, Molloy’. McDonald, The Cambridge Introduction 
to Samuel Beckett, 88. 
614 Irish literary critic, Vivian Mercier, famously described Waiting for Godot as a play in which ‘nothing 
happens, twice’. Vivian Mercier, “The Uneventful Event,” Irish Times, February 18, 1956, 6. One might 
similarly be tempted to claim that the two monologues which constitute Molloy are in fact nothing more 
than the ostensibly out-of-sync verbal meanderings of two unrelated and, arguably, semi-deranged 
narrators, who fundamentally ‘say’ absolutely nothing, twice. Likewise, the ‘trilogy’ as a whole could be 
regarded as a complex amalgamation of streams of a somewhat haunted consciousness. 
615 When listening to the audiobook versions, one is required to be mindful of what resides beyond the 
ostensibly diffused and incoherent speeches. Of course, this would also depend upon the performer’s 
ability to deliver and manifest the fact that there is something more to the text than the text itself. 
616 Davies, "Three Novels and Four Nouvelles," 47.  
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parts in their turn a kind of belonging’.617 In his attempt to identify what I would regard 
as their institutional fact, Davies asserts that these narratives are necessarily ‘cohered 
by a compelling […] circular logic’.618 Indeed, succumbing to the arguable temptation of 
reducing the novel’s literary substance to nothing more than formless ramblings would 
merely leave one with the ‘brute’ fact of the matter. Yet, in seeking to identify its 
institutional fact, Molloy can be experienced as an outstanding work of modern fiction—
and arguably Beckett’s magnum opus.619 Inevitably, the two ostensibly separate 
monologues of Molloy and Moran can be construed not only as very much connected 
to each other—as well as seeming to resonate with the other narratives of the entire 
‘trilogy’—but also as possessing an innate significance (i.e., a distinct embodied 
meaning, of sorts) and therefore they do in fact ‘say’ quite a lot. For the most part, 
Molloy and Moran seem to convey their thoughts (or thought processes), insights (for 
whatever they might be worth), as well as occasional (inherently fragmented) 
memories. Thus, despite appearances, their ramblings should not in fact be regarded as 
ramblings at all.620 
                                                 
617 H. Porter Abbott, "Beginning Again: The Post-Narrative Art of Texts for Nothing and How It Is," in The 
Cambridge Companion to Beckett, ed. Pilling, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 110. 
618 Ibid. 
619 Correspondingly, an encounter with, for instance, Jackson Pollock’s Full Fathom Five (1947) or, 
perhaps, Number 18 (1950) should most definitely not lead one to conclude that these paintings are in 
fact an explicit deceit, effectively consisting of different ‘versions’ of blots, drippings, and spritzes of paint, 
unintentionally scattered upon a large canvas. To be sure, as NITA clearly demonstrates, one not only can 
see these works as legitimate paintings, but also potentially identify them as artistic masterpieces—
ranking among the highest achievements in abstract expressionist painting.  
620 I find that the novel uniquely conveys the ‘unscripted’ nature and ongoing ‘ever-editing’ flow of human 
cognitive consciousness. For instance, Molloy appears to be situated in such isolation that he is merely 
able to resort to the fractured thoughts and distant memories within his consciousness. Arguably, this 
was Beckett’s perception of the human condition at its most fundamental. The novel demonstrates this 
through the idiosyncrasies of Molloy’s thinking process, as they manifest in his narration. I am reminded 
of the long-running radio programme, Just a Minute, an improvisational panel-based comedy show, which 
also found its way to television. The stated objective of the participating panellists is to speak for an entire 
minute about some given subject, without hesitation, repetition or deviation. Although literature usually 
conceals them, attempting to create an artistically coherent flow of thought upon the printed page, 
Beckett does not. As the novel progresses, Molloy, who essentially narrates ‘himself’, employs all three, 
effectively demonstrating Beckett’s insights in respect of the lapses in one’s consciousness. 
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In what constitutes a fitting indication of what the internal logic of the novel 
should be—or, at least, the manner in which it should be approached—McDonald 
maintains that  
[I]f the point of a novel, its aesthetic effect as it were, is to withhold 
clarity of theme or rational ‘message’, then explaining that novel, 
translating it into coherent themes, is in a sense to lose it. Critical 
approaches to the trilogy are thrown back on themselves: ‘reading’ 
the trilogy immediately asks questions about how the trilogy should 
be read in so far as it challenges many of the procedures and 
conventions underlying critical interpretation. As ever, we need to 
proceed with caution, and with proper critical circumspection. An 
attentive encounter with Beckett’s fiction is one which is alert to the 
quality and nature of the voices, the structure of the story, how the 
narrative is being told as much as what it ‘means’. There is little point 
in pillaging these texts for readily packaged themes or clear messages, 
no point in seeking to iron out their dislocations and difficulties. On 
the other hand, we cannot simply ignore the challenge to 
interpretation that these elusive texts pose, eschewing their 
ambiguities and perplexities for the appreciation of a nicely caught 
cadence. Even if we fumble the questions, it might not be a bad 
starting point to try to identify what some of them are.621 
A close reading of their narratives appears to reveal that Molloy and Moran express 
discrete philosophical attitudes pertaining to human existence. As Davies suggests, 
Beckett’s fictions confront […] a conflict between two powerful forces. 
One is the […] cogito, abstract reasoning, the conscious mind, 
determinism, […] the imposition of extrinsic order. The historical index 
of this force is the Cartesian Enlightenment and the empirical tradition 
[…] Beneath, above and against this force, is the opposite force […] 
which does not respond to analysis; […] the actual unfoldment of 
existence, that is, something which we know […] but which is beyond 
our powers of comprehension.622 [emphases in original] 
In appearing to represent these two forces,623 Molloy and Moran effectively embody 
two sides of the same proverbial coin—an adherent of a currency that can be utilised 
                                                 
621 McDonald, The Cambridge Introduction to Samuel Beckett, 89–90. 
622 Davies, "Three Novels and Four Nouvelles," 43. 
623 Davies explains that ‘Beckett’s narrators embody the spiritual emergency of the Cartesian 
consciousness. […] The Cartesian split goes against the spiritual ecology of the human mind just as the 
smoke does against the delicate equilibrium of the baleful insects. […] Three aspects of the Cartesian 
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for transacting with the complementary two novels.624 In Malone Dies, for example, 
Malone—the narrating protagonist—is bedridden, and helpless, just like Molloy. He too 
is ultimately awaiting his own death, and is similarly deprived of both the physical 
strength and the mental capacity to change his condition. Unlike Molloy, he appears to 
hold a distinctly religious Christian outlook—especially with respect to the promise of a 
better life after death.625 While this arguably bestows Moran with a purpose of some 
kind, or perhaps an ostensible reassurance of what he might expect after death, his 
outlook also seems to represent Beckett’s comment on the degree to which institutional 
restrictions, for lack of a better term, quite literally dictate what one is essentially 
permitted to reflect upon during one’s lifetime. Molloy, on his part, appears to convey 
the belief that one’s life is deprived of choice—and that one lives one’s life moment to 
moment, while clashing from time to time with the occasional figure of authority that 
the world confronts one with. Although he is crippled (arguably, not only in the physical 
sense), he seems determined to ‘go on’.626 Thus, to some extent, Moran also seems to 
                                                 
separation spring from Beckett’s pages with exceptional force. The first is in the realm of the storyteller’s 
discourse, the question as to whether words can tell the truth or not […]. The second is in the realm of 
the storyteller’s images: Beckett’s celebrated evocation of humans shut up in a small circular space […]. 
The third is […] what in traditional philosophy used to be called prima materia. […] These three issues run 
deep in all Beckett’s poetry, drama and later fiction. But it is in the trilogy that they make their most 
obvious and memorable, not to mention accessible, impression’. Ibid., 45–47.  
624 Abbot, for instance, argues that a ‘central theme’ of the ‘trilogy’ is the ‘bewildering multiplicity of the 
speaking subject’. Abbott, "Beginning Again," 112. Correspondingly, Iain Wright’s assertion that all three 
narrators ‘are ceaselessly at work in a deconstructionist activity—foregrounding their own textuality, 
decentring the texts they inhabit, subverting subject positions, denaturalizing language—the issue is 
misery and meaninglessness, and that activity is what they seek continually, but unsuccessfully to escape 
from, back into a world of solid foundations, solid signifiers’ [emphasis in original]. Cited in P.J. Murphy, 
"Beckett and the Philosophers," in The Cambridge Companion to Beckett, ed. Pilling, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 223. 
625 As McDonald points out, ‘Moran’s Catholicism is witheringly portrayed at the start of his narrative, 
while his supposed pilgrimage to see the “Turdy Madonna” revisits the early conflation of maternity and 
excrement in Molloy’s mind’. McDonald, The Cambridge Introduction to Samuel Beckett, 93. While it is 
after Moran’s condition deteriorates that he begins to be preoccupied with innately theological 
questions, ‘the list he contrives is a dark, quasi-blasphemous parody of the doctrinal catechism’. Ibid. 
626 Beckett develops this attitude into its poetic coda in The Unnamable, where he concludes the novel, 
and thereby the ‘trilogy’ as a whole, with the narrator uttering his famous last words: ‘you must go on, I 
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represent all that Molloy is not or cannot be. Indeed, whereas Molloy appears to be free 
despite his incapacitated state, Moran, although fundamentally free, leads a rather 
limited life, unable to accomplish the task of ceasing to be.627 
As one engages with the novel on a deeper level, it becomes evident that the act 
of writing resides in its core. Indeed, both Molloy and Moran are consumed with writing 
down their thoughts and making up stories. In doing so, they rekindle their past, give 
shape and form to their memories, and document their own lives in the form of a 
fragmented fictional narrative. They effectively utilise their writing to define their own 
identities—and thus, they are compelled to write.628 Furthermore, as they both 
habitually write reports, the very act of writing is also essential in defining them.629 
As a developing character in one three-part narrative, Malone too appears to 
share with his literary auditors—Beckett’s readers—his acceptance of that which he 
                                                 
can‘t go on, I‘ll go on’. Samuel Beckett, The Unnamable, in Three Novels: Molloy, Malone Dies, The 
Unnamable (New York: Grove Press, 2009), 407. 
627 John Calder, for instance, depicts the novel as ‘the first person monologue of […] an old man, lying in 
bed and waiting to die’. John Calder, notes to Samuel Beckett, Malone Dies, unabridged, read by Sean 
Barett (Naxos Audiobooks, NA531912D, 2004), 7. Malone, he asserts, ‘is not a nice old man: his 
‘bitterness’ at having had to live at all, his spite against others he has known, and his sour memories which 
make up the real or imagined stories he tells himself between naps and other thoughts, make that clear 
enough; the tone is fiercely ironic, […] and, because of its extravagance, also very comic. […] Malone 
makes it clear that he is resigned to his forthcoming death’. Ibid., 7–8.  
628 As Calder points out, Malone ‘is not in a hurry to die; boredom is worse, but he has an inventive mind 
and can think up little stories, even if they are not entirely made up’. Ibid., 8. He goes on to assert that ‘as 
the novel—and Malone’s ebbing consciousness—nears its end, the stories become wilder and more 
sadistic and a Dante-like demon appears, Lemuel, surely from Hell, who in Malone’s imagination kills the 
characters one by one. Ibid., 9. Thus, for Calder, ‘Malone’s mind, the real hero of this novel, can make as 
much out of a trivial incident that it has invented as of a major one, changing the story half-way through, 
changing the name of a character on a whim or going back to start again’. Ibid., 10. 
629 While Molloy is not sure whom his report is for, or indeed why he is writing it to begin with, he is 
nevertheless compelled to do so. ‘There’s this man that comes every week […] He gives me money and 
takes away the pages […] When he comes for the fresh pages he brings back the previous week’s. They 
are marked with signs I don’t understand’. Samuel Beckett, Molloy, in Three Novels (New York: Grove 
Press, 2009), 3. Moran’s reports are focused on the subject of the person he is looking for, which is, as 
aforementioned, the character of Molloy, and his reports are to be given to his supervisor. In effect, they 
both write about writing, or the rituals thereof, and at the time report about what they write. To some 
extent, Beckett’s readers (who are engaged with the novel Molloy), are also the implied audience of the 
characters themselves. As will soon be explained, just as Molloy and Moran are ostensibly compelled to 
write, they also require an audience who will read their output.    
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cannot change. He is very much aware of the fact that his pencil, increasingly 
disintegrating with every page, parallels his own life, which is nearing its last breath. At 
the same time, Malone is constantly attempting to delay his death by means of writing. 
In brief, he writes (and narrates) stories featuring characters who reside somewhere, 
‘out there’, far away, and beyond the pages. Much like Molloy—and as will presently 
become clear, much like the narrator of The Unnamable—his state of paralysis 
notwithstanding, Malone endows his fictional creations with precisely that which he 
himself lacks: the capability to journey the world, freely and unburdened. An argument 
could surely be made that experiencing Malone Dies as an audiobook has the potential 
of intensifying and enriching one’s sense of Malone’s awareness of his own mortality. It 
is at the heart of one’s aesthetic experience. Readers should no doubt be aware—at 
least in the back of their mind—that Malone’s existence is tied in with the continuously 
depleting number of pages. Indeed, the novel exists from cover to cover. The listening 
audience of the audiobook would likewise be mindful that the narrator’s so-called life 
expectancy is dependent upon the recording’s running time. Thus, the aural 
performance cannot exist beyond its prescribed intrinsic count-down. No matter who 
the assumed narrator is, having the physical novel at hand will forever serve as a 
reminder to who the text’s author actually is. An aural recording, however, can be said 
to bestow the fictional narrator with greater power. With Beckett’s ‘trilogy’ in particular, 
as the narrators apparently attempt to assume ownership over the texts themselves—
while the printed work shall forever remain overshadowed by the imprinting of 
Beckett’s name, an aural performance ostensibly assists in making the narrative their 
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own.630 Consequently, the act of writing, coupled with the act of narration, are 
established as two distinct self-reflective themes.631 Indeed, as literary devices, they can 
be traced throughout all three novels—and thereby be identified as distinct connective 
threads.632 
All three novels seem to intentionally blur the boundaries between that which 
resides within the ‘trilogy’ and that which exists beyond its pages.633 There no doubt 
exists an inherent relationship between all three novels and the characters who both 
inhabit and narrate them.634 As Catherine Laws point out,  
The ambiguous relationships between Molloy, Moran and the author 
undermine our sense of narrative origins. The question of authority is 
permanently in doubt, not least because the worlds of the two men 
are in many ways very similar; the objects, events and ideas of one 
story are frequently repeated in a related form in the other, and even 
dissimilarities are often effected by the stated absence or denial of 
that which appeared in the other story, rather than by the actual 
inclusion of thoroughly different material. Identity is therefore put 
                                                 
630 Malone, for example, appears to claim ownership over Molloy—the novel—and thereby raises an 
important question regarding the literal existence of characters who are, for all intents and purposes, 
fictional. As this can be identified as one aspect of the novel’s internal logic, a good audiobook narrator—
who effectively ‘owns’ the aural performance—should in this case be able to manifest the manner in 
which the character endeavours to assume a ‘real’ possession of a fictional work.  
631 In some respects, it could be argued that readers experience the three novels intermittently as (a) the 
‘brute’ fact of what they actually are—i.e., the distinctive works of Samuel Beckett, and (b) the 
‘institutional’ fact of what the text appears to be—i.e., the individual works of the fictional characters 
themselves. For example, as Malone’s narrative progresses, it appears as though his stories—a 
fictionalised biography, of sorts—ultimately form a mirror image of Malone’s own life. I would argue that 
Malone’s ostensible self-created doppelgänger resonates with the splitting of Molloy between two 
different narrators—who may themselves in fact prevail as a duplicated representation of one single 
character. This is predominantly why the Naxos choice of two different narrators is problematic.   
632 When reading the ‘trilogy’ as a whole, it becomes evident that Beckett’s narrators are very much aware 
of their place in the world. Indeed, they know full well that their journey in life is confined solely to the 
stories they tell. This is why the act of narration in particular possesses the potential of becoming 
extremely intensified when one experiences the audiobook version of these novels as AP artworks. 
633 This is most evident when considering the author of the novels, the narrating characters, their possible 
direct or indirect relationship to each other, or the manner in which they correspond both with the so-
called ‘real’ world of the readers and their own fictional ‘Beckettian’ world. 
634 Despite alluding to a prevailing difference between the three novels, I find that Calder does the exact 
opposite: he not only demonstrates the manner in which they correspond with each other, but he also 
insinuates a common artistic thread. Indeed, although originally written as three individual works, quite 
a number of eminent scholars have advocated that they share more than might initially meet the eye. 
Even if one does find an inherent connection between the three novels, the fact that some kind of 
connection does exist cannot be ignored. Merely asserting that they are ‘totally unconnected’, as he does 
in his notes, moves one further away from seizing its appropriate internal logic.  
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into question, and this is extended in Malone Dies […] As J. D. O'Hara 
points out […] its focus is the actual process of writing, but this is also 
an inevitable consequence of the textual duality of Molloy. This 
explicit association of writing with the necessary but futile attempt to 
evolve an objective and unified history of the self becomes most 
unbearable in The Unnamable: the repeated demonstration of the 
impossibility of self-presence, and the resultant need continually to 
invent others, destabilise the coherence of subjectivity.635 
Completing the cycle of Beckett’s ‘trilogy’, the narrating character in The Unnamable is 
deprived of any distinctive identity.636 Throughout the novel, the solipsistic narrating 
protagonist remains, by its own admission, ‘a big talking ball, talking about things that 
do not exist, or that exist perhaps, impossible to know, beside the point’.637 Evidently, 
‘he’ not only has no name but also no body.638 Yet, his ability to speak remains.639 It is 
his most distinctive characteristic, and perhaps all that he has. Isolated, confined to his 
own contemplations, he accordingly utilises words and his power of speech in an 
attempt to assume or substantiate his own identity.640 Nonetheless, his attempt is due 
                                                 
635 Catherine Laws, "Music and Language in the Work of Samuel Beckett" (PhD diss., University of York, 
1996), 149–50. 
636 This resonates with Malone, who manifests his presence and/or existence by an apparent 
unwillingness (or rather, a literal inability) to refer to himself in the first-person. At the same time, the 
contradiction in terms notwithstanding, as he narrates the novel, Malone appears to have a similar 
inability to speak about anything other than his own self. 
637 Beckett, The Unnamable, 299. 
638 While an argument could be made that for this reason one should, in fact, regard this character as an 
‘it’, I refer him as a ‘he’ because he corresponds directly with the narrating protagonists of the previous 
two novels in the ‘trilogy’.    
639 As Calder asserts, this novel ‘might almost have been written to be read aloud, catching the nuances 
of the thinking mind and the change of tone from random speculation to storytelling to desperate panic. 
It is a compulsive voice, asking questions, seeking answers without expecting to find them, always a little 
surprised at its own ability to reason and to keep going’. John Calder, notes to Samuel Beckett, The 
Unnamable, unabridged, read by Sean Barrett (Naxos Audiobooks, NA533712D, 2005).8  
640 According to Davies, ‘Beckett’s depictions of confinement within a closed space are known even 
amongst those who have never seen a Beckett play, or read his novels. […] Sometimes it is merely a 
thought or comparison in the narrator’s imagination; sometimes, as in The Unnamable, the narrative 
image itself is of a being, a person, trapped in a jar constantly’. Davies, "Three Novels and Four Nouvelles," 
52. He later points out that ‘The Cartesian split, embodied by Beckett in the infernal jar, imprisons the 
soul and prevents its communion with the life which is its own essential sustenance. This is Beckett’s 
unique picture of existential anguish’. Ibid., 57. In essence, the narrating character in The Unnamable 
proclaims his existence by way of both narrating ‘himself’ and personifying two particular characters. The 
former, arguably, highlights the classic philosophical notion that words and speech create reality (i.e., if, 
for instance, one does not say the words ‘Let there be light’, light simply cannot be); the latter, 
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to fail. Predominantly in Beckett’s works, one seems to require an additional personage 
who is able to validate one’s existence. The speaker in The Unnamable has no such 
‘other’ person do so, except perhaps the readers of the novel. This, I would argue, is 
further intensified through the audiobook versions: the voices become concrete, and 
the listeners are rendered as a literal ‘other’ to hear them.641 
In some respects, it could also be argued that the narrating characters in Molloy 
function as their own audience. Since they require an audience, appearing to address 
their narrative to whoever is willing to listen to them, the readers (and listeners) might 
be perceived as a proxy, of sorts—for an ostensible imagined audience—that enable the 
narrators to sound out their thoughts and speak aloud to themselves.642 In The 
Unnamable, all that the speaker is left with—and, conceivably, all that the readers are 
left with as well—are resonating disembodied voices, governed by a kind of liminality.643 
                                                 
emphasising the line that Beckett draws between all the narrating characters in the ‘trilogy’, utilising 
stories and fiction in trying to define who they themselves are.   
641 In the same vein, consider the last words spoken by the character of Vladimir to the character of the 
Boy at the end of Act II in Waiting for Godot: In his reply to his question ‘What am I to tell Mr. Godot, Sir?’ 
Vladimir says to the Boy, ‘Tell him . . . (He hesitates) . . . tell him you saw me and that . . . (He hesitates) . 
. . that you saw me. (Pause. Vladimir advances, the Boy recoils. Vladimir halts, the Boy halts. With sudden 
violence.) You're sure you saw me, you won't come and tell me to-morrow that you never saw me! Silence. 
Vladimir makes a sudden spring forward, the Boy avoids him and exit running. Silence. The sun sets, the 
moon rises. As in Act 1 […]’. Samuel Beckett, Waiting for Godot (New York: Grove Press, 1954), 59–60. 
That Beckett specifies Vladimir’s sudden violent outrage when wishing to make sure that the boy indeed 
saw him is crucial. Not only does it relate to the circular nature of the play—indeed, the act of waiting for 
Godot (who never appears onstage)—but it also emphasises the importance of one’s having the 
assurance from someone other than one’s self as to whether or not one actually exists. Since one can 
indeed doubt one’s own words, one requires the ‘testimony’ of another.  
642 According to McDonald, ‘The overarching tone of the anguished voices who narrate these stories, 
these exhausted, dilapidated tales held in such contempt by their tellers, is one of bewilderment. […] But 
whatever the narrators’ perplexity, and however repetitious and bewildered the language that registers 
it, the prose is at the same time enduringly calm and serene. […] If Moran is not fully sure why he is 
pursuing Molloy, what the reasons are for Youdi to be issuing his reports, then this information is also 
withheld from us. In this respect, the text does not just express bewilderment and confusion, it enacts it’. 
McDonald, The Cambridge Introduction to Samuel Beckett, 88–89. 
643 These voices appear to reside between the actual space he inhabits, and that which he hears inside 
his own head. The internal monologue of the narrating characters in the ‘trilogy’—and perhaps primarily 
of that in The Unnamable—is quite reminiscent of the internal monologue with which Beckett endows 
the main protagonists in his radio plays: namely, Henry in Embers, Voice in Cascando or Words in Words 
and Music, to name but a few. What is more, although I refer to this as an internal monologue, it is 
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Ultimately, more than any other narrating character in the ‘trilogy’, this speaker (or, 
arguably, this ‘version’ of him) seems to be most in need of an imagined auditor to speak 
to. According to Abbot, it is in the later passages of The Unnamable that Beckett’s prose 
culminates the steady, inexorable progress of the 'trilogy', a progress 
that contextualizes it and, in so doing, to a certain extent naturalizes 
it. If the trilogy is not impeccably linear, if it enacts a gradual progress 
of unravelling and disembodiment rather than the triumphant arrival 
at a goal, its progressive disembodiment nonetheless belongs to a 
narrative; and the narrative in its turn conforms to the oldest pattern 
of story-telling, the voyage or quest.644 
Thus, endeavouring to identify the audiobook versions of Molloy as AP artworks, and 
subsequently evaluating their aesthetic nature, quite simply necessitates one to try and 
pinpoint not only the particular and individual internal logic of Molloy as a singular work 
in its own right, but also to consider its intrinsic connection to the other two novels. As 
McDonald puts it,  
Successively, the stories within the whole move further and further 
away from a recognisable physical world, as the characters become 
first more debilitated and then, in The Unnamable, no longer 
recognisably human. At the same time resonant themes of the nature 
of the self and subjectivity, of the urge or the imperative to tell stories, 
of the relationship between language and the world, of the nature of 
suffering and of experience, of the ramifications of human solitude, 
are explored in a controlled prose of tremendous grace and formal 
eloquence.645 
Once establishing, for instance, that Beckett appears to endow his characters with what 
can be identified as quite concrete and no doubt distinctive voices, certain questions 
should be raised particularly with respect to narration. Beckett’s work is famous for 
incorporating the voices that his characters hear in their heads. Some of the creative 
                                                 
nevertheless very much above the surface insofar as its literal existence is in the form of printed words. 
In an aural performance, it prevails above the surface through the spoken—and, indeed, heard—words.  
644 Abbott, "Beginning Again", 106. 
645 McDonald, The Cambridge Introduction to Samuel Beckett, 87–88.   
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choices in recording Beckett’s prose as audiobooks would entail, for instance, making 
the decision of whether or not the characters are talking to themselves, whether or not 
they are aware that someone is hearing what they are saying, and whether or not what 
on the printed page might seem like the thoughts of a character should sound more like 
the thoughts or voices that one hears in their head—rather than direct speech. Thus, 
ascertaining whether or not the two monologues are, in fact, supposed to be read (or 
rather heard) as if they are indeed narrated by two separate characters becomes a 
matter of prime significance. 
The Naxos recording, as stated, made an explicit choice of employing two actors. 
Once setting aside the question of talent and capability, and despite their possible 
relevancy to the institution of AP, in appreciating their recording as an AP artwork, one 
must consider and question the very choice of employing them both. While Barrett and 
Crowley may indeed be regarded as accomplished actors, their apparent success in 
delivering the material does not resolve the problematic nature of the aesthetic choice 
of having the novel read by two different performers.646 Fundamentally, this must be 
questioned in light of its internal logic and whether or not the choice itself complies with 
it. Indeed, as an artistic choice, one should be able to justify its particular artistic 
rationale: that is to say, it should constitute the result of an explicit exploration of the 
work, rather than an educated guess. (As aforementioned, even if its aim is to ostensibly 
interrogate or challenge the original internal logic of the novel, it invariably springs from 
that very logic). 
                                                 
646 It appears as though they both succeed in lending the written pages a dramatic aural ‘presence’, 
thereby endowing the fictional characters (who in their essence are narrators and storytellers 
themselves) with a distinctive voice of their own. It can only be assumed that they base their dramatic 
portrayal of Beckett’s characters on the existing dramatic nature of the text’s narrative, causing a reader 
to ‘hear’ the words s/he is reading in a very specific rhythm, which is unique to Beckett. 
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In continuing what I began exploring in my previous case study—and as I intend 
to fully illustrate with my third—I find this ultimately invites questions pertaining to 
whether or not, and to what extent, one is able to accept a fictional character’s extended 
existence: that is to say, its own ostensible endeavour to reach beyond the confines of 
the printed pages—the context and particular circumstances of the text’s fictional 
world—and sustain a continued state of existence. As an aesthetic experience—one 
which utilises the property of the human voice, effectively employing performers for 
aurally conveying to an audience an intimate personal monologue—the implied 
narrative voice is consequently intensified when examined through the workings of the 
institution of AP. 
 
7.3 Molloy: The Implied Narrator(s?)   
Conceivably, Beckett’s splitting of the novel into two parts and endowing each one with 
a different narrator, while at the same time naming the novel after only one of them—
implies that Molloy and Moran are in fact a single schizoid-character, whom Beckett 
split in more ways than one. Indeed, this aspect is essential for evaluating the aesthetic 
nature of the novel’s audiobook versions as AP artworks, which are supposed to succeed 
in manifesting and exhibiting the novel’s internal logic. 
To some extent, neither Molloy nor Moran can be trusted as narrators. An 
attentive reader, and in this case, listener, would always seem to question the validity 
of their narrative. As McDonald points out, ‘often in fiction, third-person narrative 
purports a degree of “impartiality” […] as if we are being told a story for the purposes 
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of reportage’.647 Explicitly referring to Molloy and Moran, he maintains that unlike ‘the 
knowing, often sneering hauteur of the third-person narrator in Beckett’s early forays 
into narrative fiction, these lonely men […] are lost and confused. [...] The first-person 
narrator in Molloy [sic] seems to know very little indeed’.648 He concludes that ‘the 
multiple selves discerned by the speaking “I” throughout the novel, the confusion 
between creator and creation, between first and third person, of present and past, is 
partly ascribable to this difficulty of speaking or articulating the self’.649 In the same vein, 
Davies maintains that  
The language of Beckett’s novels does not only tell a story, 
transparently as it were, but it also reflects, as it tells, on the means of 
telling. This trick has many names, one of which—the 'narrator 
narrated'—has been current since the rise of the Modernist 
movement. Beckett’s narrations are littered with second thoughts and 
comments which question the validity of what was put forward first.650 
On the one hand, Molloy’s and Moran’s narratives express their reflections upon their 
past and the world they inhabit, coupled with an ever-increasing sense of doubt with 
regard to their own existence.651 On the other hand, they both are arguably quite 
aware—or at least appear to be more aware than not—that their story is in fact already 
written.652 Thus the particular choice employed by Naxos is inherently problematic as it 
                                                 
647 McDonald, The Cambridge Introduction to Samuel Beckett, 83.  
648 Ibid., 88.  
649 Ibid., 104. 
650 Davies, "Three Novels and Four Nouvelles," 58. 
651 Notions concerning the condition and definition of identity appear to occupy all three narrators. 
Molloy, for example, recounts that his mother had never referred to him as ‘son’, but rather as ‘Dan’. He 
states that he does not know why, as his name is not Dan: ‘Dan was my father’s name, perhaps’. Beckett, 
Molloy, 13. Malone, for his part, seems to demonstrate an obsession with making an inventory of his past 
professions. One could assume that his attempt to list all he has done and achieved would somehow 
assist in understanding who he is, or what kind of man he is, thus making clear his place in the world. 
Should not the listener of the audio version be led to the same aesthetic ‘state’ by the performer? In 
speaking about his own writing, Beckett has been cited as saying that ‘It means what it says’. Davies, 
"Three Novels and Four Nouvelles," 44. Ultimately, should not the intertextuality of the novel also be 
addressed, to some extent, when considering its performance? 
652 While the readers know that the novel itself was penned by Beckett, as the novel progresses they also 
ostensibly bear witness to narratives that seem to be in the process of being written and being told. 
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essentially forces a listener to accept an explicit reading of the novel: one that effectively 
embraces Molloy’s and Moran’s perceptible ambiguities—thereby conceiving of them 
as two completely different characters. As aforementioned, one can identify the act of 
writing as the defining quality of Molloy’s and Moran’s existence. Within the workings 
of Molloy as an audiobook, the innate need of Molloy and Moran to put things into 
writing is translated into sound. In effect, their characters become similarly compelled 
to speak aloud that which they write. What is identified on the page as the characters 
narrating their thoughts to the readers of the novel is transformed into literal voices.653 
To regard Molloy and Moran as ‘characters’, as McDonald indicates, ‘may be a 
misnomer here, for there is too much porousness between these figures, too much 
fluidity and uncertainty of identity, too much perplexity, for the unified, stable self’.654 
Indeed, nowhere does the novel explicitly clarify whether or not the fictional narratives 
by Molloy and Moran are uttered by the same individual.655 In fact, one could assume 
that the two are ostensible variations of one another—each endowed with an implied 
distinctive voice. Arguably, a perceptive reader should be able to quite literally hear the 
                                                 
Indeed, both Molloy and Moran deliver their narratives themselves (i.e., in the first-person) while at the 
same time appear to be reflecting ‘aloud’ (in writing) on the very act of telling their story. 
653 A well-performed audiobook version of the novel can potentially enhance the idea that narration 
itself—or, alternatively, the notion of one ostensibly narrating oneself ad infinitum—can be identified as 
a form of existence, and perhaps survival. Indeed, listening to concrete ‘l’ voices narrate a text that the 
very act of narration is part of its core can—again, when well-performed—constitute an immensely 
rewarding aesthetic experience. Although audiobooks should not, as previously emphasised, substitute 
for the reading of the novel, they can provide an added dimension to one’s aesthetic experience of certain 
particular works.   
654 McDonald, The Cambridge Introduction to Samuel Beckett, 88. 
655 Moran, for instance, seems to believe in will power, action, reason, habit, and control. He ostensibly 
rambles on and on in a manner that is characterised by logical deductions. This creates a sense of 
fragmented thoughts, running in, through his head—and then, out, through his mouth, at about the same 
speed. Although Molloy also appears to manifest in his narrative a similar kind of fragmented thought—
speaking his mind and sounding thoughts as things occur to him—his thinking process appears to function 
in a slightly different manner, that better accords with his assumed personality. Indeed, an argument 
could be made that each narrative follows a different kind of internal logic which is specific to the 
individual nature of its character. Molloy’s narration, for example, could be perceived as a verbal 
manifestation of his unconscious mind and Moran’s that of his perceived super-ego.  
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manner in which each character utters each word and composes each sentence, as well 
as identify the breaths and pauses that abide in between their spoken thoughts.656 Put 
simply, one is expected to read between the lines: that is to say, to conduct a close 
reading of their meandering monologues—effectively trying to identify whether the 
manner in which they narrate themselves manifests a kind of ostensible voicing of their 
own consciousness.657 At the same time, nowhere is it explicitly clarified that Molloy 
and Moran are one and the same either. Indeed, their similarities notwithstanding, each 
of them—as literary characters—appears to possess his own distinctive momentum.658 
                                                 
656 While this may not be easy to undertake, once achieved, the aesthetic experience is immensely 
rewarding. It is, in fact, bearing witness to a manifested internal logic at work. It is in this respect that a 
good audiobook version of the novel (which appropriately captures and manifests its internal logic, as an 
aural performance) has the potential of making one’s aesthetic experience even more rewarding. 
657 Anthony Minghella’s 2001 film adaptation of Beckett’s Play, for instance, uniquely demonstrates the 
manner in which a particular aspect of given work’s internal logic can be properly maintained when 
transformed to a different medium. In brief, one of the most prominent aspects in Play can be found in 
Beckett’s specific and strict stage directions pertaining to the use of the spotlight. Minghella successfully 
applies the employment of spotlight in the theatre, effectively translating it into camera movements and 
film-editing. His cinematic adaptation thus embodies and exhibits this particular aspect of the internal 
logic of the play. Indeed, even though a different medium is used, this aspect not only remains ostensibly 
intact, but also is preserved in its so-called newly delivered medium. Minghella’s film is part of the Beckett 
on Film project—a joint venture of BBC’s Channel 4, Ireland’s RTÉ, the Irish Film Board, and artistic 
director of the Gate Theatre in Dublin, Michael Colgan—which adapted all of Beckett’s nineteen theatre 
plays for the big screen. See: Colin Duckworth and Anna McMullan, "The Blue Angel Beckett on Film 
Project: Questions of Adaptation, Aesthetics, and Audience in Filming Samuel Beckett’s Theatrical Canon," 
in Drawing on Beckett: Portraits, Performances, and Cultural Contexts, ed. Linda Ben-Zvi (Tel Aviv 
University, the Assaph Series, 2004).   
658 By way of illustration, consider the following passage, in which Molloy contemplates his own 
flatulence: ‘And in winter, under my greatcoat, I wrapped myself in swathes of newspaper, and did not 
shed them until the earth awoke, for good, in April. The Times Literary Supplement was admirably 
adapted to this purpose, of a neverfailing toughness and impermeability. Even farts made no impression 
on it. I can’t help it, gas escapes from my fundament on the least pretext, it’s hard not to mention it now 
and then, however great my distaste. One day I counted them. Three hundred and fifteen farts in 
nineteen hours, or an average of over sixteen farts an hour. After all it’s not excessive. Four farts every 
fifteen minutes. It’s nothing. Not even one fart every four minutes. It’s unbelievable. Damn it, I hardly fart 
at all, I should never have mentioned it. Extraordinary how mathematics help you to know yourself’. 
Beckett, Molloy, 25–26. On the one hand, one could perceive it as nothing more than toilet humour. On 
the other hand, it could also be examined as Beckett’s parody of the Cartesian approach to logic and 
reasoning. Arguably, just as with Duchamp’s Fountain, the flatulence passage could be regarded both as 
a ‘brute’ fact (i.e., a text about farts) and as an ‘institutional’ fact (i.e., a literary text of importance and 
magnitude). In order for Molloy to understand or make sense of the very nature of his bowel activity, he 
concludes that it is essentially (or rather, rationally) good for nothing save his act of counting the number 
of ‘noises’ he manages to produce.  
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Notwithstanding, a close reading of their thought processes—for instance, the 
manner in which they exhibit their (mis)understandings of the world, or the particular 
style and rhythm that shape both their narrations—will reveal that the two complement 
each other in more ways than one. Indeed, as McDonald puts it, ‘even though the 
profane may be the opposite of the sacred, they both deploy the same vocabulary and 
structures of thought’.659 Ultimately, the line that one might draw between the 
characters becomes less visible as the novel progresses. The similarities between Molly 
and Moran should be accessible to a reader (i.e., who effectively engages with the novel 
in its original chosen medium). Yet, as alluded to earlier, a well-executed audiobook 
version of the novel can surely enhance them. Since all three novels have received an 
aural iteration—and, explicitly in McGovern’s case, all three narrated by the same 
performer—they are not only able to heighten and enrich one’s aesthetic experience of 
Molloy in its own right, but also broaden one’s understating of the ‘trilogy’ as a whole. 
Indeed, as aforementioned, listening to an actual human voice, performing Beckett’s 
text—a narrative (perhaps two) which gives the impression that it is still being told as it 
progresses—creates a unique additional level to aesthetically experience the novel.660 
Molloy and Moran each appears to abide in his own isolated state of 
existence.661 This, in turn, should also be made audible in an aural performance of the 
                                                 
659 McDonald, The Cambridge Introduction to Samuel Beckett, 93. 
660 One is able to identify a thematic thread in Beckett’s work (evident in his prose as much as it is in his 
texts for the stage) that appears to both revolve around and demonstrate an inherent fascination with 
the human voice—or, more precisely, with the voices that one experiences, or indeed literally hears in 
one’s own head. In Molloy, this fascination is explored through the narratives of Molloy and Moran, and 
appears to be further developed in the succeeding two novels.  
661 As Davies points out, the general isolation of Beckett’s characters ‘is not that of never having been or 
never having had, but the isolation of separation—the lessening of contact, the weakening of 
musculature, the wandering of mind, the fading of destination. The emphasis on separation leading to 
isolation is crucial, and is imaged and discoursed upon constantly by Beckett’s narrators. Their 
predicament is epitomized in the person of Molloy […]. In the prose and plays alike, the same description 
fits them all: the homeless, wandering, ageing male, with […] speech impediments; general sensory 
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text. In narrating each section of the novel by themselves, they in effect literally narrate 
themselves, and thereby promulgate their very existence. In sustaining, perhaps 
prolonging, their fictional existence by narrating themselves—conceivably, until they 
will no longer be able to do so—they are ostensibly supplying evidence of the fact that 
they certainly were. It is their way to attain affirmation—as much for themselves as from 
whomever it may be who encounters their narratives.  
A good aural performance should thus be able to highlight this sense of the 
characters through the narration itself. To be sure, the discovery, insight and recognition 
that one’s life essentially constitutes a prolonged state of dying is something of a 
recurring theme in Beckett’s work.662 Consider the opening lines of the Speaker in the 
play A Piece of Monologue,663 the final words uttered by Pozzo in Waiting for Godot,664 
or the famous visual image of Winnie’s predicament in Happy Days.665 Both narratives 
in Molloy similarly either begin at their ending, or, alternatively, end at a point which 
                                                 
confusion; a special fondness for small objects; […] a tendency to aporia (purposiveness without purpose); 
hatred of sexuality, conception and birth; isolation from relationships with human beings; varying degrees 
of cripplement; and a rarely failing sense of humour in the midst of these deprivations. By describing what 
seem to be distinct individuals who are ultimately re-reflections of the same human state, Beckett is able 
to illustrate the human consequences of a philosophical perspective, without naming it directly’. Davies, 
"Three Novels and Four Nouvelles," 46–47. 
662 In essence, one does not choose to be born into this world. At the time, one knows full well that 
existence is not only limited but also undetermined and tentative. This notion (perhaps recognition) also 
entails that one’s lifetime will surely contain more suffering than pleasure. While this depends on pure 
chance—when, where and to whom one is born—in the end, which may be closer to the beginning than 
one might realise, death is certain (perhaps the only certainty). With death comes the disappearance of 
everything one holds dear, beginning with one’s notion of consciousness, one’s idea of one’s own 
individuality and self-awareness. This, as far as Beckett is concerned (as is evident throughout his work), 
comprises the absurdity of life. 
663 ‘Birth was the death of him. Again. Words are few. Dying too. Birth was the death of him’. Samuel 
Beckett, A Piece of Monologue, in Collected Shorter Plays (New York: Grove Press, 1984), 265. 
664 ‘[…] one day we were born, one day we shall die, the same day, the same second, is that not enough 
for you? (Calmer.) They give birth astride of a grave, the light gleams an instant, then it’s night once more.’ 
Beckett, Waiting for Godot, 58. 
665 In the beginning of Act 1, Winnie appears ‘Imbedded up to above her waist’ in the centre of a mound; 
Later, at the beginning of Act 2, she is ‘Imbedded up to neck, hat on head, eyes closed. Her head, which 
she can no longer turn, nor bow, nor raise, faces front motionless throughout act’. Samuel Beckett, Happy 
Days (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1961), 7 and 49, respectively. 
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mirrors their beginning.666 As a literary device, this manifests in the ‘trilogy’ as a whole, 
expressing a perspective that can be identified throughout Beckett’s writing.667 
 
7.4 Embodied Voices: Sounding Beckett’s Characters 
In experiencing Molloy as an AP artwork, one must be mindful of the fact that the 
professional performers featured on the recordings are portraying characters who are 
themselves narrators. As the characters are created through writing and narration—
writing about the very nature of speaking, speaking about the very nature of writing, 
and arguably perceiving both these activities as a particular form of sustaining their own 
existence—it may lead one to discover certain aspects of the novel’s internal logic that 
one might very well have missed when merely reading the novel in print.668  
Even if one identifies Barrett and Crowely as particularly good actors—or, 
indeed, as narrator whom are at very least technically proficient in delivering Beckett’s 
prose—the deficiency of the Naxos version lies in the explicit decision to regard Molloy 
and Moran as necessarily different agencies. Ultimately, albeit a valid artistic choice, to 
employ two different performers, thereby endowing each character with a distinct voice 
and palpable identity of his own, can be identified as a failure to interpret the aspect of 
                                                 
666 The first part ends with Molloy’s character lying in a ditch, waiting for help to come, and hoping to 
somehow manage to find his way to his mother’s house. The second part begins with the words ‘It is 
midnight. The rain is beating on the windows’, and ends with ‘It is midnight. The rain is beating on the 
windows. It was not midnight. It was not raining’. Beckett, Molloy, 87 and 170. This not only brings the 
end of the narrative back upon its own beginning, but also suggests that the narrator may not have been 
a reliable one.  
667 Among the criteria Esslin found for a particular dramatic work to be considered ‘absurdist’ is that it 
ends at the same point where it began. While the novels comprising the ‘trilogy’ are not dramatic works, 
the idea that they might possess a similar kind of aesthetic to what Esslin considered absurdist, could 
potentially provide one with a key to revealing the internal logic of every Beckett text. 
668 According to Calder, ‘actors have always loved reading Molloy and often, when heard, some of the 
puzzles and conundrums become clearer although this is incidental to the enjoyment of a text which can 
be frightening, moving and very funny’. John Calder, notes to Molloy, 7. 
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the novel’s internal logic that is explicitly concerned with the identity of the narrators. 
Indeed, despite certain individual discernible traits or characteristics, the identity of the 
narrators is anything but palpable, all the more so when one considers Molloy in the 
context of the ‘trilogy’ as a comprehensive literary artwork. Consequently, as a 
misinterpreted reading of the novel, the Naxos release prevails for the listener as a 
manifestation of an aesthetically bad AP artwork.  
I would argue that McGovern’s aural performance of Molloy uniquely succeeds 
in demonstrating the somewhat obscure duality that exists between the two narrating 
characters. Since one might identify Molloy and Moran as two sides of the same 
proverbial coin, McGovern’s achievement demonstrates that the two are not 
completely different characters. He succeeds in doing so throughout his rendition of the 
entire trilogy—which consequently suggests that all three narrating characters are 
either indeed one and the same, or that each of them represents some version of his 
ostensible predecessor. As McDonald points out, ‘Each protagonist of Molloy starts by 
searching for someone else, but ends by returning to himself, or to a different (perhaps 
deeper) version of himself’.669 Arguably, the distinction between McGovern’s rendition 
and Naxos’s release could be resolved by stating that there is no ‘right’ choice and it is 
merely a matter of artistic license or interpretation. Nonetheless, in order to fully 
appreciate McGovern’s achievement—which I believe should rank as one of the best 
aural performances in recorded history—the focus of one’s attention should be on 
whether or not the interpretation accords with this particular novel. In other words, one 
should determine whether or not, and to what extent, the aural performance succeeds 
                                                 
669 McDonald, The Cambridge Introduction to Samuel Beckett, 92.  
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in appropriately complying with the internal logic of the novel’s world. Naxos’s 
audiobook, as stated, simply does not. McGovern, unlike Barrett and Crowley, 
demonstrates an ability to utilise his understanding of the novel and the various aspects 
of its internal logic, and that he knows what kind of performance the text itself requires. 
Employing two different actors to perform the novel’s two parts as two discrete 
extended monologues—while at the same time making an attempt to convey the 
possibility of the two narrators being in fact two sides of the same coin, and thus more 
like one another than not—could have worked given a slightly different approach. (For 
example, one could direct the two actors to mimic or impersonate each other’s vocal 
traits, intonation, pronunciation, and so forth—while, inevitably, throwing light on the 
particular style, tone and rhythm with which Beckett embedded the text).670 Even if one 
chooses to assume that Beckett’s narrators are indeed completely different characters, 
part of the novel’s conceit appears to be that their individual identity is always put into 
question. McGovern’s performance demonstrates this quite clearly. It is surely amplified 
by the fact that it remains his voice throughout the recording of both parts of the novel. 
Additionally, his narration also demonstrates a clear understanding of how to perform 
within the particular confines of the aural medium. One can literally sense that he is not 
                                                 
670 I am reminded in these respects of John Woo’s action-packed film, Face/Off (1997), and explicitly of 
the performative aesthetics employed by its two leading actors, John Travolta and Nicholas Cage: In brief, 
as the plot progresses, assisted by a dose of special effects, Travolta’s generic ‘good guy’ ends up literally 
replacing his face with Cage’s generic ‘bad guy’. Consequently, each actor ends up playing two different 
personalities—thereby portraying the protagonist and antagonist simultaneously. Now, aesthetically, the 
manner in which Travolta (the ‘good guy’) assumes the role of ‘bad guy’ (who looks and sounds just like 
the ‘good guy’), complies with the manner in which Cage (the actor) portrays the ‘bad guy’ before the 
two change places. Furthermore, Travolta’s performance accords with the manner in which the 
audience—who is acquainted with both actors—would have intuitively expected Cage to portray a 
generic ‘bad guy’. Cage, in turn, does the same, only vice versa. With respect to the Naxos recording, I 
believe that had Barrett and Crowley (or rather, the person who decided to cast them) approached their 
performance in a similar manner, the result could have made for a fascinating and rewarding aesthetic 
experience. Predominantly, it would have demonstrated that their interpretation complies with the 
generally accepted understanding of the novel’s internal logic.  
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merely transforming the printed text into recorded form, but rather performing it for a 
designated audience. In what certainly corresponds with McGovern’s aforementioned 
conjecture, Enoch Brater maintains that Beckett’s language is ‘performative’ in the 
sense that it seeks a voice to speak it. His prose, in effect, demands to be read out loud. 
It is an inherent property of Beckett’s text.671 One could thus argue that the putative 
voice of the speaker attains an ostensible personality in its own right.672 A major aspect 
of a performer’s job would entail seeking and finding the manner in which to realise that 
voice as an aural performance—by way of combining both the technical abilities 
pertaining to one’s mastering one’s craft as an actor, and one’s informed intuition which 
evokes an imaginative interpretation of the written text as a blueprint for 
performance.673 
In an editorial commemorating Beckett’s centenary, Eric Ormsby argues that 
while the ‘bare words’ in Beckett’s prose appear to be saying one thing, ‘their shape and 
                                                 
671 Enoch Brater, The Drama in the Text: Beckett’s Late Fiction (NY: Oxford University Press, 1994), 4. In 
terms of this dissertation, this should no doubt be regarded as part of the internal logic of Beckett’s text. 
Indeed, it demonstrates that there is a certain quality which is embodied within the text—a quality with 
which Beckett has endowed the literary voice of his speakers/narrators. That ‘something’ is what I earlier 
regarded as the sense that they appear to be literally compelled to speak. Brater maintains, for instance, 
that many passages in Molloy appear to be ‘so wonderfully speakable: they are written for the 
performative voice, a resonant human voice, and they attain their full spontaneity only when spoken 
aloud’. Ibid.  
672 Although a voice would surely sound different to every reader, one might arguably compare it to the 
iambic pentameter in Shakespeare in that it should essentially be identified by all readers—i.e., as an 
indication of what a reading is supposed to sound like—and thereby constitutes an ostensible springboard 
for each individual putative performance. 
673 Dickens, for instance, as Rubery points out, is ‘to this day […] routinely cited as an author better heard 
than read’. Rubery, The Untold Story of the Talking Book, 39. In the same vein, Knox, citing Rubery, claims 
that while Hardy’s Wessex stories and novels inhabit a lesser degree of ‘latent aurality’ than that which 
exists in the novels of Dickens, they nevertheless do ‘lend themselves to audio performance’. Knox, 
"Hearing Hardy, Talking Tolstoy," 128. Indeed, the notion that certain texts appear to ‘lend themselves’ 
to an aural performance—i.e., that they ‘cry out’ to be ‘read aloud’—is crucial. Similarly implying that 
certain texts seem to sound ‘better’ when spoken aloud—or, alternatively, that they simply require being 
heard—Roach asserts that ‘anyone who reads Shakespeare with the eye must feel the need to speak the 
lines’. Roach, Spoken Records, 11. I would argue that while it may not necessarily constitute a minimum 
requirement, it surely informs the creative process. In effect, it would contribute to the process of 
creating the audiobook. Consequently, when well performed, it should enrich one’s aesthetic experience.     
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rhythm and intonation’ are saying something else; ‘however bleak the message, it is 
delivered with pungent vitality. […] The impact of the prose […] is most immediate when 
heard, onstage or in readings’.674 Referencing the Naxos recording, Ormsby maintains 
that both Barrett and Crowley ‘demonstrate this brilliantly […] The jagged eloquence of 
Beckett’s prose, with its screeds against the treacherous body interwoven with sly 
allusions to writers as disparate as Langland and Dante, Kafka and Joyce, elicits a 
memorable reading from both performers’.675 I would argue, however, that Barrett and 
Crowley do not in fact ‘demonstrate this brilliantly’ at all. Their rendition of Beckett’s 
prose is far from ‘brilliant’, especially when compared to McGovern’s performance, 
whose vocal texture is simply captivating. As early as the opening lines, his deep voice, 
and the slow pace with which he endows his performances are almost hypnotic. He 
succeeds in conveying a clear distinction between what can be identified as direct 
speech and a thought that is spoken aloud as it enters the character’s head.676 Crowley’s 
tone of voice, on the other hand, does not appear to do so as successfully—as a result 
of his choice of different emphases. By way of illustration, consider, for instance, the 
following seemingly simply sentence. ‘Yes, I work now, a little like I used to, except that 
I don’t know how to work anymore’.677 Whereas McGovern complies with the precise 
given punctuation,678 Crowley’s rendition makes the sentence appear as though it was 
punctuated slightly differently, something along the lines of ‘Yes, I work, now, a little, 
like I used to, except that I don’t know how to work, anymore’.679 Coupled with the fact 
                                                 
674 Eric Ormsby, "No’s Knife in Yes’s Wound," New York Sun, April 5, 2006, accessed September 9, 2016, 
http://www.nysun.com/arts/nos-knife-in-yess-w-ound/30381/.   
675 Ibid.  
676 See USB flash drive for the Barry McGovern recording, disc1, track1.  
677 Beckett, Molloy, 3. 
678 See USB flash drive for the Barry McGovern recording, disc1, track1, 00m32sec. 
679 See USB flash drive for Crowley’s narration in the Naxos recording, track1, 00m45sec. 
- 221 - 
 
that he has a somewhat higher-pitched voice, one can regard these elements as 
constituents of his vocal personality, which consequently forms a completely different 
kind of Molloy. Thus, while McGovern’s Molloy sounds as if he is carrying the weight of 
his life experiences with him, Crowley’s Molloy sounds ostensibly soft, as if he has yet 
to have undergone those same experiences.  
In the same vein, Barrett’s rendition of Moran’s character evidently sounds 
rather soft-spoken.680 His voice is distinctly different from Crowley’s. McGovern’s 
Moran, on the other hand, is not at all soft-spoken, and arguably, at least to some 
extent, even harsh, or rather practical.681 As a so-called ‘alternate’ version of Molloy, he 
consequently succeeds in making sound precisely like the experiences that shaped him. 
Although Barrett’s Moran sounds less aloof, for lack of a better description, than 
Crowley’s Molly, his rendition of the character is nevertheless not as developed as 
McGovern’s. 
Conceivably, it is to a large extent McGovern’s sensitivity as a performer that 
enables him to identify the manner in which a written text seems to elicit a reading 
aloud—and thereby a putative performance. It would also imply that certain texts can 
have a distinct kind of voice—or rather, a limited range of possible kinds of voices, which 
would work best for a reading aloud of a particular given text. Now, on the one hand, 
one can surely argue that no written text—e.g., a script of a play or a text that 
constitutes a novel—is able to prescribe the precise manner in which one should 
perform it. Indeed, even when one follows implicit stage directions or when one is able 
to detect a certain tone embedded in the writing, these would surely not constitute 
                                                 
680 See USB flash drive for Barrett’s narration in the Naxos recording, e.g., track40. 
681 See USB flash drive for the Barry McGovern recording, e.g., disc5, track1. 
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ostensible absolute determinants. On the other hand, as explicitly alluded to earlier, 
such aspects would determine the limited range of possibilities that are most 
appropriate for a given text. It is not that they define the one single manner in which a 
text must be performed, but they do set the preferred possibilities for a performative 
interpretation. The sensitivity of a reader or a performer—effectively employing one’s 
informed intuition—predominantly contributes to one’s ability of determining the kind 
of reading a particular text requires, and in effect the most appropriate kind of 
performance, delivered by a certain performer, within a specific medium.682 In these 
respects, one could argue that Beckett’s literary voice and prose writing elicit a similar 
kind of range of possibilities for performance—much like that with which he endowed 
his stage plays, radio drama and television scripts. 
While there is no single and distinct manner in which an ostensible ‘Beckett 
character’ must speak, the fact that there exist certain qualities (e.g., an implicit tone, 
cadence, rhythm and style) that together define what one identifies as a Beckett 
character to begin with, conceivably implies that there is a manner in which these kinds 
of characters should be interpreted. To a large extent, the characters in all three novels 
are beset by voices and sounds, and they all seem to stem from within: they are voices 
that reside in and are heard in the head, rather than by the ears.683 The notion that the 
‘trilogy’ elicits a reading aloud could be perceived as one of the ostensible properties 
with which Beckett customarily endowed his texts. (Although the text itself is not 
                                                 
682 As explained earlier, almost every written text—and especially those which are written with the 
intention to be regarded as performance texts—encompasses an explicit and limited range of plausible 
possibilities for a putative performing. Extensive or ostensibly elastic as the range of possibilities may be, 
it nonetheless would be limited by two points beyond which one cannot venture. Predominantly, the 
range would be determined by the commonly agreed upon internal logic of the text in question. 
683 In many of Beckett’s works, the protagonist often appears to be hearing voices other than their own. 
Alternatively, they seem to be consumed by their own voices, either internally or externally (e.g., Eh Joe, 
Embers, Footfalls, Krapp’s Last Tape, Rockaby, and What Where).  
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necessarily prescriptive, it would seem that Beckett’s writing does lend itself to 
communicating the implied embodied voices, which should prevail as the most 
appropriate kind of voices for a reading aloud). Thus, as a plausible aspect of the overall 
internal logic of his work, it would no doubt inform, to some degree, the putative 
performance of his texts—and would thereby particularly serve as a rather helpful 
guideline with respect to casting. This no doubt strengthens the idea that the narrating 
characters of Beckett’s novels are compelled to speak. The audience too, as an auditor, 
arguably becomes trapped in the aural performance. Effectively, compelled to listen to 
the vocal output, the listeners—like the characters confined to the voices in their 
heads—are thereby confined to the voices entering their ears, making their way into 
their heads. Ultimately, their iteration as AP artworks surely enhances one’s aesthetic 
experience of the novels. 
In listening to McGovern’s aural performance, one seems to identify a difference 
in the tone and the voice he employs when narrating each part of the novel.684 This 
arguably complies with the notion that the two might in fact constitute completely 
different characters. Yet, I find that the fact that McGovern records the entire novel 
himself is crucial. It is not just that one hears the same actor and is able to identify his 
voice in the two characters. Rather, while he endows the two narrators with somewhat 
different personalities of their own by slightly altering the tone of his voice, McGovern 
succeeds in expressing the similarities between the two.685 Although one might argue 
that highlighting the parallels between the two is not inherently necessary—and 
perhaps not even possible—I would argue that having one actor portray both narrators 
                                                 
684 See USB flash drive, e.g., disc2, track11; disc3, track2; and disc4, track9 (for Molloy); and See, e.g., 
disc5, track 12; disc6, track11; and disc8, track10 (for Moran). 
685 See USB flash drive, e.g., disc1, track14; disc3, track8; disc7, track8; and disc8, track6.   
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creates a much more effective impact on a listener (i.e., in light of the aesthetic 
experience that a putative performance is able to evoke). Ultimately, as opposed to 
hearing two different actors, each providing a completely different voice and a 
predominantly individual style, listening to one actor—whose voice and overall 
approach to Beckett’s text seems to remain consistent throughout the entire 
performance—is surely more compliant with the internal logic of the work. 
 
7.5 Beckett Audiobooks: Unabridged, Abridged and Ostensible ‘Concept Albums’ 
As stated earlier, the McGovern and the Naxos recordings currently prevail as the only 
unabridged audiobook versions available. There are, however, two prominent abridged 
recordings—consisting of a compilation of passages from all three novels: One, 
performed by Irish actor Cyril Cusack, released in 1963;686 the other, as alluded to 
earlier, constitutes an aural rendition of Jack MacGowran’s one-man-play, released in 
1966,687 coinciding with Beckett’s 60th birthday. Seemingly, it might not seem fitting to 
compare these abridged versions with the unabridged manifestations of the novels. 
Nonetheless, I would argue that one can compare the recordings with respect to their 
aesthetic qualities as unique AP artworks. Indeed, the cuts to the texts notwithstanding, 
one should predominantly be able to identify whether or not, and the degree to which, 
Cusack and MacGowran have succeeded to manifest and exhibit the internal logic of 
Beckett’s text as an aural performance. Furthermore, as a comparative case study, the 
Cusack recording can more easily be compared with McGovern’s given that in both 
                                                 
686 Samuel Beckett, Molloy / Malone / The Unnamable, performed by Cyril Cusack, directed by Howard 
Sackler (Caedmon Records, TC 1169, 1963). 
687 Samuel Beckett, MacGowran Speaking Beckett (Claddagh Records, CCT3CD, 1966). [Recording made 
under the personal supervision of Samuel Beckett]. 
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cases an auditor engages with one actor who takes on a narration of all the protagonists. 
MacGowran’s recording, however, as will presently be made clear, requires a slightly 
different perspective. While it too prevails as a performance by a single actor, it does 
not consist of readings from the ‘trilogy’ alone. 
In the Cusack recording of the novels, the reading of Molloy plays for a little over 
25 minutes, and those of Malone Dies and The Unnamable run 15 and 17 minutes, 
respectively. The back cover of the LP sleeve states: 
The epic concerns itself (to the extent that it concerns itself) with 
Molloy, Malone and the Unnamable. All three are writers, figments of 
one another, or their imaginations, or the author, or nobody. […] 
trying to balance on the Cartesian fulcrum, Cogito ergo sum. It is a 
shaky business: they know that they think, but they are not at all sure 
they exist. There is no plot. No sequence, no incidents, no cathartic 
idea, only the hypnosis of immobility, impotence and the suspicion 
that none of it, including the audience, exists.688 [emphasis in original] 
In considering, for instance, the difference in their characterisation of the narrator, it is 
quite evident that Cusack and McGovern have chosen two different paths. Explicitly, 
Cusack’s voice sounds quite old (almost wrinkled). There also seems to be an ostensible 
deterioration in his reading—not so much of the narration itself, but rather of the 
narrating voice. Indeed, rather than forming a distinction between what could be 
argued to be three different narrators, this choice gives the auditor a sense that the one 
narrator is slowly fading away.689 Furthermore, as opposed to McGovern, Cusack’s 
performance sounds less crisp-clear—not so much the sound quality of the recording, 
but rather the performance itself. In some respects, his narrator sounds somewhat 
intoxicated, drifting between strains of thought as he sounds them aloud. As an 
ostensible drunken patron of a local pub, he seems to be speaking to no one in 
                                                 
688 Molloy / Malone / The Unnamable—Performed by Cyril Cusack (Caedmon Records, 1963). 
689 See USB flash drive for the Cusack recording. 
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particular, and at the same time to whoever is willing to hear him. In other words, he 
appears to be directing his words at a particular audience. McGovern’s performance, 
however, sounds as if he is most definitely speaking directly to the listeners of the 
recording, making every word count—much like what one can sense as a reader when 
confronted with the text itself. In effect, whereas Cusack’s narrator appears to struggle, 
at least in part, to have what he says sound clear and meaningful, McGovern appears to 
speak in such way that almost naturally, seemingly without strain, emphasises every 
single word. While both Cusack and McGovern succeed in evoking the fragmented 
speech patterns of narrators—effectively resonating loud and clear what one might 
identify as a not entirely lucid thought process—it would seem that McGovern 
manifests this aspect with more conviction. This surely manifests in a change of pace, 
rhythm and intonation. Arguably, if Cusack makes the character sound intoxicated, 
McGovern makes it work without the ostensible artistic excuse of alcohol. 
Even when the narrator appears, in the text, to be hesitant or perhaps unsure of 
his own perception of the world he inhabits, McGovern’s performance demonstrates 
that it is part of the nature of the character, and that he arguably has been in his current 
state of affairs for a very long time. Alternatively, it could be argued that when listening 
to McGovern, one can sense that the narrator is not so much at ease, but rather that he 
has just become used to the habit of narrating himself. While Cusack’s narrator appears 
to be talking and sounding out his own thoughts more to himself (regardless of who 
may be listening to him at any particular time), with McGovern, although the narrator 
similarly seems to be primarily thinking aloud and talking to himself, it is nevertheless 
evident that he needs the words to be directed at some auditor. His performance 
demonstrates that it is not enough for him to merely sound out his thoughts to himself. 
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Rather, he requires an auditor. One of the most remarkable things about McGovern’s 
achievement is that the designated audience of the audiobook seems to be compelled 
to listen, effectively consuming every meaningful (and potentially meaningless) word 
that the narrator utters. Indeed, unlike the Cusack and Naxos recordings, McGovern’s 
performance is so engaging it almost forces one to listen to him. To be sure, if Beckett’s 
narrator is compelled to speak, so much so that his very existence seems dependent on 
that fact someone else hears him speak), McGovern’s performance appears to literally 
create an equal, and rather striking, need in his audience to listen to him. His 
performance conveys this sense powerfully to the listeners, who in turn are offered a 
fuller and richer aesthetic experience of the novel as an AP artwork. As alluded to 
earlier, he both communicates the text as is—following the punctuation and style of the 
writing as they appear on the page—and succeeds in endowing it with the proper tone 
and rhythm. 
In her aforementioned book, Roach alludes to a number of recordings of works 
by James Joyce, featuring Cusack, Irish actress Siobhán McKenna, and American actor E. 
G. Marshall. Her evaluation considers three elements making that performance of the 
narrators particularly excellent. Explicitly, she identifies Cusack as being ‘sensitive to the 
Ireland of Joyce’s time and with vocal qualities comparable to those of Joyce himself’.690 
Addressing the Cusack and McKenna recording of Finnegans Wake (1939), Roach asserts 
that ‘it took especially quipped artists for the difficult language, vocal movement, touch 
of irony and innuendo, loveliness and harshness of this allegoric symphony.691 Now, to 
understand Roach’s aesthetic evaluation of these recordings, one would be required, 
                                                 
690 Roach, Spoken Records, 75. 
691  Ibid., 76. 
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predominantly, to possess at least some general notion of what precisely the ‘Ireland of 
Joyce’s time’ is, as well as to identify what exactly ‘vocal qualities’ and ‘speech texture’ 
are. In many respects, Roach appears to be alluding to the manner in which what one 
might identify as the internal logic of the text manifests in praxis by the actors in their 
performance.692 Only having done so would one be able to recognise—as Roach does—
whether or not Cusack, McKenna and Marshall succeed in utilising their craft to exhibit 
in their performance the idea of Joyce’s Dublin, and if so, the extent to which they do. 
Given the relationship between certain aspects of Beckett’s writing as those that abide 
in Joyce’s, I find Roach’s evaluation of Cusack’s performance indicates, at least to some 
extent, that a putative Cusack performance of Beckett should be aesthetically good. At 
the same time, her evaluation can also serve as an explanatory illustration to support 
an evaluation of Cusack’s performance of Beckett as aesthetically good too. 
As previously stated, the narrators in Beckett’s prose seem to attempt to 
validate their existence by the act of narration. Indeed, speaking and narrating one’s 
own story, thoughts, consciousness—one’s very existence—as well as the notion of one 
being compelled to speak oneself up to the point at which one either is able to speak 
no more, or cannot but speak, is a continuous theme throughout Beckett’s oeuvre. (I 
have illustrated this earlier by examining the short dialogue between Vladimir and the 
character of the Boy in Waiting for Godot). Once Beckett’s prose takes the form of an 
audiobook—effectively bestowing the narrators with literal voice—if properly 
                                                 
692 Knox, for instance, in examining ‘the implications of the voicing narrator’s presence’ in audiobooks, 
focuses her discussion on the novels of Hardy and Tolstoy. Although they are identified as two ‘very 
different figures in the nineteenth-century literary canon’, they are both ‘credited for their capacity to 
evoke the world of sound’. Knox, "Hearing Hardy, Talking Tolstoy," 128. Quoting musicologist Murray 
Schafer, Knox points out that novelists such as Tolstoy and Hardy, as well as Thomas Mann, succeed in 
capturing the soundscapes of their own places and times. Ibid. Surely this also constitutes an apt 
description of Joyce’s ability to accurately depict the soundscapes of his time in his own writing.  
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performed, one cannot but ostensibly confirm their existence. Consequently, one could 
even go so far as to say that the characters become dependent upon the performer’s 
ability to convey the text’s internal logic thereby assisting in proving their existence.693 
The liner notes for the aural compilation MacGowran Speaking Beckett state 
that the recording ‘clearly associates Jack MacGowran, an established actor of the first 
category with the interpretation of the author’s work. The actor has chosen passages 
from various books by the author to give expression to a particular aspect’.694 One can 
deduce what this particular aspect actually is from MacGowran’s own recount, referring 
to his original idea for the stage adaptation of Beckett’s prose:  
Having read his novels so often and got to know him [Beckett] so well 
[…] I thought I’d love to do an anthology of his work—because there’s 
a great unity in his writing. […] I had to look for a theme, and a 
continuity […] I didn’t want to a do a ‘reading’ in the sense that I think 
it can be boring to do a reading. Well, […] I thought I’ll do it as a 
performance, enacted in costume, in a composite figure of the 
‘Beckett tramp’ […] using most of the materials from the novels. […] 
Using five of his novels, I found passages that linked beautifully and 
made the anthology a development. […] I worked with Mr. Beckett 
[…]—and he made some little suggestions which were very useful, so 
that we got the linking and the continuity so much so that it now 
seems like a one-man play, rather than a one-man show.695 
In the same vein, the album’s liner notes also point out,  
Having already experimented with a single-handed stage presentation 
[…] Mr. MacGowran, in response to the audience reaction and after 
consultation with the author, has made changes to give this 
                                                 
693 In Play, the character of 'M' utters the words ‘Am I as much as … being seen?’ Beckett, Play, in The 
Complete Dramatic Works, 317. This question—perhaps the most essential philosophical contemplation 
in the entire play—might be applied to the aural incarnation of the narrators in Beckett’s prose—
effectively making their existence dependant on the auditor, and thereby rendering them merely as much 
as ostensibly ‘being heard’.  
694 C.L., liner notes to MacGowran Speaking Beckett (Claddagh Records, 1966). 
695 See USB flash drive for MacGowran’s interview with Nolan, 01m02sec–03m13sec. 
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composition an effect of something more than synthetic amalgam of 
stray texts. 696 
 Although it too prevails as an aural compilation, MacGowran’s recording in many 
respects constitutes a more complex case study than of Cusack—predominantly as 
MacGowran’s selected passages are not restricted to the ‘trilogy’ alone. Effectively, in 
order to aesthetically evaluate this recording as an AP artwork in its own right, one is 
required to ascertain whether or not it appropriately evokes an ostensibly new internal 
logic, or to what extent it either re-thinks and comments on the original one. To be sure, 
one can scrutinise, for instance, the manner in which the chosen excerpts have been 
woven together, thereby consequently taking the form of a unified aural work. The fact 
that MacGowran himself, reflecting on his stage adaptation, explains that he ‘could only 
use the novels […] that were written in the first person’697 no doubt demonstrates that 
the passages were neither chosen or woven together arbitrarily. While one is arguably 
unable to consider this recording in the exact same aesthetic terms as one would 
MacGowran’s live stage performance, one could, potentially, seek and find its internal 
logic in the same manner. Similarly, although one cannot evaluate this recording in the 
same manner that one would evaluate a complete and unabridged performance of the 
entire novel, one could nonetheless consider it in similar terms, as a sub-(institutional)-
category of AP. 
Ultimately, I would argue that much like the evaluation of what in the world of 
music is perceived as a so-called ‘concept album’—e.g., The Beatles’ Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely 
Hearts Club Band (1967), David Bowie’s Ziggy Stardust and the Spiders from Mars 
                                                 
696 It is worth noting that MacGowran’s performance also received a screen adaptation. See YouTube clip: 
"Samuel Beckett—Beginning to End," accessed March 21, 2014, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D7zXy57O7bc. 
697See USB flash drive for MacGowran’s interview with Nolan, 02m59sec–03m01sec.  
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(1972), Jethro Tull’s Thick as a Brick (1972) and Lou Reed’s Berlin (1973), to name but a 
few—one should take into account the overall aesthetics of the recording as a whole. 
Effectively, rather than merely examining each passage individually, it is significantly 
more important to consider their particular order and arrangement. Although, with 
music albums, one might enjoy particular songs more than others, and while one may 
surely choose to skip over the odd song as one listens, I find that concept albums in 
particular manifest an explicit kind of internal logic—effectively rooted in their artistic 
concept. While there surely are some exceptions, the track listing on a concept album 
is predominantly more important than that on a mere ‘best-of’ compilation. Thus, in 
cases such as MacGowran’s recording, one should examine not only the chosen 
passages themselves, but also the implicit conceptual reasoning for their particular 
order. 
For example, although Molloy constitutes the first of the three novels, the 
selected passages in MacGowran’s aural adaptation are neither utilised for one’s initial 
introduction to his composite Beckettian tramp figure, nor are they the first passages 
heard from the ‘trilogy’ itself. Evidentially, the compilation begins with a section from 
Malone Dies, commencing with the words ‘I shall soon be quite dead at last in spite of 
all’. It is followed by first-person passages from Watt, From An Abandoned Work and 
Embers. The passages from Molloy appear on the fifth and sixth tracks. The first begins 
with the words ‘My mother never refused to see me, that is she never refused to receive 
me, for it was many a long day since she had seen anything at all’. The second—
described in the liner notes as most memorable—consists of what is known as the 
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novel’s ‘sucking stone scene’.698 Next in line is a passage from The Unnamable, followed 
by additional first-person excerpts from Endgame and Echo’s Bones. If there indeed 
exists an artistic rationale (i.e., for the specific choice of passages and their particular 
order)—and, as Beckett himself was involved, I would argue that there most definitely 
should be—it, in turn, would inform one’s aesthetic experience and subsequent 
evaluation. Effectively, one would be required (a) to consider the original internal logic 
of the chosen passages (and the manner in which they should manifest as AP artworks), 
and (b) to identify (and consequently evaluate) the compilation in its own right—that is 
to say, as a new and distinct AP artwork, based on existing texts from Beckett. As such, 
it would thereby establish the sub-(institutional)-category of the so-called conceptual 
AP artwork.699 
In the same vein, German composer and radio play director and dramatist Klaus 
Buhlert directed in 2000 an avant garde Beckett-themed radio production entitled 
‘…the whole thing’s coming out of the dark’.700 It features readings of passages from 
Molloy (1951), L’image (1959) and Company (1980), all accompanied by sounds and 
                                                 
698 ‘If the sucking habit of the narrator is strange, the manner in which he devotes himself to it is hilariously 
funny and Jack MacGowran knows how to squeeze out the comedy inherent in this seemingly 
uncompromising material’. C.L., liner notes to MacGowran Speaking Beckett (Claddagh Records, 1966). 
699 As alluded to earlier, one’s aesthetic experience and appreciation would also benefit from similarly 
examining the particular passages chosen for the Cusack recording with respect to the recording as a 
whole. Indeed, it too can be perceived more as an ostensibly ‘conceptual’ AP artwork, which utilises the 
novels—rather than prevailing merely as an abridged aural version. In these respects, as two kinds of 
adaptations, one might also consider the manner in which both performers approach the Beckettian 
narrator: e.g., Cusack’s aforementioned ostensible drunk vs. MacGowran’s self-confessed tramp. 
Consequently, one is required (a) to ascertain whether or not their performances successfully manifest 
the internal logic of Beckett’s text, (b) to recognise whether or not their performance complies with the 
confines of the aural medium and the institution of AP, and (c) to identify whether or not—and if so, to 
what extent—their interpretations successfully exhibit their own internal logic as unique conceptual AP 
artworks.  
700 The title draws on a comment made by Beckett in a letter he wrote to his American publisher in 1957. 
The comment concerned the origin and quality of his radio plays, and pertained especially to All That Fall. 
The production was created for German radio and produced for the ‘intermedium’ Media Art Biennia. 
Production credits: BR Radio Drama and Media Art/ORF/DLR/Kunsthalle Wien/ZKM Karlsruhe. It was also 
released on CD: ISBN 3-934847-00-5. See URL: accessed December 16, 2015, 
http://www.ubu.com/sound/beckett_whole_thing.html.   
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music. The texts are performed by actors Barry McGovern and Natasha Parry, alongside 
Beckett scholar and author Raymond Federman. The instrumental music featured in the 
production was composed by Uwe Dierksen of the Ensemble Modern. Following 
Buhlert’s direction, Dierksen’s attempts to implement an ostensible musical equivalent 
to the novel’s prominent ‘sucking stones’ sequence, in which Molloy narrates three 
inventive variations on the ‘correct’ manner in which one should suck sixteen pebbles—
explaining how one should savour them by meditatively juggling them between one’s 
coat or trouser pockets. As an aural performance—one which is not only derived from 
the same source material, but is also delivered by the same performer whose aural 
interpretation of the unabridged work constitutes a remarkable achievement in its own 
right—this passage alone might be utilised an additional comparative case study. 
Nevertheless, just as with the MacGowran and Cusack recordings, these passages 
should be evaluated with respect to the production as a whole. While Beckett’s text 
remains the same, and although McGovern’s interpretation of performing Beckett may 
similarly demonstrate his exceptional understanding of how Beckett should be 
performed, his two performances are nevertheless delivered within two different 
contexts—each pertaining to a somewhat different internal logic. By the same token, 
while MacGowran performed his own one-man adaptation on stage, screen and an AP 
artwork, one cannot evaluate all the different iterations in precisely the same manner 
despite the fact they all predominantly consist of the same kind of adaptation. Indeed, 
his performance and the manner in which his character addresses his auditor differs in 
each case due to the internal logic of the medium. To be sure, speaking to a live 
audience, to a camera or to an imagined audience when recording the text in a studio 
yields completely different results. Consequently, while both the audiobook versions of 
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the novel and the production of ‘…the whole thing’s coming out of the dark’ are part of 
the same general aesthetic category (i.e., to the same ‘mother institution’ of AP), each 
of them belongs to a different kind of sub-(institutional)-category.701 That this 
production incorporates the sound of musical instruments (primarily a trumpet) and 
sound effects adds to the sense of this production constituting a more concept-based 
aural interpretation. The short passages from Molloy in this production are distributed 
over a number of tracks, none of them longer than five minutes. The text itself is both 
cut and edited. It is meshed with the sound effects.702 
On the one hand, the production of ‘…the whole thing’s coming out of the dark’ 
is, and therefore should be evaluated as, a radio drama. At the very least, that should 
be the point of departure when setting out to evaluate it. On the other hand, this 
production, to some degree, seems to be a rather nonstandard radio play, if not a 
completely experimental one. It demonstrates an attempt to decipher and better 
understand Beckett’s prose works by filtering his texts through the realm of sound. One 
could understand the particular choice of fragmenting the text, creating repetitions and 
meshing the spoken word with sound effects as a means of utilising the aesthetics of 
the medium for the purpose of literally realising the sound that the text inhabits.703 In 
evaluating this production as a sub-(institutional)-category of AP, one would effectively 
                                                 
701 Although one could attempt to evaluate the manner in which McGovern demonstrates the internal 
logic of Beckett’s text in both instances, and while it might to some degree serve as an interesting 
comparison, I would argue that this may also be slightly missing the point. Yet, what might prove 
interesting would be to examine the manner in which both AP artworks succeeded in manifesting the 
internal logic of Beckett’s texts within the aural medium—while at the same time bearing in mind that 
one case is a performance of the text itself and the other is an adaptation of the text (which therefore 
might even be attempting to create a new internal logic which may be influenced by, yet may not be 
restricted to, that of Beckett). 
702 See USB flash drive for ‘…the whole thing’s coming out of the dark’, tracks 3, 6, 10, 12, 16 and 19.   
703 As such, it would comply with Sprinzak’s aforementioned notion of ‘text-sound art’ more than it would 
with what a radio play is supposed to be. 
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better understand its particular interpretation of Beckett’s work. With respect to 
Molloy’s character, for instance, one could argue that this approach demonstrates his 
arguable compulsiveness or the scattered nature of his train of thought. Similarly, 
Molloy’s seemingly grotesque movements are ‘translated’ into musical movements. 
Ultimately, when considering (a) the acts of breaking up the text and the inclusion of 
repetitions, (b) the intentional fragmenting of already half-fragmented sentences which 
are spoken by fragmented characters (who themselves speak and write in fragments), 
and (c) their being sound aloud as ostensible aural fragmentations—heard precisely 
alongside those which fade into the background, far into the darkness of the human 
skull—one could effectively conclude that ‘the whole thing’s’ not, in fact, ‘coming out 
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8. Author as Performer and the Autobiographies of ‘Nonexistent Personages’: An 
Aural Case Study (3) 
 
8.1 Aesthetic Literary Qualities vs. Aesthetic Complexities of Aural Performance  
As aforementioned, in the realm of audiobooks one comes across a large number of 
recordings read by the authors.704 As stated, despite the rather popular conception, an 
author’s reading does not necessarily entail that it would constitute a better 
performance than that of anyone else.705 Audiobook consumers seem to relish in having 
the opportunity of listening to the author of a particular literary work narrate their own 
work in their voice. This also seems to evoke a rather intense state of attentiveness. 
According to Roach, ‘listeners have the right to hope that when an author reads his own 
works he will convey what he meant in the way he meant it and that listening to such 
“informed” readings will bring them closer to the writer’s work’.706 Although concluding 
that ‘with careful listening one learns to discover […] poets and authors who have met 
the challenge of the medium’, Roach at the same time asserts that ‘there are more 
uncommunicative, poorly read records by authors than by any other group’.707 Thus, 
Without direction, writers […] frequently have come off poorly. One 
cannot place a neophyte before a microphone, tell him to relax and 
expect him to do much more than try to avoid mistakes. What has 
                                                 
704 It should be noted that some authors may participate in the production of an audiobook in a number 
of ways other than in that of narration: namely, they may record a particular section from the printed 
work (such as the introduction, the foreword, or the afterword), or they may record what would comprise 
a so-called ‘bonus feature’ (usually an interview) which is specifically created and designated for the 
audiobook release. To some extent, these cases can be perceived as nothing more than a so-called 
gimmick or ostensible ploy designated to boost the sales, essentially contributing nothing of real 
substance. Nevertheless, whether or not their contribution is indeed significant (i.e., in its contribution to 
the aesthetics of the particular audiobook) would have to be evaluated on a case by case basis. 
705 While s/he may indeed be responsible for creating the work to begin with—and thus should not only 
know it inside out and know it better than any other person—it should not be considered a given that 
s/he should also be responsible for recording the audio version.  
706 Roach, Spoken Records, 51.  
707 Ibid., 51-52. 
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often been recorded, in the case of the poet, has not been his poetry, 
but the audible record of his struggle as a poor reader. In the struggle 
he usually tries to listen to it himself so as to be correct. In the process 
he sets up a cycle from mouth to ear which excludes other listeners.708  
In accommodating to any new medium—and, I would add, to any new aesthetic 
category—Roach asserts that ‘preparation and practice are necessary’.709 
Appropriately, the task of the (audio-)performer—that is to say, his/her institutional 
role with respect to AP—should be unequivocally clear.710 On the one hand, I concur 
with Roach’s implied assertion that an author or poet’s reading of his/her own work—
counter-intuitive as it may sound—could prove to be not only the wrong choice for the 
text in question, but also quite ill-advised with respect to the medium involved. On the 
other hand, there are cases in which it appears to be abundantly clear that nobody but 
the author could have performed the particular text in question. Indeed, some authors 
can be said to be the only person who should record it—with their narration constituting 
the most appropriate reading of the text.711 
As I will presently demonstrate, one such case can be found in the work of 
Australian performer-satirist-author-dadaist-comedian-artist, Barry Humphries. Now, in 
concluding my exploration of the manner in which audiobooks utilise and manifest the 
first-person narrative, explicitly focusing on Humphries’s pseudo-autobiographical 
                                                 
708 Ibid., 51. 
709 Ibid. 
710 In brief, a performer is required to bear in mind and possess an understanding of two sets of internal 
logic—that of the text in question and that of the aural medium. Albeit having demonstrated the internal 
logic of their work in its written form, many authors are simply unable to perform it. Nonetheless, if the 
decision is made merely for the sake of having the author’s work ostensibly documented as an aural 
recording in his/her own voice, it would not necessarily constitute an AP artwork. 
711 Tracy, for instance, referencing what the collection of spoken word recordings at the University of Iowa 
consisted of, asserts: ‘Undoubtedly among the most interesting recordings of authors reading from their 
own works are Gertrude Stein and e e cummings, whose experiments with language and typography have 
made their work difficult of access on the page. Edith Sitwell’s recording of Façade is an exhibition of her 
verbal and vocal virtuosity that is hard to match in all of recorded literature, although James Joyce’s 
reading of a fragment from “Anna Livia Plurabelle” likewise reveals the vocal gifts of the author’. Tracy, 
"Echoes in a Bottle," 27–28.    
- 238 - 
 
writing—or rather, on the manner in which Humphries transformed his own written 
texts into unique aural performances—his audiobooks consist not as one case study, 
but, in fact, as three. 
Additionally, I would argue that the audiobook versions of Humphries’s pseudo-
autobiographies prevail as an even more complicated case study than that of Beckett. 
Now, this is not to say that the literary quality of Beckett’s writing is overshadowed by 
that of Humphries. Rather, in comparing the audiobook versions of their works, it would 
seem that despite the evident elaborate properties that one finds in the aural iterations 
of Beckett’s prose, Humphries’s aural performances of his own work project a 
considerably exceeded aesthetic complexity. In what can surely be identified as a 
borderline-surreal case study, Humphries’s aural performances are virtually 
labyrinthine. As I will show, whereas fictional autobiographies are customarily 
embedded with true biographical elements, Humphries’s pseudo-autobiographical 
audiobooks put into question not only the identity of the narrating characters, but also 
their ostensible (non)-existence. Ultimately, one is unable to ascertain whether what 
one is listening to should be perceived as a novel (i.e., that written by Humphries), or as 
a literal autobiography (i.e., that written and effectively spoken by one of Humphries’s 
own fictional characters). In accordance with his stage and screen works, Humphries’s 
aural performances both test the boundaries of the mother institution and manifest the 





- 239 - 
 
8.2 Dame Edna vs. Barry Humphries 
There is little doubt about the fact that the personae known as Dame Edna Everage and 
Sir Leslie Colin (aka ‘Les’) Patterson exist in the world as Humphries’s distinctive comic 
inventions. The brute fact of their being fictional characters notwithstanding, no 
problem whatsoever was posed in crediting each of them, individually, as the sole writer 
of their own autobiographies. Furthermore, when time came to record the audiobook 
versions of their published works, that they both ostensibly exist as ‘nonexistent 
personages’, seems to have presented no difficulties for either one to be chosen as the 
most appropriate performer. Quite the contrary: having them read their own work was 
in fact the most obvious choice. 
Dame Edna’s autobiography, My Gorgeous Life: the Life, the Loves, the Legend 
(1989), credits Edna as its author.712 It was also Edna, in the flesh, as it were, who had 
in 1993 recorded its audiobook version.713 As Edna herself notes, ‘[…] Chances are you 
might think this is just another showbiz autobiography, written by a ghost for some 
stupid empty-headed glamour puss. No way! […]’.714 Sir Leslie’s autobiography, The 
Traveller’s Tool (1985) similarly credits Sir Les as its author.715 Likewise, it was he too, 
‘warts and all’, who in 2011 proceeded to record his own literary endeavour.716 Despite 
the fact that it is Humphries who in actuality is responsible for penning ‘their’ so-called 
autobiographies, his name is not in any way credited or cited in either book—neither in 
their printed versions, nor in their aural incarnations. On the one hand, that Humphries 
                                                 
712 Dame Edna Everage, My Gorgeous Life: An Adventure (London: Macmillan, 1989). 
713 Dame Edna Everage, My Gorgeous Life, written and performed by Dame Edna Everage (Dove Audio, 
1993). [Digitally Remastered by Phoenix Books, 2014].  
714 See USB flash drive for Edna’s autobiography, track1. (Quote appears at 01m20sec).  
715 Sir Les Patterson, The Traveller’s Tool (London: Michael O'Mara Books Limited, 1985).  
716 Sir Leslie Colin Patterson, The Traveller’s Tool. Read by the Author (Tullamarine, Victoria, Australia: 
Bolinda Audio, 2011). See USB flash drive for Les’s autobiography, introduction. (‘Warts and all’ reference 
at 00m39sec–00m58sec).  
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removes himself and that his name is intentionally omitted could be argued to be a mere 
ars poetic joke and explained by the fact that the designated readers of these books 
should obviously be aware that both the characters and their individual autobiographies 
have been devised and created by Humphries. Put simply, Humphries’s designated 
audience both accepts and expects that that is just what he does. On the other hand, I 
maintain that these particular audiobooks demonstrate an idiosyncratic example of 
something which is quite unique in the world of performance—something that is 
distinctive to Humphries and his artistic voice (or rather, voices in this case).  
Much like McGovern’s performance of Beckett’s three novels, Humphries’s 
audiobooks, as AP artworks, manifest the manner in which his creations have to some 
extent managed to take on an almost literal life of their own—in effect extending well 
beyond the confines of their existence as performances.717 Humphries’s conscious 
artistic decision to transform their literary autobiographies into audiobooks 
demonstrates part of his unique ability to meticulously orchestrate and construct his 
characters as individual personages. His performance extends their presence on stage 
and screen, and having them pen ‘their own’ printed works, gives each of their individual 
                                                 
717 While arguably this is true to a somewhat lesser extent with respect to Sir Leslie, it can surely be said 
to be a concrete institutional fact about Dame Edna. This is rooted in the fact that part of what I would 
consider as her character’s internal logic—and surely part of the internal logic of what Humphries does 
as a performing artist—is that she, quite simply, ‘is’. The very essence of the drag queen act, for instance, 
or that of the pantomime dame, centres on one seeing the man behind the act. In both cases, part of the 
internal logic of the performance is rooted in revealing and acknowledging the showmanship of the 
performer—which, in effect, is usually what the audience eventually applauds. Humphries, by contrast, 
does not reveal himself before Edna steps off the stage or goes off screen. The audience never gets to see 
the man behind the mask. At the same time, the audience knows he is in fact there all along. While 
Humphries may refer to Edna as an actual person—asserting they are not one and the same, and although 
Edna may similarly acknowledge Humphries’s existence—asserting her horror of people’s assumption 
that she is in fact a character being skilfully portrayed by him, Humphries himself does not appear to ‘go 
beyond himself’ to reveal his own self. Humphries quite simply allows Edna to be—allowing his audience 
to accept her as ‘her’, knowing full well that they inevitably know that ‘she’ is in fact he. 
- 241 - 
 
voices even more prominence. The fact that their ‘performance’ can be experienced in 
printed form is quite an astounding achievement. 718 
Making matters worse, Humphries published two of his own autobiographies: 
More Please (1992)719—winner of the 1993 J.R. Ackerley Prize for Autobiography720—
and its revised update, My Life as Me (2002).721 Interesting to consider, for instance, is 
the manner in which his preface to More Please corresponds with his prologue to My 
Life as Me—a work which Humphries himself regards as a ‘parallel memoir’.722 In the 
former, Humphries states as follows: ‘I am already the subject of two generous 
biographies, and it is only the fear that my adventures might for a third time be 
profitably chronicled by another man that prompts me to relate my own story’.723 In the 
latter, he asserts:  
Here and there, readers may recognise a coincident event or 
personage from my earlier volume, for this is a cubist, even a futurist, 
self-portrait that I offer the reader, observing myself from many angles 
at once as in the hall of mirrors at a fairground, and with whiffs of 
scent, incoherent voices, shards of music. I have changed the names 
of several of my dramatis personae who are still living, especially 
where their portrayal is of such accuracy as might inspire foolhardy 
litigation. I have honoured the dead by calling them by their real 
names.724 
                                                 
718 So distinct a character is Edna that her autobiography quite literally becomes her. To some extent, one 
is able to compare Edna’s autobiography to Flaubert’s Madame Bovary (1856). Although My Gorgeous 
Life is hardly an influential achievement in literary realism, the two do share at least one distinct 
commonality: namely, they both clearly manifest a male author’s writing exercise, focused on depicting, 
to the best of his ability, a fully formed (and, indeed, authentic) female character. I would also argue that 
Humphries’s and Edna’s frequent assertions that neither one is in truth the other, resonates with 
Flaubert’s famous assertion, ‘Madame Bovary, c'est moi’ (‘Madame Bovary is me’). 
719 Barry Humphries, More Please (London: Viking, 1992). 
720 Paul Matthew St Pierre, A Portrait of the Artist as Australian: L’Oeuvre bizarre de Barry Humphries 
(Montreal, Quebec: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), 137.  
721 Barry Humphries, My Life as Me (London: Michael Joseph, 2002). 
722 St Pierre, A Portrait of the Artist as Australian, 144. 
723 Humphries, More Please, xi. 
724 Humphries, My Life as Me, x. 
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In addition to these, Paul Matthew St Pierre lists no less than seven individual ‘life-
tellings’, as he puts it, published over the years.725 He considers More Please to be one 
of Humphries’s greatest works—alongside his first novel, Women in the Background 
(1995).726 The latter, he maintains, appears to be something of a ‘mirror-image’ of 
Humphries’s own life.727 Furthermore, according to St Pierre, the parallels between 
Humphries and his novel’s main protagonist, Derek Quick, appear to be blatant, the 
novel can be said to consist as ‘a kind of displaced autobiography’, whose protagonist 
can either be identified as Humphries himself or be said to represent his 
doppelgänger.728 Humphries has been cited for saying that he may have indeed 
‘unconsciously woven some autobiographical material into this fiction’.729 St Pierre 
similarly argues that Edna’s My Gorgeous Life can be said to be ‘only once removed’ 
from Humphries’s More Please and My Life as Me.730 Additionally, he asserts—quite 
rightly, I would argue—that while addressing Humphries’s autobiographies as ‘his’ own 
narratives might seem ‘redundant’, this can in fact highlight his unique literary talent.731 
Indeed, he explains that since one is sure to come across numerous cases in which an 
ostensible autobiography had in fact been penned by a ghost writer, one could argue 
that Humphries too had employed such a scheme. Nevertheless, as St Pierre puts it, ‘no 
one could ghost Humphries’ story’.732 
Now, although this view is true, it is only partly so. Explicitly, I would argue that 
it is missing a so-called complementary qualifier, noting something along the lines of 
                                                 
725 St Pierre, A Portrait of the Artist as Australian, 138.  
726 Ibid., xiii. 
727 Ibid., 187. 
728 Ibid., 216. 
729 Ibid., 187. 
730 Ibid., 216.  
731 Ibid., 315n10.   
732 Ibid.     
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‘other than Humphries himself’. To be sure, Humphries tests the boundaries of 
performance and identity. He skilfully works on the edge, effectively extending the 
existence of his own performed personages. He transferred them from the worlds of 
the stage and screen to the world of printed words, only to subsequently reinstate their 
assumed status by ostensibly re-animating their words in the form of an aural 
performance. In this respect, I maintain that no one other than Humphries himself could 
ghost write his own story. While one should not question whether Humphries himself 
had indeed written his own autobiographies, one might question the extent to which 
those autobiographies are authentic depictions of his own life story.733 
Further complicating matters, in what was promoted as a behind-the-scenes 
glimpse into Edna’s notable rise from her life as a simple Melbourne housewife to the 
heights of ‘Mega-Stardom’, Humphries also penned Handling Edna: The Unauthorised 
Biography (2009).734 It too received an audiobook version, performed by Humphries 
himself.735 While the book indeed credits Humphries as its author, it is nevertheless 
unveiled as a work that had been written (and, subsequently, performed) by a 
somewhat different Barry Humphries—an assumed alternate version of his own 
persona.736 In brief, the book depicts his life as Edna’s long-time manager and appears 
to be dedicated to unravelling his exhaustively researched account of her life.737 As 
                                                 
733 St Pierre does in fact state that Humphries himself might be arguably identified as the so-called ghost 
writer of his own Women in the Background, especially since the authorship of the novel is apparently 
assumed by its main fictional protagonist. Ibid., 199. Indeed, the extent to which Humphries may have 
taken literary liberties in the construction and delivery of his own life story could in effect render him his 
own ostensible ghost writer, employing the format of the autobiography as yet another exercise in his 
distinctive approach to performance. 
734 Barry Humphries, Handling Edna: The Unauthorised Biography (Sydney: Hachette, 2009). 
735 Barry Humphries, Handling Edna: The Unauthorised Biography. (Orion, 2010).  
736 See USB flash drive for Humphries’s narration, e.g., 00m00sec–01m30sec. 
737 According to St Pierre, unlike with More Please or My Life as Me—and, I would add, unlike with My 
Gorgeous Life and Handling Edna—Barry Humphries, ‘the historical person, as distinguished from the 
implied author’ does appear in Women in the Background. St Pierre explains that this is the result of (a) 
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Handling Edna was published five years after St Pierre’s study, it is therefore not 
referred to at all. Had St Pierre indeed been able to include it in his study, it would have 
proven to be a very interesting addition, particularly in light of his fifth chapter, 
‘Autobiography as Mockery, or Barry Humphries in Mock Turtle’.738 Accordingly, 
Humphries—as the narrating character in his own Handling Edna—surely complies with 
St Pierre’s assertion that ‘Humphries’ “Barry Humphries” in More Please and My Life as 
Me is, by implication, an artistic creation, an ironic readymade and a processional 
person: the implied author’s implied narrator’.739 
Complying with what in print appears in the form of the author’s depiction of his 
conversations with Edna and his inclusion of their written correspondences, the 
audiobook version appropriately delivers Edna’s so-called guest appearances. As 
Humphries evidently reads Edna’s letters as Edna—rather than having Edna read them 
‘herself’—his aural performance in this case appears to elicit an aesthetic conundrum, 
of sort, albeit a highly satisfying and entertaining one. Indeed, this audiobook does not 
feature Dame Edna in full form. Humphries (or, arguably, this particular version of him) 
                                                 
the book in question being a novel—a work of fiction and imagination, (b) the fact that he has already 
penned two volumes of autobiography—and thus "has no need to boil his cabbages thrice", and (c) his 
extended fictionalization of himself, which manifesting in a number of different versions: namely, ‘Barry 
Humphries’ in Dame Edna’s act, ‘Brian Humphry’ in Sir Les Patterson’s act, and ‘Dr. Humphries’ in his 
theatre programs and promotional material. Effectively, there is no essential need for Humphries to ‘cast 
himself’ as the protagonist of his own literary endeavour as well. St Pierre, A Portrait of the Artist as 
Australian, 217. 
738 At the same time, while I am happy that my own study benefits from the new attention I bestow upon 
the internal logic of Humphries’s aural performances–his audiobooks as AP artworks–given the scope of 
St Pierre’s study, I find it regrettable that he fails to investigate the audiobook versions of Humphries’s 
works. In fact, but for (a) alluding in his preface the ‘seventy-two audio recordings’ among what 
constitutes the ‘art’ that Humphries ‘is usually identified with’, and (b) citing the audiobook releases of 
My Gorgeous Life and More Please in his appendix, St Pierre not seem to consider these at all. Ibid., x, 
and 281-82, respectively. Although St Pierre does mention Edna’s role as the narrator in Sergei Prokofiev’s 
Peter and the Wolf (1936), the reference is brief and it does not appear to be sufficiently analysed with 
respect to its nature as an AP artwork. Ibid., 82 and 147.   
739 Ibid., 139. 
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does not go the extra performative mile in voicing Edna as Edna herself.740 Furthermore, 
the fact that he narrates the novel as himself (or, again, the assumed version of himself), 
both intensifies and enriches one’s aesthetic experience.741 As St Pierre explains it, 
alluding to Humphries’s own autobiographies, 
Humphries’ soi-même autobiographical identity is a dialectic idem-
identity (sameness) and ipse-identity (selfhood), in which sameness 
has priority over selfhood. […] His autobiographical utterance […], is 
not, ipse dixit, true because ‘he himself said it’. It is true, idem, because 
it has been spoken previously: it is a speech or narrative readymade, 
a replica of Humphries’ life-so-far. […] Even though Humphries-himself 
(lui-même) is a man of kingly singularity […] he is, lui-même/soi-même, 
the ‘same him/herself’, the ‘same oneself’ as everyone in his audience. 
In contradistinction to his mirror-image, his ‘I’ is, idem, 
indistinguishable from that of any other soi-même person who has 
lived.742    
To some extent, a comparison could be made between the manner in which Humphries 
plays with (or, rather, comments on) the representations of the self in art and 
performance, and Warhol’s aforementioned readymade Brillo Box installation: Indeed, 
just as Warhol presents his audience with an artwork that is literally indistinguishable 
from the product found at one’s local supermarket, Humphries, by the same token, 
presents his audience with a readymade persona—an alternate replicated version of 
himself—that appears to be indistinguishable from Humphries.743 
                                                 
740 One can literally hear that it is essentially ‘Humphries reading as Edna’ rather than ‘Edna reading as 
herself’. This is emphasised by the fact that the audiobook is credited to have been ‘read by Barry 
Humphries’. It should be underlined that on more than one occasion, and in various individual 
appearances, both Humphries and Edna make it abundantly clear that they are most definitely not the 
same person. They both have made extensive comments on this issue. Had Humphries intended this 
recording to form a ‘double-act’ of sorts, the final product would no doubt have credited them both. 
741 As I will later show, in Humphries’s narration, as Edna, of My Gorgeous Life, precisely the same thing 
occurs in reverse when Edna vocalises her own interactions with ‘Barry Humphries’: that is to say, one 
does not in effect hear Humphries’s ‘own’ voice, but rather Edna’s ‘take’ on what he sounds like.       
742 St Pierre, A Portrait of the Artist as Australian, 145.  
743 Although no longer in circulation, it must be noted that both More Please and Women have been 
subjected to Humphries-narrated audiobook renditions (released by Penguin Audiobooks in 1993 and 
Reed Audio in 1996, respectively). St Pierre does not explicitly address these recordings in his book, 
although he does reference them in his appendix. Ibid., 282. Arguably, the fact that these recordings exist 
can be said to strengthen my assertion that the novels themselves can be perceived as a kind of 
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To be sure, the audiobook versions of Patterson’s The Traveller’s Tool, Edna’s My 
Gorgeous Life, and Humphries’s Handling Edna all comply with the institution of AP, and 
can all thereby be defined as distinct AP artworks. Ultimately, complying with R2, all 
three consist of existing written texts, which are recorded by a performer solely for an 
aural format (notwithstanding their previous existence on stage and screen), and are 
effectively delivered to an Artworld public, consisting of either Humphries’s fans or 
consumers of AP artworks. (This all takes place within the context of a particular 
Artworld-system, which is, in essence, the institution of AP itself). Appropriately, 
complying with R3, Humphries constitutes the (audio-)performer. The mere fact that he 
performs these books ‘in-character’ demonstrates that he undoubtedly is purposefully 
creating an AP artwork. That his narration can be identified as a performance—created 
explicitly for a designated audience—cannot be disputed. The audience, for its part, and 
in compliance with R4, has to be prepared to take on the responsibility to understand a 
particular recorded written-text as an AP artwork.744 
While his work can be said to incorporate elements of low comedy, what 
Humphries does is in fact not only highly stylised, but also extremely witty and 
profoundly intellectual. His performance employs a distinctive kind of aesthetics, which 
                                                 
performative exercise on Humphries’s part. One might, for example, choose to compare between the 
manner in which Humphries performs ‘himself’ in his autobiography, More Please–as opposed to the 
manner in which he performs the alternate version of himself in Handling Edna. As stated, this recording 
is no longer available. However, there is interest in comparing the manner in which Humphries performs 
the ostensible ‘version’ of his own self in narrating Handling Edna, and the manner in which he delivers 
‘his’ life story in narrating his own autobiography More Please. One could examine whether or not, and 
to what extent, there might exist differences in his intonation, his delivery, the manner in which he voices 
his own text, and so forth. 
744 It is no doubt essential that one be aware of the fact that these books are recorded ‘in-character’ by 
an established performer. Even if one does not necessarily consider oneself a fan of Humphries or part of 
his designated audience, that would nevertheless entail an understanding of what he does. Accordingly, 
if one is unaware of that fact, all that one is consequently left with is the ostensible brute fact—and would 
thereby experience these audiobooks either as (a) the boring confessions of a stardom-obsessed 
megalomaniac in Edna’s case, or (b) the obnoxious pure-drivel ramblings of a bodily-functions obsessed 
buffoon in Les’s case.   
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is precisely dependent upon playing a game with his audience. Even when conducting 
interviews in the guise of Dame Edna (interviews that are essentially part of Edna’s 
show) her interviewees—predominantly performers in their own right and/or 
individuals who are no strangers to the stage—become, almost without their realising 
it, part of the audience who is watching Edna interview them. In other words, they 
simultaneously accept that they are being interviewed by a very real and very vivid 
Dame Edna, and, they are also fully aware that the person who is interviewing them is 
in fact performing to, with and in front of them. In utilising the fact that everyone plays 
along, Humphries is able to deliver what is revealed as his fine-tuned and razor-sharp 
satire. One is thus confronted with a variety of apt comments on such issues as the 
concept of celebrity and its place in culture, the very nature of what is perceived as 
reality within the context of performance—the various masks that one either puts on or 
pulls off in everyday life, and even, to an extent, the very essence of what art actually 
is. In these respects, Humphries is literally unmatched. 
By way of comparison, consider the fictional autobiography, I, Partridge: We 
Need to Talk About Alan (2001),745 depicting the life and times of one Alan Gordon 
Partridge. Just like Edna and Les, Alan Partridge is a fictional character—a non-existent 
personage—invented in the 1990s and portrayed by English actor-comedian-
impressionist-writer, Steve Coogan.746 Although one might find I, Partridge allocated to 
the ‘Humour’ section of one’s local bookshop, it is essentially just as much an 
autobiography as the books of Edna and Les. Accordingly, the audiobook version is 
                                                 
745 Alan Partridge, Rob Gibbons, Neil Gibbons, Armando Iannucci and Steve Coogan. I, Partridge: We Need 
to Talk About Alan (London: HarperCollins, 2001). 
746 Partridge constitutes the brainchild and collaborative invention of Coogan, alongside Scottish satirist-
writer-director, Armando Iannucci, and English comedian-writers, Stewart Lee and Richard Herring. 
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narrated by Coogan ‘in-character’. Unlike Edna and Les, however, Partridge does not 
receive the sole credit for penning the autobiography.747 The recording gives a full run-
down of names to whom the work is credited. Immediately thereafter, Coogan 
announces, ‘This is Alan Partridge’. The manner in which he delivers these few small 
words, emphasising his very first utterance as Partridge, makes it sound as if he officially 
assumes authority over the printed text that he is narrating—and in effect making it 
clear to the listeners that the audiobook should be experienced through the voice of 
Partridge himself.748 This ostensible affirmation of his own identity does not (perhaps 
even cannot) appear in the printed version and evoke the same effect. It is utilised as a 
device through which Coogan asserts his role as Partridge, speaking explicitly to the 
listeners of the audiobook, as he elicits their undivided attention. 
Although apparently a very successful character, Partridge pales in comparison 
to Humphries’s creations. Not only with respect to successfully creating a virtually 
concrete personage (rather than a mere character, sophisticated as it may be), but also 
in the level and sophistication of his comedy. Notwithstanding, Partridge’s creators do 
seem to be playing an ostensible game with their audience, reminiscent of both 
Humphries’s work, and, to some extent, the aforementioned Spinal Tap band 
members.749 Ultimately, to fully appreciate the extent of Humphries’s performance 
                                                 
747 In the printed book, the name ‘Alan Partridge’ appears above all the real authors. In the audiobook, 
only having explicitly pointed out that one is listening to a book ‘by Alan Partridge, with Rob Gibbons and 
Neil Gibbons, Armando Iannucci and Steve Coogan’ does Coogan proceed to read the book. Nonetheless, 
and albeit to a less successful extent than Humphries, the creators of Partridge seem to be playing a 
similar game with their audience: in the printed version, the name ‘Alan Partridge’ is evidently presented 
in a much larger typeface than all the other writers; in the audiobook, Coogan is heard running through 
real authors’ names quite rapidly. 
748 See USB flash drive for Coogan’s narration of I, Partridge. 00m00sec–01m11sec.  
749 It is apparent not only in their release of a fictional autobiography performed by the fictional character 
himself, but also in the DVD releases of the 1997/2002 television series, I Am Alan Partridge, in which 
there is a featured commentary track of Coogan, alongside one of his co-stars, Felicity Montagu, both in-
character. I shall later dedicate a section specifically to examining the notion Audio Commentaries as AP 
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artistry, one is predominantly required to employ a ‘willing suspension of disbelief’. 
With Les, the more vulgar, tasteless and utterly disgusting he appears to be, the more 
laughter he elicits from the audience;750 with Edna, one essentially comes to accept her 
as an actual persona by complying with her own estimation of herself: namely, a simple 
Melbourne housewife who sincerely believes that she is nothing less than a ‘megastar’. 
The distinctive type of storytelling that Humphries employs, as Edna, in My 
Gorgeous Life is precisely what makes it her story. Indeed, one simply cannot help but 
literally hear Edna’s voice in one’s head when faced with the text alone. At the same 
time, as St Pierre points out, ‘Edna Everage is not a storyteller: she is, as she states 
throughout My Gorgeous Life, a biographer. […] She does not presume to tell a story 
because there is none’.751 When one listens to the audiobook version, hearing Edna tell 
her own story, one’s aesthetic experience of Humphries’s unique brilliance as a 
performer is effectively intensified. The audiobook begins with Edna noting that ‘all the 
persons in this book exist and are called by their real names. Anyone objecting to this 
                                                 
pieces. Arguably, that it required four different people to compose I, Partridge as opposed to one 
individual creating two singular works may not be an entirely fair point to raise, yet it nevertheless 
contributes to establishing Humphries as a remarkable and prolific creative genius. Nevertheless, Coogan 
himself is quite a remarkable performer. In fact, in the context of this dissertation, I would argue that 
Coogan’s own autobiography, Easily Distracted (2015), presents a much more interesting case study, its 
lacking a so-called ‘character’ notwithstanding. I will later in this chapter further elaborate on this matter, 
in comparison to Handling Edna, as well as with respect to what Coogan already in his introduction to 
Easily Distracted refers to as ‘doing’ a ‘version of’ himself. 
750 ‘Leslie Colin Patterson, in his original incarnation as Entertainments Officer at Sydney football club, 
was intended to convince his audience of his working-class authenticity. But his character developed [...] 
and gained the international status as Australia’s Cultural Attaché [...] The fact that most healthy women 
are sexually attracted to Sir Les contributes in no small measure to my pleasure in inhabiting him. A 
cautionary figure, as well as a comic one, Les Patterson is that part of me that didn't stop drinking. […] It 
was always wonderful and exhilarating to walk into my dressing-room at the theatre and slip into a vast 
and clammy “fat suit”, obscenely and priapically padded, then to don a deeply stained powder-blue Hong 
King suite, “kipper” tie and finally a pair of two-toned, Cuban-heeled shoes of a monstrous design, 
fashionable in the early seventies. A boozy make-up swiftly applied and a clip-on denture of crooked, 
nicotine-stained teeth complete the transformation. Audiences adored this genial and foul-mouthed 
figure, and he even wrote a book called The Traveller’s Tool, a manual needless to say [...] A new edition, 
The Enlarged and Extended Tool, is surely called for’. Humphries, My Life As Me, 221-222. 
751 St Pierre, A Portrait of the Artist as Australian, 185. 
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could find themselves in costly and interminable litigation’.752 Now, the manner in which 
these words are spoken by Edna—and especially her utterance of ‘interminable 
litigation’—manifest her almost devilish relish in the very thought of going through the 
process of suing someone. As a performer, Humphries’s choice to have Edna conclude 
this statement with a small quaint giggle merely enhances the listening experience. The 
mental image one conjures up of the smile that surely appeared on Edna’s face is so 
strong that it is virtually built-in to his performance. Although the giggle does not appear 
in the original text. (Not even as an ostensible stage direction. Indeed, the original text 
is, supposedly, a proper autobiography—and not a dramatic text). Nonetheless, the 
giggle is, conceivably, very much implied. As stated, the novel consists of Edna’s 
autobiography, written by her, told in her own voice. It is, in effect, Edna’s voice that a 
reader would hear in the mind’s ear when confronted with the text.753  
Could there have been another choice?—Yes, quite obviously. One might choose 
to speak the aforementioned opening sentence very seriously. Perhaps in a manner that 
would imply some impending disastrous circumstances for those objecting to Edna’s 
naming of names. However, would it have worked? That is to say, would it have 
managed to exhibit and manifest the internal logic of ‘Dame Edna’s autobiography’? It 
is highly unlikely. If, hypothetically, the book’s audio copyrights would have only been 
made available long after Humphries’s natural death, and if a gifted performer would 
have managed to narrate the book in a manner that would comply with the internal 
                                                 
752 Dame Edna Everage, My Gorgeous Life, 00m24sec. 
753 Moreover, if one is adequately acquainted with Edna’s character, her mannerisms, the tone of her 
voice and her odd vocal exclamations, one is arguably supposed to hear the giggle as well. At the very 
least, one should be able to envision some variation thereof, that would work in accordance with Edna’s 
character. Consequently, it can be argued that in choosing the most appropriate performer for the 
audiobook re-incarnation of her autobiography, literally nobody other than Dame Edna herself could do. 
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logic of Edna’s character, it might have presented an interesting case study—the 
inherent difference from a performance by Humphries himself notwithstanding. 
Arguably, such a recording could be evaluated either as an aural interpretation of an 
established (fictional) character, or—what seems more appropriate in Edna’s case—as 
an aural performance that is based on an actual person’s autobiography. This is precisely 
why I find that no one other than Humphries himself could have been cast to portray or 
narrate his characters ‘in-character’. 
By way of comparison, consider the audiobook version of Chronicles: Volume 
One (2004), the autobiography of American singer-songwriter-artist and folk legend, 
Bob Dylan, as performed by acclaimed American actor, Sean Penn—whose narration, 
evidently, does not try to perform the text ‘as’ Dylan (i.e., ‘doing’ or imitating his 
distinctive voice).754 Indeed, one of Dylan’s ostensible trademarks—or, at least, one of 
the inherently identifiable characteristics of his persona as a performer—no doubt 
manifests through his distinct vocal qualities. So much so, in fact, that it has been subject 
to as much parody and impersonation as Dylan’s musical style has been subject to 
emulation and interpretation. Effectively, when one reads his writing—especially an 
autobiography, depicting his own personal story—one essentially cannot help but hear 
Dylan’s voice in one’s head. For reasons beyond understanding, Dylan did not record 
the audiobook version himself. It surely would have constituted an interesting case 
study, as well as, presumably, served as an example of a good AP artwork.755 Now, while 
                                                 
754 Bob Dylan, Chronicles: Volume 1, abridged, read by Sean Penn (Simon & Schuster, 2004). See USB flash 
drive for Penn’s reading, e.g., disc1, track1. 
755 Similarly, consider the audiobook version of Bruce Springsteen’s autobiography, Born to Run (2016). 
The differences and commonalities between the two notwithstanding, Springsteen’s status and stature 
in the history of American singer-songwriters is surely no-less legendary than Dylan. Fundamentally, 
Springsteen too possesses what can be identified as a unique artistic voice, as well as a distinct literal one. 
Having Springsteen perform his own autobiography adds to one’s aesthetic experience of listening to him 
tell his own story, in his own words, through his own mouth. In some respects, this also adds a certain 
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it would surely be easy to succumb to the temptation of reading the entire book as 
Dylan, I would argue that what is quite interesting about Penn’s performance is that it 
manifests an understanding of Dylan’s artistic voice, rather than an attempt at matching 
the sound of his actual voice. Indeed, Penn’s narration succeeds in capturing and 
conveying a number of different shades or tones of Dylan’s assumed persona, without 
making it seem as if he is mimicking him. Arguably, had he done so, the result would 
have made for an aesthetically bad AP artwork. Rather, his performance succeeded in 
identifying the internal logic of the writing, the manner in which it should be conveyed 
in the form of an audiobook, coupled with some idea of what the internal logic of Dylan 
as a cultural figure is supposed to represent.756 
Autobiographies on the whole—particularly those of people whose profession 
centres on performance, and who just happen to possess the kind of voice that appears 
to be almost custom-made for the aural medium—having their autobiography 
performed by anyone other than them can rarely be justified. If audiobooks of first-
person narratives are able to create the sense that a particular text is ostensibly 
delivered personally to the listener by the narrating character, this sense is amplified by 
the audiobook version of autobiographies that are told by the author him/herself. By 
way of illustration, consider, for instance, the audiobook version of Judi Dench’s 
                                                 
level of prestige for the consumers who chose to invest in listening to an audiobook as a more fulfilling 
aesthetic experience, rather than ostensibly settling for reading the book. See USB flash drive, Bruce 
Springsteen, Born to Run, read by the Author (Unabridged; Simon & Schuster, 2016), e.g., track1. 
756 At the same time, I would argue that Penn’s achievement constitutes a unique exception in the way in 
which he captures the internal logic of Dylan’s writing, which becomes even more evident when one 
listens to the unabridged version of the book—released a year later—with the narration by Nick Landrum. 
A comparison between these two recordings also demonstrates that whether or not a recording happens 
to be abridged should not factor in ascertaining its aesthetic quality. Indeed, despite the fact that he 
narrates an abridged version of the text, Penn’s performance surpasses that of Landrum. See URL for 
online sample: Bob Dylan, Chronicles: Volume 1, narrated by Nick Landrum (Unabridged; Whole Story 
Audiobooks, 2005), accessed March 10, 2017, https://wholestoryaudiobooks.co.uk/product/chronicles-
volume-one.       
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autobiography, And Furthermore (2012), in which Dench is only heard reading the 
preface. Dench begins by asserting, ‘I don't in anyway consider this to be an 
autobiography. I've neither the time nor the skill to write one’, and concludes with her 
stating, ‘I have enjoyed—and still am enjoying—a wonderful life, and made some 
friendships I cherish deeply, many of which appear in these pages, and that is one of the 
most important reasons why I am happy to put all this on the record’.757 In the recording, 
Dench adds a sentence proclaiming ‘And here is one of these friends, and she is going 
to read the rest of the book. Samantha Bond’.758 Put bluntly—and with absolutely no 
disrespect for Ms. Bond—I would argue that to produce a recording of Dame Judi 
Dench’s account of her own life, without having it read by Dame Judi herself, is pointless. 
Moreover, I find that to read the text itself while, guided by one’s informed intuition, 
ostensibly ‘hearing’ Dench’s voice in one’s own head can, to some extent, constitute a 
more rewarding aesthetic experience. Unlike similar audiobooks where an author can 
be heard reading a preface or afterword, the fact that Dench is merely heard 
momentarily, only to subsequently consign the reading to Bond, could even be 
experienced as a tactless tease on behalf of the production. Indeed, Bond’s talent and 
performative abilities notwithstanding, her overall narration might even prevail as an 
ostensible annoyance, as one is consequently deprived of the opportunity to hear Dench 
narrate the complete book in her own voice—which would arguably constitute the 
primary reason why one would be interested to purchase an audiobook version of her 
book to begin with. By the same token, had the audiobook versions of, for instance, the 
diaries of acclaimed English actor Alec Guinness—Blessings in Disguise (1985) and A 
                                                 
757 Judi Dench, And Furthermore (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2010), xv. 
758 Judi Dench, And Furthermore (Unabridged; Orion, 2010). See USB flash drive for Dench’s preface to 
And Furthermore, and see also sample of Bond’s reading from Chapter 1.  
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Positively Final Appearance: A Journal, 1996-1998 (2008)—or even the autobiography 
of accomplished English actor Brian Blessed, Absolute Pandemonium: My Louder Than 
Life Story (2015), been performed by anyone other than their authors, one’s aesthetic 
experience would no doubt have suffered greatly.759 Indeed, in such cases, one’s 
informed intuition simply identifies that due to the remarkable performative qualities 
of these individuals, listening to any other narrator would ostensibly be unacceptable.760 
Fundamentally, I am doubtful that had one performed Humphries’s works in the same 
way that Penn performs Dylan’s book, the result would have been as good. Indeed, in 
considering his characters in the context of their own utterance, Humphries is the only 
person who is able to perform their words appropriately. His portrayal of these 
characters elicits both a distinct visual image of what they look like and an embodied 
aural sound of the manner in which they speak. Effectively, the characters themselves 
are embodied with the written text. Since one cannot but hear their voices when 
reading the text, to actually hear Humphries perform his own work enhances one’s 
experience.  
Now, in literally performing her own autobiography, Dame Edna demonstrates 
an inherent awareness that she is making the recording specifically for a designated 
audience: namely, her audience–the people who know who she is, who love and admire 
                                                 
759 See USB flash drive for the Alec Guinness recordings; and See URL for online sample of Brian Blessed’s 
narration of his autobiography: accessed February 6, 2012, http://www.audible.co.uk/pd/Biographies-
Memoirs/Absolute-Pandemonium-The-Autobiography-
Audiobook/B012BNLA66/ref=a_search_c4_1_1_srTtl?qid=1495982592&sr=1-1.        
760At the same time, if a renowned performer happens to no longer be alive, one could settle for a kind 
of performance that one’s informed intuition would find as an acceptable effort in doing justice to the 
original author-performer. Consider, for example, the Derek Jacobi reading of the letters of John Gielgud. 
See John Gielgud, Gielgud's Letters, edited by Richard Mangan, read by Derek Jacobi (Orion, 2004); and 
See USB flash drive for sample of the BBC radio version.    
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her, and who crave to know more about her. She is clearly addressing the listeners. 
Examples indicating this awareness can be heard in the following sections: 
[…] And let’s face it, I am a survivor with a story to tell, and this is it. 
It’s a funny thought that there will be millions of people listening to 
this best-seller, some voluntarily, many as a compulsory school 
subject, who never heard of me.761 […] I am naturally into 
reincarnation, listeners.762 […] Twenty-four hours and three Valia 
later, my J [—that’s plural for Valium—] my Jumbo touched down in 
Melbourne.763 
This so-called aside, aimed at explaining the correct grammatical use of the plural form 
of Valium, clearly indicates Edna’s awareness of her audience. At the same time, it 
assists Humphries in achieving an additional laugh by choosing explicitly such a word for 
Edna to underline. Although such an aside may also appear in print, its aural 
representation in the audiobook version, allowing one to actually hear the voice that 
one would otherwise be required to imagine, constitutes a much more rewarding 
aesthetic experience. 
I was already thinking of you my listener, my millions of listeners who 
would want to know it all.764 […] My listeners would not have thanked 
me if…765 […] did she have to entertain millions on stage, screen, 
television and tape?766 […] I meant to mention my three brothers, Roy, 
Ethel, and Lorie, and chances are, it will come as a big, well eye opener 
to a lot of my listeners767 […] This mustn't go any further, listeners, but 
I've always thought Madge had [Enda pauses. She then whispers the 
following word] 'tendencies'768 […]  
                                                 
761 See USB flash drive for Dame Edna, My Gorgeous Life, 00m59sec. 
762 Ibid., 05m15sec. 
763 Ibid., 07m17sec. 
764 Ibid., 08m35sec. 
765 Ibid., 11m35sec. 
766 Ibid., 13m00sec. 
767 Ibid., 20m55sec. 
768 Ibid., 27m43sec. 
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The effect of the pause and the whisper can be only grasped in the audiobook version 
of this text, for while it may still be very funny on the page, the pause and whisper enrich 
one’s aesthetic experience in a way which the text itself simply cannot do. 
Frankly, listeners769 […] As I anticipated, listeners, […]770 I know that a 
certain element of my listeners, a small one, I hope, is expecting to 
hear lurid and permissive details about my wedding night. But this is 
not that kind of programme, I'm sorry, but it isn't.771 […] Even as I 
speak these words […]772 [my emphasis] She won't thank me for 
mentioning that fact in this fearless recording.773 
Later in the recording, Edna is heard saying that ‘had any of my readers felt that an 
evening was ruined even before it began, that was how I felt that night’.774 Arguably, 
keeping the word ‘readers’ rather than replacing it with ‘listeners’ (which appears a 
number of times in the audiobook) could be perceived as a failure with respect to the 
adaptation.775 
When Edna recounts that ‘a deep sob passed through my body, as my eyes filled 
with scalding tears’, her reading and description convey her being almost on the verge 
of tears.776 While one is constantly reminded that they are listening to Edna’s personal 
story, one is also very much aware that it is a complete fabrication. Nonetheless, it is 
Humphries’s performance that enhances the sentiment that Edna wishes to convey. 
Despite her existence as a fictional character, one accepts that one is listening to her 
telling her own story. Indeed, one relishes the different levels of hilarity and 
                                                 
769 Ibid., 01h21m26sec. 
770 Ibid., 01h24m41sec. 
771 Ibid., 01h35m49sec. 
772 Ibid., 01h40m39sec. 
773 Ibid., 01h41m37sec. 
774 Ibid., 54m23sec. 
775 The same can be said for the following section: ‘I suggested these tasks caringly, listeners, and as 
occupational therapy, to stop her becoming morbid. I'm sure that grief-counselors reading this will back 
me to the hilt’ [emphasis added]. Ibid., 02hr10m42sec. 
776 Ibid., 12m10sec. 
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grotesqueness in the completely fabricated life story that Humphries has devised for 
Edna. In allowing Edna to narrate her own story, Humphries extends the range of his 
performance and achieves a new level of surrealism, which effectively re-affirms Edna’s 
ostensible existence as a literal agency in her own right. While one is well aware that 
one is experiencing a performance delivered by Humphries, one is simultaneously 
captivated by Edna’s storytelling. That her storytelling, as she engages with her audience 
by vividly reconstructing various scenes from her own past, is all part of Humphries’s 
‘shtick’, becomes almost irrelevant. Indeed, one wilfully suspends one’s knowledge of 
her existence as Humphries’s creation and accordingly accepts the pseudo-
autobiography of his fictional character as her story.777 That Edna goes on to explain the 
manner in which she chose to tell the story, i.e., to perform the written text, adds to the 
vividness of the performance. Thus, the listener’s experience is enhanced by Edna’s 
explicit, albeit inaccurate account of the manner in which she decided to convey her 
own story to her listeners. While she describes her approach as ‘deliberately detached’, 
to describe Edna’s narration as ‘detached’ could not be further from how it actually 
sounds. To a large extent, unless one were very well-acquainted with Edna’s character 
and personality, it would be almost impossible for one to hear in one’s head the 
dissonance between what Edna regards as a ‘detached’ account, the manner in which 
her account appears on the page, and the actual manner in which she narrates the 
text.778 
                                                 
777 ‘I am now coming to a part of my story [one hears her almost breaking into tears] which has never 
been told. This is a secret Norm and I have kept for many years, listeners. But now it must be told’. Ibid., 
01h37m07sec. ‘[…] I've told this terrible story in a deliberately detached way. Because I re-live it, possums, 
every time I think about it’. Ibid., 01h39m03sec. 
778 Consider, for example, the passage where Edna conveys her near-drowning experience, having 
attempted to save the life of her friend, Madge Allsop: ‘With no thought for myself, as per usual, I plunged 
into the aqua sea and struck out in the direction of my floundering friend. Only when I was out of my 
depth with the salt water searing my throat did I remember that I could not swim! […] I tried to make my 
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Ultimately, this pseudo-autobiography could be perceived, at least on some 
level, as a text that is designed to be performed. Indeed, much like McGovern suggested 
with respect to Beckett’s prose, My Gorgeous Life similarly appears to cry out to be 
performed—only that in this case it cries out, in Edna’s voice, to be performed by none 
other than Edna herself. Furthermore, to an audience who is acquainted with their 
staged personification, it is quite easy to imagine each Enda or Les sitting in the 
recording studio narrating their own works. In this respect, I would not be surprised to 
discover that Humphries actually recorded these books in full costume. While it is, one 
the one hand, completely irrelevant due to the nature of the aural medium, it might on 
the other hand, be very relevant to Humphries as a performer—particularly as he is 
delivering a first-person narrative as ostensibly ‘real’ personae.779 
In addition to having Edna tell her own story, Humphries also endows Edna with 
the ability to tell the story by employing a number of different voices for other 
characters. Consider, for instance, the passage where she describes her uncle, Victor. 
He is first introduced to the listeners when Edna proclaims that ‘as I looked at his small 
                                                 
life flash before me but it wouldn’t. I must have blacked out, but seconds later I came to. […] I saw the 
face of my rescuer […] my young savior carried me in his arms and laid me gently on the sands. […] At that 
moment I felt, and I am not ashamed to confess this, listeners, as though that […] young warrior could do 
with me as he liked’. Ibid., 36m22sec. 
779 To some extent, one could consider Harold Pinter's radio play, A Slight Ache (1958) in similar respects. 
Explicitly, with respect the fact that one of its three characters (a Matchseller) does not utter single word, 
and onto whom the two other characters (Edward and Flora) gradually project their own realities. While 
the play has also been performed on stage, the visible silence of a mysterious mute figure is surely 
different from that of an un-seen one. Indeed, the idea that a radio play even permits the ‘presence’ of a 
character who does not speak, surely makes one contemplate whether or not he exists at all. Now, many 
radio productions—including one from 2002 staring Pinter himself—credit only two performers. What I 
find interesting in respect of whether or not Humphries performs his characters’ autobiographies in full 
costume, is questioning whether or not, and to what degree, would the performers of A Slight Ache be 
affected by the physical presence (or, indeed, lack thereof) of a third performer. Conceivably, just as 
Humphries’s performance would benefit from a narration in full costume, the cast of Pinter’s play would 
benefit from the presence of a third performer—his muteness notwithstanding. In this respect, if one 
were made aware that Humphries is in full costume or that there is indeed a third cast member, it could, 
potentially, re-direct or fine-tune one’s interpretation and aesthetic evaluation of the performances. 
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and vulnerable form, it was impossible to believe that he had once been called “The 
Butcher of Borneo”'.780 She then proceeds to impersonate her uncle, or speak in his 
voice.781 It becomes quite evident in the recording that it is indeed Edna’s voice that is 
making the attempt to produce a different voice–rather than an attempt on 
Humphries’s part to produce a completely different voice for Victor’s character that 
would in effect not resemble Edna’s voice in any way. In a different passage, however, 
when one hears the line ‘What seems to be the trouble’782—which consists of Edna’s 
quoting of a male character—one cannot similarly claim to hear Edna’s distinctive voice 
within the quote. This could therefore be construed as something of an inconsistency 
with respect to Humphries’s performance. In essence, the listeners may not find this 
particular segment as fine-tuned as the others and it is not as clear whether that line is 
spoken by Edna or rather demonstrates Edna’s attempt at vocalising the voice of a 
character who is supposed to sound like a young man. The source of this confusion 
appears to be rooted in the fact that the said line is spoken in the same intonation that 
is identified with Edna’s character (or rather, that which listeners have grown to identify 
her with). An additional passage demonstrating a similar distinctive vocal ambiguity can 
be heard when one is introduced to the character of Mr. Mushinski, the Russian hedge-
clipper. Although depicted by Edna as ‘ghastly foreign-sounding’, when Mushinski is 
quoted as saying ‘”You're a pretty little girl”, said a ghastly-foreign sounding voice. “Can 
I help you catch something?”’,783 the first part of the quote sounds very much like Edna, 
and thus not matching her own depiction of what Mushinski is supposed to sound like. 
                                                 
780 See USB flash drive for Dame Edna, My Gorgeous Life, 07m40sec. 
781 Ibid., 07m51sec. 
782 Ibid., 13m42sec. 
783 Ibid., 26m02sec. 
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It is only from the second part of the sentence and onwards that one can literally hear 
in Humphries’s performance Edna’s attempt to portray the said ‘ghastly foreign’ quality. 
Nonetheless, the vast majority of the other individuals and characters mentioned in the 
book are portrayed through Edna’s narration by Edna herself.784  
In this respect, the performance is incredibly consistent, with the exception of 
two characters: Edna’s husband, Norman (aka Norm), and the character referred to as 
‘Les’. The latter makes his appearance in the book as Edna’s date for her first big 
dance.785 While his full name is not mentioned, one can but assume that readers of the 
printed book may have indeed suspected or at least had very little doubt that the ‘Les’ 
in question is none other than Humphries’s second most well-known character, Les 
Patterson. In print, this assumption can be justified by his character’s depiction, coupled 
with what should be one’s assumed acquaintance with Humphries’s work. In the 
audiobook, Humphries’s performance leaves no doubt—it is indeed his own Leslie Colin 
Patterson.786 
As an off-stage character, albeit quite present in Edna’s on-stage references, 
Norman is hardly as vivid a character as Les Patterson—with whom Humphries’s 
audience should be well acquainted from various appearances on stage and screen. The 
audiobook, presumably for the first time, enables Humphries (or rather Edna, as the 
                                                 
784 Edna can be heard speaking in the voice of her mother and singing a bedtime lullaby; she can be heard 
as her father; as Madge; as a group of Nazis celebrating (in caricaturised ‘broken’ English) Hitler’s birthday 
party. Ibid., 42m26sec. Likewise, as the book takes on the guise of a ‘real’ autobiography, Edna can also 
be heard speaking as people whom the readers/listeners may potentially be acquainted with: namely, 
Peter Cook, Barry Humphries, and the Queen of England. 
785 Ibid., 53m15sec. 
786 Due to the distinctive manner in which Humphries constructs his characters, one can almost imagine 
that the segments featuring Les are not actually read by Edna, but rather by Les himself. On the one hand, 
this is yet another example of Humphries’s unique talent. On the other hand, as this book is supposed to 
be performed by Edna, it may be somewhat problematic, as far as the internal logic is concerned, that Les 
sounds ‘too much’ like Les, and not as if Edna is trying to speak in Les’s voice. 
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narrator) to endow Norm with a distinct voice of his own. To some extent, Humphries’s 
aural performance almost makes it seem as if a completely different actor has entered 
the recording studio to portray Norman’s character, rather than sounding as if Edna is 
ostensibly ‘doing’ his voice.787 Consider, for example, the segment where Edna mentions 
that she had ‘got a nice long aerogram from Norman’, followed by her stating that ‘only 
the postscript irritated me slightly: You'll be pleased to hear the kiddies haven't 
mentioned you once since you left. So don't worry.’788 By way of comparison, when Edna 
narrates a letter from Madge, one clearly hears that it is Edna who is reading Madge’s 
words, while employing a slightly different intonation.789 
Humphries himself also makes an appearance as one of the characters in Edna’s 
account of her own life. Nonetheless, while he may appear to be Humphries’s own self, 
the aural manifestation of his character (or alternate version thereof) is ultimately 
delivered through Edna’s voice and speech patterns, rather than his own. Edna 
describes in her book how she came to meet Humphries and how she contributed to his 
acting career.790 It is particularly in the light of her account that I find it interesting to 
                                                 
787 Another distinct voice that is heard on the recording, making a very short appearance, is that of a 
character named Kevin Farelli—a reporter for the fictional 'Morning Murdock', who informs Edna about 
her winning the ‘Lovely Mother Quest’. Ibid., 01h45m25sec. He too is not performed ‘through’ Edna. 
Rather, Humphries bestows him with a voice of his own, albeit one that sounds quite similar to that of 
Les. I can but assume that it follows his attempt to capture some kind of Australian authenticity. 
788 Ibid., 01h53m47sec. 
789 In this section, she goes between her reading of Madge’s letter and commenting about it, which is in 
the text, and expressing various reactions to it, as part of her performance, such as releasing a small 
amount of air in disapproval or irritation. Ibid., 01h54m52sec. 
790 Consider, explicitly, the following passage: ‘The last letter was one of the most important in my life […] 
it was from a young actor planning a variety show about Australian suburban life. He was playing the role 
of a housewife who'd just been on her first overseas trip and he wanted to “pick my brains”, he said, for 
his research. I snorted, weird types are starting to write to me now. This one sounds a bit of a “Sissy” too. 
He’s planning some kind of a show where he dresses up as a woman and makes fun about the wonderful 
Australian way of life. What kind of homes do people like that come from? He’s probably breaking his 
parents’ hearts. […] I met Mr. Humphries in a restaurant downtown. To be perfectly honest, I enjoyed my 
lunch. […] We parted with a promise that I would come to a few rehearsals and help him with his female 
impersonation. Though it made me a bit uncomfortable, in fact almost sick, to think of a man trolling 
around in women’s attire. I'm sorry, but it did. Perhaps it was his mention of a fee that twisted my arm. 
[…] Barry had the cheek to peer into the auditorium to solicit out praise. How was that? Pretty good, I 
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consider a similar account of the same first encounter, as presented in Handling Edna 
by Humphries (or rather, ‘Humphries’, as an additional peculiar version of himself). As a 
self-proclaimed ‘unauthorised biography’, the book sets out to right the wrongs and 
express the ostensible truth about the relationship between Humphries and Edna: 
Hitherto the public has been confused, and in some cases deceived, 
by divergent accounts of Dame Edna’s life and origins. Some of these 
accounts and wild speculations have been verbally diffused and 
rumour and hearsay have been transmuted into 'fact'. Many have 
been published in books and academic theses, and there is now a 
considerable apocrypha bearing Edna’s name. It should be said that 
the author of this memoir has himself contributed to these legends 
and obfuscations for reasons, largely indefensible, which are set out 
in the text that follows. The reader is exhorted to ignore all other 
accounts, withal bearing the weight and authority of Academe, and 
accept what follows as the 'onlie true historie'.791 
Now, on the one hand, this elaborate endeavour might very well be construed as merely 
more of the same: that is to say, having written a version of himself, as depicted by a 
fictional character (which he in fact created and is thereby responsible for), Humphries 
proceeded to create an additional version of himself, writing in its own voice. While 
presumably more authentic than the version of himself depicted by Edna (which, lest 
we forget, is Humphries himself), this alternate ‘Humphries’, writing as the ‘real’ 
Humphries—and, in the audiobook, appears to sound precisely like him as well—is 
effectively just as ostensibly real as Edna’s Humphries. 
Arguably, one might be tempted to dismiss Handling Edna as yet another item 
in Humphries’s ostensible assembly line—a prolonged, tired, game that he has been 
playing with his audience for a number of decades. Similarly, as a new addition to his 
                                                 
felt, He said. There was a long dark silence, broken at last by a cultured woman’s voice. Pretty good I don't 
think. Pretty awful, more like it. I've never seen such twaddle and hoo-ha on the stage in all my life. And 
I've just been to the West End of London. That woman’s voice was mine’. Ibid., 02h20m20sec. 
791 Humphries, note to the reader, in Handling Enda, xi. 
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well-oiled ‘shtick’, it might even be perceived as a lesser effort: conceivably, to create 
an alternate version of oneself is much easier, and thus less impressive, than to create 
a complete autobiography for—and, indeed, as—a fictional character. On the other 
hand, however, I would argue that it is precisely in these respects that Handling Edna 
should be identified as a fascinating artistic effort—one which is effectively amplified 
and enriched by its audiobook version, performed by Humphries himself as his own 
altered version.  
I wish I had kept the postcard she sent me in June 1955 – fifty-four 
years ago! But why should I have kept it? What early scrap of which 
collectors now call 'Ednabilia' was worth preserving in those far-off 
days, before Fame unwisely smiled upon her? This was just a stage-
stuck young Melbourne mother writing to a young actor seeking his 
advice. Her handwriting, if I recall, was studied but childish. The fact 
that her letter was written in green ink with circles over the 'i’s should 
have alerted me immediately to the serious danger of an ensuing 
correspondence. 'Dear Mr Humphrey', she had begun… If the green 
ink had not warned me of the impending danger, my misspelt name 
should have. […] Dear Mr Humphrey, you don't know me from a bar of 
soap, but I am a prematurely young housewife from the dress circle 
suburb of Moonee Ponds… Moonee Ponds was a drab working-class 
suburb on the 'wrong side of the tracks', as my mother would have 
described it. It in no way deserved the fashionable fifties epithet 'dress 
circle', usually applied by estate agents to suburbs commanding 
panoramic views. The postcard continued: …I read a write-up about 
you in The Argus doing some of your skits at Melbourne Uni and I am 
desirous of teeing a meeting because my girlfriends say I've got real 
talent…. I paraphrase slightly, but the enthusiasm, one might even say 
chutzpah, of this young woman’s letter somehow engraved it my 
memory.792 
When Humphries is heard reading Edna’s letter to him, he unmistakably performs 
Edna’s words as Edna herself—that is to say, he reads her words in-character, rather 
than sounding like someone (or, a version of himself, in this particular case), making an 
effort to ‘do’ Edna (i.e., read it as himself, but trying to assume her voice). While this 
                                                 
792 See USB flash drive for Humphries, Handling Edna, 02m05sec. 
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might seem somewhat self-evident since Edna is his invention, one could argue that the 
listener in effect is confronted with two different personages. It literally sounds as if 
they are both in the studio—and they both quite obviously are as they are both 
Humphries. To some extent, just as with the individual autobiographies of Edna and Les, 
it appears as though Handling Edna also cries out to be read aloud. Here, no one other 
than Humphries could be regarded as an appropriate person to perform the book, in his 
own voice, as an altered version of himself. In its printed form, Handling Edna 
constitutes another in a line of alternate quasi self-deprecating reflections, in which 
Humphries endeavours to underline and convey his relationship with his own creation. 
Evidently, he not only was required to regard Edna as an entity in her own right (just as 
one naturally does), but also to regard his own self as such—in effect creating another 
‘him’. In its audiobook form, Humphries’s literal necessity to effectively ‘handle’ Edna, 
struggling with his responsibility with respect to her action, becomes an immensely 
gratifying aesthetic experience for an audience–who are both in on the game and at the 
same time willing to accept the conceit of his performance and suspend their disbelief. 
One can find a similar approach to the idea of performing oneself in Steve 
Coogan’s introduction to his autobiography, Easily Distracted (2015). The following is a 
transcript from the audiobook version: 
Hello. My name is Steve Coogan, and I'm reading my autobiography, 
which is entitled 'Easily Distracted'—so titled because it was one of the 
comments that my teacher put in one of my school reports, ehrm, with 
very good reason. Ehr, just a note to let listeners know that I won't be 
doing a perfectly well-modulated ‘RADA’ rendition of the text, and, 
ehm, if I stumble occasionally, well, that should, eh, add to the visceral 
pleasure and honesty of my imperfect delivery. Erhm, so, off we go – 
Ehm, Acknowledgements […] Introduction: Most of my life has been 
spent wanting to be someone else. If I pretended to be other people, 
then I didn't have to be me. […] When I did stand-up, I did impressions. 
When I did my act, I would do a rather distant, pompous version of 
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myself. I affected a very, er, sort of received pronunciation, erh, 
accent, because I thought it would make me sound more, er, 
[Idon'tknow *said as one word*] palatable. Emm, I've had a slightly 
schizophrenic relationship with my accent— [*brief sighs*] if I'm with 
the, eh, you know, if I'm with, ehm, a load of 'toffs' [?] then I'll, I'll sort 
of affect their accent, and if I go up to Manchester I start to sound like 
Liam Gallagher—which is an aside, by the way [*laughs*] to the main 
text, but I just thought I'd put that. So if my accent varies, please don't 
give me grief for it. It’s just the way I am. Some people might call it 
disingenuousness or hypocrisy, ehrm, I call it, ehm, a chameleon-like 
empathy. O.K. —I continued to do versions of myself in Coffee and 
Cigarettes, A Cock and Bull Story, and The Trip. […] Until now I have 
shared only versions of 'Steve Coogan'. The real me is slightly less 
desperate for fame than Alan Partridge, slightly less irascible than the 
Steve who eats his way around the Lake District and Italy in The Trip, 
and slightly less libidinous than the version of me in A Cock and Bull 
Story. […] I don't like being defined by others, so for those are 
interested I will to do it myself. […] it is my work that I have offered up 
for judgement, not my personal life. […] Judge me on the work, not on 
the cocaine and the strippers. You won't find any grief porn in this 
book. It isn't Angela’s Ashes.793   
Here, the concept of portraying a ‘different version’ of oneself is quite eloquently 
articulated. Coogan’s reading is indeed not what he regarded as one which befits a 
RADA-trained actor. It is ‘imperfect’ with respect to his following the printed text, yet 




                                                 
793 See USB flash drive for Coogan’s introduction to Easily Distracted (Penguin Random House, 2015). 
794 Coogan adds his own comments now and again. When he notes, for instance, that he once ‘had to 
cancel five dates in the middle of the run because I was partying too hard; the official line was that I had 
acute laryngitis. I had an acute something – but it wasn't that’, the last sentence does not in fact appear 
in print. Ibid., track2, 05m50sec. Similarly, when Coogan is heard saying ‘I'd find myself in Soho House, a 
private members’ club, every night. Until I was booted out at 03-AM’, the last sentence is also an addition 
that appears only in the audiobook. Ibid., track2, 06m25sec. Alternatively, Coogan might also choose to 
disregard certain sentences. Although the following example may be a result of a somewhat inadvertent 
and/or psychological omission, when Coogan is heard saying ‘I had an affair when my girlfriend was 
pregnant with our daughter, and the story was splashed all over the papers. And then I had another affair. 
I know it was entirely my fault and I know I behaved selfishly’, the information about the additional affair 
does not appear in the recording. Ibid., track2, 06m55sec. 
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Conclusion: Casting Aural Performances as a Praxis of Aesthetic Appreciation 
My thesis demonstrates the somewhat untapped potential for comprehending a new 
kind of artistic medium by way of creating a previously undefined aesthetic category, 
namely the artistic institution of Audio Performance (AP). In identifying, developing and 
constructing a distinctive set of critical terms with which to describe what constitutes 
an aural performance—and, in turn, establishing both the context and criteria for 
defining audiobooks as artworks—this thesis identifies the importance of institutional 
aesthetic categories. 
Since the New Institutional Theory of Art (NITA) exists both as a philosophical 
and cultural theory, it pertains to both art and art-making as cultural phenomena. It thus 
determines the circumstances under which a given cultural activity is identified as 
intrinsically artistic. Having established that certain kinds of performances can be 
regarded as works of art in their own right, I have demonstrated that just as NITA is able 
to distinguish between ‘art’ and ‘not-art’, the institution of AP—as an aesthetic 
category—is effectively able to do the same with aural performances.795 Ultimately, it 
is the artistic institution, drawing on its status in the Artworld, which establishes the 
appropriate context and circumstances for both classifying and evaluating art. 
In utilizing a comparatively new vocabulary—communicating the pivotal 
significance of the notion of internal logic and its association with the concept of 
informed intuition—my study implicitly warrants virtually any aesthetic discourse to 
adhere to (and, to some extent, depend upon) these two terms. In what prevails as a 
                                                 
795 As has been established, AP essentially distinguishes between (a) the recorded ‘reading aloud’ that 
constitutes an ostensibly simple aural rendition of a given written text—and therefore cannot be 
considered art, and (b) the recorded reading aloud that complies with the institutional definition of what 
an aural performance should be—and can thereby be regarded as an AP artwork.  
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conceivably successful undertaking, I have made an explicit effort to articulate the 
notion of internal logic in particular, by way of carefully analysing its function in my 
selected case studies. To paraphrase an explanatory, almost parenthetical, remark 
made by Graves in his review of Umberto Eco's On Beauty: A History of a Western Idea 
(2004)—an observation I have intentionally reserved for this concluding chapter—the 
internal logic is, ultimately, a function pertaining to the overall rules that bind together 
a coincidental assemblage of elements into a perceivable coherent artwork.796 In 
similarly utilizing the selected case studies to scrutinise what I consider as informed 
intuition, I found it to be inherent to the craft of casting aural performances: explicitly, 
to the manner in which the craft of casting fundamentally embodies the praxis of 
aesthetically appreciating artworks. In brief, to have the sense that if a particular 
performer were to tackle a specific text, that it should result in an aesthetically 
rewarding (or, alternatively, un-rewarding) performances is dependent upon one's 
informed intuition. As one cannot aesthetically evaluate an artwork without employing 
informed intuition, the sense that a particular casting decision should conclude in an 
aesthetically good (or, indeed, bad) out-turn, is thus in itself informed by aesthetic 
appreciation. Fundamentally, even if one is not necessarily aware that this process is 
taking place, one simply cannot make a casting decision without employing some kind 
of aesthetic appreciation. Casting, in other words, constitutes an aesthetic process, and 
thereby demonstrates how informed intuition works in action. 
                                                 
796 David Graves, "Reshimat Ha'Makoet" ["The groceries list"], Odyssey—A Journey Through Ideas, issue 
#11 (May 2011) 25. 
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While a casting director would surely be able to account for his/her decision, 
there appears to be no definite technique or set of guidelines.797 Yet, as NITA 
demonstrates, there very well should be. Implicitly, once one consciously identifies that 
which appears to prevail as an ostensibly unconscious process, one could utilize the act 
of aesthetically appreciating an audiobook as an artwork for the purpose of both re-
directing and fine-tuning a particular casting choice. This, I would like to believe, 
potentially constitutes one of the most significant contributions which my thesis offers 
to this field.798  To be sure, the idea that informed intuition in itself informs the manner 
in which one evaluates an artwork, coupled with a comprehensive understanding of 
what the notion of internal logic entails, can conceivably serve both scholars and 
practitioners alike. I thus find that my thesis potentially contributes to identifying both 
of these inherently philosophical notions as practical key terms in prospective academic 
discourse.799  
                                                 
797 Evidently, there is no agreed definition of the actual internal process that a casting director undertakes 
when s/he is trying to ascertain whether or not a particular performer is right for a role. Indeed, despite 
the substantial quantity and comprehensive scope of available literature pertaining to the theories, the 
well-documented history, and various performing arts practices (e.g., acting, directing, dramaturgy, 
scenography, lighting, camera operating, film editing, and so forth), it is surprising that casting remains 
virtually unexplored. Although one is sure to come across a number of books pertaining to casting 
sessions, none of them—not even those written by casting directors–addresses the very nature of the 
craft itself. (Predominantly, these either allude to the preferred preparation procedure for auditions, or 
discuss the particular kind of rapport that one should establish when conducting a casting session). 
798 Drawing on NITA, one can conflate the role of a casting director with the institutional role of an artist. 
The craft of casting, therefore, can be likened to any other artistic undertaking. In these respects, I am 
hopeful that my institutional analysis and appreciation of audiobooks as artworks will potentially evoke 
future applications of NITA. Indeed, this kind of institutional analysis—particularly as an ostensible 
apparatus for aesthetic evaluation—could be applied to different kinds of performance-oriented media. 
It, in effect, demonstrates the manner in which aesthetic appreciation functions in action, as an 
apparently necessary conclusion to informed intuition. 
799 Fundamentally, any internal logic is grasped and/or sensed intuitively—through first-hand experience. 
Thus, the fact that my study endeavours to articulate it at all, conveying its meaning to the reader in the 
form of an academic explanation, should not be regarded as a conventional argumentative excursive, 
which ultimately identifies the internal logic as a complex, esoteric and virtually inexplicable philosophical 
novelty. Rather, I would argue that my study employs both an analytic and an intuitive approach to this 
term, which I have taken in an effort to demonstrate its practical functionality in aesthetic appreciation—
and, consequently, its role in the craft of casting. 
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As unique aural artefacts—predominantly revealing that the manner in which 
something is said (or rather performed) is no less important than that which is being 
said (or, rather, written on the page)—audiobooks constitute a concrete example of 
informed intuition in action. Ultimately, any AP artwork can demonstrate the extent to 
which the craft of casting an aural performance utilises (a) the comprehensive 
understanding of the internal logic of a particular text, (b) the cognizance of a particular 
performer's talent and abilities, and (c) an extensive understanding of what performing 
for the aural medium entails.800 Indeed, the manner in which one consequently deduces 
which particular performer constitutes the best choice for a specific role is customarily 
considered the result of a gut feeling at best. Nonetheless, while indeed rooted in a so-
called intuitive hunch, the key challenge in this craft appears to focus on creating a 
proper aesthetic match between a performer and a role (or, in this case, a particular 
written text) that is in fact well informed and rooted in different sources of knowledge. 
All the first-person narrators in my selected case studies consist of characters 
whose narrative contrives to make sense of the world they inhabit. In the audiobook 
versions, through the spoken word, a listener experiences this as the character's 
                                                 
800 In considering, for instance, the aforementioned Audible’s ‘a-list’ collection, if one is acquainted with 
a particular printed work to the same extent that one is presumably acquainted with the performer, 
then—much like a good casting director—even merely imagining someone like Colin Firth performing 
Graham Greene’s The End of the Affair (1951), Dustin Hoffman performing Jerzy Kosinski’s Being There 
(1970) or Kate Winslet performing Emile Zola’s Thérèse Raquin (1867), should lead one to (a) ponder, in 
essence, ‘what could go wrong?’, and (b) to conclude, in effect, that these recordings would surely 
constitute a rewarding experience. Furthermore, see the following URL link to a short clip of Dustin 
Hoffman speaking about his recording of Kosinski’s novel: accessed February 2, 2014,    
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qsK1O7QsFFM. One of the most fascinating segments in this clip, I 
would argue, appears forty seconds into the video, where Hoffman is seen literally ‘conducting’ himself, 
as he is reading. It is almost as if he regards the written text as some kind of ostensible ‘vocal partitur’. 
Then, again, two minutes into the recording, the camera focuses on his hands. He is clearly attempting to 
find the proper rhythm of the written text, as transforms the print into an aural performance. It is, I find, 
absolutely fascinating to watch. In my own terms, I would argue that this can be identified as his attempt 
to evaluate in real-time whether or not he has succeeded in properly manifesting what should be part of 
the novel’s internal logic.  
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attempt to valorise their own consciousness. Although this arguably resonates most 
strongly with Beckett's prose fiction, as uniquely exemplified by Barry McGovern's 
performance in the audiobook version thereof, Barry Humphries’s audiobooks 
constitute the most complex case study. Once one is acquainted with the characters he 
created, one cannot separate ‘their’ written words and so-called individual literary 
voices—through which they ostensibly depict themselves in their pseudo-
autobiographies—from the very literal voices and distinct kinds of aurality with which 
Humphries endows them. Ultimately, as aurally-recorded solo-performances, the first-
person narratives that inhabit all three of my major case studies effectively demonstrate 
the need for creating an explicit aesthetic category for classifying and appreciating them 
as artworks to begin with. 
To attain an understanding of the craft of casting an AP artwork can in turn 
contribute to the deeper understanding of the manner in which one aesthetically 
appreciates any work of art. (Arguably, this would be most evident when engaging with 
aesthetically good artworks, which properly manifest the internal logic of their own 
world). In the realm of audiobooks, casting directors need to possess (or, at least, to 
develop) an ability to hear in their heads how a particular text would sound as an aural 
performance, once the words in print are transformed into spoken words.801 It is not 
entirely clear whether a casting director relies on intuition alone, or whether his/her 
attempt to ‘foresee’ the possible (or, at least plausible) outcome of his/her choice is 
                                                 
801 Summarily, casting directors begin by reading the book they are required to cast. They then attempt 
to get a sense of what it is ‘all about’. Subsequently, they begin to imagine who among the several 
hundred actors that they work with regularly might best be suited for the job. They predominantly 
combine their understanding of the text with their experience in working with particular performers. 
Effectively, they are able to ascertain which performer is of the right age and/or possesses the appropriate 
vocal personality to match as many requirements of a particular text as possible. 
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nothing more than guesswork.802 As has been established, although each work 
essentially abides by an internal logic of its own, some works that are created by a single 
artist can be linked together by a more comprehensive internal logic, certain aspects of 
which can be identified in all of an artist's works.803 When one engages with a new work 
by an author who, conceivably, already has a particular style or well-established internal 
logic associated with his/her work, one is required to investigate whether or not it 
indeed complies with the putative internal logic that is customarily identified with that 
author.804 If a new work appears to assume, or at least allude to, a new kind of internal 
logic, unique to that particular work, one is effectively invited to decipher and evaluate 
what the internal logic is and/or supposed be.805 This, I would argue, is consequently 
resolved by understanding the particular role of informed intuition in respect of 
appreciating artworks. Ultimately, as my study sets out to explain, in order to determine 
whether or not an AP artwork is aesthetically good, one is required to consider the two 
sets of internal logic, namely that of the original written text one the one hand, and that 
                                                 
802 Howard expresses her tendency to scribble notes to herself as she reads, and she usually comes up 
with four or five names of potential readers who she believes could be good performers for the specific 
book she is reading. Eventually, she manages to work it down to one particular name, and she does so 
without having needed to actually call them up and request them to audition for her. She seems to just 
know, intuitively, that for the particular book in question, the person she has in mind will be able to 
perform it appropriately. In essence, she knows that person's skills so well, based on her previous casting 
of that person for other books, and she has developed the ability, as part of her job, to be able to recognize 
what a particular book ‘needs’, and who she may know that possesses and/or is able to supply it. She 
believes it is very much ‘an instinctive thing that develops over time and experience’. 
803 In the same vein, Thompson points out that when she is able to choose the audiobook she reviews, 
she usually makes her choice ‘based on length, subject, narrator, and author’. If the book happens to be 
part of a series, she examines whether or not the particular narrator has also recorded the previous title 
in the series. She claims that it makes a difference because if the first narrator was fantastic, listeners will 
want to know if the replacement is worth the effort. 
804 Consider, for example, authors such as Margaret Atwood, Michael Chabon, Stephen King, John le Carré 
or J.K. Rowling, to name but a few.  
805 Rowling's Harry Potter books, for instance, are associated with and inhabit a completely different kind 
of internal logic from that which can be identified with her novel The Casual Vacancy (2012) or the 
Cormoran Strike crime novels, written under the pseudonym Robert Galbraith. Ultimately, new books are 
‘an empty slate’, as Howard puts it. Each individual internal logic would effectively inform a potential 
casting of an aural performance in its own right.  
- 272 - 
 
of its performed iteration on the other. Drawing on the workings of NITA, it is the 
structure of AP, as an artistic institution in its own right, that facilitates (perhaps even 
necessitates) the act of aesthetic appreciation. 
As a further inference, I would argue that the process of casting an aural 
performance in itself entails something of a preliminary aesthetic evaluation. In other 
words, the casting director of an AP artwork—or anyone else who is responsible for this 
particular aspect in creating the recording—would effectively be required to 
aesthetically appreciate a putative aural performance. Effectively, s/he would need to 
judge the potential aesthetic nature of a recording that does not yet exist in actuality, 
based on his/her informed intuition. As a craft, one is able to develop and fine-tune 
his/her ability to make better casting choices. As alluded to earlier, once one becomes 
aware of the ostensibly unconscious process of aesthetic evaluation that takes place, a 
process that is inherently linked to what drives a particular casting choice, one can begin 
to consciously identify and intentionally (re-)direct his/her particular choices.806  
I believe that the world of cuisine can present a good illustrative analogy. 
Consider, for instance, the well-established coupling between apples and cinnamon.807 
Arguably, the first person in history to conjure up this particular match would have had 
to have been well acquainted with the individual internal logic of the two ingredients.808  
                                                 
806 Even if the particular text in question happens to be the local Yellow Pages, one needs to bear in mind 
that it too, like any other text, either has or is supposed to have some kind of internal logic. Subsequently, 
one would need to identify (a) the manner in which this particular text should be performed, and (b) the 
manner in which it should be performed specifically within the confines of the aural medium. Thus, one 
would need to ascertain how this text is supposed to work as an AP artwork. 
807 As celebrity-chefs Clarissa Dickson Wright and Jennifer Paterson once remarked on their Two Fat 
Ladies cooking show, it is, to be sure, ‘a match made in heaven’.   
808 In other words, in order to predict whether or not this casting should yield a good result (i.e. before 
actually tasting the two together) s/he would have had to have possessed a rather comprehensive 
understanding of how apples ‘work’, and, similarly, s/he would have had to have acquired an exhaustive 
cognizance of the so-called ‘workings’ of cinnamon. 
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In subsequently employing what I regard as informed intuition, s/he would be able to 
determine what the matching of these two items should result in. This, I would argue, 
prevails as a good example what would constitute a case of good casting—and, as such, 
can be compared with what a casting director should undertake. 
Furthermore, I also find it interesting to examine the kinds of so-called culinary 
castings that one would customarily characterise as requiring an acquired taste. 
Arguably, the mere thought of such castings as chocolate & chili, pear & blue cheese 
salad, sea-salt-embedded caramel-fudge, chocolate-covered pretzels, or peanut butter 
and bacon, to name but a few, can raise at least one brow. While all these cases may 
indeed require an acquired taste, they all nonetheless constitute the result of an 
informed intuition working in action. They all have a prospective consumer. Now, while 
the aforementioned reference to Gilbert Gottfried's rendition of Fifty Shades of Grey is 
arguably an extreme example—as it has obviously been created for the purpose of 
eliciting laughter—I would argue one is sure to come across certain ostensibly counter-
intuitive matches in the performing arts, which would effectively appear as poor casting 
decisions. The challenge I find with so-called oppositional casting is particularly 
fascinating with aural performances. Indeed, the kind of first-person narratives that 
inhabit audiobooks is unique, and, again, merits the construction of an aesthetic 
category of its own.  
Finally, casting aural performances as a form of aesthetic ‘match-making’ is both 
guided by one's informed intuition, and rooted in the identification of different kinds of 
internal logic. The process of deciphering which particular performer is best suited to 
deliver a certain text—even if this decision follows an interpretation that abides by a 
new internal logic—and, indeed, the ability to quite literally predict whether or not a 
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performance should be evaluated as aesthetically good, can potentially be applied to 















                                                 
809 Consider, for instance, the manner in which an informed intuition can assist one in concluding which 
singer, musician or conductor would best be suited for performing a cover version of a particular song, or 
a piece of music. Just as the casting of a particular performer with a certain text—and, for that matter, 
just like the casting of apples and cinnamon—one would be required to acquaint oneself both with the 
particular song or piece of music, and with the talent and qualifications of the singer, musician or 
conductor. What if one were to determine, for instance, which of the numerous so-called cover versions 
to, say, Modest Mussorgsky's Pictures at an Exhibition, the Beatles’ "With a Little Help from My Friends" 
or Stephen Sondheim's "Send in the Clowns", might be distinguished as aesthetically better than all the 
others? In such a case, one would need to attain an understanding of the internal logic of each individual 
work (i.e. as ostensible original text), as well as that of each individual performing artist. Only then would 
one be able to utilise one's informed intuition, and begin to get a sense of a possible aesthetic hierarchy. 
With Sondheim, one might establish that Judi Dench's performance, for instance, exceeds that of 
Bernadette Peters. With the Beatles, one could determine that Joe Cocker's cover version cannot be 
compared with other cover versions as he employs a somewhat different kind of internal logic to the 
song—effectively endowing it with a different kind of meaning. Arguably, the Emerson, Lake & Palmer 
progressive rock interpretation of Mussorgsky, should not, and, perhaps, for a similar reason cannot, be 
compared with Leonard Bernstein's conducting of the New York Philharmonic. 
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(The Great Courses, The Teaching Company.). 
http://www.thegreatcourses.com/courses/classics-of-american-
literature.html. 
–––. "Introduction to Classics of American Literature". In Classic American Literature. 
Lecture 1. (The Great Courses, The Teaching Company.). 
http://www.thegreatcourses.com/courses/classics-of-american-
literature.html. 
Sorkin, Aaron. "Writing Captivating Dialogue". In Masterclass: Aaron Sorkin Teaches 
Screenwriting (2016) Week 5, Lecture 21. 
https://www.masterclass.com/classes/aaron-sorkin-teaches-screenwriting 
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 ‘Audiography’: Content of the Running-Order on USB flash drive 
Arranged by [Chapter] [footnote] (filename) 
[3.6] [n288] Pinter - Writing for the Theatre [see 01m14sec-02m02sec].m4a 
[5.1] [n436] Alan Bennett - Talking Heads - A Chip in the Sugar (disc1, track1) .mp3 
[5.1] [n436] Alan Bennett - Talking Heads - A Chip in the Sugar (disc1, track2).mp3 
[5.1] [n436] Alan Bennett - Talking Heads - A Chip in the Sugar (disc1, track3).mp3 
[5.1] [n436] Alan Bennett - Talking Heads - A Chip in the Sugar (s1ep1).avi 
[5.1] [n436] Alan Bennett - Talking Heads - Her Big Chance (disc3, track1).mp3 
[5.1] [n436] Alan Bennett - Talking Heads - Her Big Chance (disc3, track2).mp3 
[5.1] [n436] Alan Bennett - Talking Heads - Her Big Chance (disc3, track3).mp3 
[5.1] [n436] Alan Bennett - Talking Heads - Her Big Chance (s01ep05).avi 
[5.2] [n443] (a) Tom Parker - Huck Finn - Chapter 01.lnk 
[5.2] [n443] (b) Grover Gardner [online sample].lnk 
[5.2] [n447] (a) Norman Dietz - Chapter 01.lnk 
[5.2] [n447] (b) James Damron [online sample].lnk 
[5.2] [n448] James Damron - Chapter 31 [online sample].lnk 
[5.2] [n450] Norman Dietz - Chapter 31 [see 07m45sec-11m20sec].lnk 
[5.2] [n451] Tom Parker - Chapter 31 [see 05m51sec-08m30sec].lnk 
[5.2] [n452] Michael Prichard - Chaptet 3.lnk 
[5.2] [n453] Don Hagen [online sample].lnk 
[5.2] [n454] (a) Norman Dietz - Chapter 5.lnk 
[5.2] [n454] (b) Michael Prichard - Chaptet 5.lnk 
[5.2] [n455] (a) Dick Hill - Explanatory & Notice [online sample].lnk 
[5.2] [n455] (b) Dick Hill - Chapter 01.lnk 
[5.2] [n456] Michael Prichard - Chaptet 9.lnk 
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[5.2] [n458] Elijah Wood.lnk 
[5.2] [n459] Eric G. Dove [online sample].lnk 
[5.2] [n460 Johnny Heller [online sample].lnk 
[5.2] [n461] Will Wheaton [online sample].lnk 
[5.2] [n462] (a) Patrick Fraley Chapter 14.lnk 
[5.2] [n462] (b) William Dufris - Chapter 14.lnk 
[5.2] [n464] Jack Lemmon [online sample].lnk 
[5.2] [n477] - Norman Dietz - Chapter 11.lnk 
[5.2] [n478] Thomas Becker - Chapter 11.lnk 
[5.2] [n479] Tom Parker - Chapter 11.lnk 
[5.2] [n480] Garrison Keillor - Chapter 11 - see 45m10sec.lnk 
[5.2] [n482] Robin Field [online sample].lnk 
[5.2] [n483] Dufris - Chapter 11.lnk 
[5.2] [n484] Stephen L. Vernon [online sample].lnk 
[5.2] [n485] Dick Hill - Chapter 11.lnk 
[5.2] [n487] Patrick Fraley - Chapter 11.lnk 
[5.2] [n488] Michael Prichard - Chaptet 11.lnk 
[5.3] [n489] Garrick Hagon - Chapter 31 [see 00m00sec-06m00sec].lnk 
[5.3] [n490] Garrick Hagon - Chapter 11.lnk 
[5.3] [n491] Elijah Wood - see 01hr58m51sec.lnk 
[6.1] [n508] War of the Worlds - Chapter 1 - 'read' by TTS program.mp3 
[6.1] [n529] Gilbert Gottfried Reads 50 Shades of Grey [video; CollegeHumor].lnk 
[6.2] [549] (a) SULM (sample1).mp3 
[6.2] [549] (b) SULM (sample2).mp3 
[6.2] [549] (c) SULM (sample3).mp3 
[6.2] [549] (d) SULM (sample4).mp3 
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[6.2] [549] (e) SULM (sample5).mp3 
[6.2] [549] (f) SULM (sample6).mp3 
[6.2] [n553] (a) Seinfeld & The Buddy Rich Tapes.lnk 
[6.2] [n553] (b) Obscure Audio 1 Buddy Rich Cursing His Band.lnk 
[6.2] [n554] Orson Welles Frozen Pea.lnk 
[6.3] [n570] (a) Mcluhan - The Medium Is The Massage - Side1.mp3 
[6.3] [n570] (b) Mcluhan - The Medium Is The Massage - Side2.mp3 
[6.3] [n573] Cheese Emporium [from Matching Tie and Handkerchief].mp3 
[6.4] [n578] (a) David Cross - I Drink For a Reason - disc1, track1.lnk 
[6.4] [n578] (b) David Cross - I Drink For a Reason - disc1, track2.lnk 
[6.4] [n578] (c) David Cross - I Drink For a Reason - disc1, track3.lnk 
[6.4] [n578] (d) David Cross - I Drink For a Reason - disc1, track4.lnk 
[6.4] [n579] Cleese - So, Anyway... [see 00m00sec-03m11sec].lnk 
[6.4] [n580] David Cross - I Drink For a Reason - disc1, track6 [04m22sec].lnk 
[6.4] [n581] David Cross - I Drink For a Reason - disc2, track1 [01m55sec].lnk 
[6.4] [n582] (a) Shalom Auslander - Foreskin's Lament- A Memoir.lnk 
[6.4] [n582] (b) Alda, Alan - Things I Overheard While Talking To Myself.lnk 
[6.4] [n582] (c) Ephron, Nora - I Remember Nothing.lnk 
[6.4] [n582] (d) Fran Lebowitz - The Fran Lebowitz Reader.lnk 
[6.5] [n586] King Kong (1933) - CC Laserdisc Commentary.ac3 
[6.5] [n587] Who's That Knocking At My Door (1967) - Scorsese [Scene-Selected].ac3 
[6.5] [n589] Fellini Satyricon (1969) - CC DVD Commentary.ac3 
[6.5] [n593] This Is Spinal Tap (1984) - MGM SE In-Character Commentary.ac3 
[6.5] [n595] Blood Simple (1984) - Universal Commentary.ac3 
[7.1] [n599] Jack McGowran - Interviewed by Liam Nolan [see 03m50sec].lnk 
[7.1] [n600] Jack McGowran - Interviewed by Liam Nolan [see 03m57sec].lnk 
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[7.2] [n612] Jack McGowran - Interviewed by Liam Nolan [see 00m15sec-00m31sec].lnk 
[7.4] [n676] Barry McGovern - Molloy [`I am in my mother's room...'].lnk 
[7.4] [n678] Molloy - Barry McGovern [see 00m32sec].lnk 
[7.4] [n679] Molloy - Crowley (Naxos) [see 00m45sec].lnk 
[7.4] [n680] Moran - Barrett (Naxos) [`It is midnight...'].lnk 
[7.4] [n681] Moran - Barry McGovern [`It is midnight...'].lnk 
[7.4] [n684] (a) McGovern (Part I - disc2, track11) [`So I put my clothes on...'].lnk 
[7.4] [n684] (b) McGovern (Part I - disc3, track02) [`My bicycle had disappeared again...'].lnk 
[7.4] [n684] (c) McGovern (Part I - disc4, track09) [final passages of Part 1].lnk 
[7.4] [n684] (d) McGovern (Part II - disc5, track12) [`Molloy, or Mollose, was no stranger...'].lnk 
[7.4] [n684] (e) McGovern (Part II - disc6, track 11) [`I have no intention of relating...'].lnk 
[7.4] [n684] (f) McGovern (Part II - disc8, track 10) [`Now I may make an end...'].lnk 
[7.4] [n685] (a) McGovern (disc1, track14) [`And suddenly I remembered...'].lnk 
[7.4] [n685] (b) McGovern (disc3, track08) [`And while saying to myself that...'].lnk 
[7.4] [n685] (c) McGovern (disc7, track08) [`It was evening. I had lit my fire...'].lnk 
[7.4] [n685] (d) McGovern (disc8, track06) [`Certain questions of a theological nature...'].lnk 
[7.5] [n689] Cyril Cusack - Molloy.lnk 
[7.5] [n695] Jack McGowran - Interviewed by Liam Nolan [see 01m02sec-03m13sec].lnk 
[7.5] [n696] Jack McGowran - Beginning To End [video; RTE].lnk 
[7.5] [n697] Jack McGowran - Interviewed by Liam Nolan [see 02m59sec-03m01sec].lnk 
[7.5] [n702] `[...] The Whole Thing's Coming Out of the Dark'.lnk 
[8.2] [n714] Dame Edna - My Gorgeous Life - Track1.lnk 
[8.2] [n716] Sir Less Patterson - Introduction.lnk 
[8.2] [n736] Handling Edna [see, e.g., 00m00sec-01m30sec].lnk 
[8.2] [n748] I Partridge [see 00m00sec-01m11sec].lnk 
[8.2] [n754] Bob Dylan - Chronicles, Vol. 1 - disc1, track1.lnk 
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[8.2] [n755] Bruce Springsteen - Born to Run - track1.lnk 
[8.2] [n758] (a) And Furthermore - Judy Dench - preface to And Furthermore.lnk 
[8.2] [n758] (b) And Furthermore - Samanth Bond reading from Chapter 1.lnk 
[8.2] [n759] (a) Alec Guinness - Blessings in Disguise [sample].lnk 
[8.2] [n759] (b) Alec Guinness - A Positively Final Appearance [sample].lnk 
[8.2] [n759] (c) Brian Blessed - Absolute Pandemonium.lnk 
[8.2] [n760] Jacobi reads Gielgud's Letters (radio version, episode 2).lnk 
[8.2] [n761] Dame Edna - My Gorgeous Life [see 00m59sec].lnk 
[8.2] [n762] Dame Edna - My Gorgeous Life [see 05m15sec].lnk 
[8.2] [n763] Dame Edna - My Gorgeous Life [see 07m17sec].lnk 
[8.2] [n764] Dame Edna - My Gorgeous Life [see 08m35sec].lnk 
[8.2] [n765] Dame Edna - My Gorgeous Life [see 11m35sec].lnk 
[8.2] [n766] Dame Edna - My Gorgeous Life [see 13m00sec].lnk 
[8.2] [n767] Dame Edna - My Gorgeous Life [see 20m55sec].lnk 
[8.2] [n768] Dame Edna - My Gorgeous Life [see 27m43sec].lnk 
[8.2] [n769] Dame Edna - My Gorgeous Life [see 01h21m26sec].lnk 
[8.2] [n770 Dame Edna - My Gorgeous Life [see 01h24m41sec].lnk 
[8.2] [n771] Dame Edna - My Gorgeous Life [see 01h35m49sec].lnk 
[8.2] [n772] Dame Edna - My Gorgeous Life [see 01h40m39sec].lnk 
[8.2] [n773] Dame Edna - My Gorgeous Life [see 01h41m37sec].lnk 
[8.2] [n774] Dame Edna - My Gorgeous Life [see 54m23sec].lnk 
[8.2] [n775] Dame Edna - My Gorgeous Life [see 02hr10m42sec].lnk 
[8.2] [n776] Dame Edna - My Gorgeous Life [see 12m10sec].lnk 
[8.2] [n777] (a) Dame Edna - My Gorgeous Life [see 01h37m07sec].lnk 
[8.2] [n777] (b) Dame Edna - My Gorgeous Life [see 01h39m03sec].lnk 
[8.2] [n778] Dame Edna - My Gorgeous Life [see 36m22sec].lnk 
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[8.2] [n780] Dame Edna - My Gorgeous Life [see 07m40sec].lnk 
[8.2] [n781] Dame Edna - My Gorgeous Life [see 07m51sec].lnk 
[8.2] [n782] Dame Edna - My Gorgeous Life [see 13m42sec].lnk 
[8.2] [n783] Dame Edna - My Gorgeous Life [see 26m02sec].lnk 
[8.2] [n784] Dame Edna - My Gorgeous Life [see 42m26sec].lnk 
[8.2] [n785] Dame Edna - My Gorgeous Life [see 53m15sec].lnk 
[8.2] [n787] Dame Edna - My Gorgeous Life [see 01h45m25sec].lnk 
[8.2] [n788] Dame Edna - My Gorgeous Life [see 01h53m57sec].lnk 
[8.2] [n789] Dame Edna - My Gorgeous Life [see 01h54m52sec].lnk 
[8.2] [n790] Dame Edna - My Gorgeous Life [see 02h20m20sec].lnk 
[8.2] [n792] Humphries - Handling Edna [see 02m05sec].lnk 
[8.2] [n793] Steve Coogan - Easily Distracted - Inroduction.lnk 
[8.2] [n794] (a) Steve Coogan - Easily Distracted, track2 [see 05m50sec].lnk 
[8.2] [n794] (b) Steve Coogan - Easily Distracted, track2 [see 06m25sec].lnk 
[8.2] [n794] (c) Steve Coogan - Easily Distracted, track2 [see 06m55sec].lnk 
[Conclusions] Behind the Scenes with Dustin Hoffman.lnk 
